

**PROGRAM-FOR-RESULTS INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE**

Report No.: PIDC0141642

Program Name	<i>National Urban Development and Decentralization Program</i>
Region	<i>Africa</i>
Country	<i>Mozambique</i>
Sector	<i>Public Sector Management, Sub-national government administration, Solid waste management, general water, sanitation and flood protection sector</i>
Financing Instrument	<i>Program-for-Results</i>
Program ID	<i>P163989</i>
Parent Program ID	
Borrower(s)	<i>Republic of Mozambique</i>
Implementing Agency	<i>Ministry of Finance, Ministry of State Administration</i>
Date PID Prepared	
Estimated Date of Appraisal Completion	<i>06/29/2018</i>
Estimated Date of Board Approval	<i>09/03/2018</i>
Concept Review Decision	<i>Following the review of the concept, the decision was taken to proceed with the preparation of the operation.</i>

I. Introduction and Context

A. Country Context

1. **Mozambique has experienced significant economic and social development over the past two decades, but significant challenges and inequalities remain.** With the end of a devastating 15-year civil war in 1992, and the implementation of several political and economic reforms, GDP per capita growth has been strong, averaging 4.1% annually (1990-2016). Robust growth was made possible by sound macroeconomic management, several large-scale foreign-investment projects in the extractives sector, political stability and significant donor support. On the short-term, low commodity prices, climate shocks, and the revelation of previously undisclosed state debts in 2015-2016, led to a sharp decline in GDP growth, strong depreciation of the currency, and heightened levels of inflation. Looking four to five years ahead, planned investments in natural resource extraction should increase public revenues, and accelerate GDP growth again. However, capital-intensive megaprojects could also accentuate non-inclusive growth trends. Hence, the challenge will be to maintain macroeconomic stability, while also pursuing diversification for inclusive growth through sectors such as agriculture.

2. **Rapid growth has also not translated into significant poverty reduction.** While strong economic growth led to a 16-percentage point decline in the national poverty headcount between 1997 and 2003, the pace has slowed considerably since then. Whereas the bottom half was the only group that recorded positive consumption growth in the period 2002-2008, the upper half experienced the largest growth in recent years (2008-2014). Growth has become less inclusive, particularly in urban areas. 43.2% of Mozambicans live in chronic poverty.

3. **Poverty is concentrated in the rural areas (80% of the poor) and in the central and northern regions, and these regional disparities explain the varying responsiveness of poverty reduction to growth.** Between 2003 and 2008, poverty rates dropped in the less poor southern region and in urban centers. However, they increased in Zambezia, Sofala, Manica, and Gaza. In Nampula, a province with more than 22 percent of the country's poor, poverty remained practically unchanged during this period. In 2008, Zambezia and Nampula alone accounted for almost half of the poor (48 percent), up from 42 percent in 2003. Together, these two provinces saw their poverty rates increase by more than 5 percent between 2003 and 2009, while the rest of the country experienced a 17.3 percent reduction in poverty rates.

4. **Mozambique's political landscape bears the scars from the 16-year civil war that followed independence from Portugal.** The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) are still the main political forces in the country, followed by the Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM). Politics between the main parties has become increasingly confrontational amidst heightened stakes for control of power and resources. Renamo continues to dispute the results of the 2014 general elections won by Frelimo, and has attempted to leverage its better-than-expected performance in the polls to extract further concessions from the ruling party.

5. **An incomplete post-conflict political settlement is at the heart of the violence and tensions between the former warring parties.** The centralization of both political and economic power in the hands of Frelimo elites and supporters has contributed to feelings of marginalization and grievance felt by Renamo elites and its supporters. Linkages between politicians in the ruling party and private companies has created a sense that political connections confer positions of privilege in the private sector which are not available to the opposition. Meanwhile regional disparities in public expenditure and development outcomes reinforce a sense of marginalization by the central government of Renamo-dominated areas. This lack of inclusiveness and unequal access to economic opportunity has bolstered Renamo's calls for decentralization of political and economic authority.

6. **Fragile political system and power dispute to control resources will continue to pose governance challenges in-the-near future.** Recent armed attacks on local public offices in the oil and gas rich northern province of Cabo Delgado, and the murder of the reformist mayor of Nampula, the fourth largest city in the country, on 4 October, the Mozambican Day of Peace and Reconciliation reflect the country's fragility. Upcoming elections (local in 2018, general in 2019) could expose even further political tensions, which have been compounded by the country's changing political economy with the discovery of significant gas reserves, raising expectations of a windfall, and amplified competition between the rival factions.

7. **The recent debt crisis has highlighted the depth and criticality of the governance challenges facing Mozambique.** Governance indicators for Mozambique, including the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), reflect a gradual decline of government effectiveness, control of corruption, the rule of law and voice and accountability over the past several years. The debt crisis has surfaced a number of very concrete governance challenges, namely around public investment management, debt management and insufficient oversight mechanisms for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This has also generated a more general crisis of confidence in the government's fiduciary capacity and its ability to responsibly manage natural resource revenues. Perceptions of corruption within the public service are given credence by civil society organizations, which have voiced concerns with regards to the absence of sufficient public accountability in the use of state revenues. To date, IMF has not resumed its program in Mozambique, and the country is now classified as "fragile" by the World Bank.

8. **Greater decentralization is seen by many as a path to political inclusivity and a means by which to redistribute resources and political influence.** Decentralization, resource-sharing between center and provinces, and political decentralization are at the core of the ongoing political dialogue following some episodes of open conflict in the country's central region (stronghold of the main opposition party, the RENAMO) in 2015-16. The Renamo is pushing for decentralization reforms, including democratic election for provincial governors, and greater control of locally-collected resources by provinces as a mean to ensure more autonomy to provinces. Ongoing negotiations between FRELIMO (in power) and RENAMO leaders could lead to a political agreement, and subsequently proposal for constitutional amendments which need to be voted by the Parliament before March 2018 if direct elections for governors would be included in the 2019 general elections.

B. Sectoral (or multisectoral) and Institutional Context of the Program

9. **The Government has pursued a gradual approach to decentralization to promote local development, through a hybrid of deconcentration and devolution.** Decentralization reforms initiated in 1997 created Local Authorities (municipalities, in larger urban areas) and Local Government Agencies (Provinces and Districts, known as *Órgãos Locais do Estado* – OLEs, deconcentrated entities). Municipalities have fiscal and administrative autonomy, and their leadership is democratically elected. Provinces and districts, as well as sub-district levels (administrative posts and localities) have no fiscal or administrative autonomy, and serve as extensions of the central state. The 2012 Decentralization Policy and Strategy (*Política e Estratégia Nacional de Descentralização* – PEND) foresees a gradual increase in the number of municipalities, and the expansion of their resources with functions transitioned from OLEs. Laying the groundwork for this transition, there have been significant reforms in the public sector regulatory framework over the last decade (e.g. in treasury and budget management, procurement regulations, and payroll). However, implementation has been slower than expected, and the impact on service delivery has been marginal. Approximately 63 percent of all spending remains at the central level, compared with 35 percent at the deconcentrated level, and the small remainder at the municipal level.

10. **While decentralization was an important element of peace processes in Mozambique, limitations in technical efficiency considerations have left structural weaknesses.** Functional segregation remains unclear. Fiscal transfers lack transparency, equity, and predictability, with a disconnect between rules and their application. Significant capacity limitations of local public administrations are exacerbated by imbalances in workforce composition and limited performance-based management. Capacity gaps in municipalities create missed opportunities for revenue generation, territorial planning, and land management. Internal and external controls of public expenditure weaken at decentralized levels, and mechanisms for public participation and accountability are often superficial.

11. **The Government's Decentralization Policy and Strategy Implementation Plan (PIPED, 2016-2019) aims to enhance the contributions of decentralization to equitable development and more efficient public sector's management.** The Government has sought support from the World Bank and other development partners for this program. The intended impact is to strengthen the institutional capacity of local entities (decentralized municipalities and deconcentrated provinces and districts) and the implementation of decentralization (including fiscal transfers), to improve infrastructure and basic local services, and to promote participation and accountability. More broadly, supporting PIPED implementation will help ensure decentralization sustainably contributes to advance poverty and inequality reduction.

Deconcentration and the role of the provinces and districts

12. **The provinces are an important intermediary level.** Currently, provinces are a deconcentrated administration, with governors appointed by the central government, yet with some level of representation through the provincial assemblies (elected in 2009) with a consultative mandate. Provincial administrative

structures replicate the central level, with separate “directions” reporting both to their central ministries and the governor. Provinces have an important role in term of territorial development and diffusion and monitoring of the implementation of sectoral policies. They also are being considered as a prospective “capacity hub” to assist both districts and municipalities. They have a crucial role in allocating sectoral allocations at the district level.

13. **Depending on the outcome of the current discussions on the elections of the provincial governors and the retention of some direct control over local resources, the role of the provinces could significantly change in-the-near future, and this program can support the GoM in clarifying key policy issues around respective mandates of various levels of government and resource-sharing.**

14. **The district is the “the principal territorial unit of the organization and functioning of the local administration of the state and the base of the planning of the economic, social and cultural development of the Republic of Mozambique”.** Within the scope of functions assigned to each level of deconcentrated administration, the local organs of the state (OLEs) exert the power of decision, execution and control at their respective levels.

15. **Despite this stated role of district as basic planning unit,** there is a strong disconnect between the local development planning process at the district level (the Strategic Plan for District Development- PEDD and the annual District’s Economic and Social Plan and Budget – PESOD) and central and provincial level planning and budgeting.

16. **Overall, districts do not have a strong role in delivering public services, despite their legal mandate to do so, because of their relative low technical capacity and the concentration of resources at the provincial level** (through sectoral programs) or at national level.

17. **Furthermore, some districts co-exist with decentralized municipalities, and weak coordination with municipalities create significant issues for territorial development.**

18. **Provinces and districts currently have limited entitlement to an independent fiscal base and are reliant on annual allocations from central government.** Internally generated income constitutes just 2.5 percent of provincial revenue and 0.4 percent of district revenue (World Bank, 2014), and the vast majority of tax revenue is channeled to central levels – a normal situation in a unitary nation. Provinces receive the bulk of their financing through a non-sector specific block grant for financing provincial and district-level expenditures. In principle, this transfer is allocated based on population size and poverty rates, and designed to cover recurrent operational costs of the provinces and districts (i.e. salaries and some goods and services), and occasional investments in infrastructure of other services at the discretion of the provincial governor. Sector-specific funding is channeled through line ministries and aligned with the national plan for the sector ministry (comprised of provincial and district departmental plans) and captured in the central financial management system (SISTAFE).

19. **Yet expenditures at the district level have increased in recent years as the government pursues deconcentration.** The largest increases in district resources are in earmarked sector spending, which is requested by district service spending units, and decided at the provincial level through the input of provincial governors in negotiation with provincial directorates and central line ministries. District expenditures are largely deconcentrated recurrent expenditures, mainly salaries, with wide variations between the levels of deconcentration in each sector. The education sector has the largest degree of decentralized expenditures on salaries and recurrent spending, both in terms of the percentage of total education expenditures at the subnational levels (provincial and district), as well as the overall size of education expenditures relative to other sectors at the subnational level.

20. **Given the lack of institutional autonomy and of noteworthy revenue base and investment**

funding at their disposal, the role of OLEs in service delivery remains limited. The degree of deconcentration of functions and resources remains limited, with most of the deconcentrated spending used for personnel cost and the purchase of fuel, goods and services, i.e. the recurrent budget items.

21. **Deconcentrated expenditures, in aggregate, show wide variation between regions, potentially increasing inequities.** In a relatively centralized unitary system, estimating per capita expenditures of lower levels of the administration is complicated since not every budget line would be sufficiently disaggregated. For public expenditures that are disaggregated, however, analysis shows significant discrepancies between regions. There are notable gaps in per capita expenditures in the larger, but traditionally underserved, northern provinces of Zambézia and Nampula, which together account for nearly 40 percent of Mozambique's total population. A comparison of average district poverty levels shows that total district expenditures are inversely correlated with poverty. The levels of civil servant allocations per capita also show wide variation across regions. This suggests that current expenditure allocations are reinforcing regional inequities, which is an area for concern should Mozambique continue to increase the share of expenditures at the subnational level.

22. **Finally, although there are various forums for direct participation at local level (starting with the Local Councils), their composition, representativeness and capacity are generally considered low.**

23. **To sum up, main challenges to decentralization include:** i) lack of adequate resources, and lack of transparency in allocating resources, ii) limited capacity at all levels, iii) numerous coordination issues between sectors and levels of administration stemming from overlap of functions and territories, and iv) limited participation of citizens in local governance.

Urbanization and the role of municipalities

24. **The process of *municipalization* in Mozambique has already demonstrated important achievements in improving urban management, but not without challenges.** Since the first wave of decentralization reforms in the late 1990s, 53 municipalities have been created through formal devolution with fiscal, administrative, and political responsibilities to manage local affairs in the most urbanized areas of the country. From initially being providers of basic urban infrastructure and services, as local roads, markets, parks, cemeteries, public lighting, and solid waste services, existing legislation is gradually increasing municipal responsibilities to provide more complex services like health and education. To be able to provide this menu of basic infrastructure and services, municipalities were empowered with several own source revenue instruments, such as property tax and services tariffs (ex. waste collection fee, building licensing). Municipalities have also full responsibility for territorial planning, as well as land management within their jurisdiction.

25. **However, the role of municipalities to harness the full benefits from urbanization is far from completed as institutional strengthening of municipalities has been incremental and uneven.** Urbanization can be instrumental in enhancing productivity as cities offer greater opportunities of “agglomeration economies”, which enhance productivity via three key mechanisms: transport cost savings, developing markets for specialized services, and labor market matching. However, municipalities in Mozambique were created upon very weak organizational structures, and inherited enormous infrastructure and services deficits from Colonial time, and years of Civil War. Meanwhile, fast urbanization has increased the pressure on elected *municipal presidents* (mayors) and councilors to deliver as they are closer to citizens and business. Central government and donors' support to strengthen institutional capacity of municipalities has been limited both in geographic scope and finance. While the largest and richest municipalities only now demonstrate the first results in terms of increased municipal resources, urban planning and land management, as well as investments in infrastructure and services

delivery, others have still a long way to go.

26. **While there has been an overall positive trend between urban growth, economic growth and poverty reduction in Mozambique, the impact of urbanization on poverty reduction has been lower than expected.** GDP per capita growth has been strong since the end of the civil war and the economic reforms of the 1990's, averaging 4.1 percent annually. Urban poverty rate fell from 42 percent to 32 percent during the 2002-2015 period. It is estimated that the 23 largest cities today generate approximately 51.4 percent of the national GDP, and average per capita consumption in cities is at more than triple the rural average (\$1,160 versus \$336). In the next 25 years, the urban population is expected to more than double, adding more than 11 million people to cities.

27. **There are approximately 3.3 million people living under the poverty line in cities, but poverty levels vary significantly from city to city.** While less than 7 percent of the population in the large port cities of Maputo, Matola and Beira are below the poverty line, most people living in medium cities and small towns are below the poverty line (ex. Nacala had 45%, and Gorongosa 84% in 2007). Inequality is also on the rise in cities. Gini coefficient for urban areas increased from 0.49 to 0.55 from 2002 to 2014. Consumption growth in cities increased about 12.5% in the upper part of the income distribution, but only 2.5 percent for the 30 percent of the poor population during the period of 2008-2014. Contrarily from global trends, migration from rural to urban areas has not contributed to poverty reduction. Tradable nonagricultural employment makes up just 13 percent in urban areas of the country. Workers' earnings are not significantly higher in urban areas than in rural areas when wages are deflated to adjust for spatial differences in the cost of living. The lack of a real wage premium indicates that cities are not taking advantage of agglomeration economies to increase production and create the jobs for a young, growing urban population.

28. **Indeed, most municipalities have not been able to cope with the pace of urban growth, neither to make a significant dent on the infrastructure and services deficit.** With an average of US\$ 8 per capita for capital investments, municipalities are barely able to maintain the urban infrastructure built during Colonial times. The urban poor that live far from the so called *cidade cimento*, the consolidated urban core, are the most affected by lack of investments in urban infrastructure. About 70 percent of urban dwellers live in informal areas with only basic level of infrastructure, in houses built with nondurable material, and without land use rights titles. Improved sanitation only covers about 40% of households. In average, only 60% of urban households have proper waste collection services, and revenue solid waste tariffs do not cover half of the O&M costs, let alone the needs for new investments. While the Government created a national Roads Fund, investments in urban transport is suboptimal as most municipalities have difficulty in accessing these funds. Environmental degradation has accelerated in many cities due to unplanned development and poorly regulated land use, often including growth of low income residential settlements in vulnerable areas without associated infrastructure investments.

29. **Weakness in the institutional and financing framework underpinning urban infrastructure investments and services delivery also hamper performance.** While the decentralization law devolved all the basic urban management functions to municipalities, in practice many areas continue to be significantly centralized and fragmented. As the Government adopted an incremental approach to decentralization, national entities were created to finance infrastructure investments and manage assets in transport, water, sanitation, and drainage. However, after twenty years only few of the largest municipalities have been able to develop alternative service delivery models, limiting investments in urban infrastructure and leaving some areas such as drainage and sanitation mostly abandoned. The land and territorial planning institutional and regulatory framework is also not conducive to urbanization as it was crafted to address rural issues. Until now, none of the municipalities have all the legally required territorial planning instruments, which has fueled informal urbanization. Land registration and

regularization is also complex, opaque, and cumbersome, creating serious bottlenecks in the supply of formal land, which in turns accentuates the shortage of affordable land and housing. Weak territorial planning and land management capacity also undermine the capacity of municipalities to increase land-based infrastructure finance particularly through property tax, which is one of the main OSR instruments in most cities around the world.

C. Relationship to CPF

30. **The proposed program is in line with the Mozambique Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY17-21.** The CPF puts strong emphasis on urbanization and decentralization and identifies local governments and the deconcentrated district administrative units' as the responsible entities for basic service delivery. However, the CPF identifies considerable technical support needed to ensure that these institutions have the capacity to deliver essential public services. The CPF also highlights that revenue assignments and intergovernmental fiscal transfers and allocations are not need-based and lack equity and transparency, creating significant disparities in the transfer of resources at the sub-national levels. **The program is designed to support objective 10 of the CPF (Promoting Inclusive Urbanization and Decentralization) as well as objective 8 (Increased Accountability and Transparency of Government Institutions).** The CPF highlights the need to reinforce both rural and urban local entities and strengthen participation and accountability as a mean to ensure effective delivery of essential public services. The program will strengthen government systems to improve equity and transparency of fiscal transfers and allocations and increase institutional capacity of selected districts and municipalities to deliver basic infrastructure and services. The program will also provide technical support to key national entities responsible for the formulation and implementation of key aspects of decentralization policies and programs.

II. Program Development Objective(s)

A. Program Development Objective(s)

31. **The Program's Development Objective (PDO) will be to:** improve institutional capacity of the Government of Mozambique to support its decentralization policies, and to improve the performance of selected municipalities and districts in the poorest provinces to deliver basic infrastructure and services.

B. Key Program Results

32. **Key program results might include inter alia the following:**

- Indicator on transparent and equitable municipal transfers
- Indicator on transparent and rationalized allocations of expenditures in OLEs and in particular in districts
- Number of municipalities meeting Minimum Conditions
- Number of districts meeting Minimum Conditions
- Percentage of progress in annual performance assessment
- Number of municipalities and districts that achieved the infrastructure and service delivery targets

III. Program Description

A. PforR Program Boundary

33. **The proposed program will support the Government's Decentralization Policy and Strategy (PED) and the operationalization of its Implementation Plan (PIPED).** In line with the various

decentralization reforms and initiative to support deconcentrated and decentralized entities since the 1990's, the Government approved the PED in December 2013 to: (i) guide the government and other actors interventions particularly on citizens participation, improvement of infrastructure and services, and promotion of local development; (ii) integrate and systematize the different processes which have been undertaken in decentralization; and (iii) lay out a way forward to achieve the vision and predicted objectives for the decentralization process. Following the PED approval, and in accordance with the Government's 5th Quinquennial Plan, the Government formulated the PIPED 2016-2019 to serve as an implementation instrument to achieve the objectives of PED, define indicators and targets, clarify the responsibilities to implement the different actions, as well as monitor and evaluate the different interventions.

IV. Initial Environmental and Social Screening

A. Environmental and social systems aspects

34. **Mozambique shows a well-developed environmental and social safeguards legislation, but compliance at local level is a major challenge.** The national environmental and social safeguards legislation includes the national environmental law, defining that all public and private activities with the potential to influence environmental components should be preceded by an environmental assessment to identify possible impacts, as well as their mitigation, a process that culminates in the Environmental Licensing. Additionally, the Country has well defined procedures for public hearings. Recent environmental and social assessments, carried out for the implementation of the Cities and Climate Change Project permits to conclude that existing environmental and social management procedures of the national environment management authority (MITADER) are adequate for use by the program. Mozambique has also a national resettlement legal framework. However, it has been formulated to address mostly resettlement issues due to mining activities and rural issues, and presents gaps related to compensation for raw land, economic impacts and loss of access to resources.

35. **However, this experience also indicates that capabilities to manage social and environmental risks are incipient and variable, especially at the municipal and district level.** It shows that all levels of government may be under-staffed and under-funded to handle the environmental and social aspects of the proposed volume of projects. There are also process gaps where actions are prescribed but accountability is not well defined and scarce inspection or similar processes that establish accountability for failure to implement requirements. Implementation of the national resettlement regulations in urban areas pose major challenges, particularly to the requirement of minimum plots of 800 m² as municipalities find difficult to acquire enough land in well-located areas, and with basic infrastructure. These issues will need to be further examined and, if necessary, will be addressed in the design of the proposed operation and integrated in pertinent DLIs.

36. **P-for-R and IPF requires different environmental and social safeguards assessments, instruments and capacity in place.** An Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (ESSA) should be carried out for the P4R result areas, assessing the existing systems for managing environmental and social risks. The Bank already requested additional information on the proposed implementation agencies environmental and social institutional capacity, existing regulations and policies, and their legal and practical applicability at the program level, aiming to initiate the ESSA preparation. Key measures identified by the assessment will be incorporated into the overall Program Action Plan, and may also be reflected in the DLIs.

37. **IPF requires an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), as well as a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF).** Since project resources will fund construction of basic infrastructure, the expected impacts localized and limited in scope. The Project is classified as Category B, as not Category A intervention will be eligible. Based on the experience of the Cities and Climate

Change project, the following safeguard policies are triggered: (OP/BP 4.01) on Environmental Assessment, (OP/BP 4.04) on Natural Habitats, (OP/BP 4.36) on Forests, (OP/BP 4.11) Physical Cultural Resources, and (OP/BP 4.12) on Involuntary Resettlement. The implementation of the activities aiming to improve fiscal transfers' equity and transparency, as well as the institutional strengthening activities are not expected to cause direct adverse environmental or social impacts.

38. **At this stage, a few no-cost mitigation measures have already been identified.** Firstly, certain types of infrastructure will be put on a “negative” (or proscribed) investment menu – these will include infrastructure items that are very likely to have a significant negative social or environmental impact. Secondly, risk mitigation will be factored into the program through the urban infrastructure grants assessment process itself, which will include some degree of *ex ante* scrutiny of proposed infrastructure investments. A screening process and procedures to implement the safeguards instruments will be included to complement local requirements, as needed, for the infrastructure component. Consultation requirements will also be mainstreamed into project selection and management processes. A project operation manual is the likely instrument to define the procedures needed to implement the safeguard instruments and establish the corresponding reporting requirements.

V. Tentative financing

Source:	(\$m)
Borrower/Recipient	
IBRD	
IDA	100
Others (specify)	
Total	100

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