



1. Project Data

Project ID P148886	Project Name Second Emergency Food Security Support P	
Country Guinea-Bissau	Practice Area(Lead) Agriculture	
L/C/TF Number(s) TF-17872,TF-17873	Closing Date (Original) 30-Jun-2015	Total Project Cost (USD) 7,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date 10-Oct-2014	Closing Date (Actual) 30-Sep-2015	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	7,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	6,801,758.16
Actual	0.00	6,801,758.16

Sector(s)
Irrigation and drainage(10%):Crops(40%):Other social services(40%):Agricultural extension and research(10%)

Theme(s)
Global food crisis response(50%):Rural services and infrastructure(25%):Social Inclusion(25%)

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Second Emergency Food Security Support Project (SEFSSP) was a follow up project to the Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468) which closed on August 31, 2013.

The statement of objectives as articulated in the Project Paper (p. 3) was to:

"improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the Recipient territory."

The statement of objectives as articulated in the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund Grant Agreement (p. 5) was to:

"improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the Recipient's territory."



- b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

- c. Components

The project had three components:

1. Support to the Most Vulnerable Population (appraisal cost: US\$2.15 million, actual cost: US\$2.15 million). This component aimed to provide immediate support to the most vulnerable population, including school children, to access food and expand the area under rice cultivation through rehabilitation of degraded land under the food for work program. It included two sub-components:

1.1. School Feeding Program (appraisal cost: US\$0.80 million, actual cost: US\$0.80 million). The sub-component would support school feeding for primary school students in targeted regions. The school feeding would be funded for one school year (160 days), and are expected to serve about 17,500 students. The food basket would contain cereals, corn-soya blend (CSB) food, pulses, vitamin A-enriched, vegetable oil, sugar and iodized salt.

1.2. Food for Work to increase food production (appraisal cost: US\$1.35 million, actual cost: US\$1.35 million). The food-for-work activities would support the rehabilitation of rice land by rehabilitating dikes for mangrove rice land (about 2,000 ha) and drainage channels and anti-erosion banks for lowland rice (about 3,000 ha).

2- Provision of Improved Agricultural Inputs and Services to Smallholders (appraisal cost: US\$4.00 million, actual cost: US\$4.26). This component aimed to improve access to modern agricultural inputs, technology and services to smallholder farmers engaged in rice cultivation to improve rice production and productivity. It included three sub-components:

- **2.1. Modern Agricultural Inputs (appraisal cost: US\$1.30million, actual cost: US\$1.33 million).** This sub-component would provide matching grants to smallholder farmer groups in the form of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and basic production tools.
- **2.2. Small Agricultural Equipment (appraisal cost: US\$2.50 million, actual cost; US\$: 2.72 million).** This sub-component would provide 250 power tillers in the form of matching grants to eligible smallholder rice farmer groups or associations.
- **2.3. Provision of Technical Support (appraisal cost: US\$0.2 million, actual cost: US\$0.2 million).** This sub-component aimed to strengthen the technical capacity of the MOA to assist smallholders and their organizations.

3. Project Coordination, and Monitoring and Evaluation (appraisal cost: US\$0.85 million, actual cost: US\$0.57 million). This Component was designed for project management, coordination and monitoring and evaluation.

- d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. The total project cost was expected to be US\$7.0 million. Actual cost reported by the ICR (Annex 1) was US\$6.98 million.

Financing. The project was expected to be financed through a US\$7.0 million Grant from the Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund. Total amount disbursed was US\$6.80 million and US\$0.2 million were cancelled.

Borrower Contribution. The project was fully financed through a Grant and no borrower contribution was expected.

Dates. The project closed on September 30, 2015, three months later than expected (original closing date was June 30, 2015). The project was restructured two times, both Level Two restructurings. First, on June 9, 2015, amount disbursed was US\$2.83 million, in order to extend the closing date of the project from June 30, 2015 to August 31, 2015. Second, on August 15, 2015, amount disbursed was US\$3.02 million, in order to extend the project closing date from August 31, 2015 to September 30, 2015

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

- a. Relevance of Objectives

Relevance of objectives is rated high; however, achievement of these objectives as framed was extremely challenging under the short timeframe of the project.

Guinea Bissau experienced serious and chronic food insecurity at the national and household levels. According to the September 2013 food assessment done by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), the level of food insecurity in Guinea-Bissau was very high. WFP



estimated that only 7% of households are food secure, leaving about 93% of households classified as food insecure. The high level of food insecurity was partly attributable to a significant drop in the price of cashew nuts and the effect this had on cashew producers, which seriously affected the purchasing power of poor rural households.

At project appraisal, objectives were in line with the Government's 2010 National Program for Agricultural Investment (PNIA) which was a 15 year program designed to improve agricultural growth and food production through expansion of cultivated area, an increase in productivity through use of improved agricultural technology, strengthened value chains for agricultural commodities, and improved access to market. The Second Emergency Food Security Support Project (SEFSSP) is a follow up project to the Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468) which closed on August 31, 2013. In line with the original project, the proposed project was to support the Government of Guinea-Bissau in improving food security among vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the country. The project was designed as a follow up operation and would scale up activities supported under the original project, using the same implementation arrangements and instruments, including an operations manual and environmental and social safeguards.

At completion objectives continued to be in line with the World Bank's Interim Strategy Note (ISN) FY14-15 for Guinea-Bissau, especially with the pillar that focused on gradual re-launching of economic recovery. The objectives reflected the Government's and the Bank's continued focus on short-term and medium-term food security, economic stabilization and revitalization through improvement in agricultural productivity, particularly for rice. The January 2015 Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) and the March 2015 Country Engagement Note (CEN) for FY15-16 described a country context (poverty rates, macroeconomic and growth constraints, fragility conditions) similar to the one described in the 2014 PAD. The CEM stated that increasing the productivity of rice would not only increase food security, especially for the poor, but also help to diversify the agricultural economy dominated by the production of cashew nuts. The CEM also mentioned that because poverty was so widespread and government capacity to deliver urgently needed services so limited, social assistance programs such as cash transfer, food-for-work and other safety net interventions were expected to be part of Guinea Bissau's agenda for economic revitalization.

Rating

High

b. Relevance of Design

Relevance of design is rated modest.

Design included an ambitious statement of objectives; however, it was not clear what was meant by vulnerable populations. The PDO mentioned only one category of the vulnerable population group: school children. Without a clear definition of this targeted population it is difficult to determine if some of the project achievements could potentially address the root causes of these vulnerability and risk factors. The Results Framework contained weak causal links between the project's outputs and the food security status of the targeted vulnerable populations. To achieve the stated objectives the project sought to provide school feeding for primary school students in targeted regions; and to improve rice production and productivity through irrigation rehabilitation and provision of inputs. While the activities supported by the project were relevant to improve short term access to food, the causal link between the supported activities and the food security status of vulnerable populations was not clear. Finally, food security is a multidimensional aspect and it is difficult to view how the design would achieve the stated objective under a very tight implementation time frame (nine months).

Rating

Modest

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

PDO: "to improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the Recipient's territory."



Rationale

PDO: to improve food security of vulnerable populations, including children in selected areas of the Recipient's territory. Rated: modest.

Outputs

- 2,769 ha of low land area was rehabilitated compared to a target of 3000 ha (92% rate of achievement).
- 2,532 ha of Mangroove land rehabilitated compared to a target of 2,000 ha (126% rate of achievement).
- 250 ton of seeds were distributed compared to a target of 320 ton (78% rate of achievement).
- 444 ton of fertilizer were distributed compared to a target of 300 ton (148% rate of achievement).
- 35,115 student were receiving one meal a day compared to a target of 17,500 (200% rate of achievement).
- 16,259 farmers were using improved agricultural technology promoted by the project compared to a target of 4,000 (406% rate of achievement).
- The project provided limited food supply to school children for 96 days for one meal a day (target: 160 days).

