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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H1510)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 4.6 MILLION
(US\$7.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF

BURKINA FASO

FOR AN

ADMINISTRATION CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT

April 13, 2012

Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building (AFTPR)
Country Department West Africa
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective on 4/13/2012)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

501.49 CFAF = US\$1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CADSS	<i>Cellule d'Appui à la Décentralisation du Système de Santé</i> (Support Unit for Health Decentralization)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CDMT	<i>Cadre de Dépenses à Moyen Terme</i> (Medium Term Expenditure Framework)
CID	Circuit Intégré de la Dépense (Computerized Expenditure Circuit)
CND	<i>Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation</i> (National Council for Decentralization)
COGES	<i>Comité de Gestion</i> (Management Committee)
CPPR	Country Portfolio Performance Review
CSPS	Centre de Santé et de Promotion Sociale
DAF	<i>Direction de l'Administration et des Finances</i> (Financial Directorate)
DCCF	<i>Direction Centrale du Contrôle Financier</i> (Central Procurement Directorate)
DCMP	<i>Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics</i> (Central Procurement Directorate)
DEP	<i>Direction des Etudes et de la Planification</i> (Directorate for Planning and Studies)
DG	<i>Direction Générale</i> (General Directorate)
DGB	<i>Direction Générale du Budget</i> (General Directorate for Cooperation)
DGCAT	<i>Direction Générale de la Coordination des Affaires Territoriales</i> (General Directorate of Coordination of Territorial Affairs)
DGCOOP	<i>Direction Générale de la Cooperation</i> (General Directorate for Cooperation)
DGD	<i>Direction Générale des Douanes</i> (General Customs Directorate)
DGDCL	<i>Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales</i> (General Directorate of Local Governments)
DGRE	<i>Direction Générale de la Réforme de l'Etat</i> (General Directorate for State Reform)
DGTCP	<i>Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Comptabilité Publique</i> (General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounts)
DRH	<i>Direction des Ressources Humaines</i> (Human Resources Directorate)
ENAM	<i>Ecole Nationale d'Administration et de la Magistrature</i> (Public Administration School)
ENAREF	<i>Ecole Nationale des Régies Financières</i> (Financial Administration School)
FMR	Financial Management Report
FMS	Financial Management Specialist
IDA	International Development Agency
IT	Information Technology
HRM	Human Resource Management
KPI	Key Performance Indicators

MATD	<i>Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation</i> (Decentralization Ministry)
MEDEV	Ministry of Economic Development
MEF	<i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i> (Ministry of Economy and Finance)
MFPRE	<i>Ministère de la Fonction Publique et la Réforme de l'Etat</i> (Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform)
MS	<i>Ministère de la Santé</i> (Ministry of Health)
PCU	Project Coordination Unit, Prime Minister's Office
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PDO	Project Development Objective
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSM	Public Sector Management
SG	<i>Secrétaire Général</i> (Permanent Secretary)
SIGASPE	<i>Système intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale des Personnels de l'Etat</i> (Integrated system for Financial and Human Resource Management)
SGPM	<i>Secrétariat General du Premier Ministère</i> (Prime Minister's Office)
SIGASPE	<i>Système intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale des Personnels de l'Etat</i> (Integrated System for Human Resource Management)

Vice President:	Obiageli Ezekesili
Country Director:	Madani M. Tall
Sector Manager:	Anand Rajaram
Project Team Leader:	Bepio C. Bado
ICR Team Leader:	Gael Raballand

BURKINA FASO
Administration Capacity Building Project

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**BURKINA FASO
ADMINISTRATION CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
BASIC DATA SHEET**

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Burkina Faso	Project Name:	Administration Capacity Building Project
Project ID:	P078596	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H1510
ICR Date:	12/01/2011	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	TAL	Borrower:	BURKINA FASO
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 4.60M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 4.19M
Revised Amount:	XDR 4.60M		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Office of the Prime Minister PP 7027, Ouagadougou 03 Burkina Faso			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: None			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	01/30/2003	Effectiveness:	08/25/2005	08/25/2005
Appraisal:	12/02/2004	Restructuring(s):		06/20/2010
Approval:	03/22/2005	Mid-term Review:	05/26/2008	05/26/2008
		Closing:	02/28/2011	08/31/2011

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Medium/Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Yes (2008)
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes

	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	80	80
Sub-national government administration	20	20

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Administrative and civil service reform	40	40
Decentralization	20	20
Health system performance	20	20
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	20	20

E. Bank Staff

Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director:	Madani Tall	A. David Craig
Sector Manager:	Anand Rajaram	Helga W. Muller
Project Team Leader:	Bepio C. Bado	Helene Grandvoinet
ICR Team Leader:	Gael Raballand	
ICR Primary Author:	Gael Raballand & Colum Garrity	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The project's development objective was to improve administration structures and processes in light of the decentralization policy, which would yield, in the medium-term, measurable impact on service provision to the citizens of Burkina.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

Strengthen the recipient's central government resource management capacity and enhance the recipient's capacity in the planning, organization, and monitoring of the decentralization process.

Indicator	Baseline Value (2009)	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1: Strengthen central government efficiency and controls, by			
(a) Support to the definition of policies and procedures to implement decentralization; and	90 days	45 days	38 days
(b) support to planning, allocation of responsibilities and costing of activities in terms of both human and financial resources	70 days	45 days	32.75 days
Indicator 2:			
Enhance the planning, organization and monitoring of the decentralization process	0	A fully costed decentralization roadmap, including M&E system is available	The decentralization roadmap could not be prepared under project because of the consultant deficiency. However, the activity was transferred under other Bank financing in the sector (<i>Local Government Support Project, P120517</i>)
Strengthening the Recipient's capacity to develop a decentralization road-map and a medium-term (three to five year) decentralization implementation plan, including through:			
(a) Support to the definition of policies and procedures to implement decentralization; and			

(b) support to planning, allocation of responsibilities and costing of activities in terms of both human and financial resources.			
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The results framework could not be automatically generated by the system. The indicators below are from the project's *Restructuring Paper*.

Indicator	Baseline Value (2009)	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Indicator explanations	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Component 1:				
Strengthen central government efficiency and controls	0 Ministries	17 Ministries	Number of ministries in which SIGASPE has been fully implemented	34 Ministries
The central government will strengthen its ability to manage financial and human resources in preparation for further decentralization	50% (baseline)	50%	Finalization of the MALT model (training)	Was not completed
	0	12	Number of regions in which the pay changes have been processed	12
Component 2:				
Strengthening policy formulation, coordination and monitoring in key ministries responsible for decentralization	0	1	Decentralization roadmap produced	(Noted above) Decentralization Roadmap not completed but transferred to the <i>Local Government Support Project</i>
	0	3	Number of operational manuals prepared and disseminated	3


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	05/27/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/08/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.51
3	07/22/2006	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.70
4	04/11/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.27
5	12/27/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.32
6	06/30/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.90
7	01/22/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.99
8	07/22/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.49
9	06/30/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	5.02
10	04/02/2011	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	5.61

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
06/20/2010	June 29, 2010	MS	MS	5.02	Streamlined reform agenda in line with capacity constraints to refocus TA and training to most needed areas.

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. A landlocked country with a surface area of 274,000 km² and a population of about 13.5 million in 2004, Burkina Faso has scarce natural resources and partly depends on external aid and income from immigrant workers. At the time of appraisal in 2004-5, Burkina Faso was ranked 175 among 177 countries, according to the 2004 Human Development Index¹. A key challenge to Burkina Faso's economy is the persistence of poverty despite relatively sustained economic growth (5.5% per year since 2000) and the enactment of reforms that followed from the June 1991 approval of the *IV Republic Constitution*. A stated goal of the Government has been to improve the revenues and living conditions of the population living outside the main cities, which represents more than 52 percent of the poor and more than 80 percent of the country's population.

2. In the 1990s, Burkina Faso enacted a 'first generation' of reforms that were aimed at adapting the public sector to a market-based economy, yet did not address the public sector management (PSM) system as a whole, with the reforms concentrated mainly on technical improvements to the central administration, not impacting the regional or provincial levels. A 'second generation' of PSM reforms began in 1998 with a decision to establish the legal framework for decentralization, the *Textes d'Orientation de la Décentralisation (TOD)*. The appraisal document notes that Burkina Faso's public administration suffered from top-down processes (planning or budget preparation), and a lack of a solid results-based approach and that the country's strong centralist culture, reflected in existing structures and systems, impeded efficient service delivery, particularly at the communal level where most of the actual service delivery takes place.

3. Around the time of appraisal, the *General Local Governments Code 2004 (Code Général Des Collectivités Territoriales)* was passed, which conferred responsibility for primary service delivery to the local municipalities. The Government aimed to enhance service delivery through decentralization—recognizing that many incentive and accountability structures were poorly aligned and that there was a low level of capacity, particularly at the local level. Two of the objectives of the *2004 PRSP* highlighted the need for improvement in public sector performance and the *2000 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)* and *2003 CAS Progress Report* highlighted the need to enhance good governance and institutional reform, including building public sector capacity and improving public financial management systems. The *2003 CAS Progress Report* explicitly anticipated the Administration Capacity Building Project (Projet de Renforcement des Capacités Administratives – or PRCA project). In 2000 and 2004, the first and second *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)* were formulated in an effort to accelerate growth based on equity, broaden employment and income generating activities for the poor, and promote good governance. Burkina Faso recognized the role an efficient public sector can play in attaining its development objectives, e.g., a public sector with more rationalized structures, efficient mechanisms for public expenditures management (in particular planning, inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral allocations, timely budget execution, and check and balances), human resource management (an efficient and dedicated civil service), and monitoring and evaluation.

4. At appraisal, the implementation of two parallel decentralization and de-concentration initiatives—establishment of branch offices for line ministries in the mid-1980s and the creation of semi-autonomous local governments—were seen to be hampered by a lack of a common understanding and stalled implementation. The main reforms had been adopted in 1998 and 2000 and seem to have faced some resistance and a certain lack of guidance to be implemented on the ground. Thus the

¹ Available at: <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BFA.html>.

PRCA project aimed to focus on these issues through: i) clarification and implementation of the decentralization reform agenda, de-concentration of some functions, and organization of transfers of responsibilities and resources for others; ii) de-concentration of responsibilities between core ministries (budget, personnel) and line ministries, and de-concentration from central offices to de-concentrated offices and frontline units; and iii) accountability and transparency measures such as implementation of a staff evaluation policy and support to control institutions.

5. The projects were designed at a time when several Ministries had adopted sectoral strategies, such as the strategy to strengthen public finance in the Ministry of Finance, which would be (partially) implemented by the project.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators *(as approved)*

6. The project's development objective was to improve administration structures and processes in light of the decentralization policy, which would yield, in the medium-term, measurable impact on service provision to the citizens of Burkina.

7. The project was designed as a Technical Assistance Grant to be implemented over a five year period (from August 2005 to August 31, 2010) and was designed to be linked to and complement budget support operations in order to provide support for the administration to build administrative capacity.

8. A built-in mechanism of competition from Ministries to get grant was designed, aiming mainly at building capacity while leaving the sustaining of reforms and financing of recurrent costs linked to decentralization and de-concentration to the national budget (including through the PRSC series). The grant did not aim at financing any construction, vehicles or maintenance.

9. The original project supported reform implementation in five ministries – the four cross-cutting central ministries (Finance and Budget, Economy and Development, Civil Service and State Reform, and Territorial Administration and Decentralization), the Ministry of Health and the Prime Minister's office. The five ministries requested support from IDA and they were assisted in the design of institutional action plans during preparation of the project. The project also supported the Prime Minister's office to strengthen its inter-ministerial coordination role.

10. The project aimed to be 'demand-driven' in that technical assistance was made available according to the demands of each ministry.

11. The project's original key performance indicators are presented in Table 1 below:

Table 1 – Key Performance Indicators

Overall

- Number of line Ministries with satisfactory program budgets and Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), which are reflected in annual credit allocations, aligned with PRSP objectives and the national MTEF, with budget execution monitored annually according to priority programs.
- Percent of national budget transferred to and executed by local governments.

Component 1: Support to the Ministry of Civil Service & State Reform

- Number of ministries implementing staff evaluation policies (including defining annual result agreements and basing promotions on the results of annual evaluations).
- Number of ministries managing their personnel through a fully operational and de-concentrated SIGASPE system (human resources database).

Component 2: Support to Ministry of Finance & Budget

- Number of regions directly connected to Computerized Integrated Circuit (CID)
- Number of controls performed by the Auditing Body (IGF), number of follow-up missions performed by IGF, and number of formal communication on implementation of recommendations sent by controlled public institutions within one year of control.

Component 3: Support to the Ministry of Economic Development

- Number of regions where regional PRSP is prepared and monitored according to procedures and schedule.

Component 4: Support to the Ministry of Territorial Administration & Decentralization

- Number of implementation texts adopted and implemented for the transfer of competencies and resources of the decentralization law.
- Percent of elected local government officials, staff of the territorial civil service and actors of technical and financial support trained according to capacity building strategy.

Component 5: Support to the Ministry of Health

- Percentage of Health Regional Directorates and Districts (CDPS, CMA, ECD) which receive their notice of budget allocation before mid-February.
- Number of contracts with the private sector for health care delivery effectively implemented by Central and Regional Health Authorities.

Component 6: Support to the Prime Minister's Office

Percentage of agreed recommendations of the completed organizational audit implemented.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority), Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

12. The project was subject to a Level 1 restructuring which was approved by the Board on June 29, 2010 and signed by the Government on July 8, 2010. The restructuring: (1) revised the projects Results Monitoring Framework by reformulating the PDO as follows:

Original PDO (based on the original PAD ²)	Revised PDO (based on the Restructuring Paper ³)
To improve administration structures and processes in light of the decentralization policy, which would yield, in the medium-term, measurable impact on service provision to the citizens of Burkina.	Strengthen the recipient's central government resource management capacity and enhance the recipient's capacity in the planning, organization and monitoring of the implementation of the decentralization process.

(2) streamlined the number of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs); (3) reduced the original six components to three; and (4) reallocated the remaining resources across few components to ensure efficiency in the utilization of resources.

13. According to its *Restructuring Paper*,⁴ the project was restructured in order to streamline its activities to be more in line with capacity constraints of the government, enhance disbursement, and

² *Burkina Faso Administration Capacity Building Project, Project Appraisal Document* (US\$7m equivalent) (Report No.: 29909-BF), February 17, 2005. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

³ *Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project*, June 15, 2010 (Grant Number H151 BUR, March 29, 2005). Washington, DC: The World Bank.

increase the overall implementation rate of the project. The two most significant risks were seen to be difficulty in sustaining institutional reform and a lack of political commitment to decentralization (due to a lack of implementation of the recommendations proposed by the studies carried out at the beginning of the project). The focus of the restructuring was on creating clear TA exit “gates” where the technical team could go back to the political authorities for reporting and political authorization to proceed.

14. The project’s closing date was also extended by six months (approved June 20, 2010) until August 31, 2011. This was requested due to mainly (i) delays in the recruitment of a consultant to prepare the decentralization roadmap and (ii) the selection of contractors to extend the computerized systems for processing pay data in the regions.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

15. The PRCA was not specifically targeted at any predetermined segment of the population or particular social group, instead it focused on enhancing accountability, rationalizing human resource management, and modernizing the structures and processes of government in order to improve overall service delivery and reduce poverty. The project primarily financed consulting services, training, and process-streamlining. The main beneficiaries were thus the civil servants in the ministries the project supported.

1.5 Original Components

16. At the time of approval in 2005, the project had six components: i) Support to the Ministry of Civil Service and State Reform; ii) support to the Ministry of Finance and Budget; iii) Support to the Ministry of Economic Development; iv) Support to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization; v) Support to the Ministry of Health; and vi) Support to the Prime Minister’s Office.

17. **Component 1: Support to the Ministry of Civil Service and State Reform (US\$ 0.7 million)** was designed to strengthen the ministries role of guiding the de-concentration process, implement HRM deconcentration (e.g., update and improve the SIGAPSE system and de-concentrate it to line ministries and possibly to regions, and increase CS performance by working with ENAM and ENAREF in implementing training programs in evaluation policy).

18. **Component 2: Support to Ministry of Finances and Budget (US\$ 2.3 million)** financed the Ministry’s implementation of restructuring efforts to improve internal efficiency. This included completion of public account audits, strengthening the links between budget programming and the PRSP process, strengthening PEM de-concentration through expansion of CID across additional regions, strengthening internal audit capacity, and strengthening revenue collection.

19. **Component 3: Support to the Ministry of Economic Development (US\$ 0.68 million)** through establishment of procedural manuals, establishment of a single methodology for elaborating, monitoring and evaluating sectoral and local policies, and preparation of procedural manuals and training of staff in their use.

20. **Component 4: Support to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (US\$ 0.75 million)** included adoption and implementation of a new organizational chart, strengthening of the leadership role of the Ministry in implementing basic guidelines for the

⁴ *Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of the Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project, June 15, 2010 (Grant Number H151 BUR, March 29, 2005). Washington, DC: The World Bank, June 15, 2010.*

decentralization policy (disseminating the Decentralization code implementing decree), and strengthening of local governments' capacity to fulfill their role by preparing, adopting and implementing a capacity building strategy for local governments.

21. **Component 5: Support to the Ministry of Health (US\$ 1.0 million)** financed activities to implement the decentralization strategy and strengthen the Ministries' role as regulator and planner through activities such as providing support to contracting with the private sector, and strengthening the management capacity of the Ministry.

22. **Component 6: Support to the Prime Minister's Office (US\$ 0.68 million)** focused on improving internal efficiency and inter-ministerial coordination through implementation of the recommendations of an organizational audit⁵.

1.6 Revised Components

23. A Level One restructuring was approved on June 20, 2010, as the project was restructured and the six original components were streamlined into three. The revised components are:

24. **Component 1: Strengthen the Recipient's central government efficiency and controls (US\$ 2.5 million equivalent, of which IDA US\$ 2million equivalent) by**

(a) strengthening the capacity of selected Recipient's ministries to undertake longer term planning and evaluation of policies; (b) improving de-concentration of human resource management, including through the development of information technology tools; and (c) improving the pay management system through the delegation of the processing of pay changes to the Regions.

25. **Component 2: Strengthening policy formulation coordination and monitoring in key recipient's Ministries responsible for decentralization through a decentralization road-map and a medium-term (three to five year) decentralization implementation plan, (US\$ 560,000) by**

(a) supporting the definition of policies and procedures to implement decentralization; and (b) supporting planning, allocation of responsibilities and costing of activities in terms of both human and financial resources.

26. **Component 3: Supporting project management including inter alia, the operation of the PCU.**

1.7 Other significant changes

27. Following the request from the Government, a Level Two restructuring was approved on February 12, 2011 and the closing date of the project was extended for six months to August 31, 2011. The extension was requested due to delays in consultant recruitment which delayed the extension of the SIGASPE to all Ministries and regions.

⁵ Results before and after the restructuring are presented in section 3 below.

1.8 Implementation arrangements

28. The Government provided oversight of the project through a Steering Committee chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's office and composed of the Permanent Secretaries of participating ministries. A separate Technical Committee composed of PCU staff and the focal points from the participating ministries supported the Steering Committee on technical matters and monitored progress. The Steering Committee was composed of the Permanent Secretaries (SGs) of participating ministries, the focal points appointed within each ministry, and the heads of the Directorates of the SG-Prime Minister (SGPM) involved in implementation of the project. The Steering Committee was supposed to meet bi-annually and the Technical Committee quarterly to discuss implementation progress.

29. The project had a PCU that was accountable to the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister. The PCU was responsible for the overall coordination of the project and assurance of consistency among the activities of each participating ministry and the overall monitoring and evaluation of the project's outcomes. The PCU initially had a staff of three—a full-time Project Administrator, a Procurement Specialist, and a Financial Management Specialist. When the project was restructured, an accountant and a part-time monitoring and evaluation specialist were added.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

30. Project preparation was conducted between 2003 and 2005. It took nearly two years to finalize the project design and to bring the project to the Board. Project design was based on two main principles:

- (i) A 'demand-driven' process whereby each of the five cross-cutting ministries prepared their own institutional action plans to ensure buy-in into the overall project activities; the action plans being validated by the PRCA's steering committee. The individual action plans of the ministries were designed to take into account the activities funded by other donors supporting these respective ministries.
- (ii) The project focused on consultancy services, training and process streamlining and would not finance "heavy duty" operations (i.e. large investments)⁶. Equipment, such as cars and computers could be provided.

2.2 Implementation


31. During the first years of the project, implementation progress varied significantly across the original six components. The project mainly financed consultants, training and computerization of public sector management systems, principally the integrated administrative management and wage system for state employees (SIGASPE) and the integrated financial management system (Computerized Integrated Circuit or CID).

⁶ *Burkina Faso Administration Capacity Building Project, Project Appraisal Document (US\$7m equivalent)* (Report No.: 29909-BF), February 17, 2005. Washington, DC: The World Bank, p.10.

32. Following the mid-term review (MTR) in 2008,⁷ it was decided to restructure the project due to slow implementation, important delays in disbursement, and to adapt the project to changes that had taken place in the government’s organizational and strategic landscape since the project was launched in 2005. These changes to the project included: a) dropping the original Component 3 regarding support to Ministry of Economy and Development (MEDEV), since the government had merged MEDEV with the Ministry of Finance and Budget (MFB) in June 2007⁸; 2) dropping the original Component 5 relating to the Ministry of Health (MS) because the ministry was receiving support from a separate IDA project in health from 2006⁹; and 3) adjusting the project components to align with new government strategies, namely the new *Strategy for Public Finance Management Strengthening (Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques – SRFP)* and the *Decentralization Implementation Strategic Framework (Cadre Stratégique de Mise en Oeuvre de la Décentralisation – CSMOD)*.

33. While the MTR was undertaken in 2008, the restructuring of the project only occurred late in the project’s life-cycle in June 2010 (relative to the original project’s closing date of February 28, 2011.) At the time of formal restructuring, approximately less than US\$ 2 million remained undisbursed out of the original loan of approximately US\$ 7.125 million. As noted above, a Level Two restructuring was approved in mid-February 12, 2011 and the closing date of the project was extended for six months to August 31, 2011.

34. Following restructuring, the project adapted its implementation arrangements to accommodate the new structure. At closing, the project had the following overall implementation institutional structure:



⁷ *Burkina Administrative and Capacity Building Project, Mid-term Review (MTR) May 26-June 18, 2008.*

⁸ The project financed an ‘organizational audit’ leading to the reorganization of the Ministry of Economy & Development and its merger with the Ministry of Finance & Budget (MFB) in 2007.

⁹ *Burkina Faso Health System Strengthening & Multi sector HIV/AIDS Project (P093987), US\$47.7m, Approved April 27, 2006, Washington, DC: The World Bank.*

35. Implementation of the project suffered from procurement issues, mainly around the selection, recruitment; and work output of international consultants. Training in procurement could not lead to the expected impact because of high turnover of staff. Recruitment of consultants by the Ministry of Finance was also at one point suspended because the financial proposals made by the selected firms were well above the estimated costs. The extension of the computerized pay system to the regions was delayed because the procurement committee of the Ministry of Finance took too much time to incorporate Bank procurement comments. Further, the recruitment of the consultant to complete the ‘decentralization roadmap’ faced a number of recruitment and selection hurdles, including that the second consultant recruited produced a paper that was rejected by the Committee in charge of its supervision. At the end of the project a third international consultant needed to be recruited for this assignment.¹⁰

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization

36. The project’s design incorporated an integrated management system with the PCU prior to project effectiveness. The PCU had close monitoring of all the project’s activities and linked them to the project’s objectives and results. The PCU was responsible for coordinating data collection from each of the ministries to track progress on each of the project’s components. Overall monitoring was discussed at the Technical Committee level and presented annually to the Steering Committee. The institutional action plans that recipient ministries prepared during the design phase of the project also included monitoring and evaluation. The appraisal document included detailed arrangements for results monitoring, including target values, data collection and reporting to the responsible ministry.

Table 2: Monitoring of Project Indicators – Timing and Responsibilities¹¹(post Restructuring)

Project Indicators	Data collection (frequency)	Verification Source	Responsible Ministry/Agency
Reduce by 50% the time taken to change salary data in SIGASPE	Each semester	SIGASPE	Solde/MEF
Reduce by 50% the time to treat the decisions of human resources in the sectoral ministries	Each semester	SIGASPE	DRH/MFPRE
The budgeted ‘road map’ including the M&E system is available	Each semester	PCU	PCU Administrator and focal points of ministries
Component 1: Strengthening central government efficiency and controls			
The number of ministries where the SIGASPE has been fully implemented	Each semester	DRH/MFPRE DRH/MFPRE	DRH/MFPRE DRH/MFPRE
Level of completion of the	Each semester	-	-

¹⁰ISR Mission FRM0003720, September 12, 2010.

¹¹ *Elaboration d’un Nouveau Mécanisme de Suive Evaluation du Projet de Renforcement des Capacités de l’Administration (PRCA) et Assistance a l’Elaboration du Premier Rapport de Suivi Evaluation*. Burkina Faso, Premier Ministère, Secrétariat General, Projet de Renforcement des Capacités de l’Administration (PRCA), Sept. 2010, p. 45.

MALT model			
The number of regions where changes in pay have been processed	Each semester	SIGASPE Report of the Regional Budget Directors	Regional Budget Directors
Component 2: Supporting planning, organization and monitoring of the decentralization process			
The future view of decentralization including the full cost of the implementation plan is developed and approved by the Government	Each year	Decree adopted by the Council of Ministers	MATD UCP
The number of operational manuals on the skills management transferred to municipalities produced and disseminated	Each year	List of manuals disseminated Survey of recipients	MATD

37. Unfortunately, during the course of the project, project monitoring was made difficult by the number of activities. Moreover, the PCU did not have a monitoring and evaluation officer and had therefore difficulties to monitor the project implementation for some activities.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

38. Concerning fiduciary compliance, audit reports were delivered on time and not qualified. Fiduciary risk has remained low throughout the life of the project and fiduciary arrangements were qualified as satisfactory.

39. The project experienced a number of procurement issues often associated with a misunderstanding of World Bank procurement procedures and there were recurrent delays in contract awards. Early in the project there were difficulties in recruiting qualified accountants in implementing agencies and the PCU often completed the accounting, control, and reporting of implementing agencies.¹²

40. The project experienced delays in disbursement with multiple delays in signing contracts with consultants. For example, there was a significant delay in recruitment of a consultant to prepare the decentralization roadmap. Further, the project experienced difficulty in finding qualified service providers who could extend the computerized system for the management of HR decisions to line ministries and extend the system for processing pay data to the regions.

¹² Financial Management Supervision Mission, Oct 1, 2005.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

41. The Burkina Faso *Local Government Support Project*, approved in 2011, built extensively on the work done under the PRCA.¹³ Similar to the PRCA project, the *Local Government Support Project* aims to strengthen the central government's capacity for decentralization and the institutional capacities of municipalities ("communes") in six regions and to improve accountability linkages between local policy makers and citizens in these municipalities. The PRCA had sensitized politicians and civil servants and prepared the country for the decentralization process.

42. Moreover, the *Decentralized Urban Capacity Building Project* (Projet Pôles Régionaux de Développement-- PRD) and the Community-Based Rural Development Project (Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs--PNGT), which focus on developing capacity in urban and rural municipalities respectively, has also built on the lessons of the PRCA and benefited from building capacity of districts and communes.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

43. This project's objectives, design and implementation remain highly relevant to Burkina Faso's development. The *2003 CAS Progress Report* explicitly anticipated the project and highlighted the need to enhance good governance and institutional reform, including building public sector capacity and improving public financial management systems. At the time of appraisal, two of the objectives of the 2004 PRSP highlighted the need for improvement in public sector performance. Further, improving social services and accelerating decentralization are cornerstones of the current *2010-12 CAS*.¹⁴

44. The project design, based on a focus on studies and small equipment, and depending on the coordination level of a broad array of activities with five ministries and the Prime Minister's office, as well as deconcentrated public servants, may have not have fully appreciated the implementation constraints such as the budget constraints, staff turnover, and lack of capacity.

45. Strong budget constraints, important turnover among focal points and an overall lack of capacity in some selected Ministries has delayed the implementation of some components (see below for more details in the Bank performance section).

¹³ *Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project*, (US\$60m Equivalent), Project Appraisal Document, October 5, 2011 (Report No: 64720-BF), Washington, DC: The World Bank. The project was approved by the Board on November 1, 2011 and the effectiveness date is March 7, 2012.

¹⁴ *Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Burkina Faso for the Period FY10-12* (Report No. 59588-BF), Washington, DC: The World Bank 2010. It notes "Public administration, though generally well-structured, lacks efficiency due to cumbersome procedures, unresponsiveness and weak capacity. Civil service reforms that were introduced in 1998 to improve efficiency are slowly being implemented, however reforms are yet to reflect the shift toward decentralization in Burkina – incentive and accountability structures remain poorly aligned and there is no local civil service. Although a nationwide capacity development policy has been created, it is yet to be operationalized. Capacity development within the public administration would significantly benefit from better coordination. (para 34, page 16).

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

46. According to OPCS guidelines, in the case of a revised PDO, the overall rating is normally assessed according to the percentage of funds disbursed prior to a project's restructuring. In the present case, since a little over 70% was disbursed prior to the restructuring, the larger share of the rating would be based on the original PDO and indicators (as done in table 4 below).

47. However, it is also important to acknowledge that the project had an important impact, which is difficult to capture and that is described in section 3.4.

48. A brief summary of the achievements of the project's intermediate outcome indicators and related implementation issues is as follows:

- All ministries and public institutions connected to the SIGASPE.
- The Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS) was extended to line ministries in the capital city and to all regions. The deployment of the in the regions was completed with the financing by the project.
- The project helped draft legal and regulatory framework for decentralization and devolution of human resources and financial resources to local units and municipalities.
- All 13 regional offices ('Directions régionales') connected online for pay/salary adjustments.
- A significant reduction in the average time needed to modify payroll data using the HR software (SIGASPE) from 90 days to 38 days.
- Three books on the management of transferred powers were consolidated into a single guide for management of skills in health, primary education, and water and sanitation.
- The project assisted in training supervisors to apply the staff performance evaluation system and initiate systematic professional development and training for the core civil service, while developing institutional capacities of the key ministries covered by the project activities (Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Civil Service, Ministry of Decentralization, and the Prime Minister's office).
- A curriculum was created with ENAREF for numerous trainings.

49. Importantly, the original project development objectives were met (for more details on the baseline and targets, see annex 2) and after the restructuring, 1 out of 2 PDO indicators were achieved.

50. As far as intermediate income indicators, results have been achieved or partly achieved for the components of the Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Territorial administration. The component of the Ministry of health was unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory for the Prime Minister Office and Ministry of Civil Service Reform.

51. After the restructuring, the combined component (finance, economic development and civil service reform) was moderately satisfactory and achieved its PDO whereas despite the fact that the roadmap was transferred to a new project, the component for the Ministry of territorial development can be considered as unsatisfactory whereas the component to the Prime Minister office can be assessed as moderately unsatisfactory since the indicator was partially achieved.

Table 3: Achievement of the PDO and Results until and after the Project Restructuring

Indicators	Original	Restructured	Met	Not met	Partially met	No data or other
Project Development Objectives						
Number of line Ministries with satisfactory program budgets and medium term expenditure frameworks						
Percent of national budget transferred to and executed by local governments						
Intermediate outcome indicators						
Component One: Number of ministries implementing staff evaluation policies.						
Component One: Number of ministries managing their personnel through a fully operational and deconcentrated SIGASPE system						
Component Two: Number of regions directly connected to CID						
Component Two: Number of controls performed by the Auditing Body (IGF)						
Component Two: Number of follow-up missions performed by IGF :						
Component Two: Percentage of formal communication on implementation of recommendations sent by controlled public institutions within one year of control						
Component Three: Number of regions where regional PRSP is						

prepared and monitored according to procedures and schedule :13						
Component Four: Number of implementation texts adopted and implemented for the transfer of competencies and resources of the decentralization law.						
Component Four: % of elected local govt. officials, staff of the territorial civil service, and actors of technical and financial support trained according to capacity building strategy.						
Component Five: % of Health Regional Directorates and District (CSPS, CMA, ECD) which receive their notice of budget allocation before mid-February.						
Component Five: Number of contracts with the private sector for health care delivery effectively implemented by Central and Regional Health Authorities. zero						
Component Six: Percentage of agreed recommendations of the completed organizational audit implemented. Audit just completed. Prime ministry restructured.						
Project Development Objectives						
“Reduce by 50% the time taken to modify the payroll data” (SIGASPE)						

Percentage of planned decentralization activities fully costed						NOT MET This indicator has been integrated with the Burkina Faso <i>Local Government Support Project</i> (effective March 2012). ¹⁵
Intermediate Outcome Indicators						
The number of ministries in which SIGASPE has been fully implemented						
Completion levels of the MALT model (training)						
The number of regions in which the pay/salary adjustments processed (Baseline=0)						
A future vision of decentralization (“Decentralization Roadmap”), including full costing of the implementation plan developed and approved by the Government						
Number of operational manuals produced & disseminated						

¹⁵ *Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project* (PAD, dated October 5, 2011), Sub-Component 1.1, “Support for high-level policy making (VDP)” which is the decentralization roadmap process.

3.3 Efficiency

52. As the PAD notes [p. 59], “the project supported public sector reforms and capacity building to improve the performance of key public institutions in implementing the PRSP. Thus, much of the return on investment under the PRCA [was] in the form of better performing public institutions that employ financial and human resources in a transparent and accountable manner to implement the PRSP and improve service delivery to the population.”

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Achievement of the overall project objective is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory**.

53. Progress toward achievement of the original/revised PDOs was rated as overall as **Moderately Satisfactory**. Following OPCS guidelines, Table 5 presents the weight per component based on their disbursement compared to the total project (without the PPF or 6.4 million in total) before and after the restructuring. Overall, the project disbursement was quite high.

54. The rating is applied on a scale from 1 to 6 for each component (HU is for 1 and HS is for 6)¹⁶. The rating is applied on a scale from 1 to 6 for each component. When all indicators were met, a component was rated satisfactory with a score of 5; when none of the indicators were met, the component was rated unsatisfactory with a score of 2. When some indicators were met and others were partially achieved, the component was rated moderately satisfactory with a rating of 4. Correspondingly, when a number of indicators were not met and others were partially met, the component was rated moderately unsatisfactory with a score of 3. Applying this approach, with weights related to the pre- and post- restructuring phases gives an overall rating for the project.

55. Due to the positive results of the components to support the ministry of finance and economic development and territorial development before restructuring and the combined component after restructuring, the total project score is 3.61 and can then be considered as Moderately Satisfactory.

Table 5: Rating weighted by disbursement and components before and after restructuring

Components	Weighing before restruct. (based on disburs. share)	Rating	Rating weighted by disburs. ratio	Weighing after restruct. (based on disburs. share)	Rating	Rating weighted by disburs. ratio
1 Support of the Ministry of Civil and State Reform	0.09	MU	0.27	0.21	MS	0.84
2 Support to Ministry of Finance and Budget	0.19	S	0.76			
3 Support to Ministry of Economic Development	0.07	S	0.35			
4 Support to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization	0.13	MS	0.52	0.02	U	0.04

¹⁶ Not any project component was considered as HU or HS.

5 Support to Ministry of Health	0.04	U	0.08			
6 Support to the SGPM	0.22	MU	0.66	0.03	MU	0.09
Total			2.64			0.97
Final total						3.61

Note: U is equal to 2, MU to 3, MS to 4, S to 5.

56. During the ICR/final supervision mission, the Ministry of Finance (MEF) noted that the “PRCA has been an invaluable contribution to MEF which has seen in the last few years of profound reforms in public finance consolidation.”¹⁷ This was corroborated by other Ministries and institutions that benefited from the project. It gave support to some Ministries, such as the Ministry of Civil Service, which are usually left out from donor support (despite their key role for public spending efficiency). According to government counterparts, the project helped in four main areas:

- Develop some key legislations and regulations, such as the law defining the resources and spending of local councils (adopted in 2006). This was critical to implement a revised budget and financial management for local councils (still in place)
- Prepare the law on human resources for local councils, which was passed by the National Assembly in December 2006.
- Prepare the transfer of power to municipalities. The project has been the main instrument to prepare the transfer of power and resources to municipalities. The project financed key sensitization events (to local officials in districts and municipalities) and even more importantly the PRCA financed the finalization and signing of memorandums of transfers of power and resources to the municipalities. These protocols are contractual documents that specify the respective roles of the State and municipalities and were signed in April 2009 between the Governor of each region and the 351 mayors of the country.
- Develop an operational manual to implement transfer of power to municipalities. The guide covers daily issues regarding technical supervision, management of human resources, management of financial resources, the role of the community and civil society organizations. It was piloted in eight urban and rural communities and was approved by a cabinet decision.

57. Finally, the *Local Government Support Project* (effective March 7, 2012) has built on some achievements and lessons learned from the PRCA, including subsuming the PRCA’s PCU. Following the project’s closing at the end of August 2011, the Government strengthened its overall ownership of decentralization reforms, illustrated by the Prime Minister’s direct leadership.¹⁸

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

¹⁷ “PRCA a été d’un apport inestimable pour le MEF qui a connu ces dernières années de profondes réformes allant dans le sens d’un assainissement des finances publiques.” (MEF summary of PRCA, June 29, 2011).

¹⁸ “Décentralisation: A la recherche d’un souffle nouveau.” *L’Observateur Paalga*, January 25, 2012.

58. As noted above, the project incorporated in its design the objectives of the 2004 PRSP which highlighted the need for improvement in public sector performance, as well the need to enhance good governance and institutional reform for poverty reduction. The Government's *Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustained Development* (SCADD) 2011-2015 notes that the preliminary results of a 2009 household survey show a 2.5% decline in poverty to 43.9%.¹⁹ However, conclusively attributing these improvements to decentralization policies is very difficult. Still, Burkina Faso has recognized the link between a more efficient public sector and attainment of development objectives, including poverty reduction, gender and social development.

59. While the project did not directly support gender-related activities, many of its activities indirectly supported women, such as enhancing the government's overall staff performance evaluation policies.

(a) Institutional Change/Strengthening

60. The project was designed to "fill the gap" to cross-cutting ministries to support institutional change, capacity development, and the overall implementation of decentralization and de-concentration of government responsibilities.

61. The project led to important institutional change (which may not necessarily have been captured in the project indicators). High officials interviewed during the ICR mission pointed out some positive impact of the project leading to reform, such as:

- Outsider view on internal organizational structure and procedures, which helped, for instance, to identify weaknesses, such as missing modules in the computerized human resources management system or a lack of de-concentrated staff for the Ministry of Public Service.
- During supervision missions, inter-ministerial meetings were organized, which enabled to take some difficult decision on de-concentration of staff for instance or transfer of power to municipalities.
- The project financed training in performance-based management in civil service, which has been extremely useful to implement some principles in several Ministries.

(b) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

62. An important positive impact the project was to underscore the importance of government communication and coordination across the ministries and layers of government. For example, the PRCA was instrumental in reorganizing and merging the Ministries of Economy and Finance. Through the established coordination mechanisms and training mechanisms of the project, management level civil servants had an opportunity to meet one another under auspices where they would not normally have interacted across government.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

Not applicable.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: **Medium/Moderate**

¹⁹ Burkina Faso, *Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable* (SCADD) 2011-2015, Government of Burkina Faso, December 2010.

63. Overall, the risk to development outcome is rated as medium/moderate, in line with the assessment of the overall rating for project outcomes, as: 1) the level of ownership of the implementation of the various action plans varied, as illustrated by the slow disbursement and the project's Level 1 (changes to PDOs) and Level 2 Restructuring (extension of closing date); 2) whether or not instituted plans and reforms will “stick” over time. Certainly the merging of ministries, installation of the HR and IFMIS systems, enactment of laws, and similar results are unlikely to be rolled back.

64. Yet, a key risk to development outcomes is the fact that de-concentration and decentralization necessitates local public servants to change their approach and practices since for the time being, they often look to the capital for direction, resources, and career growth.

65. A positive move in this direction should be the implementation of the recently approved IDA *Local Government Support Project* which aims at “a gradual shift from existing ex ante controls to ex post monitoring, as the capacity of communes increase to match their discretionary authority. It will provide support to a high-level policy making process (*Vision Prospective de la Décentralisation-VPD*) and assist the Ministries of Economy and Finance and Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security to develop their coordination and managerial capacity.”²⁰

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

An overview assessment of Bank and borrower performance is outlined in Table 1 below:

Table 1: Overall Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance Rating

Parameter	Positive	Negative
Project Preparation	The original components were relevant and aligned with priority country needs and the Burkina CAS; the project was in alignment with the government's poverty-reduction strategy and other policies.	Project was overly complex involving too many ministries in a low capacity environment; focus on studies without funding of implementation of major recommendations could be questionable.
Restructuring	The project was subject to a Level 1 restructuring which was approved by the Board on June 20, 2010 and signed by the Government on July 8, 2010. The restructuring: revised the project's Results Monitoring Framework by reformulating the PDOs. The project also had a Level 2 restructuring that extended the closing date of the project from February 28, 2011 to August 31, 2011.	Restructuring was indicated when a mid-term review was undertaken in 2008. However, the project was restructured too late in its life-cycle (about a year before closing).
Disbursement	Final disbursement was 93% of total. The project consistently financed papers and reports prepared by consulting firms that had a positive impact (e.g.,	Disbursement was medium to slow paced, but somewhat facilitated after the mid-term review.

²⁰ *Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project*, PAD, October 5, 2011, Washington, DC: The World Bank: p. 9.

	merging of two ministries into the Ministry of Finance)	
Project Supervision	Supervision missions took place regularly – over the course of the project, there were 11 supervision missions (ISRs). From 2008, the project was supervised from the country office which enabled more continuous engagement.	Some of the reporting suffered from delayed reporting and some ISRs before the restructuring were overly positive in terms of ratings.
Monitoring & Evaluation	M&E improved significantly after restructuring. The project benefitted overall from a strong PIU that did not have staff turnover.	M&E was rated MU during a number of initial ISRs up until restructuring (ISR numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7)

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Quality at entry is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory**.

66. *Quality at entry.* The initial Concept Review took place on November 14, 2002 and the project was signed on March 29, 2005 and became effective on August 25, 2005. Much of this time was devoted to the preparation of each participating ministry's institutional action plan, establishing the PCU and ensuring that each ministry had an appointed focal point.

67. In the Bank portfolio, support to decentralization, since the beginning of the 2000s, was provided through multiple interventions, including programmatic development policy lending (DPL). However, this instrument proved to be relatively unsuccessful because of political resistance and the PRCA was conceived as being more able to achieve positive results to support decentralization.

68. In terms of quality of entry, the project suffered from two issues: 1) ambitious goals in a low-capacity environment and 2) underestimation of resistance to change.

69. The project totaled over 130 activities in six years for a total of US\$ 7 million, which means that over 20 activities had to be completed a year for an average of just above US\$ 50,000. A multitude of small tasks was then undertaken and implemented creating pressure for the PCU to have these activities completed in the six Ministries. That also explains why from the mid-term review, one component was dropped and the project design considerably simplified.

70. Some sub-components or activities could have been projects in themselves. For instance, the project aimed at training *all* the elected local officials and local civil servants according to agreed training plans. With 358 local councils, there are hundreds of local councilors and mayors, of whom many are illiterate and do not speak French. Therefore, it was an immense task, which was one out of eleven tasks for the Ministry of Territorial Administration.

71. Pointed out by the QAG review, carried out in June 2008, “there has been strong resistance to introducing key reforms, i.e., a staff performance evaluation system, and the transfer of competences and resources to local governments. Resistance to reforms has particularly emanated from trade unions, whose members prefer the traditional system, which automatically promotes staff after two years in the job. Resistance to the reforms has also emanated from the executing ministries themselves, since they are reluctant to lose power because of the devolution of responsibilities to local governments”. Moreover, special allowances had been paid by the GoBF for priority activities but the project did not pay these allowances. Distorted staff incentive structures then raised “serious questions about project sustainability”.

72. *Strategic relevance and approach.* Given the project’s clear link to the PRSPs, the government’s decentralization reform strategy and the CAS, it is clear that the project was strategically relevant. The approach focusing on training and studies with limited equipment and no “heavy” investments was contradicted after the mid-term review since many sound recommendations of studies, such as creating regional technical inspections, could not be implemented because of the project design and focus. The approach should have been questioned to include studies in six Ministries without financing measures and recommendations with a budgetary impact when, in the meantime, it was recommended to limit the wage bill and have a strict MTEF. Either the project would have finance some measures with a budgetary impact (which was ultimately done after the restructuring) or the project had to be limited to a limited number of studies and Ministries to limit the budgetary impact.

73. *Ownership.* Given the project’s link and coordination through the SG for the Prime Minister and links to other ministers and government bodies (e.g., the public administration training institutes ENAREF and ENAM), the project made concerted efforts to ensure overall government ownership. Still, throughout the life-cycle of the projects a number of ISRs note that there was varying levels of ownership on the part of some members of the Steering Committee and Focal Points.

74. *Bank inputs and processes.* In a country with low capacity, Bank processes in procurement for instance have delayed the completion of some studies and the procurement of equipment.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Quality of supervision is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory**.

75. Project supervision was carried out regularly during the project lifetime. Still, the quality of supervision is questionable on two main issues: 1) the timing to restructure, and 2) ISRs ratings before the restructuring.

76. The project was restructured in June 2010, only eight months before the original closing date. However, following the mid-term review in June 2008, key decisions were taken to reorient the project to facilitate the implementation of the SIGASPE in regions or drop the health component (with the establishment of bi-annual work plans). However, the restructuring level 1 was only completed two years later.

77. ISRs appeared to have been disconnected between the project ratings and the project's overall implementation between 2007 and 2009. At the end of 2007, the disbursement lag was close to 2 years, 3 out of 6 components were rated as MU²¹ (the health one was MU before being dropped). From June 2008, the two remaining components were upgraded to MS without real evidence of progress.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

78. The overall rating for Bank performance can be rated Moderately Satisfactory. As a relatively small project on a difficult topic, it did manage to produce a broad number of studies to inform implementation of the decentralization policy and some important achievements, such as the Integrated Financial Management System extended to line ministries in the capital city and to all regions, support to draft legal and regulatory framework for decentralization and devolution of human resources and financial resources to local units and municipalities and online connection for pay/salary adjustments of regional offices. And even more importantly, it sensitized and trained local officials, which led to the beginning of transfer of funds to local administrations.

79. However, the project suffered from a complex design and supervision overrated the project between 2007 and 2009 and the formal restructuring of the project happened late in its life cycle.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Government performance is rated as **Moderately Satisfactory**.

80. The overall level of ownership on the part of the government of Burkina Faso remained solid, illustrated by the project being followed-on by a much larger IDA decentralization project, the *Burkina Faso Local Government support Project*.²² Nevertheless, the project experienced long periods of relative inactivity. The government clearly has a strong commitment to the decentralization reform agenda and to the corresponding building of local capacities. However, bureaucratic inertia and political ambivalence are relatively common factors that affect implementation of decentralization reforms and this may have been the case in Burkina.

81. The project experienced delays in disbursement and implementation and suffered from numerous turnovers of focal points in various Ministries. For instance, over a period of six years, the project have had six focal points in the Ministry of Civil Service Reform but also three procurement specialists and two financial management specialists.

82. Moreover, demands from some Ministries could have been 'filtered' in order to limit the number of activities, which made virtually impossible the project implementation.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Implementing Agency performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

²¹ Support to Ministry of Economic Development, Health and Prime Minister's Office.

²² *Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project*, Project Appraisal Document, (US\$60m), October 5, 2011 (Report No: 64720-BF). The PIU from the PRCA Project, anchored in the Prime Minister's Office, is now the PIU for the Local Government Project.

83. The formal implementing agency of the project is the Permanent Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office (SGPM). The SGPM worked closely the Project Administrator and following the project's original design (prior to restructuring) managed to coordinate a very disparate number of ministries, agencies and public servants. Despite effectiveness delays, the government appreciated the project as illustrated by a related follow-up project. Still, coordination was at times challenging and the project experienced delays in disbursement, procurement and implementation of some components, leading to the project's restructuring and extension.

84. The project was well managed by the PCU Administrator who appeared to be the 'oil' that kept the project running smoothly.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: The rating for overall borrower performance is **Moderately Satisfactory**.

85. The borrower's overall performance is rated as moderately satisfactory. The government demonstrated commitment to the project's objectives. The project experienced significant delays in the procurement process mainly due to a lack of capacity and rapid turnover in some Ministries. However, the PCU was able to put pressure and support coordination of numerous activities.

6. Lessons Learned

86. The major lessons drawn from the implementation and outcome of this project include the following:

Excessive optimism in decentralization and de-concentration commitment. It was taken as granted that support to decentralization, deconcentration and poverty reduction could be undertaken in six Ministries (of which five were cross-cutting ones) and would lead to significant results. Public sector and governance reforms affect various interests and often face resistance and are not necessarily acknowledged when designing a project. It had been five and seven years since major reforms had been adopted in 2005 without major implementation. Therefore, the project should probably have focused on fewer Ministries and activities with greater political salience to lead to more tangible outcome results. Support to decentralization is *de facto* a political question, which should be acknowledged from the beginning.

87. **Focusing on studies, training and IT equipment in a context of serious budget constraint means that some studies recommendations will not be implemented.** Several organizational audits recommended some structural changes with new de-concentrated structures for instance. However, since it had a budgetary implication and Burkina Faso was budgeted constrained, some important recommendations, such as the introduction of regional inspections in the MATD could not be fully implemented since it was supposed to lead to civil servants recruitment.

88. **A demand-driven project is not a panacea for a good design.** Several Ministries requested to finance several dozens of activities (mainly trainings and IT equipment). In a low-capacity environment, such requests: (1). make close to impossible their implementation in a 5-year period, (2). usually lack coordination. As a consequence, dozens of activities are carried out (of which several do not reach completion) and do not necessarily have a major outcome impact. For instance, some customs officers were trained on the IT system and on customs transit but the quality of customs work may not have improved accordingly. Ministries demands need to be filtered in agreement with local authorities.

89. **Public sector reform requires flexibility, which can be resource-consuming in the context of a grant.** Public sector reforms heavily depend on the political context. Strategic directions can rapidly change after ministerial changes for instance. This has, for instance, been the case in the Ministry of Civil Reform: priorities of the Ministry at the time of appraisal changed when a new Minister was appointed and had an important impact on the PRCA. Therefore, important flexibility is required for public sector reforms. Although the project was designed with the view to having flexibility, project restructuring can be resource-consuming and perceived as negative. Therefore, there should be some ways to explore to have more flexible instruments to tackle public sector reforms.

90. **Civil servant training and IT equipment do not necessarily lead to civil servant behavioral change.** Despite the fact that the project rightly put great emphasis on staff performance evaluation and merit-based promotion and numerous trainings were carried out and IT provided in some Ministries, sound performance management is still in its infancy because of strong resistance from some unions and civil servants. The assumption that training would inevitably lead to behavioral change is, in many cases, inaccurate. Changing incentives is key but is more complex than providing training and explains why the focus should be on one or two Ministries/Institution.

91. **Lack of impact evaluation for cross-cutting public sector reforms, such as decentralization and de-concentration, hampers impact improvement.** Impact measurement of decentralization or de-concentration is usually difficult to assess in data scarce countries. However, it should be embedded in the project design (and therefore requires the project to avoid scattering resources) in order to rigorously evaluate the impact of major reforms, such as decentralization and de-concentration, in these countries and then lead to better improvement of such reforms.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

Comments from the Borrower were [received] (See Annex 7) and relevant issues taken into account.

(b) Cofinanciers

Not applicable.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

Not applicable.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Costs by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (in USD million)	Spending on 12/31/2009 (in USD million)	Spending at the end of the project (in USD million)
1 Support of the Ministry of Civil and State Reform	0.70	0.58	4.05
2 Support to Ministry of Finance and Budget	2.30	1.23	
3 Support to Ministry of Economic Development	0.68	0.45	
4 Support to the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization	0.75	0.81	0.94
5 Support to Ministry of Health	1.00	0.24	
6 Support to the SGPM	0.67	1.40	1.58
7 Refinancing PPF	0.60	0.18	
8 Contingencies	0.30		
Total Baseline Cost	7.00	4.89	6.57

Note: the amount for component 1 is the sum of components 1,2,3 after restructuring and after spending after 12/31/2009. 1.37 was spent after 12/31/2009 for the first three components.

(b) Project Costs

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Total Baseline Cost	6.70	0.00	
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.30	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	7.00	0.00	
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	7.00	0.00	

(c) Financing

Source of Funds	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)
Borrower	0.125	4.00
IDA GRANT FOR DEBT VULNERABLE	7.00	0.00

Annex 2. Outputs and indicators by Component

The activities of the restructured project

The mid-term review and subsequent project restructuring and extension reduced the original six components to three (two operational one for project implementation). The restructured components and corresponding responsible Ministries are as follows:

Component 1: Strengthen the Recipient's central government efficiency and controls (US\$ 2.5m equivalent, of which IDA US\$2m equivalent)

Strengthening central government efficiency and controls, by:

(a) Strengthening the capacity of selected Recipient's ministries to undertake longer term planning and evaluation of policies; (b) improving deconcentration of human resource management, including through the development of information technology tools; and (c) improving the pay management system through the delegation of the processing of pay changes to the Regions.

Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform (MFPRE)

- Extension of SIGASPE in departments and institutions.
- Evaluation of the new formula for performance evaluation of public servants.
- Design and testing of a system of performance evaluation of institutional structures.
- Simplification of procedures and forms.
- Training Fund.

Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)

- Devolution of SIGASPE in the regions.
- Study of the integration of computer applications (MEF).
- Finalization and operationalization of management tools previously developed.
- Support for consultants (CIFE).
- Training Fund.

Prime Minister's Office (Permanent Secretary, SGPM)

- Study on the rationalization of the system of staff motivation.
- Training of the Permanent Secretary's office / PM.
- Preparation of manual for monitoring and evaluation of PRCA.
- Communications Strategy (PM).
- Strengthening of the Judicial Court of Auditors.
- Support for ASCE in the fight against corruption.
- Support to the ARMP for the training of actors on the new provisions on public procurement.
- Audit of 2008.
- Establish a monitoring system of government actions.

Component 2: Strengthening policy formulation coordination and monitoring in key recipient's Ministries responsible for decentralization (US\$ 560,000)

Strengthening the Recipient's capacity to develop a decentralization road-map and a medium-term (three to five year) decentralization implementation plan, including:

- Support to the definition of policies and procedures to implement decentralization; and (b) support to planning, allocation of responsibilities and costing of activities in terms of both human and financial resources.
- Development of a vision of decentralization and support.

Component 3: Project Coordination

- Support the implementation of the recommendations of the studies.
- Operation of the PCU.

Detailed indicators before and after restructuring

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Measurement</i>						<i>Result</i>
	Baseline Value		Progress To Date		End-of-Project Target Value		
	Number or text	Date	Number or text	Date	Number or text	Date	
Number of line Ministries with satisfactory program budgets and medium term expenditure frameworks: 2	0	01/01/2005	The ministries of Health, Primary Education and Secondary education have satisfactory program budgets. Several other ministries are starting the process (Finances, Energy, Trade for instance).	12/27/2007	10	01/01/2005	MET
Comments: MTEF was approved for all Ministries.							
Percent of national budget transferred to and executed by local governments: 1%	0	01/01/2005	The establishment of a transfer mechanism has progressed in 2007, through the establishment of 2 general purpose grants (re current and capital expenditures) and a Municipal Development Fund.	09/30/2005	+100% /baseline (0%)	08/15/2010	MET (3% in 2011)
Comments: The objective is 4% in 2015. It was close to 3% in 2011.							
Intermediate outcome							

indicator(s)							
1. Component One: Number of ministries implementing staff evaluation policies.	0	01/01/2005	Training of MFPRE staff on evaluation policy took place and all evaluation forms have been distributed, Evaluation is ongoing in all ministries.	12/27/2007	25	08/15/2010	NOT MET (due to political decision)
Comments: Policy adopted but in practice no annual results agreements and merit-based promotions.							
2. Component One: Number of ministries managing their personnel through a fully operational and deconcentrated SIGASPE system: 26	0	01/01/2005	22 ministries are doing so.	12/27/2007	18	08/15/2010	MET
3. Component Two: Number of regions directly connected to CID : 13	5	01/01/2005	10 regions are now equipped and using the CID.	12/27/2007	13	08/15/2010	MET
4. Component Two: Number of controls performed by the Auditing Body (IGF) : 73	35	01/01/2005	73 completed in 2009.	12/27/2007	148	12/31/2010	MET
5. Component Two: Number of follow-up missions performed by IGF :	0	01/01/2005		12/27/2007		08/15/2010	No information
6. Component Two: Percentage of formal communication on implementation of recommendations sent by controlled public institutions within one year of control:75%	0	01/01/2005	60%	12/27/2007	100%	08/15/2010	No information

7. Component Three: Number of regions where regional PRSP is prepared and monitored according to procedures and schedule :13	0	01/01/2005	13 regions (i.e. 100%) for 2007.	12/27/2007	100%	08/15/2010	MET
8. Component Four: Number of implementation texts adopted and implemented for the transfer of competencies and resources of the decentralization law.	0	01/01/2005	A certain number of texts have already been drafted and enacted, but real transfers are lagging behind.	12/27/2007	100%	08/15/2010	PARTIALLY MET
Comments: Four decrees taken in March 2009 to operationalize decentralization (health, education, culture, water).							
9. Component Four: % of elected local govt. officials, staff of the territorial civil service, and actors of technical and financial support trained according to capacity building strategy.	0	01/01/2005	Target values for 2007 fully met.	12/27/2007	100%	08/15/2010	PARTIALLY MET
Comments: Training on budget carried out in 2007.							
10. Component Five: % of Health Regional Directorates and District (CSPS, CMA, ECD) which receive their notice of budget allocation before mid-February. 30	0	01/01/2005	Since the Ministry of Health is not directly supported by the PRCA anymore, we have no information to update this indicator.	12/27/2007	100%	08/15/2010	NOT MET
11. Component Five: Number of contracts with the private sector for health care delivery effectively implemented by Central and	0	01/01/2005	Since the Ministry of Health is not directly supported by the PRCA anymore, we have no information to	12/27/2007	23	08/15/2010	NOT MET

Regional Health Authorities. zero			update this indicator.				
Comments: component dropped in 2008							
12. Component Six: Percentage of agreed recommendations of the completed organizational audit implemented. Audit just completed. Prime ministry restructured.	0	01/01/2005	The organizational audit was completed and led to a new organizational structure but staff training were not carried out	09/30/2005	100	08/15/2010	PARTIALLY MET
Comments:							

Table 1: Revised PDO and Results²³

PDO	Indicators	Reference or Base-line 2009	Target (End of proj) 2011)	Indicators Values		Rating
				2010	2011	
Revised Project Development Objective/Outcome: “Strengthen the recipient’s central government resource management capacity and enhance the recipient’s capacity in the planning, organization and monitoring of the decentralization process.”						
Outcome Indicator 1: “Strengthen central government efficiency and controls”	“Reduce by 50% the time taken to modify the payroll data” (SIGASPE)	90 days	45 days	64 days	38 days	MET A significant reduction was achieved in the average time to modify payroll data in SIGASPE from 90 days to 64 days in 2010 and 38 days in 2011
	Reduce by 50% the processing time for HR decisions in line ministries	70 days	35 days	45 days	32.75 days	
	Secondment	90 days	45 days	32 days	39 days	
	Leave without pay	62 days	32 days	47 days	34 days	
	Transfer to a different department	44 days	22 days	52 days	35 days	
	Creating an internship position (training)	85 days	43 days	24 days	43 days	

²³ These are the revised PDOs following the project’s restructuring in 2010.

PDO	Indicators	Reference or Base-line 2009	Target (End of proj) 2011)	Indicators Values		Rating
				2010	2011	
Outcome Indicator 2: Enhance the planning, organization & monitoring of the decentralization process	Percentage of planned decentralization activities fully costed	NA	50%	25%	50%	NOT MET This indicator has been integrated with the Burkina Faso <i>Local Government Support Project</i> (effective March 2012). ²⁴
Intermediate Outcome Indicators						
For Component 1: Strengthen central government efficiency & controls	The number of ministries in which SIGASPE has been fully implemented	0	17	34	34	MET All departments are connected to the SIGASPE
	Completion levels of the MALT model (training)	50%	100%			NOT MET Trainings were not carried out
	The number of regions in which the pay/salary adjustments processed (Baseline=0)	0	12	5	12	MET
For Component 2: Strengthen the formulation, coordination &	A future vision of decentralization (“Decentralization Roadmap”), including full costing of the implementation	0	1	0	0	NOT MET ²⁵

²⁴ Burkina Faso *Local Government Support Project* (PAD, dated October 5, 2011), Sub-Component 1.1, “Support for high-level policy making (VDP)” which is the decentralization roadmap process.

²⁵ This component was subsumed within the Burkina Faso *Local Government Support Project* (PAD, dated October 5, 2011), Sub-Component 1.1, “Support for high-level policy making (VDP)” which is the decentralization roadmap process.

PDO	Indicators	Reference or Base-line 2009	Target (End of proj) 2011)	Indicators Values		Rating
				2010	2011	
monitoring of policies in the key ministries responsible for decentralization	plan developed and approved by the Government					
	Number of operational manuals produced & disseminated	0	3	3	3	PARTIALLY MET (Guide was completed but not disseminated)

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Economic analysis was presented in the PAD *Annex 9, Economic and Financial Analysis* which noted that the PRCA supported public sector reforms and capacity building to improve the performance of public institutions in implementing the PRSP.

The decentralization reforms aimed to improve overall local governance and service delivery. The project contributed to this through supporting intergovernmental fiscal and administrative institutions, and enhancing the capacity of public sector servants. In terms of cost-benefit analysis the project strengthened government administration, leading to better management and improved managerial efficiency. Despite the fact that these benefits can be important, they are difficult to quantify.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Supervision/ICR			
Bepio C. Bado	Senior Operations Officer	AFTPR	Task Team Leader
Begnadehi Claude Bationo	Operations Officer	AFMBF	
Helene Bertaud	Senior Counsel	LEGAF	
Yolande Bougouma-Zagre	Team Assistant	AFMBF	
Wolfgang M. T. Chadab	Senior Finance Officer	CTRLA	
Yang-Hah Chung-Kong	Senior Program Assistant	AFTPR	
Siaka Coulibaly	Senior Economist	AFTP4	
William Dakpo	Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Giulio De Tommaso	Senior Public Sector Mgmt. Specialist	AFTPR	
Mamadou Lamarane Deme	Senior Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM	
Helene Grandvoinet	Lead Social Development Specialist	SDV	
Timothy A. Johnston	Senior Health Specialist	EASHH	
Lewis Kabayiza Murara	Public Sector Mgmt. Specialist	AFTPR	
Abdoulaye Kane	Consultant	AFTUW	
Sahr John Kpundeh	Adviser	AFTOS	
Kolie Ousmane Maurice Megan	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	
Oumar Ouattara	Consultant	AFMBF	
Moustapha Ould El Bechir	Senior Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	
Tawfik M. Ramtoolah	Senior Public Sector Specialist	AFTPR	
Suzanne Rayaisse	Procurement Assistant	AFMBF	
Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto	Senior Transport. Specialist	AFTTR	
Mamadou Yaro	Senior Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY03		109.94
FY04		154.64
FY05		120.07
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
FY08		0.00
Total:		384.65
Supervision/ICR		
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
FY06		109.97
FY07		72.90
FY08		111.98
Total:		294.85

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Not Applicable.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not Applicable.

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Project background

The PRCA has been designed in the context of a change in the Burkina public administration. It was also implemented in a context of frequent turnover of high officials (Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, directors and focal points). The PRCA could be at odds with some new strategies being developed. Despite this, it was able to adapt even though with difficulties at some stages.

Project appraisal

- Project appraisal took place at a time when the beneficiary ministries were developing sectoral strategies, which influenced the project design. This was the case with the Strategy of Strengthening Public Finance (SRFP) in the Ministry of Finance or the Strategic Framework for the Implementation of Decentralization (CSMOD) in the MATD.

- The original project design expected too much from the synergy that should have existed between budget support granted through PRSCs and the PRCA in the beneficiary ministries. Thus the linking mechanism between technical assistance and State Budget was too weak.

Project components

Components before and after the restructuring seem to have been well-defined. However, the component "Support to the Ministry of Health" before the restructuring was seen as unrelated to the others.

Institutional project management

- The defined organizational coordination was relevant because it ensured ownership of the project by Ministries (operational management, procurement, financial management by the implementing agencies). Its effectiveness, however, was put to a serious test because of numerous staff turnover of focal points.

Results framework

a. Project development objective

- The initial PDO, which was to improve public sector performance by supporting the implementation of reforms in six Ministries, was too ambitious (for a modest budget).
- The redefinition of the development objective after the restructuring capacity to help central government to improve its capacity in planning, organizing and monitoring the implementation of the decentralization process, has resulted in a better alignment and more realistic definition of the PRCA and Government objectives.

b. Project indicators

- Indicators were too broad and general to monitor efficiently project activities. However, the restructuring corrected this situation by redefining a new PDO and the development and a better monitoring mechanism.

The main results achieved by the project

- Despite implementation difficulties of the PRCA, the results as listed in the evaluation reports are

important and valued by the recipient Ministries, some of them even regret the project closure (MEF: SID DGB DOME etc.. MFPRE: CIOs, HR etc.).

Project impact

The PRCA will have a strong impact on the future administration in Burkina Faso (regarding structures and procedures).

The main sustainable gains made include the following:

- Establishment of the Regional Directorate of Public Service.
- Reorganization of the Ministry for Finance.
- Capacity-building of ENAM and ENAREF (equipment and training of trainers),
- Extension of the CID.
- Development and commissioning of the lease management software for the tax administration.
- Development and commissioning of a software on tax statistics for the tax administration.
- Extension of SIGASPE to all public institutions and to all regions.

Assessment of Bank Team

Supervisions were done on a regular basis; no-objection requests were always replied to on time. Training request and even informal advice were always provided promptly.

There were changes in the Bank team, but not of the same magnitude as at the borrower level. These had no influence on the project implementation.

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not Applicable.

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

World Bank
- Project Concept Note, Burkina Faso Capacity Building Program,
- Project Appraisal Document, <i>Burkina Faso Administration Capacity Building Project</i> , (Report No: 299909-BF), Washington, DC: The World Bank, February 17, 2005
- Burkina Faso: IDA Grant H151 BUR, <i>Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> , Amendment to the Development Grant Agreement, S.E.M. Lucien Marie Noel Bembamba, Minister of Economy and Finance, dated July 8, 2010
- Restructuring Paper, <i>Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (Grant No. H151 BUR), Extension of Closing Date, January 28, 2011 (Report No.: 59736-BF)
- Restructuring Paper, <i>Burkina Faso Administration Capacity Building Project</i> (Grant No. H151 BUR), The World Bank, June 15, 2010 (Report No: 53087-BF)
- Burkina Faso, <i>Country Assistance Strategy for the Period FY10-12</i> , The World Bank, August 10, 2009
- Project Appraisal Document, <i>Burkina Faso Local Government Support Project</i> , The World Bank, October 5, 2011 (Report No: 64720-BF)
- <i>Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (P078596), Procurement Plan for period July-December 2010
- <i>Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (P078596), Procurement Plan for period 2008
- <i>Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (P078596), Implementation Status Report (ISR), Numbers 1-11 and corresponding Aide Memoires from Supervision Missions.
- <i>Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (P078596), Mid Term Review, May 26, 2008
- <i>Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Administrative Capacity Building Project</i> (P078596), Financial Management and Procurement Documents
Government of Burkina Faso
Component 1 : MFPRE
- <i>Audit organisationnel des concours de la fonction publique</i> , Rapport Définitif, Juris Services KAM et Associes, Aout 2008
- Premier Ministère, Secrétariat General, <i>Plan de formation pour les ministères cibles par le PRCA : Actions prioritaires de formation continue pour le MFPRE</i> , Burkina Faso, , BDPA- Institut FORHOM, 28 Janvier 2007
- MFPRE, <i>Audit social du Ministère de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme</i> , Rapport final, Janvier 2011. CIDEM international
- MFPRE, <i>Rapport préliminaire étude en vue de l'élaboration d'un tableau de bord de la fonction publique avec mécanisme de mise a jour périodique</i> , CIFDE, Juin 2008
- MFPRE, <i>Etude en vue de la finalisation de l'extension du SIGASPE et de la formation des informaticiens du SIGASPE, Décentralisation du SIGASPE au niveau des ministères</i> , HORINFO Burkina, Février 2007
- MFPRE, <i>Etude en vue de la finalisation de l'extension du SIGASPE et de la formation des informaticiens du SIGASPE, Relecture du SIGASPE et Plan de formation des informaticiens et des utilisateurs</i> , HORINFO Burkina, Février 2007
Component 2 : MFB
- <i>Plan de Formation Pour Les Ministères Cibles Par Le P.R.C.A : Actions Prioritaires de Formation Continue Pour Le MFB</i>
- MFB, Direction de l'Administration et des Finances (DAF), <i>Audit organisationnel de la direction de l'administration et des finances du ministère des finances et du budget, Plan d'actions</i> , Panaudit Burkina, Mars 2006
- MFB, Direction de l'Administration et des Finances (DAF), <i>Audit organisationnel de la</i>

<i>direction de l'administration et des finances du ministère des finances et du budget, Rapport de Mission, Panaudit Burkina, Juin 2006</i>
- MFB, Direction des Ressources Humaines, <i>Audit organisationnel de la direction des ressources humaines du ministère des finances et du budget : analyse situationnelle</i> , Yons Associates, Octobre 2005
- Premier Ministère, Secrétariat General, PRCA, <i>Plan de formation pour les ministères cibles par le PRCA : Action prioritaires de formation continue pour le MFB</i> , BDPA – Institut FORHOM, 28 Janvier 2007
- MATD, Secretariat General, <i>Étude pour l'appui a la réorganisation et au renforcement des capacités des structures centrales et déconcentrées du Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation (MATD)</i> , CIFIDE, Mars 2007
- <i>Audit organisationnel de la direction générale des impôts du ministère des finance et du Budget (MFB)</i> , Ber Zan Coulibaly et al, 22 Janvier 2007
- <i>Rapport de l'audit organisationnel de la DCCF</i> , Deloitte Burkina S.A., 2006
- MFB, Direction Générale des Impôts, Direction de l'Informatique et des Statistiques Fiscales, <i>Rapport de conception globale du Projet de développement du logiciel de collecte et de traitement des statistiques fiscales pour le compte de la direction générale des impôts</i> , Multi Consult, Février 2007 et <i>Rapport définitif DGI</i>
- MFB, <i>Méthodologie d'élaboration périodique de l'annuaire des statistiques des finances publiques du Burkina Faso</i> , Rapport final, Lannaya Consult, Avril 2007
- MFB, <i>Elaboration d'un modèle macro-économique a long terme pour le Ministère de l'économie et du Développement au Burkina Faso</i> , Rolf Meier, 31 janvier 2007
Component 3 : MEDEV
- <i>Elaboration du schema directeurs informatiques pour le Ministère l'Economie et du Développement</i> , Période 2007-2011, Medsoft, Février 2, 2007.
- MEDEV, Secretariat General, <i>Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, Proposition d'outils d'aménagement du territoire</i> , Initiatives Conseil International, Tome 1 : Etat des lieux, 2007
- MEDEV, Secretariat General, <i>Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, Proposition d'outils d'aménagement du territoire</i> , Initiatives Conseil International, Tome 2 : Problématisation et préconisations, 2007
- Premier Ministère, Secretariat General, PRCA, <i>Plan de formation pour les ministères cibles par le PRCA, Actions prioritaires de formation continue pour le MEDEV 2007-2009</i> , BDPA – Institut Forhom, 9 Mars 2007
- <i>Proposition IAP-MALT Restitution</i> (Excel Sheet)
- MFB, <i>Méthodologie d'élaboration périodique de l'annuaire des statistiques des finances publiques du Burkina Faso</i> , Rapport final, Lannaya Consult, Avril 2007
- MFB, Secrétariat General, Direction Générale de la Coordination et de l'Evaluation des Investissements, <i>Mise en place d'un réseau informatique pour la gestion de la Banque Intégrée des Projets (BIP)</i> , Rapport final, Multi Consult, Décembre 2007
- MFB, Secrétariat General, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, <i>Formulation d'une stratégie de soutien du Ministère Charge de la Planification aux Collectivités Territoriales</i> , Rapport final
Component 4 : MATD
- MATD, Secrétariat General, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, <i>Etude sur l'identification de l'externalisation des activités du MATD et l'élaboration des procédures de leur contractualisation</i> , Rapport préliminaire, Yons Associates, Janvier 2007
- MATD, Secrétariat General, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, <i>Etude pour l'appui a la réorganisation et au renforcement des capacités des structures centrales et déconcentrées du Ministère de L'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation (MATD)</i> , Cabinet d'Ingénierie Financière et de Développement Economique, Septembre 2007
- Premier Ministère, Secrétariat General, PRCA, <i>Plan de formation pour les ministères cibles par le PRCA : Actions prioritaires de formation continue pour le MATD</i> , BDPA – Institut Forhom, draft 06 Février 2007

- MATD, <i>Rapport def, Inspections Régionales MATD</i>
- MATD, Secrétariat General, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, <i>Etude pour la conception d'un programme de renforcement des capacités des collectivités territoriales et sa mise en œuvre</i> , Rapport définitif, Bureau d'Etudes et de Recherche pour le Développement, Janvier 2007
- MATD, <i>Etude d'élaboration d'outils de gestion des finances locales</i> , Rapport final, ADERC, Aout 2008
- MATD, Secrétariat General, Direction des Etudes et de la Planification, <i>Elaboration des outils du suivi évaluation de la décentralisation</i> , Rapport final, Bureau d'Etudes et de Recherche pour le Développement, Mars 2007
- MATD, Secrétariat General, <i>Proposition d'un mécanisme de suivi évaluation du processus de mis en œuvre de la décentralisation</i> , Dr. Thomas Holtkamp et al, Juillet 2005
Component 5 : Ministry of Health (MS)
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BURKINA FASO

- PROVINCE CAPITALS
- ⊛ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- ~ RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES