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Report No: ICR00003774

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(TF-17872, TF-17873)

ON A GRANT

FROM THE

FOOD PRICE CRISIS RESPONSE TRUST FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 7.0 MILLION
TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR A

SECOND EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY SUPPORT PROJECT

March 28 , 2016

Agriculture Global Practice
Country Department AFCF1
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 3, 2016)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)
1.00 CFAF = US$ [0.0016704]
US$ 1.00 = [598.67 CFAF]

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
CEM: Country Economic memorandum
CEN: Country Engagement Note
FA: Farmer Association
FFW: Food for Work
ICR: Implementation Completion and Results Report
IFR: Interim Financial Report
ISR: Implementation Status Report
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
MOA: Ministry of Agriculturemt: Metric ton
O&M: Operations and maintenance
PDO: Project Development Objective
TCU: Technical Coordination Unit
TF: Trust Fund
WBG: World Bank group
WFP: World Food Program

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GUINEA BISSAU
Second Emergency Food Security Support Project

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A. Basic Information			
Country:	Guinea-Bissau	Project Name:	Second Emergency Food Security Support Project
Project ID:	P148886	L/C/TF Number(s):	TF-17872,TF-17873
ICR Date:	03/28/2016	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	IPF	Grantee:	MINISTERY OF ECONOMY & REGIONAL INTEGRAT
Original Total Commitment:	USD 7.00M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 6.80M
Revised Amount:	USD 6.80M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development World Food Programme			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	**Date**	**Process**	**Original Date**	**Revised / Actual Date(s)**
Concept Review:	02/06/2014	Effectiveness:	10/31/2014	02/17/2015
Appraisal:	06/24/2014	Restructuring(s):		06/09/2015 08/15/2015
Approval (Board):	10/10/2014	Mid-term Review:		
Approval of Grant funding request	08/06/2014[1]	Closing:	06/30/2015	09/30/2015

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Substantial
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Grantee Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

[1] It is this date that SAP recorded in the ICR Data sheet of the Project portal.

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	**Ratings**	**Borrower**	**Ratings**
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	**Overall Borrower Performance:**	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	**Indicators**	**QAG Assessments (if any)**	**Rating**
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes

	Original	**Actual**
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Agricultural extension and research	10	10
Crops	40	40
Irrigation and drainage	10	10
Other social services	40	40
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Global food crisis response	50	50
Rural services and infrastructure	25	25
Social Inclusion	25	25

E. Bank Staff

Positions	**At ICR**	**At Approval**
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Makhtar Diop
Country Director:	Louise J. Cord	Vera Songwe
Practice Manager/Manager:	Simeon Kacou Ehui	Martien Van Nieuwkoop
Project Team Leader:	Aniceto Timoteo Bila	Aniceto Timoteo Bila
ICR Team Leader:	Remi Kini	

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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

To improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children, in selected areas of the Recipient Territory.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

N/A

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Students receiving one meal a day (number)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	17,500		35,115
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 200% achieved and 49% of the students receiving meals were girls.			
Indicator 2 :	Rations distributed in food for work activities (number)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	250,000		312,613
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 125% achieved.			
Indicator 3 :	Quantity of new land rehabilitated for rice cultivation (hectares)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	5,000		5,301
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 106% achieved.			
Indicator 4 :	Number of farmers using an improved agricultural technology promoted by the project (percentage of which female)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	4,000 (20%)		16,259 (74%)

Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 406% achieved.			
Indicator 5 :	Number of direct project beneficiaries (percentage of which female)			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0	38,000 (20%)		55,777 (31%)
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 147% achieved.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Lowland area rehabilitated (hectares)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	3,000		2,769
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 92% achieved.			
Indicator 2 :	Mangrove land area rehabilitated (hectares)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	2,000		2,532
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 126% achieved.			
Indicator 3 :	Quantity of seed distributed (ton)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	320		250
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 78% achieved.			
Indicator 4 :	Quantity of fertilizer distributed (ton)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	300		444
Date achieved	10/10/2014	06/30/2015		09/30/2015

Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was 148% achieved.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	04/08/2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
2	09/22/2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	3.48

H. Restructuring (if any): The project was restructured twice on June 9, 2015 and on august 15, 2015. The restructuring aimed to extend the closing date in order to endure that all goods and works are procured before the project completion.

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
06/09/2015		MS	MS	2.83	Extension of project closing date from June 30, 2015 to August 31, 2015.
08/15/2015		MS	MS	3.02	Extension of project closing date from August 31, 2015 to September 30, 2015,

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. ***Country context***. Guinea-Bissau embodies some of the world's toughest development challenges, combining acute and rising poverty with persistent fragility and political instability. This situation has adversely affected the economy and the functioning of public institutions, and often resulted in the suspension of international support to the country. Since gaining independence in 1974, the country has been marked by political instability. Between 1974 and 2013, Guinea-Bissau had four successful coup d'états, with additional coup attempts and other forms of political violence. A short-lived but brutal 1998-1999 civil war is estimated to have cut national income by 20 percent. Since this civil war, economic growth has barely exceeded population growth. The latest political violence episode was the coup of April 2012.

2. The disruptions that followed this coup disruptions paralyzed the country and led to a deep economic slowdown, a fiscal crisis, and aggravation of poverty. GDP contracted by 2.2 percent in 2012 and recovered only very modestly by 0.3 percent in 2013. In 2012 annual per capita GDP was estimated at about US$520 and rose to just US$590 in 2013 (Atlas method). The poverty rate increased from 65 percent in 2002, to 70 percent in 2010 and 75 percent in 2013. The country's extreme poverty rate increased (those living on an income below the US$2 per day poverty line) from 22 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2010, and an estimated 45 percent in 2013. Three out of four households living in extreme poverty rely almost entirely on agriculture for their livelihood. The country was ranked 177 out of 187 according to the 2013 United Nations Human Development Index (HDI).2

3. **Emergency food crisis**. Although the effects of the 2008 food crisis had subsided noticeably, a combination of domestic factors and external factors contributed to the deterioration of food security. As a result, Guinea Bissau was experiencing serious food insecurity at the national and household levels. According to the September 2013 World Food Program (WFP) Assessment report[3], 93 percent of households were classified as food insecure. This high level of food insecurity was due in part to a significant drop in the price of cashew nuts and its adverse impact on cashew producers' income. In 2011 and 2012, the cashew nut prices were almost 300 CFAF/kg; and dropped to 200 CFAF/kg in 2013, partly due to the political and economic uncertainty created by the April 2012 military coup, and partly due to lower international price. Since cashew production is the main source of income for more than 75 percent of the rural households in Guinea-Bissau, their reduced income meant limited access to food. Because the country relies on imports to meet 40% of its rice consumption needs, foreign exchange issues and other trade logistics also continued to hamper the availability of the main staple food in the country. Consequently, there was an urgent need to support the implementation of the short term measures aimed to feed the most vulnerable population groups, as well as to increase and to sustain food production, particularly rice.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

[2] The country is now ranked 177 out of 187 according to the 2014 United Nations Human Development Index (HDI).[2]

[3] Vulnerability Assessment Analysis and Mapping, September 2013, World Food Program.

4. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the Recipient territory. The project covers eight regions in Guinea Bissau including: Bafatá, Gabu, Oio, Cacheu, Biombo, Quinara, Tombali and SAB (Bissau Autonomous Sector). The school feeding activities covered only three of these regions including Biombo, Gabu and Quinara.

5. It is important to emphasize from the outset that this project was designed to be implemented in 9-10 months maximum. It was approved on October 10, 2014 (the first Grant funding request was approved on August 6, 2014) with a closing date of June 30, 2015 (see paragraph 25 for details). Despite this unusually short timescale, it was determined that this project was worth undertaking, given the counterfactual. As described above, the level of food insecurity in all the regions of Guinea Bissau was high. Consequently, not undertaking this project would have contributed to further deterioration of the material and social economic conditions of the populations, especially of the poorest groups.

6. The key results to be achieved at the end of project implementation were: (i) provision of one meal a day to 17,500 students (boys and girls) for a period of 160 days, and take home rations to 2,500 school girls for 160 days; (ii) food-for work totaling 250,000 work days (100 days per participant for 2,500 farmer participants) for the rehabilitation of 5,000 hectares of land for rice farming, against the provision of food rations to 17,500 direct and indirect beneficiaries (participants and their families); and (iv) provision of agricultural inputs to at least 4,000 smallholder farmers involved in rice farming.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

7. Neither the PDO nor the key indicators were formally revised**.**

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

8. The main project beneficiaries were:

- Children of primary school age, in particular girls, were expected to benefit from in-school and take-home meals under the school feeding scheme;
- Rural male and female dwellers (and their families) facing food shortages and who were expected to receive food rations in exchange for work to rehabilitate mangrove land and low-land for rice production (under the food-for-work scheme);
- Individual male and female farmers and their associations who were expected to benefit from the distribution of modern agricultural inputs (improved seeds and fertilizer), small farming tools, power tillers, and advisory services for improved agronomic and good land husbandry practices.
- The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), especially the Department of Rural Engineering and its field offices were expected to benefit from project management training, and basic improvements in working conditions through the distribution of computer equipment, software and office renovations, equipment for soil testing and analysis.

9. Secondary beneficiaries included: (i) families of students receiving school meals and take home rations, as well as those of small-scale farmers engaged in the food-for-

work activities; (ii) families of producers receiving inputs and training; (iii) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) recruited and trained by WFP and the MoA in micro-project management, land reclamation, monitoring of field activities, etc.; and (iv) staff of MoA regional offices through on-the-job technical training.

1.5 Original Components

10. The Project consisted of three components: (i) Support to the Most Vulnerable Population; (ii) Provision of Improved Agricultural Inputs and Services to Smallholders and (iii) Project Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation.

Component 1- Support to the Most Vulnerable Population (US$2.15 million)

11. This component aimed to provide immediate food access to school children, and small-scale famers participating in the food-for-work activities to rehabilitate degraded rice fields. The component included the following activities: (i) provision of a school feeding program to school children (one meal per day for 17,500 school children and take-home rations to 2,500 female students for 160 school days in highly vulnerable areas), and (ii) rehabilitation of 5,000 ha (about 2000 ha through the construction of dikes to control salt intrusion into mangrove rice fields, and drainage channels and anti-erosion structures for about 3000 ha of low-land rice fields) through food-for-work activities. The food-for-work activities was to involve 2,500 small-scale farmers, each working for 100 days (250,000 work days). This component was implemented by WFP.

Component 2- Provision of Improved Agricultural Inputs and Services to Smallholders (US$4.00 million)

12. This component was designed to improve smallholder farmers' access to modern agricultural inputs, technology and services in order to increase rice production and productivity. It financed the following activities: (i) the provision of improved seeds for 5,000 ha (3,000 ha low-land and 2,000 ha mangrove land); (ii) the provision of fertilizer to low-land rice farmers through matching grants to cover 3,000 ha; (iii) the provision of basic production tools to all beneficiary farmers of the project (up to a total of 18,000 farmer); (iv) the provision to selected smallholder farmer groups of at least 20 members each with 250 power tillers to cultivate 2,500 ha (10 ha per group) of rice land; and (v) the provision of training and equipment to the MoA staff in order to facilitate the implementation of activities such as basic topographic surveys and soil analysis. For all matching grants, farmers were expected to make in-kind contribution estimated at 10% of the value of the inputs and equipment received. This component was implemented by the Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) created within the Department of Rural Engineering of the MoA.

Component 3- Project Coordination, and Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.85 million)

13. This Component was designed to support the coordination, and monitoring and evaluation of the project activities. It was implemented by the TCU created during the first phase of the project. The TCU was responsible for: (i) managing the funds for components 2 and 3; (ii) ensuring the effective monitoring and evaluation of the project activities; and (iii) coordinating the overall implementation of the project. The staff of the TCU included a project coordinator, an agronomist, a procurement specialist, an accountant, a communication specialist, and a safeguards specialist. In addition to the core team located

in Bissau, the TCU included 4 regional coordinators (one for every 2 regions) and 8 technical assistants to the regional coordinators (one in each of the regions covered: Bafatá, Gabu, Oio, Cacheu, Biombo, Quinara, Tombali and SAB. This component also included capacity strengthening benefiting the Department of Rural Engineering, especially the provision of computer and associated equipment, as well as equipment for soil testing and analysis.

1.6 Revised Components

14. The project components were not revised.

1.7 Other significant changes

15. Extension. The project became effective on February 17, 2015, barely four months before the original closing date of June 30, 2015. This closing date was extended twice to August 30, and then to September 30, 2015. The two closing date extensions were requested by the Government in order to accommodate the time necessary to ensure the procurement and distribution of the agricultural inputs, equipment and training of farmers under component 2.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

Soundness of background analysis

16. ***Poverty and agriculture.*** Agriculture is the primary sector of the economy of Guinea-Bissau. In 2013 it accounted for almost 50 percent of the GDP, 98 percent of the total export earnings, primarily through cashew exports, 10 percent of tax revenue and 65 percent of total employment. The growth drivers are limited to the agro-food sector and cashew nuts produced by the majority of the rural poor and traditionally bartered for rice, the main staple food for both rural and urban households. Despite good agro-ecological conditions for rice production, the country imports on average 55,000 tons of rice annually to meet its needs. Cashew production which remains the mainstay of the economy accounted for 88% of total exports in 2013. However, less than 5% of the cashew production is processed locally. This dependence on cashew production and exports had direct impacts on the poorest segments of the population in terms of inclusiveness and food security. The producer price declined to 43% of the export price in 2013 compared to 57% in 2012. This seriously affected households' economic conditions leading to under-nutrition in over a third of the population. Almost 75 percent of the population is below the poverty line, and this share has increased over time.

17. ***Alignment with Guinea-Bissau and World Bank strategies.*** The Second Emergency Food Security Support Project (SEFSSP) was designed to scale up the activities initiated under the Guinea-Bissau Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468). The objective of the project to support the implementation of short term measures addressing the food security of the most vulnerable population groups, and medium-term measures to increase food production, particularly rice was aligned with the both pillars of the FY2014-2015 Interim Strategy Note: (i) support to the most vulnerable population, and (ii) support food production particularly rice. It is also aligned with Guinea Bissau 2010-25 National Program for Agricultural Investment (NPAI) which aims to (i) improve agricultural growth and food production through expansion of cultivated area; (ii)

increase productivity through the use of improved agricultural technology; (iii) strengthen value chains for agricultural commodities and; (iv) improve access to market.

18. The SEFSSP was prepared by the same task team that prepared and supported the implementation of the first Emergency Food Security Support Project. The background analysis pertaining to the food security situation of the country that supported the preparation of the first operation remained valid, and underpinned the design of this project. Information and evidence derived from WFP country reports showed high rates of food insecurity, especially among vulnerable population groups in 2013.

Project preparation and assessment of design

19. The commitment and ownership of the Government was adequate during preparation and implementation. An inter-ministerial steering committee composed of representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Education, Social Affairs, Agriculture and other relevant government entities participated actively in all the technical meetings during project preparation. The substance of this preparation work drew from the priorities of the agricultural sector strategy and from the assistance strategy of the World Bank Group described in the Re-Engagement Note. The action plan for the first 90 days of project implementation was jointly developed by WFP and the Ministry of Agriculture.

20. Despite the simple design and scope of the planned activities, the limited number of components, and the use of implementation mechanisms that had already been tested in the first project, the overall risk was rated Substantial, at appraisal. Risks related to governance at the national level, fiduciary aspects and operating environment justified this rating. The task team emphasized technical support and the use of effective implementation mechanisms established during the first project as the main measures for mitigating this risk. The continued reliance on WFP and partner NGOs was based on the recognition of persistent technical and institutional capacity constraints facing the country.

21. *PDO*: While the country context, in particular the food security and poverty levels that underpinned the first Emergency Food Security project remained valid, it should be emphasized that the operational context of this Second Emergency Food Security Support Project was noticeably different. The much shorter duration of the implementation period was a major operational constraint that should have been fully taken into account in the design of the project. The task team failed to take this critical time variable into account in the definition and planning of the interventions.

22. The design of the SEFSSP was very similar to that of the first Emergency Food Security project (same PDO and same components) which was implemented in four years. This duration allowed the first project to make reasonable contribution in improving beneficiaries' food security. Although the SEFSSP reflected the lessons from the implementation of the previous operation, its duration was just too short to aim for the same development outcome. The PAD states that "the project activities have been determined by the crop season and the time available to implement the project". Yet, the project implementation schedule and duration do not cover the rice harvest which typically covers the period of October to January. This meant that the implementation period did not cover the harvest time supported with the modern agricultural inputs under component 2 since the closing date of the project was June 30, 2015. Consequently, it would have been difficult to assess the extent to which the harvest of the small-scale farmers who received inputs and technical support from the project met their short to medium term food needs.

This meant that the impact of the project in terms of rice production could not be measured during its implementation period. This has significant implication for the PDO.

23. In fact, it seems that the task team struggled with the definition of a PDO that would be responsive to the country's development and sectoral priorities, while remaining focused on the outcome for which the project could reasonably be held accountable, given its duration. Food security is a complex concept whose definition has evolved over the years. A commonly agreed definition is that "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life[4]". Household food security would be the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern.

24. Given the data requirements and measurement issues associated with this and other definitions, it would appear that the PDO of "improving food security of vulnerable populations in selected areas of the Recipient territory" was too ambitious given the project implementation period of nine months. The fact that the PDO indicators are output-oriented and do not include any outcome indicator describing the degree of improvement in food security meant that the project really aimed to provide food relief to reduce short-term food shortage for the targeted population groups. The PDO statement should have reflected this more modest and easily measurable objective.

25. *Justification of the project timeline*: The initial design of the intervention that the task team adopted in 2011 was to be associated with a 3 year-project focusing on the rehabilitation of irrigated rice fields. Unfortunately, the project preparation was interrupted by the April 2012 military coup and the ensuing suspension of donors' operations in the country. By the time the World Bank Group reengaged there were only 18 months left before the end of the Trust Fund that supported the Global Food Crisis Response Program. Since the country continued to face a food emergency situation, the World Bank management advised the team to modify the initial design of the project in order to address this situation. The Board of Directors approved the new project in October with the closing date set for June 30, 2105. When the project became effective on February 17, 2015, it had only 5 months of duration. Extending the closing date to September 30, 2015 added three months. The extension could not exceed three months because September 30, 2015 was also the closing date of the Trust Fund.

26. *Implementation arrangements*: The project design recognized the weak capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. For example, some of the capacities necessary for effective project implementation, such as monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were not adequately available. The Government requested WFP to continue the assistance they provided during the first phase of the project, thereby entrusting this organization with the implementation of component 1 (school feeding and food-for-work activities). The TCU established for the first project continued to support the implementation of components 2 and 3. The tested procedures and stakeholder participation mechanisms helped to smoothen implementation process right from the beginning. All the project

[4] FAO, 1996: The 1996 World Food Summit. FAO, Rome. Italy.

components were designed to further strengthen capacity at the national and regional levels, at least through continued learning-by-doing.

2.2 Implementation

Factors that contributed to successful implementation

27. *WFP's strong experience and field presence*: WFP's proven expertise and experience was a determining factor for completing component one activities successfully. This organization has been working in Guinea Bissau since 1974, and has a strong knowledge of the country context and operational environment. WFP contracted 12 NGOs through Field Level agreements in order to help implement the school feeding and food-for-work activities. WFP also signed Letters of Understanding with the Ministries of Agriculture and Education in order to ensure accountability for results in the above-mentioned activities.

28. The fact that the NGOs were already trained and were familiar with the field operations during the first project helped to accelerate the planning and implementation of the activities. WFP and the NGOs modified their field intervention protocol in order to make up for the delay due to the late effectiveness of the project. Rather than conducting community diagnostics before planning the interventions, community focus groups were jointly organized with the technicians of the Rural Engineering Department regional offices and representatives of the TCU for the selection of the rice production sites to be rehabilitated.

29. *WFP's operational flexibility*: WFP was able to start activities without delay because they pre-financed the school feeding and food-for-work activities by using resources from their regional food reserve warehouse located in Las Palmas, Canary Islands (off the West African Atlantic coast). This flexibility allowed WFP to start activities as soon as the grant became effective (with the assurance that they will be reimbursed for their expenditures). The delayed effectiveness of the project meant that the school year was shortened. In order to ensure that the committed and procured food was fully delivered to the intended children, WFP doubled the number of schools covered by the school feeding activities.

30. *Strong and effective collaboration*: The strong collaboration among the project implementation entities, i.e., the TCU, the regional staff of the MoA and the Ministry of Education, the NGOs and the staff of WFP' central and regional offices was a major contributor to project achievements.

31. *Strong technical support from the task team*: The Task team, especially the fiduciary specialists provided a strong support to ensure that all the goods are procured, delivered and paid for before the closing date of the Grant. The Client requested and was granted a waiver so that they could use direct contracting for the procurement of the modern agricultural inputs, small equipment, and power tillers. The Procurement Specialist worked closely with TCU in order to assure effective and transparent contract management, and a timely delivery of the goods. The Disbursement Specialist assured that all payments of goods are made before the closing date; in general, direct payment methods were used to expedite the process.

Factors that gave rise to implementation problems

32. Delayed project effectiveness: Because of the delayed project effectiveness, the implementation of this component was hampered by the late availability of grant resources. The TCU staff was not familiar with the "client connection" system which was not in use during the first project. The project was able to receive the grant funds in the designated account of the project only on May 7th, 2015; 3 weeks before the closing date of June 30, 2015. The short timescale of the project also created a range of operational risks, some of which materialized at the end of the project in the form of late procurement and distribution of modern agricultural inputs for farmers and full accounting for project achievements (e.g., rice harvest, beneficiary survey, etc.).

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

M&E design

33. The PAD describes how monitoring of results will be carried out during project implementation. The results framework included a set of intermediary result indicators with clear units of measurement. It also described the role of the implementing entities in carrying out the M&E function. WFP and the TCU were to have each their own M&E specialist for organizing and carrying out the monitoring and evaluation activities of their respective components. Each M&E specialist was supposed to focus on; (i) monitoring implementation progress and assessing the extent to which the agreed project results were achieved; and (ii) generate information and guidance aimed to improve the management and performance of the project. Specifically, the M&E staff were to perform two tasks: (i) to collect data and to measure the extent of project achievements against a baseline established at the beginning of the project; and (ii) measurement of the extent to which the intermediary results are achieved, and the progress toward the achievement of the PDO. The task of developing the M&E plan (including the baseline survey, data collection and analysis methods, monitoring procedures, etc.) was left to the M&E specialist of the TCU and WFP.

34. Consequently, at the beginning of implementation, the results framework of the project did not have the necessary building blocks. In particular, it lacked the road map for measuring the values of the selected indicators. Furthermore, the cause-effect links among some elements of the result chain do not seem robust enough. As mentioned above, all the indicators are output-oriented and measure intermediary results: e.g., quantity of seeds or fertilizer procured and distributed; hectares of farmland rehabilitated. Therefore, there are no outcome indicators that would help to document the change/improvement in the level of food security due to the project, or the extent of physical and cognitive development of the students who benefited from the school feeding scheme. In sum, the lack of outcome indicators made it difficult to measure the efficacy of project interventions.

35. Moreover, the rationale behind the choice of some target values of the intermediary results is unclear. For example, the target value of "direct project beneficiaries" of 38,000 seemed to measure only the total number of the food-for-work participants and their household members, while the direct beneficiaries of school feeding activities and the distribution of agricultural inputs were excluded. The pertinence of the 4,000 target value for the farmers who adopted the technology promoted by the project is unclear since the project aimed to distribute improved seeds and fertilizer to all the farmers of the rehabilitated 5,000 ha of rice fields. Measuring the adoption rate would have been appropriate only a few years after this one-time provision of modern agricultural inputs by

the project. There also seemed to be some discrepancies between the performance targets included in the PAD and those used by the implementing agencies. For example, in its completion report WFP mentioned that they doubled the initial target of 75 schools for the school feeding scheme to 150 schools in order to make up for the time lost due to the delayed effectiveness of the project. In reality, the target of 150 schools was mentioned in the PAD. Similarly, the Government completion report mentioned that the project was expected to procure 500 tons of fertilizer. The target actual number as included in the results framework was 300 tons.

M&E implementation and utilization

36. The TCU did not have any M&E specialist. The project relied on TCU agronomist and on the IT specialist of the MoA to manage the implementation data. At the regional level the regional coordinators collected performance data that was processed by the agronomist and the IT specialist. WFP also did not have a dedicated M&E specialist on their implementation team. Instead, they relied on the contracted NGOs operating in the project areas to collect and transmit the data on implementation progress to the Bissau WFP office. Nonetheless, the rich and long experience of WFP experience in school feeding and food-for-work activities helped to establish a relatively reliable data collection and information system.

37. Although promised in the PAD, no baseline data was collected at the beginning of the project, and no detailed M&E plan and monitoring procedures were developed during implementation. Consequently, the TCU did not perform its role of ensuring the monitoring and evaluation of the overall project activities. In fact, the project had two parallel sets of M&E activities implemented respectively by WFP and the TCU with little, if any coordination. These alternative M&E arrangements put in place were relatively effective in generating the data and information necessary to monitor implementation progress. Although an integrated M&E system ensuring coordination and quality control of the data could have added value to the results monitoring process, and to determine the degree of achievement of the project development objective. The information and data available were mostly adequate to evaluate the project achievements in terms of outputs, but not necessarily in terms of development outcome.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Environmental and social safeguards

38. This project was rated Category B and triggered four safeguard policies: (i) Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01); (ii) Natural Habitats (OP4.04); (iii) Pest Management (OP4.09); and (iv) Physical Cultural Resources (OP4.11). To ensure compliance with Bank Safeguard Policies, the Government had updated the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Pest Management Plan of the original project and disclosed it in country on June 24, 2014 and in the InfoShop on July 7, 2014. The project did not procure any pesticides. There were no environmental and/or social safeguards issues during implementation of the project.

Procurement

39. There was no major procurement issue. The major procurement items consisted of the agricultural inputs and power tillers. The strong support of the Bank procurement team helped to smoothen the procurement of these items. A Financial Management Specialist

participated in the last implementation support mission of the project. However, no issue related to financial management was raised in the ISR nor in the aide-memoire. There was no financial audit performed during implementation. The final financial audit of the project is due no later than March 31, 2016.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

40. The TCU was located within, and included some of the staff of the Department of Rural Engineering of the MoA. This meant that key project staff, including the project coordinator, the agronomist and most field assistants remained in the MoA after project closing. The on-going Private Sector Rehabilitation and Agribusiness Development Project (approved by the Board in May 2014) is relying on these staff to channel technical support to the smallholder rice farmers who benefitted from the project. This support includes advisory services as well as matching grants for input supply. Furthermore, a joint WFP-FAO intervention is at an early stage of identification. This operation (US$10-12 million) will target women rice and horticulture farmers and will include a savings-credit component. This project targets some of the beneficiaries of the SEFSSP.

41. The 250 power tillers that the project procured were still in one of the regional warehouses of the MoA. They are destined to 250 farmer organizations each with a 10-hectare collective rice farm. The equipment was not distributed because 250 tiller operators (one per farmer organization) needed to be trained. Resources to finance the training was not available. The ICR mission worked with the TCU to find a way to distribute these power tillers to the beneficiaries before the next crop season starts.

42. An action plan was developed and agreed including: (i) identification of the operators to be trained; (ii) training schedule per region; and (iii) distribution of the equipment was agreed. After several meetings with the authorities, including the Minister of Agriculture, a third of the training budget was secured. The mission was also able to secure co-financing from WFP in cash or in-kind (food for the 250 trainees for duration of the training). Before the end of the ICR mission, a team from the Rural Engineering Department of the MoA was in the field to begin the identification of the trainees in each community benefiting from a tiller. The training sessions started on February 22, 2016. All the power tillers will reach their intended beneficiaries by early May 2016.

43. The ICR mission also discussed the criteria for selecting the farmer organizations benefiting from the power tillers, and the conditions for using this equipment. As proposed in the PAD, the rental fees of the tillers would finance the operating and maintenance costs (fuel and spare parts). The mission also advised that a portion of these fees be allocated to an amortization account in order to help pay for the replacement of the equipment.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of objectives

Modest

44. By the time the project closed on September 30, 2015, it had been about 12 months since the operation was approved by the Board. During this period, the country context had changed little. In fact, both the January 2015 Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) and the March 2015 Country Engagement Note (CEN) for FY15-16 describe a country context (poverty rates, macroeconomic and growth constraints, fragility conditions, etc.) similar to

the one described in the 2014 PAD. The CEM clearly states that increasing the productivity of rice would not only increase food security, especially for the poor, but also help to diversify the agricultural economy dominated by the production of cashew nuts.

45. In addition to modern inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizer, the CEM advocates that the rehabilitation of mangrove and low-land rice fields would be a critical investment for increasing rice productivity and production. The CEM also mentions that because poverty is so widespread and government capacity to deliver urgently needed services is limited, social assistance programs such as cash transfer, food-for-work and other safety net interventions should be part of Guinea Bissau's agenda for economic revitalization.

46. The CEN stresses that the agricultural sector is the bedrock of the country's development trajectory, and is fundamental to addressing the food security challenges faced by the poor, especially in the rural areas. It agrees that it is critical to increase the productivity and production of rice in rural areas through improved technology and increased irrigation investment in order to increase food security.

47. The similarity in the baseline country conditions at appraisal and at the ICR stage would suggest that improving food security for the vulnerable populations could be a legitimate project development objective. This objective is emphasized in both the Government's development strategies and in the CEN and the CEM. However, no matter how one defines food security, it should cover the basic human need of having adequate food to eat regularly in order to live an active and healthy life.

48. Based on the widely accepted definition of food security quoted in paragraph 23, achieving the PDO would be problematic given the project duration and design, as discussed below. In short, while seemingly legitimate on face value, the PDO was not achievable. A modest PDO such as "to improve short term food access for vulnerable populations" would have been more relevant, and would have matched the school feeding and food-for work schemes, while also accommodating the medium term objective of increased food supply through the distribution of modern agricultural inputs and farm tools. Consequently, the relevance of the project objectives is rated "modest".

Relevance of design and implementation
Negligible

49. The CEN has observed that insufficient funding, understaffing, and institutional and managerial inefficiencies are major causes for weak service delivery. Hence the WBG's strong engagement in; (i) building institutions and strengthening public sector capacity; (ii) strengthening the provision of basic services; and (iii) providing people with the resources and skills that they need to create and take advantage of economic opportunities.

50. The CEM states that strengthening the capacity of the government is a necessary condition in seeking to improve public policy and service delivery for the benefit of Bissau-Guineans. Since it takes time to build government capacity, the CEM recommends technical assistance to strengthen public institutions. It stresses executing projects through Project Implementation Units (PIUs), leveraging the support of non-state actors such as NGOs that are very active in local development initiatives. The CEM specifically highlights the role of NGOs in delivering extension services for the intensification of rice

production given the capacity constraints of government agencies.

51. The project design acknowledged these challenges pertaining to the implementation capacity of the country by rating the project risk level as substantial. The team also adopted a project design that was fairly simple with only two investment components and a coordination component. WFP's well established experience in school feeding and food-for-work programs, and their strong knowledge of the country context are strong assets that aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of the country's weak implementation capacity. A dedicated TCU and WFP shared the implementation responsibilities. WFP contracted and trained NGOs who provided a wide range of services including technical and advisory services to farmers, food distribution, and monitoring school feeding activities.

52. The team exerted a very high level of effort in order to ensure that all the planned activities were implemented by the end of the project. These efforts ought to be acknowledged. However, several factors undermined the achievement of the expected results. First, as mentioned above, the PDO was too ambitious and could not be achieved during the time frame of 9 months allocated to project implementation. Second, some of the results indicators are not pertinent, and all the indicators included in the results framework are output-oriented. There is no measurable outcome indicator that would help to track the causal link between the project outputs and the food security status of the targeted vulnerable populations. Third, the arrangements and responsibilities for M&E, and the use of M&E were deficient. These shortcomings that plagued the design and implementation of the project at appraisal and thereafter, are also valid at the ICR stage. Consequently, the relevance of project design and implementation is rated "negligible".

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

53. Given the limited time frame of the project and the country's weak capacity, the high levels of outputs delivered by the project ought to be commended. In fact, the project exceeded the targets for most of the indicators, including the number of school children and girls benefitting from school feeding and take-home rations, the number of participants in the food-for-work scheme, the land area rehabilitated for rice production, and the number of direct project beneficiaries. This being said, these achievements have two important shortcomings.

54. The first shortcoming is related to the procurement and delivery of the improved agricultural inputs to farmers. The improved seeds and fertilizer were delivered late in the season (late August to early September). Therefore, some of these inputs were not used, at least not fully and appropriately in the 2015-2016 cropping season. For example, 30-40% of the urea (fertilizer) procured was kept in the regional warehouses of the MoA because it was too late to distribute them to the intended farmers. Also, the 250 rice tillers procured in order to help farmer associations to open new land (2,500 ha) for rice production were not distributed to the intended beneficiaries. These factors could have reduced the level of the productivity and production expected from the use of these modern inputs in the project areas. However, it is important to mention that the inputs and farm equipment that were not used last year will be used during in the 2016-2017 farming season. In a context where access to modern inputs constitutes a major obstacle to increasing agricultural productivity and the supply of food, access to these inputs will have noticeable impact on the output of rice farms.

55. The second shortcoming has an overriding effect on the achievement of the project, especially its development outcome. This shortcoming is related to the link between the outputs of the project and its intended objective of improving food security for vulnerable populations, including children. Since the results framework did not include any outcome indicator of food security it is difficult to assess the extent to which any of the project outputs has improved food security for vulnerable populations. As already mentioned, food security is a multi-dimensional concept, and for a project it would require, at least, that vulnerable populations have access (physical and economic) to adequate (quantity and quality) food at all times. Even in the absence of any outcome indicator, one could attempt to discuss how the project outputs related to the PDO indicators would meet these food security requirements: availability, access, nutritional value, and stability (access at all times).

56. School feeding: *Output*: The project provided daily meals to 35,115 school children for 96 days, and take-home rations to 5,299 school girls. *Outcome*: despite the undeniable importance of this output in the children's physical and cognitive development, it only addresses partial daily availability (one meal per day) and during a limited period of 96 days; appropriate nutritional value of the food rations is assumed, without stability of access.

57. Generation of employment: *Output*: the project generated short term employment under the food-for-work scheme for 4,403 participants who worked for 71 days and contributed total work days of 312,613 paid in the form of one food ration per day. *Outcome*: food availability and access are increased for only 71 days; while the nutritional value of the rations is assumed, there is no secure access (at all times).

58. Rehabilitation of land for rice cultivation: *Output*: The project rehabilitated 5,301 hectares of land through food-for-work activities. *Outcome*: rehabilitation of land per se does not contribute to food security. It is certain that the harvest contributed to increased food supply and availability for the farm households farming the rehabilitated rice fields. Since the project closed before the harvest season, and no data was collected on output following the harvest, the extent to which food availability increased at the household level and in the targeted areas remains unclear. At the time of the ICR mission, there was little evidence to suggest that any alleged increased food supply would be sustained over time. . Not only is secure access uncertain, but nutritional value is questionable since rice is the only crop supported.

59. Provision of agricultural inputs: *Outputs*: The project procured 250 tons of improved seeds and 444 tons of fertilizer; these inputs were distributed to 16,259 farmers (12,000 women farmers). *Outcome*: It is certain that these modern agricultural inputs will help to increase rice yields and productivity, thereby increasing food supply and access at the household level. The overall beneficial effect of these inputs was reduced by their late or partial distribution to the famers. In the absence of data on the quantity of harvested rice crop, the extent of food availability, access and stability over time associated with the use of these inputs is unknown. Nutritional value is also questionable to some extent.

60. In addition to the above-mentioned issues, it worth to mention that the lack of a clear definition of "vulnerable population" in the PDO complicate the assessment of the project achievements and results. In fact, the ability to ensure adequate food security for the vulnerable populations hinges on the ability to identify clearly the vulnerable

households or population, or at least the range of factors (permanent or transitory) that place households at risk of becoming food insecure. A clear definition of this targeted population would had helped to determine if some of the project achievements could potentially address the root causes of these vulnerability and risk factors. The PDO mentioned only one category of vulnerable population group: school children.

3.3 Efficiency

61. The project procured and distributed improved agricultural inputs to small-scale farmers with the aim to increase productivity and total output of rice crops. It also procured small farm tools and 250 power tillers for the same purpose. Unfortunately, the project closed before the harvest of the first and only harvest season during its implementation. The Government was not able to collect data on harvest and farm budgets in the project areas. Consequently, it was not possible to conduct an economic and financial analysis of the farm investments at ICR stage.

62. Also, WFP did not collect any data on the outcome of the school feeding scheme. Although the time was too short to measure the outcome in terms of physical and cognitive development, the long-term engagement of this implementing agency in the county should have helped to develop good estimates that one could use to derive the potential benefits of the school feeding activities of the project. These benefits could provide the basis for conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis. In sum, the deficiencies in the M&E system of the project resulted in the lack of data necessary to conduct a robust economic and financial analysis of the project achievements. This being said, an attempt is made to discuss and assess the extent to which the delivery mechanisms used by the project followed least-cost approaches. The narrative of this assessment is provided below.

Efficiency of project delivery mechanisms

63. School feeding and food-for-work schemes: The activities of each of the project components were planned and delivered through the lowest cost options available at the time of implementation. The choice of the beneficiary schools for the school feeding scheme followed a two-fold process. First, based on the results of the WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), three regions including Quinara, Gabu and Biombo were selected. These regions were among those that suffered the most from the 2013 cashew crisis when the reduction of the producer price resulted in income losses with adverse consequences on households' food and nutrition security. Second, the selection of the beneficiary schools within each region is based on the existence of the so-called Essential Learning Package (ELP) necessary to accommodate the school feeding program. This package includes: (i) reliable water supply, safe infrastructure for the students; (ii) existence of didactic materials; (iii) trained teachers; (iv) availability of a kitchen and a warehouse; and (v) willingness of the community and the parent-teacher association to participate in the school feeding program by creating a food management committee, and by providing cooks and wood for food preparation.

64. Ensuring that safety net schemes such as cash or food-for-work are delivered to the neediest individuals without leaking out to better off segments of the population is a continuing challenge. Such leakage and other forms of undesirable uses including elite capture and corruption tend to increase the total cost of delivering these safety net schemes, thereby reducing the net socioeconomic benefits to society. Effective methods for targeting those who need the goods or services of the safety net most can help to avoid these

unnecessary costs and waste. However, targeting also entails some cost. This cost is associated with definition of eligibility criteria and applying these criteria effectively so as to exclude the undeserving individuals. One way to minimize this targeting cost consists in designing a program that discourages the participation of the undeserving. A program that distributes goods which are primarily consumed by the poor can meet this objective. Recipients in this program decide themselves whether or not to participate.

65. By distributing daily food rations consisting mainly of rice (main staple food of the country) to participants, the food-for-work scheme attracted only the rural poor and food insecure. Representatives of the field staff of the MoA, the regional TCU staff, the Field NGOs, and WFP field staff supervised the distribution of the daily rations to the participants. The food-for-work activities took place in accessible (relatively good feeder roads) areas suffering from severe degradation of mangrove and low-land for rice production, and where the local communities created farmer' associations to maintain the dykes, drainage canals and anti-erosion structures constructed through the food-for-work scheme.

66. Provision of agricultural inputs and services to smallholders: The purchase of the food, agricultural inputs, and power tillers was done through competitive bidding, thereby assuring lowest cost and economy. The suppliers provided transportation from the capital city to the main regional cities. From these central locations, the intended beneficiaries assured transportation to their respective communities. This delivery arrangement helped to ensure cost-effectiveness.

67. It can be said that the school feeding and the food-for-work schemes, and the provision of the agricultural inputs were implemented using the best option available for achieving the most advantageous cost-benefit ratio. The use of proven local stakeholder participation processes used in the first project, and effective collaboration among Government, NGO, and WFP staff also helped to optimize the technical efficiency of the activities.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

68. The foregoing discussion (sub-section 3.2) shows that the project helped to increased food access and consumption temporarily for the targeted vulnerable populations, such as children through the school feeding scheme, and small-scale farmers facing food shortages through the food-for-work scheme. The project also helped to enhance the capacity of small-scale farmers to increase food supply through a one-time provision of modern agricultural inputs and farm tools. These achievements have undeniable welfare benefits on the poor living in the targeted areas. The project activities directly benefited 55,777 people. Using the average number of 7 members per household, his would amount to about 390,000 direct and indict beneficiaries.

69. However, the causal link between the project outputs and improved food security of the vulnerable populations is weak. In fact, there is no evidence that the project contributed to improved food security. To be sure, the time frame of the project did not allow the achievement of such an outcome in the context of Guinea Bissau. Consequently, the rating of the project development objectives is: "Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU)".

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

70. This project helped to address the needs of the poor in two areas that contributed to the welfare of the targeted population groups in the short and long term.

71. Food security, nutrition and educational impacts: The school feeding activities of the project provided an explicit welfare transfer (to households) equivalent to the value of the food distributed to the students. These activities provided: (i) one daily meal to 35,115 students (18,063 boys and 17,052 girls) in 150 schools[5] against 17,500 students in 75 schools as planned; and (ii) take home rations to 5,299 girls (who received a total of 105.8 tons of rice) against 2,500 girls as planned during 96 days instead of 160 days. These daily meals and take-home rations yielded significant food security and nutrition benefits in a country where food insecurity and poverty rates are high, particularly in rural areas. A recent study reported that these benefits can be as high as 10% of the households' income. Moreover, it is now well established that school feeding schemes increase school attendance, cognition and educational achievement, especially if micronutrient fortification is added. These schemes also had a strong gender dimension where they target girls and girls' education.

72. Employment and improved short-term food security: The food-for-work activities helped to meet the needs of food insecure community members during the slack season. These activities also helped to create productive assets in the form of rehabilitated rice fields, thereby contributing to laying the foundation for increased food production and hence food security. The food-for-work scheme generated 312,613 work days of employment for 4,403 farmers. This work helped to rehabilitate 5,301 ha of mangrove land and low-land for rice cultivation. This additional land area has the potential to produce at least 7,950 tons of paddy rice yearly, at the current level of average yield of mangrove and low-land rice. Total paddy output could double (12,000 to 16,000 tons) with the use of modern inputs, adoption of appropriate intensification technology as supported under project component 2. This potential increase in rice production will help to increase food availability and access in the areas where the rehabilitated rice fields are located.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

73. The implementation of the project contributed to capacity strengthening at three levels. First, Government institutions, especially the Department of Rural Engineering of the MoA, was upgraded through the acquisition of computer and other ICT equipment that helped to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the work force. The project also equipped the soil laboratory. This upgraded the capacity of the Department in the analysis of soil properties and the choice of fertilizer formulations that maximize the response and yields of rice and other crops. Most importantly, the staff at the central and regional level benefited from training in project management, activity planning and monitoring. The field staff of the Ministry of Education also benefitted from training in delivering and monitoring school feeding activities.

74. Second, the NGOs contracted by WFP benefitted from training aimed to strengthen their capacity in managing micro-projects, including community engagement, activity planning, monitoring and evaluation. Third, the contracted NGOs and the field staff of the

[5] Two meals were served a day. The school calendar in Guinea-Bissau that is two sets of students: one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Both sets received the same daily meal.

MoA delivered training sessions to community and farmer associations in order to strengthen their capacity in improved agronomic practices, improved harvest and post-harvest technologies, the maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, and the management of the potential environmental issues, especially using integrated pest management techniques. The technical and organizational skills acquired by the stakeholders will help to improve the implementation of future development interventions in the country.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

75. No other unintended outcomes and impacts were identified.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

76. No beneficiary assessment was conducted due to lack of time during implementation, as major activities such as the delivery of the agricultural inputs and the power tillers were acquired right at the end of the project. Though a beneficiary survey could have been conducted for the school feeding and food-for-work activities since they were completed at least two months before the closing date of the project. No budget resources were available during the ICR mission to conduct a survey or beneficiary assessment.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Significant

77. Taking advantage of the project achievements, sustaining the development outcome will require a more systematic and policy-driven approach in the areas covered by the project interventions. Unfortunately, the current policy development and implementation framework exhibits a number of factors that would pose noticeable risks to the development outcome of the project. These risks are systemic in nature and relate to the fragility context of the country, the weak capacity of the public administration, and the weak macro-fiscal framework. While the level of political and fragility risks may seem moderate, the risk levels associated with the two other factors are high. However, some aspects of project achievements, especially the strengthened technical, organizational and managerial capacity of key stakeholders could mitigate the adverse effects of these systemic risks. Therefore, the Risk to development outcome is “Significant”. These risk factors are discussed below.

78. ***Systemic political and fragility risks***: Although Guinea-Bissau now has an opportunity to build a more prosperous future following the 2014 elections, the country still faces some important risks, primarily in the areas of fragility, political instability and governance. In spite of progress on the political transition and formation of an inclusive Government, concerns persist about possible deterioration of the political environment, including involvement of the military. The latest political crisis that emerged in August 2015 between two political factions still seems not fully resolved despite the mediation of ECOWAS. The WBG is working closely with the international community to monitor the political situation. Any interruption of the current inclusive and peaceful political process will induce a lethargic situation in Government institutions, including the MoA and the Ministry of Education responsible for following up on the project achievements, thereby posing substantial risk to their sustainability.

79. ***Risk associated with a weak public administration***: In order to tackle its

development challenges effectively, Guinea Bissau will have to address the underlying technical and institutional weaknesses of its public administration. According to the results of the 2009-2010 audit of the public administration, Guinea Bissau civil servants are unusually old with almost 65% of them being 40 years of age or older. There is also an urgent need to strengthen the capacity of these civil servants, as only 14.2% of public employees hold a bachelor degree or above, while over 24% have 6 years of formal education or less. Some agencies and line ministries are overstaffed while others lack the necessary manpower to execute their mandate effectively. These weaknesses translate into deficient or missing sectoral policies. For example, there are no social safety net programs despite the existence of widespread poverty (extreme poverty rate was 45% in 2013). Also, the level of national agricultural investment plan derived from the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) as articulated in priority spending programs remains unclear. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the MoA, the Ministry of Education, and other government agencies will have the technical and organizational capacity necessary to sustain the development outcome achieved by the project.

80. ***Weak public finance and macro-fiscal stance***: Although Guinea Bissau made noticeable progress since joining the West African Economic and Monetary Union, more challenges remain in the fiscal and public expenditure administration. Since the 2012 military coup, the country is still in the process of rebuilding its fiscal management capacity and institutions. Urgent changes are needed in revenue and expenditure policies in order to ensure that revenue administration and public expenditure management effectively leverage the country's scarce human resources. On the expenditure side, off-budget transactions, lack of transparent procurement and payment procedures for goods and services and weak capacity for expenditure management and control constitute major challenges.

81. On the fiscal side, capacity for effective revenue administration is weak. In addition, fiscal policy is severely limited by a small revenue base. This reduces considerably the capacity of the government to maintain the macro-fiscal stability indispensable for assuring an adequate level of economic activity and for service delivery. The failure to deliver the training for the power tillers to the intended beneficiaries, and the fact that the data on the paddy harvested by the rice farmers supported by the project was not collected result from these fiscal constraints. This limited fiscal space is a major obstacle that will prevent the Government to maintain and expend as needed the development outcome of the project. The provision of extension services to farmers in the project areas, assistance to farmer organizations for the marketing of their production surplus and for securing timely access to agricultural inputs, transitioning from externally funded to school feeding schemes supported by domestic resources are not likely to happen under the current tight fiscal conditions.

82. ***Favorable sustainability factors in project achievements***: The achievements of the project include factors that will contribute to sustaining core elements of the development outcome. These factors include the following:

- ✓ The rehabilitation of 5,301 ha of rice fields, the development of 2,500 ha of new rice field as a result of the use of power tillers, and the provision of modern agricultural inputs constitute critical productive assets that will increase the productivity of both land and labor of the beneficiaries, thereby increasing their income;

- ✓ The increased capacity of the farmers' associations in improved agronomic practices, organizational and managerial management will help sustain the productivity and financial profitability of the initial investment in modern inputs and equipment, thereby increasing the likelihood that farm households will attain and maintain food security;
- ✓ The creation of management committees to ensure effective use and maintenance of collective equipment and productive infrastructure (irrigation canals, anti-erosion structures, etc.) will ensure that the farmers' own resources are invested in maintaining and expanding the base of the productive assets;
- ✓ In some of the project areas farmers' were contributing resources to pay for advisory services provided by NGOs; this will help to mitigate the adverse effects of low sector budgets;
- ✓ There is a strong commitment of the Regional Agriculture Directorate and Local Authorities to continue to support the farmer associations of the project areas in order to prevent the deterioration of the food security situation.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

83. The task team met the challenge of preparing an emergency operation in response to the Client's needs to mitigate the adverse impact of food shortage on vulnerable population groups. Drawing on the lessons learned from the previous emergency food security investment project, the joint Bank-Government preparation team was able to identify the possible risks to the results expected from the project, and to adopt mitigation measures accordingly. However, the team's response to Bank management recommendation to adjust the project scope for the new food emergency situation of the country did not seem adequate. The Project Development Objective of improving food security for vulnerable population groups through a 9 month-project seemed too ambitious.

84. A PDO statement that captures this limited scope of activities would have been more appropriate. In particular, the PDO should have focused on short-term emergency food relief measures through the school feeding and food-for-work activities, while limiting the activities pertaining to modern agricultural inputs and equipment to only the procurement of these goods. The fact that the provision of the agricultural inputs also included distribution to the intended beneficiaries in such a short duration of the project resulted in the failure to ensure a timely delivery of these goods to the famers in some areas.

85. The PDO indicators were output-oriented and exhibited a weak causality link with the stated project development outcome. By focusing only on intermediate results, the indicators included in result framework failed to demonstrate convincingly that the project improved the food security situation of the targeted populations. The theory of change that the result chain portrayed was not robust enough in all aspects. Also, the fact that the project closed before the first harvest of the supported farmers created technical difficulties in measuring the extent to which the project set in motion a durable process for achieving food security in the project areas, and for the most vulnerable populations.

86. While the PAD described the M&E activities to be carried out, it did not provide a

clear articulation of an integrated M&E system, including the key building blocks. The design of this system was left to the M&E specialist of the TCU. Unfortunately, the TCU did not have a dedicated M&E, and no formal M&E system was ever put in place. While the data and information available is adequate for measuring the achievements of the project, they emanated from two parallel results frameworks used by the TCU and WFP. None of these implementing entities had an M&E specialist, and there was little coordination and quality control of the data and information used.

87. Although the TCU had implemented the first food security project, it was not familiar with the "client connection" system which was not in use at that time. The lack of knowledge of this disbursement procedure was the cause of the delay in submitting the initial request to the Bank, and receiving the grant resources into the project account. Timely training of the TCU staff would have prevented this 2 month-delay (from late February to early May) and improved the implementation readiness of the project. These shortcomings justify the "Moderately Unsatisfactory" rating for "Quality at entry".

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

88. Despite political instability the Bank provided active supervision support, closely monitoring progress and adjusting the Project as necessary to facilitate effective implementation. Three implementation support missions were conducted during a 9-month period. The strong and collective efforts by the Sector Management Units (Agriculture and Fiduciary) and the Country Management Unit were decisive factors for the project achievements and high disbursement rate.

89. In particular, the Bank procurement team provided a strong and intense technical support that was highly appreciated by the Government. This team was very responsive and effective in resolving issues on procurement of goods. The team recommended and helped the Client to implement streamlined procurement processes in order to ensure that all the planned acquisition of goods, especially the agricultural inputs and equipment were completed before the end of the project. Overall, the team's efforts in ensuring that all project activities were implemented in a very short time frame of the project deserve recognition and ought to be commended.

90. This being said, the team was not proactive in addressing a number of issues. First, having acknowledged the lack of capacity and unsatisfactory M&E activities, the team should have provided timely short term technical assistance in order to ensure that an effective M&E system is put in place at the TCU and at WFP. Second, the team should have ensured that the Government collected data on the rice harvest in order to document the actual contribution of the project (provision of agricultural inputs and equipment) to increased food supply. Third, the team should have ensured that a beneficiary survey was conducted, especially for the school feeding and food-for-work activities which were completed at least two months before the project closing of the project. Fourth, the team should have worked with the Government to ensure that the 250 power tillers were distributed to the intended beneficiaries in a timely manner. Failure to take action on these important operational issues affected the development effectiveness of the project and the assessment of its achievements negatively. On balance, these implementation support achievements and issues warrant the "Moderately Satisfactory" rating for "Quality of Supervision".

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

91. The task team assessed the level of operational risk correctly, and adopted relatively good mitigation measures by keeping the design simple and by resorting to WFP for the implementation of the activities in which this organization has strong expertise and experience. However, the PDO was too ambitious given the short project time frame, and the results framework had many shortcomings related to the indicators and to the design of the M&E system.

92. The Bank team was proactive in resolving operational issues arising during supervision and use of alternative ways of project supervision when the political environment in the country was not conducive for country visit. The degree of proactivity was particularly strong for procurement issues as reflected in the streamlining of the procurement process to speed up the provision of needed agriculture equipment in a relatively short period. However, the implementation support was less effective in addressing shortcomings of the M&E system, and critical post completion issues. Overall, the initial design flaws of the projects overwhelmed the commendable implementation efforts, and resulted in the fact that agricultural inputs and equipment were not delivered in a timely manner to the farmers. This assessment justifies the "Moderately Unsatisfactory" rating for "Overall Bank Performance".

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

93. The commitment and ownership of the Government was adequate during preparation and implementation. An inter-ministerial steering committee composed of representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Education, Social Affairs, Agriculture and other relevant government entities participated actively in all the technical meetings for project preparation. Overall, Government ownership and commitment to achieving the project objectives was strong both at appraisal and during implementation. Senior Government officials were readily available and participated effectively in implementation support missions and subsequent follow-up discussions, when necessary.

94. However, the Government's performance towards meeting the project's effectiveness conditions was not adequate, and led to an unnecessary delay. M&E arrangements were inadequate, and transition arrangements to ensue support to critical activities after project closing were not adequate. Overall, the Government was not able to identify and to address the threats to the sustainability of the project achievements effectively. The "Moderately Unsatisfactory" rating is based on the foregoing assessment.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

95. The Grant under this project had two Recipients: WFP and the Government of Guinea-Bissau. The Government of Guinea-Bissau was represented by the MoA. The TCU (under MoA) was responsible for coordinating overall implementation of the project activities. The TCU put together a competent team and pursued every opportunity aimed

at enhancing the capacity of this team through targeted training under the project. This team worked tirelessly toward meeting the project objectives. The Project coordinator (who is the Director of the Rural Engineering Department of the MoA) provided the necessary leadership, motivated TCU staff and developed very good working relations with the cooperating agencies (specially the WFP).

96. WFP performed well under the circumstances because of the high level of implementation readiness. WFP worked under a very tight time line, met deadlines despite delay in receiving funds from the Bank, and committed its own resources to start implementing the school feeding program. With the participation of the TCU, local NGOs, community organizations and beneficiaries both the school feeding and work-for-food programs were completed by June 30, 2015.

97. Both the TCU and WFP had some performance issues. Both implementing agencies failed to recruit M&E specialists; this shortcoming resulted in a lack of an articulated and effective M&E system to monitor implementation progress, guide project management, and construct the evidence base necessary to assess the achievements of the project objectively. The TCU failed to ensure good coordination of the M&E activities and to provide effective quality control of the information and data collected. Also, the TCU was not proactive in assuring that beneficiary surveys are conducted before the project closing, and to use alternative resources to collect the harvest data necessary to document the impact of the project on agricultural productivity and food supply. The "Moderately Satisfactory" rating is based on this assessment.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

98. Overall, Government ownership and commitment to achieving the project objectives was strong both at appraisal and during implementation. The TCU put together a competent team and pursued every opportunity to enhance the capacity of this team through targeted training under the project. This team worked tirelessly toward meeting the project objectives. WFP worked under a very tight time line, met deadlines despite delay in receiving funds from the Bank, and committed its own resources to start implementing the school feeding program. With the participation of the TCU, local NGOs, community organizations and beneficiaries both the school feeding and work-for-food programs were completed by June 30, 2015.

99. However, the performance of the Borrower and the implementing agencies in a few areas was not adequate. M&E arrangements were inadequate, and transition arrangements to ensue support to critical activities after project closing were not adequate. Overall, the Borrower was not able to identify and to address the threats to the sustainability of the project achievements effectively. The TCU and WFP failed to put in effective M&E systems, and the TCU did not develop an integrated M&E plan to monitor the performance of overall project activities, to assure quality control and to guide implementation and project management effectively. Based on this assessment, the rating for Overall Borrower Performance is "Moderately Unsatisfactory".

6. Lessons Learned

100. **Reliance on partner development agencies with comparative advantage is important for achieving success**: This project demonstrated once again the importance

of relying on a partner institution with proven comparative advantage and experience, when preparing and implementing emergency projects. WFP's experience and know-how in school feeding and food-for-work played a crucial role in the achievement of the project development objectives, even though they failed to put in place an effective M&E system that would have helped to capture the development outcome of the important outputs achieved. The flexibility of WFP helped to mitigate the adverse effects of the delayed project effectiveness by starting the activities before the funds were made available. The NGOs that WFP contracted played an effective role in facilitating the implementation of joint activities between WFP, the TCU, the field staff of the Ministries of Agriculture and Education (school feeding activities).

101. **Collaboration among implementing agencies is key**. The successful implementation of this project can be attributed to an effective collaboration and coordination among the multiple stakeholders and implementing entities involved, including the TCU, WFP, regional technical offices (MoA and Ministry of Education), local NGOs and World Bank teams. In the absence of this effective teamwork, it would have been difficult to implement this project successfully given the shortened implementation period.

102. **Country ownership is important**: The importance of country ownership is crucial both for implementation success and for sustaining the achievements of the project following its completion. Country ownership was rather strong during implementation. This helped to achieve the project objectives despite the shortened implementation period. However, the degree of ownership following the completion of the project was not adequate. Follow-up activities such as the distribution of the power tillers to the intended farmer organizations was being completed five months after the closing of the project. Given the lack of capacity and the limited budgetary resources in this post-conflict country, the project team should have worked with the authorities before the closing of the project to ensure that adequate resources are allocated for the training of the tiller operators and the distribution of this farm equipment.

103. **Importance of adjusting the implementation time frame with the scope of the planned intervention**: An important lesson learned from the design and development outcome of this operation is that the mismatch between the PDO, and the nature and scope of the planned activities-- especially under project component 2, on the one hand, and the duration of the implementation period, on the other hand affected the achievements of the project negatively. The implementation period was too short to be able to improve the food security of vulnerable population groups. Also, the type of procurement work involved increased the implementation risks given the duration of the project.

104. In order to minimize these operational risks associated with the time frame of the operation, the design of emergency projects should adopt modest development objectives that are compatible with the time allocated to implementing the proposed interventions. Implementation readiness, especially on the fiduciary side is a crucial risk reducing measure in such projects. In particular, procurement preparatory work should go beyond a procurement plan. As much as possible, the task teams should get the biding documents ready by project effectiveness. This is particularly important when these projects involve the procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs to farmers. In such cases, the procurement of the inputs for the next farming season should start in the current year so that the distribution to the beneficiaries is timely. In sum, matching the time frame of

projects, especially emergency projects with scope of planned activities deserves greater attention than is often the case at design stage. This would help task teams to form realistic expectations of what can be achieved over what time frame, and about the operational risks involved.

105. **Importance of a sound M&E system and accountability for results**: Delivering results requires high quality and effective implementation readiness arrangements. A sound results framework is a critical tool of these arrangements. A robust results framework should include all building blocks that ensure the efficient allocation and management of the project resources (inputs) to generate the outputs necessary for achieving the expected development outcome of the project. An M&E system that articulates clearly this result chain and the underlying cause-effect linkages is at the core of such robust results framework. This M&E system must be described clearly in the project documents (PAD and implementation manuals). Leaving it to the project implementation units to design and implement the M&E system is likely to result in an ineffective and failed result framework. This would make it difficult to develop a coherent and strong story line documenting the achievements of the project.

106. Given scare resources and demanding development objectives, it is essential to leverage development partners' in order to achieve the outcome expected from investment operations. However, assuring accountability for results for all participants involved in implementation is crucial, and requires strong leadership and commitment for results from all, especially on the part of the Borrower. The Borrower must ensure that all implementing agencies and partners put in place instruments and methods that ensure a systematic monitoring of implementation progress and results, and a thorough evaluation of the impact of the project operations. Without such a leadership, it is difficult to ensure the high quality implementation necessary to achieve development effectiveness measurable through objective outcome indicators.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee

(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies

107. While the Government stressed the adverse consequences of the delayed effectiveness of the project on the results of the interventions at the completion of the project, the authorities also expressed their satisfaction about the results given the short implementation period. They credited the good collaboration among all the stakeholders involved in the implementation of the activities, and the strong technical support that the TCU received from the Bank team, especially on procurement for the good satisfactory results of the project. The technical evaluation report of the Government includes lessons learned from the implementation of this project, and recommendations for addressing some of the constraints encountered during the implementation of the activities. These lessons and recommendations are presented below (see annex 7 for a summary of the Government's technical evaluation report).

108. **Lessons learned**: The lessons learned from the implementation of the Second Emergency Food Security Support Project which may serve other phases of the project or similar projects are as follows:

- Equity and transparency in the distribution of procured goods is important in order to avoid frustration and conflict: most of the goods and equipment purchased under

the project were properly distributed in a transparent manner on the basis of pre-set criteria, and the beneficiaries covered the transportation costs to their communities (as part of the 10% in-kind matching grants contribution);

- Ownership of the project by the farmers associations (FA) is important for effective farmer support operations;
- Participatory Project Coordination approach whereby all actors are involved in decision-making regarding the life of the project led to satisfactory project results;
- Regular monitoring of FAs' activities by the project staff is important for successful implementation;
- Effective collaboration between TCU, Government and the World Band team was an important factor for the success of the project;
- Community engagement, good communication and NGOs' assistance in promoting good agricultural practices are important factors for success of the ;
- Project execution period was extremely short, this constrained project impact evaluation.

109. **Recommendations**: Given the constraints encountered during the implementation of project activities, the following are recommended:

- Reinforce the institutional collaboration between the various actors (project, NGOs, Regional Structures of the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities in the monitoring and consolidation of project activities;
- Reinforce low-land rehabilitation initiative and rural feeder road rehabilitation in order to facilitate the marketing of agricultural products;
- Reinforce the training of members of FAs for the maintenance of equipment, accounting and organizational management and introducing literacy program for women;
- Reinforce gender participation for the forthcoming training sessions, particularly for the regions of Bafata and Gabu in rice cultivation;
- Introduce the supply of motor-pumps and its accessories for irrigation for double rice cultivation throughout the year in the regions of Bafata and Gabu (Bafata-Campossa; Contuboel and Sonaco-APALCOF-TESITO);
- Increase the use of power tillers in order to expand the cultivated areas and to reduce the workload on women who provide the largest workforce in rice production; and
- Reinforce the supply in herbicides, fertilizers and improved rice seeds.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1: Support to the most vulnerable population	**2.15**	**2.15**	**100%**
Sub-component 1.1: School feeding program	0.80	0.80	100%
Sub-component 1.2: Food-for-work program	1.35	1.35	100%
Component 2: Provision of improved agricultural inputs and services	**4.00**	**4.261**	**106.5**
Sub-component 2.1: Modern agricultural inputs	1.30	1.332	102.5%
Sub-component 2.2: Small agricultural equipment	2.50	2.729	109%
Sub-component 2.3: Provision of technical support	0.20	0.20	100%
Component 3: Project coordination, monitoring and evaluation	**0.85**	**0.577**	**67.8%**
Total Project Costs	**7.00**	**6.988**	**99.8%**

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Global Food Crisis Response Program Trust Fund (TF 17872)	2.15	2.15	100%
Global Food Crisis Response Program Trust Fund (TF 17873)	4.85	4.651	95.8%
Total Financing	**7.00**	**6.801**	**97.14%**

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Support to the Most Vulnerable Population (US$2.15 million)

School feeding program:

1. This component financed activities that aimed to provide one meal a day to 17,500 (8,925 boys and 8,575 girls), students and Take Home Rations to 2,500 girl students for 160 days. In order to support these activities, WFP procured 780 metric tons of food as planned (484.6 tons of Sugar Corn and Salt; 46 tons of oil; 61.9 tons of canned fish; 93 tons of pulses; 94.1 tons rice). The implementation of the school feeding scheme started on February 16, 2015 and was completed on June 30, 2015. Due to the 4 month-delay in the start of the activities, WFP doubled the number of schools from 75 to 150 schools in order to use the procured food before the end of the school year. The number of estimated increased from 17,500 to 34,435.

2. At the end of the project and despite the delay, the school feeding program achieved satisfactory results. The program provided one daily meal to 35,115 students (18,063 boys and 17,052 girls) in 150 schools[6] against 17,500 students in 75 schools as planned, and take-home-rations (105.8 tons of rice) to 5,299 girls for 96 school days (instead of 160 school days). These 5,299 school girls received 508704 take-home-rations as compared to a target of 400,000 (i.e., 2,500 multiplied by 160 days). (See Table 2 below for details).

Table 2: Results of the School Feeding Scheme

Description	Unit	Planned	Actual	%Achieved
Days covers by the school feeding and take-home-rations	day	160	96	60%
Students receiving one meal a day	meal/day	17,500	35,115	201%
School girls who benefitted from take-home-rations	girls	2,500	5,299	212%

Food-for-work program

3. The food-for-work program aimed to provide temporary employment to 2,500 farmers for 100 days (250,000 work days) against payment in the form of food rations to 17,500 direct and indirect beneficiaries (i.e., on average 7 household members for each of the 2,500 participants). The activities under this program were to rehabilitate dykes to prevent salt water intrusion into mangrove rice fields, drainage channels and erosion control structures to reduce the sedimentation of low-land rice fields. These investments were to help reclaim 5000 ha of land for rice cultivation. The rehabilitation work was completed in 71 days from May 20 to July 31, 2015. To implement the work before the closing date and in anticipation of the rainy season, the program hired additional workers outside the targeted areas.

[6] Two meals were served a day. The school calendar in Guinea-Bissau has two shifts in a day; one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Students in both shifts received the same daily meal.

4. WFP estimated that about 1,078 metric tons of food would be needed for the food-for-work scheme. However, only 994.7 tons were distributed to beneficiaries (660 tons rice, 160 tons of pulses, 161, 8 tons of oil, 11.4 tons of salt). This amount of food paid for 312,613 work days executed by 4,403 farmers (i.e. 71 days for each of the 4,403 farmers) who rehabilitated 5,301 ha (including 2,532 ha of mangrove land, and 2,769.5 ha of low land). Consequently, the food-for-work activities exceeded the number of direct beneficiaries by 76%, the number of work days by 25%, and the size of the rehabilitated land by 6% (see table 3 for a summary).

Table 3: Results of the Food for Work Program

Description	Unit	Planned	Actual	%Achieved
Lowland area rehabilitated	Ha	3,000	2,769.5	92%
Mangrove land rehabilitated	Ha	2,000	2,532.0	127%
Farmer household beneficiaries	worker	2,500	4,403.0	176%
Work days	Days	250,000	312,613	125%

Component 2: Provision of Improved Agricultural Inputs and Services to Smallholders

Provision of agricultural inputs and basic tools

5. This component was designed to improve at least 4000 smallholder farmers' access to modern agricultural inputs, technology and services in order to increase rice production and productivity. It financed the following activities

- ✓ The provision of improved seeds for 5,000 ha (3,000 ha lowland and 2,000 ha mangrove land);
- ✓ The provision of fertilizer to lowland rice farmers through matching grants to cover 3,000 ha;
- ✓ The provision of basic production tools to all beneficiary farmers of the project (up to a total of 18,000 farmer);
- ✓ The provision of selected smallholder farmer groups of at least 20 members each with 250 power tillers to cultivate 2,500 ha (10 ha per group) of rice land
- ✓ The provision of training and equipment to the MOA staff in order to facilitate the implementation of activities such as basic topographic surveys and soil analysis.

6. For all matching grants, farmers were expected to make in-king contribution estimated at 10% of the value of the value of the inputs and equipment received. The results framework of the project shows that this component was to procure and distribute 320 tons of rice seeds and 300 tons of fertilizer.

7. The component procured 250 tons of improved rice seeds (150 tons for mangrove and 100 tons for low land) and procured locally 444 tons of fertilizer of which 50 percent (222 tons) NPK. About 222 tons of Urea were delivered in Bissau on August 28, 2015. At the end of the project, 250 tons of improved rice seeds were distributed against a project target 320 tons. Four hundred forty four (444 as compared to a target of 300) tons of fertilizers were distributed to 16,259 farmers including 12,000 women. This component achieved 78.12% of its target for rice seed distribution, and more than quadrupled the beneficiary

target for fertilizer distribution, whereas the targeted quantity of procured fertilizer was exceed by 48%.

8. This component procured 13.620 sets of 5 basic tools (shovels, Spades, pickaxes, and rakes cutting tools) were procured and distributed to 13.620 farmers. In addition, 297 PVC pipe of 30 cm of diameter were procured and benefited 16,620 farmers[7]. These agricultural inputs and basic tools helped to strengthen the capacity and productivity of the farmers cultivating the 5.301 ha of rehabilitated mangrove and lowland rice fields. It is important to mention that due to the delay in procuring the agricultural inputs, the distribution to farmers was not timely on some project areas. The MOA kept about 30-40% of the urea procured in 3 regional warehouses because it was too late to distribute these inputs to farmers. These agricultural inputs will be distributed to the intended beneficiaries during the 2016-2017 farming season.

9. Overall, the total number beneficiaries of the school feeding program (35,115 students, including 5,299 girls benefiting from take home rations), the provision of agricultural inputs and equipment (16259 farmers, including 12,000 women), and the food-for-work scheme (4,403 participants) amount to 55777

Table 3: Provision of Agricultural Inputs Indicators Achievement

Description	Unit	Planned	Actual	%Achieved
Quantity of seed distributed	Ton	320	250	78.12%
Quantity of fertilizer distributed	Ton	300	444	148.00%
Number of beneficiary farmers	farmer	4000	16,259(12,000 women)	406%%

Provision of small agricultural equipment

10. Although the 250 power tillers were procured before closing date of the project, they were not distributed to the beneficiaries, and were still in the warehouse five months after the closing of the project. The obstacle to getting these tillers to the beneficiaries was the lack of resources to finance the training of the 250 community members who will operate these tillers on behalf of the farmer associations. The ICR mission agreed with the authorities on an action plan to deliver these tillers to the farmer associations before the start of the next agricultural season.

11. The cost of the training sessions will be shared among WFP (cash or in-king in form of food for the trainees during the sessions), the private entity who supplied the tillers and who will supply the spare parts, and the Government. The identification of the trainees started before the end of the mission. The training sessions which started on February 22, 2016 will be completed by April 9, 2016. Each of the 250 farmer organizations will receive a power tiller after training of selected operators is completed.

[7] Many farmers benefitted from more than good supplied by the project (input, small equipment, PVC pipe, etc.).

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

The project procured and distributed improved agricultural inputs to small-scale farmers with the aim to increase productivity and total output of rice crops. It also procured small farm tools and 250 power tillers for the same purpose. Unfortunately, the project closed before the harvest of the first and only harvest season during its implementation. The Government was not able to collect data on harvest and farm budgets in the project areas. Consequently, it was not possible to conduct an economic and financial analysis of the farm investments at ICR stage.

Also, WFP did not collect any data on the outcome of the school feeding scheme. Although the time was too short to measure the outcome in terms physical and cognitive development, the long-term engagement of this implementing agency in the county should have helped to develop good estimates that one could use to derive the potential benefits of the school feeding activities of the project. These benefits could provide the basis for conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis. In sum, the deficiencies in the M&E system of the project resulted in the lack of data necessary to conduct a robust economic and financial analysis of the project achievements.

Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending/Grant Preparation			
Aniceto Timoteo Bila	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	GFA07	TTL
Celia A. Faias Dos Santos	Program Assistant	GED01	Program Assistant
Cheick A. T. Sagna	Sr. social Development Specialist	GSU01	Social Development
Fatou Fall	Sr. social Development Specialist	GSU05	Social Development
Gunnar Larson	Operations Analyst	GFA12	Operations Analyst
Cheick Traoré	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGO07	Procurement
Mohinder S. Mudahar	Consultant	GWADR	
Aissatou Diallo	Sr. Finance Officer	WFALA	Financial Management
Mamadou Diedhiou	Consultant		
Anta Tall Diallo	Program Assistant	AFCF1	Program Assistant
Marie-Chantal Uwanyiligira	Country Program Coordinator	AFCSN	Country Program Coordination
Evelyn Awittor	Sr. Operations Officer	AFCF1	
Paulo Jorge Temba Sithoe	Environmental Specialist	GENDR	Environmental Management
Sidy Diop	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGODR	Procurement
Supervision/ICR			
Aniceto Timoteo Bila	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	GFA07	TTL
Rémi Kini	Sr. Agriculture Economist	GFA01	TTL ICR
Fatou Fall	Sr. Social Development Specialist	GSU05	
Aniceto Timoteo Bila	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	GFA07	TTL
Mohinder S. Mudahar	Consultant	GWADR	
Cheick Traoré	Sr. Procurement Specialist	GGO07	
Ibrahima Dione	Consultant		

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		**81,035.36**
F14	9.8	
Total lending	**9.8**	**81,035**
Supervision/ICR		
FY15	13.2	45,214
FY16	4	48,057
Total Supervision	**17.2**	**93271**
TOTAL	**27**	**174,306**

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

No beneficiary survey was undertaken for this project.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

No stakeholder workshop was organized to discuss the results of this project.

Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1 Introduction

1. In October 2014, the World Bank approved a grant in the amount of US$7 million to the Republic of Guinea Bissau in order to help the authorities respond to urgent food security needs of vulnerable population groups. This grant was aimed at financing the Second Emergency Food Security Support project. This project helped to carry on the activities initiated under the first Emergency Food Security project, and was implemented by the Ministry of agriculture through the same Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) that implemented the first project. The TCU was placed under the Department of Rural Engineering and headed the by the Director of this Department.

2. Descriptive Summary

2. The aim of the project was to improve food security of the most vulnerable populations including children and to strengthen small-scale farmers' capacity for rice production. The project had three components including: Component–Support to the most vulnerable population; Component 2-Provisionof improved agricultural inputs and services to smallholders; and Component 3-Project coordination, and monitoring and evaluation. The World Food Program (WFP) office in Guinea-Bissau was responsible for the implementation of component 1 whereas the TCU was responsible for the implementation components 2 and 3.

3. The implementation of the project activities was delayed. While the activities of component 1 started in February 2015, those of component 2 did not start until early May, 2015. Hence, component 2 & 3 were implemented from May to September 2015 in 8 regions: Bafatá, Gabu, Oio, Cacheu, Biombo, Quinara, Tombali and SAB (Bissau Autonomous Sector). This technical completion report describes the project activities and achievements of these two components. During this short implementation period, the TCU assured the effective management of the project assets and financial resources, the procurement of goods, services and works. It also assured the effective coordination of the overall project activities. Overall, the TCU made a strong contribution toward achieving the development objectives of the project.

4. Despite some shortcomings in terms of timing, the performance of the project is satisfactory, thanks mainly to the successful procurement of the agricultural inputs and equipment in a short period of time. The satisfactory performance of the project was due to several factors: (i) strong operational capability of the TCU team, a strong implementation support from the World Bank team, and strong support from the Government through the Ministry of Agriculture; (ii) effective and quick procurement of the inputs and farm equipment thanks to close and sustained assistance from the World Bank team, and (iii) reception and distribution of these inputs and equipment to the beneficiaries.

5. The success of the project was due to following advantages, namely: (i) active participation of the Farmers' Associations (FA) in the reception and distribution of the inputs and equipment procured; (ii) role of partners such as NGOs, Regional Agriculture Directorate, Local Administration Authorities, and the Regional Project Coordinators in the choice and selection of farmers' associations beneficiaries; (iii) participation of FA, NGOs, local administration authorities and traditional leaders in selecting the activities to be implemented in the regions covered by the project; and (iv) strong ownership of the project by the FAs. In view of the above, it can be concluded that the project played a crucial role in supporting the intensification of agriculture, at least for the 2015-2016 farming season.

3. Project components

Component 1: Support to the Most Vulnerable Population (US$2.15 million)

6. This component was implemented by WFP based on two Letters of Understanding (LOU) signed between WFP and the Ministry of Education and with the Ministry of Agriculture. Activities on the ground were implemented in partnership with the Department of Rural Engineering of the Ministry of Agriculture. The component aimed at supporting vulnerable population groups of the targeted regions through (i) school feeding and (ii) food for work to rehabilitate degraded agricultural land for rice production.

7. The expected results from these interventions were: (i) provision of one meal per day to 17,500 school children in 75 schools for 160 days in highly vulnerable areas; and (ii) rehabilitation of 5,000 ha of land for rice cultivation under the food for work program and provide food rations to 2,500 participants for 100 work days each.

8. Due to the 4 month-delay in the start of the activities, WFP doubled the number of schools from 75 to 150 schools in order to use the procured food before the end of the school year. The number of estimated beneficiaries increased from 17,500 to 34,435.

9. At the end of the project and despite the delay, the school feeding program achieved satisfactory results. The program provided one daily meal to 35,115 students (18,063 boys and 17,052 girls) against a project target of 17,500 students. The number of schools covered increased from 75 to 150, and take-home rations benefitted 5,299 girls (who received a total of 105.8 tons of rice) against a target of 2,500 girls.

10. From the start of the school feeding activities in February to April 30, WFP distributed 428 metric tons of food out the 780 metric tons initially planned for the same period. This food distribution covered 53 school feeding days. From May to June 30, WFP distributed an additional 352 metric tons were distributed for 43 schools days. Hence the entire stock of food procured was distributed in 96 school days instead of 160 days as planned.

Component 2: Provision of Improved Agricultural Inputs and Services to Smallholders (US$4.00 million)

Sub-component 2.1: Modern Agricultural Inputs

11. Under this sub-component the project was to procure 375 tons of improved rice seeds and 500 of fertilizer to benefit 5000 farmers. In reality, the project procured and distributed

250 tons of improved seeds to 5,538 farmers. Of the expected 500 tons of fertilizer, only 444 tons (222 tons of urea and 222 tons of NPK) were procured and distributed to 16,259 farmers (including 12,000 women farmers). This component was also to procure basic farming tools (shovels, spades, pickaxes, and rakes cutting tools, etc.) to benefit about 18,000 producers. However, only 13.620 units of 5 tools (shovels, Spades, pickaxes, and rakes cutting tools) were procured and distributed to 13.620 farmers. In addition, 297 PVC pipe of 30 cm of diameter were procured and benefited 3,000 additional farmers. These agricultural inputs and basic tools helped to strengthen the capacity and productivity of the farmers cultivating the 5.301 ha of rehabilitated mangrove and lowland rice fields. It should be noted that reduction in the quantities of procured inputs and basic tools is due to the change in the prices between the planning phase and the time of procurement. Eight NGOs were recruited on the competitive basis (one for each region) to assist in the implementation of the project activities.

Sub-component 2.2*: *Small Agricultural Equipment.

12. Under this component, the project procured 250 power tillers to be distributed to 250 farmer associations. Each association should have at least 20 members and cultivate a 10 ha-rice field. Hence, these power tillers will help increase rice productivity and production on 2,500 ha.

Sub-component 2.3: Provision of Technical Support

13. The project helped to strengthen the operational capacity of the Department of Rural Engineering of the MOA through the provision of 17 computers, 3 vehicles and laboratory equipment. This upgraded the technical capabilities of MoA, especially in the application of soil science in order to increase land productivity. Some of the activities carried out by the project was to support national land laboratory in the physico-chemical analysis of soil properties in different areas. This would help to identify the best formulation and application of mineral fertilizers that would maximize the productivity land and labor in rice production.

4. Key constraints during implementation of the project

14. The main constraints during implementation of the project activities can be summarized as follows: (i) the project execution period of only 5 months was too short; (ii) lack of training for the operators of the power tiller due to lack of time and money; and (iii) lack of resources to follow-up on project achievements, for example to evaluate the project impact on rice production.

5. Communication and citizen engagement

15. Food insecurity is prevalent in all the regions of the country, and all the producers need help. But it was important for the project to focus on the most vulnerable producers. The project achieved important results in the rehabilitation of mangrove and lowland areas for rice production, and in the provision of agricultural inputs and equipment. Good communication and citizen engagement played a very important role in achieving these

positive results by helping to assure maximum transparency of all the processes associated with the distribution of the inputs and equipment.

16. The communication and citizen engagement processes were based on a strong disclosure strategy. This strategy included the following: (i) dissemination of messages using participatory methods and communication through NGOs partners; (ii) broadcasting through the national and community radios; (iii) television reporting and covering of actual distribution of inputs and equipment; and (iv) sensitization and community raising awareness of events by project field staff, traditional chiefs, religious leaders and local administration authorities.

6. Durability

17. The extent of the results achieved by a project is an important factor for the durability of the project impact. We can point to four (04) results that would help to ensure the durability of the project achievements. These are: (i) agro-inputs and equipment purchased and distributed to FA satisfactory; (ii) members of Farmers' Associations trained in different aspects of agricultural production and in organizational management; (iii) creation of management committees to ensure effective use and maintenance of collective equipment and productive infrastructure (irrigation canals, anti-erosion structures, etc.); (iv) creation of a maintenance fund for the power tillers (funded through user fees); and (v) continued support provided by the Regional Agriculture Directorate and Local Authorities to FAs.

7. Lessons learned

18. The lessons learned from the implementation of the Second Emergency Food Security Support Project which may serve other phases of the project or similar projects are as follows:

- Equity and transparency in the distribution of procured goods is important in order to avoid frustration and conflict: most of the goods and equipment purchased under the project were properly distributed in a transparent manner on the basis of pre-set criteria, and the beneficiaries shouldered the transportation costs to their communities (as part of the 10% in-kind matching grants contribution);
- Ownership of the project by the FAs is important for effective farmer support operations;
- Participatory Project Coordination approach whereby all actors are involved in decision-making regarding the life of the project led to satisfactory project results;
- Regular monitoring of FAs' activities by the project staff is important for successful implementation;
- Effective collaboration between TCU, Government and the World Band team was an important factor for the project success;
- Community engagement, good communication and NGOs' assistance in promoting good agricultural practices are important for project success factors;
- Project execution period was extremely short, this constrained project impact evaluation.

8. Recommendations

19. Given the constraints encountered during the implementation of the project activities, the following recommendations can be formulated:

- Reinforce the institutional collaboration between the various actors (project, NGOs, Regional Structures of the Ministry of Agriculture and local authorities in the monitoring and consolidation of project activities;
- Reinforce lowland rehabilitation initiative and rural feeder road rehabilitation in order to facilitate the marketing of agricultural products;
- Reinforce the training of the members of FAs for the maintenance of equipment, accounting and organizational management and introducing literacy program for women;
- Reinforce gender participation for the forthcoming training sessions, particularly for the regions of Bafata and Gabu in rice culture;
- Introduce the supply of motor-pumps and its accessories for irrigation water supply for double rice culture throughout the year, in the regions of Bafata and Gabu (Bafata-Campossa; Contuboel and Sonaco-APALCOF-TESITO);
- Increase the use power tillers in order to expand the cultivated areas and to reduce the workload on women who provide the largest workforce in rice production; and
- Reinforce the supply in herbicides, fertilizers and improved rice seeds.

Annex 8. Summary of the completion report and comments from the World Food Program (Implementing agency for project component 1: Component 1: Support to the most vulnerable population)

Introduction

1. This report describes the achievements of the activities implemented by the World Food Programme (WFP) under the Second Emergency Food Security Support Project (SEFSSP). The SEFSSP followed the Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468) closed on August 31, 2013. The SEFSSP aimed at improving food security of vulnerable population, including children. This objective is pursued through coordinated activities implemented in the following three project components: (1) Support to the most vulnerable population, (2) Provision of improved agricultural inputs and services to smallholders, and (3) Project coordination, monitoring and evaluation.

2. WFP was the implementing agency for project component 1: Support to the most vulnerable population with a total cost of US$2.15 million. The component had two sub-component. Sub-component 1: School feeding program aimed to support the revitalization of Guinea Bissau's education sector by providing one daily to 17,500 in three of the most food insecure and vulnerable regions of the country including Biombo, Gabú, and Quinara. This sub-component also aimed to provide take home rations to 2,500 school girls. These activities were to last 160 days. This sub-component was implemented in collaboration with the Ministry of Education.

3. Sub-component 1.2: Food for work to increase food production aimed to create temporary employment for rural populations paid through food rations. This program was expected to provide 2,500 participants employment for 100 days, i.e., 250,000 work days in total. This work was intended to rehabilitate 5,000 hectares of land for rice production, including 3,000 hectares of lowland, and 2,000 hectares on mangrove land. The food-for-work program was to benefit directly 2,500 people. The activities performed consisted in constructing or rehabilitating dikes in order to prevent or reduce saline water intrusion into mangrove rice fields; draining irrigation channels and constructing anti-erosion banks to prevent the sedimentation of lowland rice fields. Due to high level of food insecurity in the country, the project covered cover all eight regions in the country, with the exception of Bolama (the region with small islands). This sub-component component was implemented by the WFP, in partnership with the Rural Engineering Department of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).

Implementation arrangements and Achievements

4. Prior to the implementation of the project WFP signed separate Letters of Understanding (LOUs) with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education. The LOUs captured the party's obligations during the project implementation. Similarly, WFP signed Field Leve Agreements (FLA) with twelve NGOs. These organizations worked jointly with WFP and the field staff of the Rural Engineering Department in the identification of sites

to be rehabilitated, and in the targeting of the project beneficiaries. These NGOs were responsible sensitization of the communities in the selected regions. They undertook regular field visits to monitor project implementation activities and community level, and provided advisory services to farmers, and participated in the distribution of food to the participants of the food-for-work program.

1- School Feeding

5. Despite the delayed start of the project, the school feeding program was able to meet its objectives. In fact, the program exceeded its targets. In order to make up for the loss school days due to the delayed effectiveness of the project, WFP double the number of schools targeted from 75 to 150 schools. This change helped to almost double the number of targeted beneficiaries to 34,435 students of which 16,749 are females.

Outputs

6. The school feeding activities started on February 16, 2105. This delay reduced the number of school days from 160 to 96 days. February to April 30, WFP distributed 428 metric tons of food out the 780 mt tons initially planned for the same period. This food distribution covered 53 school feeding days. From May to June 30, distributed an additional 352 mt tons were distributed for 43 schools days, which made a total 780 metric tons planned for all project. Take home rations have benefitted 5,299 girls and a total of 105.8 tons have been distributed. A total of 35,115 children were fed compared to 34,435 beneficiaries initially planned (18,063 boys and 17,052 girls). Table 1 below summarizes the

Table 1. Summary of beneficiaries and the nutritional composition of the food planned and distributed (mt)

Total beneficiaries					**Duration of the assistance**					
School Feeding	**35,115**				96 feeding days					
Take Home Rations	**5,299**									
Daily rations/child (g)					Food required (mt) for the assistance					
Super Cereal	Oil	Canned Fish	Pulses	Rice	Super Cereal	Veg. Oil	**Canned Fish**	Pulses	Rice	Total (mt)
135	15	20	30	208						
Total planned food (mt)					455.1	51	67.42	101.1	105.8	780.0
Distribution from February to April 2015 (53 school days)					250.9	27.9	37.18	55.8	56.3	428.1
Balance at the end of April 2015					204.15	22.68	30.24	45.37	49.46	351.91
Distribution from May to June 2015 (43 school days)					203.8	22.6	30.20	45.3	49.0	350.9
Balance at the end of June 2015					0.31	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.50	0.96

NB: *The ending balance of 0.96 mt (last column and last row) were distributed during the examination period at first week of July 2015.*

Outcomes

7. The result outcomes (enrolment, dropout, gender parity, pass and retention rates) will be available after data treatment and reported in the final Standard Project Report (SPR) 2015.

2- Food For Work component /Land rehabilitation for rice cultivation

Outputs

8. The food-for-work program contributed to generate employment for 4,403 farmer participants. The program distributed food ration to 30,821 direct and indirect farmer household beneficiaries The rehabilitation of dykes and drainage channels to reclaim land for rice cultivation was undertaken during 71 days from May 20 to July 31, 2015. During this period, a total of 312,613 work days were generated (71 days of work and 4,403 participants per day). In terms of food requirements, it was estimated that about 1,077 metric tons would be required for planned activities as per LOU signed with the Ministry of Agriculture. At the end, the actual food distributed reached 994.7 MT of food (see tables-2 and 3 for details).

9. With respect to land reclamation and improvement, 5,301.5 hectares of land were rehabilitated against 5,000 hectares initially planned. The table 2, below captures the actual

10. Final results can be measured after the rice harvest, which could occur by the end of December 2015, early January 2016. The rehabilitated lands are still under cultivation. It is expected that the total production would amount to 13,255 tons of paddy rice which corresponds to 7,953 tons of cleaned rice. This quantity would contribute to alleviate effects of hunger for at least six months prior the agricultural season.

Table 2. Land rehabilitated per region (hectares) July - August 2015

Nº	Regions	Ecologies		Total
		Mangrove Swamps	Low land Valleys	
1	SAB	70.00	50.00	120.00
2	Biombo	194.00		194.00
3	Bafatá	50.00	484.00	534.00
4	Gabu		434.00	434.00
5	Cacheu	537.00	510.00	1,047.00
6	Oio	356.00	1,176.50	1,532.50
7	Tombali	493.00	88.00	581.00
8	Quinara	832.00	27.00	859.00
9	**Grand-total**	**2,532.00**	**2,769.50**	**5,301.50**

Table 3. Food commodities distributed and participants per regions July – August 2015

Nº	Regions	Rice	Pulses	Vegetable Oil	Iodized Salt	Total Food	Total participants
1	SAB	23,100	4,822	5,751	403	34,076	154
2	Biombo	74,073	18,148	5,260	1,296	108,777	494
3	Cacheu	103,091	25,257	25,773	1,804	155,925	687
4	Oio	171,627	42,049	42,907	3,003	259,586	1,144
5	Bafata	96,218	3,573	24,055	1,607	145,454	641
6	Gabu	75,727	18,553	18,932	1,281	114,493	505
7	Quinara	57,336	14,047	14,334	1,003	86,721	382
8	Tombali	59,309	14,531	4,827	1,038	89,705	395
9	**Grand-total**	**660,482**	**160,981**	**161,838**	**11,436**	**994,737**	**4,403**

Concluding remarks

11. The project was initially planned for project was planned to cover 17.500 children (8,925 boys and 8,575 girls), for a period of 9 months (from October 2014 to June 2015). For the same period 2,500 girls were expected to benefit from take home rations. In total, 780.0 mt of food were to be procured and distributed for the daily meals at school and for take home rations. However, the funds were made available only in February 2015. WFP started the school feeding program with its own resources in order to avoid an even delay. However, this mitigated the 4-month delay only partially. Fortunately, the doubling of the number of schools helped to achieve and to exceed the quantitative targets of the school feeding program. The lack of baseline data on the level of food security and nutrition of the school children, and on their educational achievement (including the increased level of school attendance by girls benefitting from take home rations) did not allow WFP to measure the outcome of the program.

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document: Second Emergency Food Security Support Project – Guinea Bissau
2. ISR April 2015
3. ISR August 2015
4. WFP Final narrative report September 2015
5. Report for Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities (WFP Final Report)
6. WPF procurement plan and progress report for component 1
7. Borrower ICR (RELATÓRIO FINAL DO PROJECTO PEASA II.; August, 2015)
8. Project interim financial report (IFR)
9. Aide memoire/Implementation Supervision Mission April 27 May 2, 2015
10. Aide memoire/ Implementation Supervision Mission August 2015
11. Procurement Plan
12. Manual of implementation for the first 90 days)
13. Guinea Bissau Country Engagement Note March 19, 2015
14. ICR Guinea Bissau Emergency Food Security Response Project February 28, 2014
15. Interim Strategy Note (FY2014-2015) for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Draft, Dec 16, 2013
16. Guinea Bissau Country Engagement Note FY2015-2016, March 19, 2015.
17. Guinea Bissau Country Economic Memorandum, January 2015
18. Project Appraisal Document: Private Sector Rehabilitation and Agribusiness Project –Guinea Bissau.

MAP


SENEGAL
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GUINEA
BISSAU
BIOMBO
CACHEU
OIO
BAFATÁ
GABÚ
QUINARA
TOMBALI
BOLAMA
Arquipélago dos Bijagós
GUINEA-BISSAU
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
REGION CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
REGION BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
0 10 20 30 40 Miles
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