Outcome

- The number of direct project beneficiaries reached 55,777 beneficiaries compared to a target of 38,000. The project met or surpassed most of its output targets.
- It generated short term employment under the food-for-work scheme for 4,403 participants who worked for 71 days and contributed total work days of 312,613 paid in the form of one food ration per day. The project also distributed agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) for farmers which could potentially increase rice yields and improve productivity.
- However, the improved seeds and fertilizer procured by the project were delivered late in the season (late August to early September). Therefore, some of these inputs were not used as expected in the 2015-2016 cropping season. For example, 30-40% of the urea (fertilizer) procured was stored in regional warehouses of the Ministry of Agriculture because it was too late to distribute them to the intended farmers. Also, 250 rice tillers procured under the project in order to help farmer associations to open new land (2,500 ha) for rice production were not distributed to the intended beneficiaries. These factors could potentially have reduced the level of the productivity and production expected from the use of these modern inputs in the project areas.
- Further, the project closed before the harvest season, and no data was collected on output following the harvest. Therefore, the extent to which food availability increased at the household level and in the targeted areas is unclear (ICR, para 58); moreover, the nutritional value of the intervention was unclear since only one crop (rice) was supported.
- Finally, there were no outcome indicators to assess the improvement in the level of food security and/or the extent of physical and cognitive development of the students who benefited from the school feeding scheme. The lack of these critical outcome indicators made measuring the efficacy of project interventions not possible.
- The absence of relevant indicators to gauge the impact of the project on improving food security and the closure of the project before the harvest season makes assessing the efficacy of achieving the project development objective difficult. These problems as well as failure to distribute modern inputs on time, such as fertilizer and power tillers, lead to a rating of modest efficacy.

Rating
Modest

5. Efficiency

Economic and Financial Analysis

ex ante



- The analysis did not provide an overall project economic or financial rates of return.
- The Impact of investing in 250 power tillers for improving rice production was analyzed. The analysis estimated the financial rate of return at 19% at a Net Present Value of US\$1.93 million and a price of US\$500 per ton. When the price of rice was US\$450 per ton the FRR was 16% at a NPV of US\$1.49 million.

ex post

- There was no calculation of ERR or FRR.
- The project closed before the harvest of the first and only harvest season during its implementation. The Government was not able to collect data on harvest and farm budgets in the project areas. Consequently, it was not possible to conduct an economic and financial analysis of the farm investments at ICR stage. Also, WFP did not collect any data on the outcome of the school feeding scheme.
- Moreover, fertilizer and power tiller inputs were not distributed to farmers in a timely manner.

Administrative and Institutional Efficiency

Project effectiveness was delayed by about 3.5 months from October 31, 2014 until February 17, 2015. The delayed effectiveness of the project meant that the school year was shortened, and only 96 feeding days (instead of 160) were provided by the World Food Program. The delayed effectiveness also impacted the implementation of component 2 where the grant funds were received in the designated account of the project only on May 7th, 2015; 3 weeks before the closing date of June 30, 2015.

Efficiency is rated modest due to the lack of ex post economic and financial analysis; and to concerns about the late delivery of inputs, including 250 power tillers that according to the ICR (para 41) were still stored in a regional warehouse for the Ministry of Agriculture.

Efficiency Rating
Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objectives was rated high while relevance of objectives was rated modest. Efficacy was rated modest due to the lack of evidence on the impact of the food on improving food security for vulnerable populations. Efficiency was rated modest due to the lack of economic and financial analysis; and to concerns about the late delivery of inputs including 250 power tillers that according to the ICR (para 41) were still stored in a regional warehouse for the Ministry of Agriculture.

a. Outcome Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory



7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Risk to development outcome is rated substantial. There are several factors that could negatively impact the sustainability of the development outcomes:

- Political instability: the country continued to suffer from political instability with the possible deterioration of the political situation and the involvement of the military.
- Weak public administration: the capacity of public institutions was extremely weak. If this situation were to persist, it would be unlikely that the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education, and other government agencies would have the technical and organizational capacity necessary to sustain the development outcome anticipated by the project (ICR, para 79).
- Weak public finance and macro-fiscal stance: the country continued to face challenges in fiscal and public expenditure administration. On the expenditure side, off-budget transactions, lack of transparent procurement and payment procedures for goods and services and weak capacity for expenditure management and control constituted major challenges. On the fiscal side, capacity for effective revenue administration was weak. In addition, fiscal policy was severely limited by a small revenue base. These challenges were a major obstacle that could potentially prevent the Government to maintain and expend as needed to sustain the development outcome of the project.

- a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

- a. Quality-at-Entry

- The World Bank prepared this emergency operation in response to the Client's needs to mitigate the adverse impact of food shortage on vulnerable population groups.
- The project was designed as an emergency operation to scale up activities initiated under the previous Guinea-Bissau Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468).
- The Project Development Objective of improving food security for vulnerable population groups through a 9 month-project was too ambitious (see section 3b above).
- Design took into account lessons learned from the implementation of the Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468) and from the implementation of the European Union Emergency Food Security Support Project. Namely, use of the existing WFP framework to support the implementation of one project component (support to the most vulnerable population) in order to minimize implementation delays and prevent elite capture; a minimum set of project readiness conditions coupled with intense implementation support; and intensive supervision; including a functioning and regular monitoring and evaluation system.
- Two main risks were identified at the appraisal stage: (i) limited time (about one year) available for implementation since the project was scheduled to close on June 30, 2015; and (ii) limited local capacity to implement the project. These two risks materialized during implementation, but the ICR does not report on mitigation measures. The project team did not respond to IEG's attempt to elicit more information on risk mitigation measures.
- M&E suffered from design weaknesses including a weak Results Framework (see section 10 a).
- Given the significant shortcomings at entry, Quality at Entry is rated moderately satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

- b. Quality of supervision

The project was implemented under a challenging political environment. Three implementation support missions were conducted in nine months. The Bank procurement team provided strong and intense support to the project. The team recommended and helped the project's Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) to implement streamlined procurement processes. However, there were some shortcomings that negatively



affected the project's achievements including:

- the lack of provision of timely short term technical assistance in order to ensure that an effective M&E system was put in place at the TCU and at WFP,
- lack of collection by the Government data on the rice harvest in order to document the actual contribution of the project (provision of agricultural inputs and equipment) to increased food supply,
- lack of a beneficiary survey was conducted, especially for the school feeding and food-for-work activities which were completed at least two months before the project closing of the project; and
- lack of working with the Government to ensure that the 250 power tillers were distributed to the intended beneficiaries in a timely manner.
- Technical Coordination Unit staff were not familiar with the Client Connection system which was not in use during the first project; and this resulted in implementation delays.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

According to the ICR (para 93) the Government showed adequate commitment to the project during both preparation and implementation. An inter-ministerial steering committee composed of representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Education, Social Affairs, Agriculture and other relevant government entities participated actively in all the technical meetings for project preparation. Senior Government officials were readily available and participated effectively in implementation support missions and subsequent follow-up discussions, when necessary. However, the Government did not perform adequately in meeting the project's effectiveness conditions. This led to an unnecessary delay in effectiveness. (The project team did not respond to IEG's attempt to elicit more information on the Government's performance regarding project effectiveness conditions.) Further, M&E arrangements were weak, and transition arrangements to ensue support to critical activities after project closing were not adequate. Finally, the Government failed to identify and effectively address the threats to the sustainability of the project achievements (ICR, para 94).

Government Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

- The project was implemented under the Ministry of Agriculture through a dedicated Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) that oversaw overall coordination of project implementation. The World Food Program (WFP) was responsible for implementing the work-for-food program.
- The TCU benefitted from the leadership of the project coordinator (who was the Director of the Rural Engineering Department of the Ministry of Agriculture). The TCU staff benefitted from capacity building through targeted training under the project.
- WFP showed good implementation readiness and demonstrated strong performance despite a delay in receiving funds from the Bank. However, both implementing agencies failed to recruit an M&E specialist to monitor implementation progress, guide project management, and construct the evidence base necessary to assess the achievements of the project objectively.
- Also, the TCU failed to ensure proper coordination of the M&E activities and to provide effective quality control of the information and data collected. Further, the TCU was not proactive in assuring that beneficiary surveys were conducted before the project closing, and that alternative resources were used to collect the harvest data necessary to document the impact of the project on agricultural productivity and food supply.



Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The project paper described M&E activities; however, it did not include a clear articulation of an integrated M&E system with clear methodology on measuring values of the selected indicators. The Results Framework (RF) included six PDO level indicators that were output-oriented (for example: quantity of seeds or fertilizer procured and distributed; hectares of farmland rehabilitated) but exhibited a weak causality link with the stated project development outcome. The RF did not include any outcome indicators that would assess food security—the core project objective. M&E design could have benefitted from including indicators to assess the change/improvement in the level of food security due to the project, or the extent of physical and cognitive development of the students who benefited from the school feeding scheme. Finally, the rationale behind the choice of targets for some indicators was unclear, for example, the target value of direct project beneficiaries of 38,000 measured the total number of the food-for-work participants and their household members, while excluding the direct beneficiaries of school feeding activities and of the distribution of agricultural inputs. Since the project aimed to distribute improved seeds and fertilizer to all the farmers of the rehabilitated 5,000 ha of rice fields, measuring adoption rate may not have been the best choice.

b. M&E Implementation

M&E implementation was weak. The Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) did not have an M&E specialist and consequently did not perform its role of ensuring the monitoring and evaluation of the overall project activities. The project relied on the TCU agronomist and on the IT specialist of the Ministry of Agriculture to manage the implementation data. While the World Food Program (WFP) did not have a dedicated M&E specialist, WFP experience in school feeding and food-for-work activities helped to establish a relatively reliable data collection and information system. WFP relied on contracted NGOs operating in the project areas to collect and transmit the data on implementation progress to the Bissau WFP office. No baseline data were collected at the beginning of the project, and no detailed M&E plan and monitoring procedures were developed during implementation as envisioned at appraisal. Also, M&E activities were implemented in parallel by both agencies with no coordination between TCU and WFP.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E system generated enough data to assess most project outputs, however, assessing the outcome was not possible due to M&E design limitations. Moreover, it is not clear how M&E data were utilized to take management decisions. Given these severe shortcomings, M&E Quality is rated negligible.

M&E Quality Rating
Negligible

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was rated Category 'B' and triggered four safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01); Natural Habitats (OP4.04); Pest Management (OP4.09); and Physical Cultural Resources (OP4.11). To ensure compliance with Bank Safeguard Policies, the Government updated the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Pest Management Plan of the Emergency Food Security Support Project (P113468) and disclosed it in country on June 24, 2014 and in the InfoShop on July 7, 2014. The project did not procure any pesticides.



According to the ICR (para 38) “there were no environmental and/or social safeguards issues during implementation of the project.”

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management. According to the ICR (para 39) there were no issues related to financial management. However, it was not clear how the project was rated in the final external audit report. The project team did not respond to IEG’s attempt to elicit more information on financial management.

Procurement. The project received strong procurement support from the Bank team to assure effective and transparent contract management, and timely delivery of goods. The project disbursement specialist assured that all payments of goods are made before the Grant closing date. Direct payment methods were generally used to expedite the process. The Government requested and was granted a waiver to use direct contracting for the procurement of the modern agricultural inputs, small equipment, and power tillers. This enabled timely procurement (but not timely distribution as noted above) of agriculture inputs and 250 power tillers.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR included five lessons. IEG selected the following three that are of particular importance with some adaptation of language:

- **Collaboration among implementing agencies is key to successful implementation of projects, particularly under a shortened implementation period.** Effective collaboration and coordination among the multiple stakeholders and implementing entities involved, and World Bank teams, is critical to achieve a successful outcome. In the absence of this effective teamwork, it would be difficult to successfully implement projects with a shortened



implementation period.

- **Adjusting the implementation time frame within the scope of the planned intervention is critical to successfully achieve the desired outcome.** The mismatch between the PDO, and the nature and scope of the planned activities and the duration of the implementation period negatively affected the achievements of the project. The implementation period was too short to improve the food security of vulnerable population groups. Also, the type of procurement work involved increased the implementation risks given the duration of the project.
- **A sound M&E system and accountability for results is a critical tool for project management.** A robust results framework should include all building blocks that ensure the efficient allocation and management of the project resources (inputs) to generate the outputs necessary for achieving the expected development outcome of the project. An M&E system that articulates clearly this result chain and the underlying cause-effect linkages is at the core of a robust results framework. This M&E system must be described clearly in the project documents (PAD and implementation manuals). Leaving it to the project implementation units to design and implement the M&E system is likely to result in an ineffective and failed result framework. This would make it difficult to develop a coherent and strong story line documenting the achievements of the project, as well as not providing useful evidence as a management tool necessary for making mid-course corrections in the project.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well written. It provides good coverage of project activities and candidly reports on most project shortcomings. It includes five lessons that reflect project experience. The ICR provides a logical discussion of outcomes--to the extent possible given the absence of critical outcome indicators. However, the ICR should have provided a clear statement on the compliance with each triggered safeguard policy; and the most recent status of external audit reports.

- a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial