Project Information Document (PID)

Concept Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 05-Nov-2019 | Report No: PIDC26335

BASIC INFORMATION

A. Basic Project Data

Country	Project ID	Parent Project ID (if any)	Project Name
South Sudan	P169949		South Sudan Enhancing Community Resilience and Local Governance Project (P169949)
Region	Estimated Appraisal Date	Estimated Board Date	Practice Area (Lead)
AFRICA	Mar 25, 2020	May 28, 2020	Urban, Resilience and Land
Financing Instrument	Borrower(s)	Implementing Agency	
Investment Project Financing	UNOPS	IOM	

Proposed Development Objective(s)

To improve access to basic services and to strengthen the service delivery capacity of local institutions in selected areas.

PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)

SUMMARY

Total Project Cost	65.00
Total Financing	65.00
of which IBRD/IDA	65.00
Financing Gap	0.00

DETAILS

World Bank Group Financing

International Development Association (IDA)	65.00
IDA Grant	65.00

Environmental and Social Risk Classification	Concept Review Decision
High	Track II-The review did authorize the preparation to continue

B. Introduction and Context

Country Context

1.   **South Sudan was beset by decades of armed conflicts prior to its independence in 2011, and these have only become increasingly complex in the years since.** Southern Sudan, as the region was called before independence, has been marred by conflict since 1955. The region experienced systematic marginalization and underdevelopment under both British and Sudanese rule, depriving the region of physical and human capital development. At independence in July 2011, South Sudan ranked almost at the bottom of the global development indicators with little infrastructure, basic services provided almost entirely through humanitarian aid, and an economy completely dependent on oil. Renewed civil conflict broke out in December 2013 as the tensions among different groups intensified and violence continues to date. Beginning as in-fighting between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by the President and the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by the then Vice President, the conflict grew more fragmented as groups excluded from previous peace negotiations took up arms to establish their claims. There are now over 40 armed groups involved in the conflict. Violence, which was largely limited to the Greater Upper Nile region in the first years of the war, has spread to other historically stable locations such as Western and Central Equatoria States, coming to engulf the entire country. The renewed violence has undermined the development gains since independence and worsened the humanitarian situation.

2.   **The country faces a challenging economic situation compounded by misplaced priorities which exacerbates food insecurity and access to basic services.** The economy is estimated to have recovered with a growth rate of 3.2 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2019. This reflects a strong rebound in the oil sector while non-oil economy such as manufacturing, agriculture, and services continue to underperform. The oil sector thus continues to be the sole source of growth in South Sudan. It is worth noting that this growth is unlikely to improve the distribution of income as very little is spent on improving food security and basic service delivery. The economy is beset with high inflation and soaring foreign exchange rate premium. Inflation averaged 60.8 percent in FY2019 compared to 121.4 percent in FY 2018, partly reflecting reduced central bank financing of the budget deficit and the positive impact of peace on trade and the functioning of markets. The gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel market rate remains high and increased from 65 percent in December 2018 to 85 percent in June 2019. The external sector current account deficit, excluding grants, rose to 6.5 percent of GDP in FY2019 from 4.5 percent in FY 2018. Expenditures continue to be skewed toward defense at the expense of poverty reduction. Security and accountability/public administration accounted for 83 percent of total spending during FY2019. By contrast, combined expenditures on health, education, and rural development are estimated to make up around 3 percent of total government spending, worse than in previous years.[1]

3.   **Poverty in South Sudan has reached unprecedented levels.** Over 8 out of every 10 people in South Sudan lived below the poverty line (US$1.90 per day) in 2017, a considerable increase from 51 percent in 2009. The urban poverty rate stood at over 70 percent – a sharp increase from 40 percent in 2015.[2] Poverty rates were (and remain) the highest in the former states of the Greater Upper Nile region, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and Western Bahr el Ghazal, where poverty has reached an unprecedented level of over 90 percent.[3] Unsurprisingly, except for Eastern Equatoria, these states are also among the most heavily affected by the war. Chronic and widespread poverty contributes

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[1] World Bank (2019). "South Sudan Macro-Poverty Outlook, September 2019".
[2] World Bank (2019).
[3] World Bank (2018a). "Impact of Conflict and Shocks on Poverty: South Sudan Poverty Assessment 2017".

to South Sudan's ranking of 187 out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), with a life expectancy of only 57 years compared to the global average of 72.[4]

4.   **The cumulative effects of years of violent conflict have taken a significant toll on the people.** As of September 2019, nearly 3.8 million people (over a third of the country's population) have been displaced, many of them more than once. About 2.3 million have fled to neighboring countries in search of safety while 1.5 million are displaced within the country.[5] Over 60 percent of South Sudan's Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are concentrated in the Greater Upper Nile region. It is estimated that 85% of IDPs are women, girls and boys. A recent study estimates that some 380,000 people have died between December 2013 and April 2018 as a result of the war and displacement.[6] About **6.4 million people (54% of the population)** are classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity.[7]

5.   **Gender disparities and inequalities are staggering.** South Sudan ranks in the bottom third of countries for the HDI's life-course gender gap[8] and women's empowerment, indicating that South Sudanese women and girls are more likely to have less choices and opportunities over the course of their lives compared to their male counterparts and they have less agency and options for self-determination.[9] Before the current crisis, almost 80 percent of women had no education and girls were less likely to be sent to school compared to their male counterparts.[10] Girls are often excluded from educational opportunities based on gender norms dictating girls' domestic and caretaking responsibilities along with prospects for early marriage. Female teachers and school administrators are also few and face their own challenges including safety concerns, gender-based discrimination or targeting from colleagues, and less opportunity.

6.   **Gender-based violence, particularly against women and girls, remains high.** The incidence of gender-based violence (GBV) in South Sudan is among the highest in the world. While perpetration is driven by underlying norms and dynamics that perpetuate power imbalances between men and women, ongoing conflict, displacement and pervasive insecurity have contributed to the increased exposure of women and girls to varying forms of violence and GBV-related risks, including the risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. A prevalent study on violence against women and girls conducted by the Global Women's Institute of George Washington University found that up to 65 percent of women and girls interviewed reported experiencing some form of physical or sexual assault in their lifetime, either by an intimate partner or non-partner.[11] These rates are double the global average. Incidence of GBV reflect longstanding acceptance and normalization of the use of violence for certain acts, particularly against women and girls, as well as perpetuation of discriminatory norms and practices such as wife inheritance, early and forced marriages, abduction, high bride wealth, and ghost marriages.[12] Displacement, the continuing militarization of South Sudan and of Sudanese masculinities,

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[4] United Nations Development Programme 2018 Human Development Reports.

[5] UNOCHA South Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report September 16, 2019.

[6] Checchi, F. et. al. (2018). "Estimates of crisis-attributable mortality in South Sudan, December 2013- April 2018: A statistical analysis". London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine.

[7] Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. (2019). "South Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Situation for August 2019 – April 2020"

[8] HDI's life-course gender gap compiles 12 indicators that analyze gender gaps in choices and opportunities across the lifespan including education, labor and work, political representation, time use and social protection. HDI's women's empowerment dashboard compiles 13 woman-specific empowerment indicators in three categories – reproductive health and family planning, violence against women and girls and socioeconomic empowerment.

[9] UNDP (2018). Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update – South Sudan.

[10] Ministry of Health, National Bureau of Statistics and UNICEF (2013). South Sudan Household Survey 2010. It should be noted that comparative *educational outcomes* are not very different between boys and girls in South Sudan due to enduring challenges with increasing access to education for youth. The levels are low across both genders.

[11] https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/2294/southsudanlgsummaryreportonline.pdf

[12] Ghost marriages are a form of levirate marriage practiced by the Nuer and other Nilotic tribes. These marriages take place in the name of a man who died without marrying or without producing any children. A male relative will stand in for the deceased and marry a woman in order to produce a (male) heir for the "ghost" and to carry on the deceased's bloodline.

combined with war-related trauma, the absence of viable income generating opportunities and high rates of alcohol abuse, have negatively influenced the well-being and agency of women, particularly in their homes.

7.   **The Revitalized Peace Agreement, signed in September 2018, provides an opportunity for stability although the situation remains uncertain.** The power-sharing agreement between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO includes the reinstatement of the former First Vice President and sharing of a number of key positions as well as new security arrangements among different groups. Should the provisions of the Agreement be implemented, it can pave the way for the stability in the country, although issues of enduring and entrenched corruption, weak governance and high fiduciary risks will persist. Violence between the two major political opponents has declined since the signing of the agreement giving rise to cautious optimism that peace may be sustained, although not in areas where a number of opposition groups remain. In addition, inter-communal violence, criminality, and violent competition over resources is also on the rise with armed militants contributing to local tensions in some areas. Forced demographic changes and property disputes resulting from earlier conflict are also a source of ongoing grievance. Important issues around security, internal boundaries, and power/resource sharing among ethnic groups remain unresolved. The formation of a unity government by November 12, 2019, if materializes, will be an important indicator of progress towards peace and stability. Yet ongoing peacebuilding will be necessary for the stability and sustainability of power sharing arrangements.

8.   **While the situation remains fluid, the recent reduction in armed conflict may facilitate substantial population movement.** About 1.2 million people have returned from displacement within and outside of South Sudan since 2016 to date. Among them, over 534,000 people (45 percent) returned since the signing of the revitalized peace agreement in September 2018 until March 2019.[13] This demonstrates that more people returned in a shorter period of time since the signing of the agreement. According to both the UNHCR and IOM's recent intention surveys, major pull factors for return are improved security, family reunification, access to basic services, and livelihood opportunities. For refugees, 30 percent of them in neighboring countries consider returning but majority are waiting to see how the situation unfolds. Slightly higher numbers of IDPs have longer term return intentions to home areas. The prevailing security and basic living conditions are not yet conducive to more widespread return movements among both populations, however. In addition, there have been new/secondary displacements triggered by intensifying inter-communal clashes in areas such as Unity, Warrap, Lakes, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, Central Equatoria and Jonglei.[14] Population movement thus remains volatile, where temporary visits by single family members to look after assets and property in home areas predominate. Should the unity government be formed in November 2019 and security situation improve, however, the return of some of the 4.2 million displaced (both refugees and IDPs) is likely to accelerate.

9.   **Unlike in other countries where significant numbers of returnees gravitate to major cities, in South Sudan the evidence suggests that IDPs and refugees are likely to return to their original villages or in their vicinity.** Existing data shows that a large majority (87 percent) of IDP and refugee returns are primarily to areas of habitual residence while relocations to third areas is quite low at an estimated 6 percent. [15] The majority of the IDPs returned to their places of habitual residence from within the same county (64 percent) or within the same state (23 percent) while only a few (13 percent) returned from outside the state.[16] Most returnees are therefore likely to be concentrated in rural and peri-urban areas except for some who opt to permanently settle in urban centers (e.g. Wau or Malakal) or some who remain in cities as they are unable to return to their villages due to security concerns or occupation of their land and houses by other groups (e.g. Bor or Bentiu).[17] This has also been confirmed by a Bank commissioned population movement analysis by IOM

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[13] IOM DTM

[14] UNMISS (August 2019) (*Mimeo*)

[15] IOM DTM. The remaining 7 percent demonstrates those whose movement could not be clearly tracked.

[16] IOM DTM

[17] Returnees in this PCN include both IDP returnees as well as refugee returnees.

which found no overlap between major urban centers and concentration of returnees.[18] As of August 2019, the 5 counties that hosted the largest number of returnees were: Luakpiny/Nasir in Upper Nile; Wau and Jur River in Western Bahr-el-Gazal; Terekeka in Central Equatoria; and Akobo in Jonglei, areas that were impacted by conflict.[19]

10.   **Upon return, many returnees face a challenge with their housing, land and property.** The destruction and deterioration of housing structures coupled with secondary occupation, loss of land deeds and forced evictions contribute to land-related disputes among returnees, remaining displaced people and host communities. For widows and child-headed households returning to their homes of origin, the lack of documentation and rights for women to use and own property pose substantial threats to safety and security.

Sectoral and Institutional Context

11.   **Basic service provision is severely constrained in South Sudan, and increased demands by the displaced, and particularly large numbers of returnees, will further strain people's access to services.** Access to electricity in the country is virtually non-existent in rural (1 percent), and low in urban areas (14 percent). Only 5 percent of rural households have access to improved sanitation compared to 57 percent of urban households.[20] The destruction of schools and the departure of teachers from conflict-affected areas have severely impacted access to education. More than 70 percent of school-aged children are not receiving education.[21] Three fourths of the population lack access to improved sanitation facilities and 30 percent lack access to safe water. The country has the lowest road density in Africa with less than 2 percent of the primary network paved, constraining access to the schools and health facilities that do exist.[22] Seasonal rain and periodic floods regularly leave large parts of the country inaccessible for months at a time.[23] Low trust in government institutions and social divisions wrought by way have weakened social cohesion in the country and will impact governance in South Sudan for the foreseeable future.[24] Women face a disproportionate burden of poor access to services. The situation is likely to worsen as the numbers of returnees increases and where humanitarian assistance may be limited. UNOCHA estimate that US$1.5 billion will be needed in 2019 to accommodate the increased demand on food security, basic service delivery and IDP/refugee return support.[25]

12.   **Local institutions – both local governments and community institutions – are mandated to play an integral role in providing services to the people.** Under the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (TCSS, 2011) as well as the Local Government Act (LGA, 2009), the government is organized into three tiers – at the national, state, and local levels. The local government, in turn, consists of three levels of local government councils, namely *county*, *payam*, and *boma* councils in rural areas, and *city/town*, *block*, and *quarter* councils in urban areas. Local government councils are to be headed by county commissioners/mayors who are to be directly elected but who are currently appointed by the State governor. Under the LGA, the responsibility for service delivery is devolved to the county/city level. The LGA and its implementation guidelines stipulate *Boma* Development Committees (BDCs) and *Payam* Development Committees (PDCs), semi-formal community institutions, their responsibilities to support local governments in local development and their composition.

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[18] IOM "Draft Population Movement Analysis October 2019".

[19] IOM DTM

[20] UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview (2018)

[21] UNESCO et. al. (2018). "Global Initiative on Out of School Children, South Sudan Country Study".

[22] World Bank 2018a.

[23] Pape, U. Benson, M. Ebrahim, M. Lole, J. (2017) Reducing poverty through improved agro-logistics in a fragile country: findings from a trader survey in South Sudan. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

[24] World Bank (2016) "*Peoples of South Sudan: A Country Social Analysis of Ethnic Diversity in South Sudan (Vol 3: Inclusive Development: The Social and Institutional Context*".

[25] UNOCHA (2019) "Humanitarian Appeal 2019".

The latest National Development Strategy (NDS) 2018-2021 also envisages that services will be delivered through these local institutions; even though there continues to be misalignment between current budget priorities and the NDS. At the same time, and largely due to the absence and under-performance of these local bodies, South Sudan's informal and collective structures have provided much of what counts as an economic and social safety net in the country. In specific localities, categories of power are not always easily distinguished between formal and informal, as the power of particular actors may derive from an intertwining of traditional, formal political, civil society, economic and military sources.

13.   **Despite these mandated responsibilities and legal provisions for their existence, most local governments have been unable to provide services to the people.** *De jure*, county governments are supposed to provide services using the annual fiscal transfer called the County Development Grants (CDGs) and their own sources of revenue raised through taxes and fees on land, animals, local chiefs' court and trade among others. Due to the limited capacity to generate their own revenues and possible leakages, however, local governments are entirely dependent on fiscal transfers. Yet the ability of the National Revenue Authority to mobilize domestic resources and to utilize effective systems to execute transfers as budgeted is also limited. In 2012, for example, CDGs were suspended altogether and salary payments to local level government employees were sharply curtailed. Even if these transfers were occurring, the combined expenditures on health, education, and rural development constitute only about 7.4 percent of the total budget for FY2019. The government thus continues to depend almost entirely on external assistance for service delivery.

14.   **This predicament is compounded by additional factors.** The 2015 and 2017 Presidential decrees created new states and counties, increasing the former 10 states and 79 counties to 32 states and 316 counties. County governments are now facing by unclear jurisdictions and contested administrative boundaries. Austerity budgeting has prevented the recruitment of new civil servants to staff the new counties. Where staff do exist, county governments struggle with low capacity, high employee turn-over and low morale due to low salary levels (US$15-20/month) as well as months-long delays in salary payments. Newly established counties have few, if any, functional government institutions and are unable to fulfill their mandates. This lack of capacity is reflected in public sentiment. According to a World Bank survey, an overwhelming 90 percent of the South Sudanese people feel that the government is performing poorly in providing infrastructure and services. [26]

15.   **Protracted conflict has also eroded the social fabric and weakened both informal and formal institutions.** In the absence of effective formal governance, particularly in rural areas, people increasingly have come to rely on community institutions. Yet, as ethnic identities have been politicized and large numbers of armed youth feel less allegiance to traditional authorities, relationships within and between communities have become more strained and the role and effectiveness of traditional institutions have been undermined. Consequently, these informal institutions have become less capable of managing social tensions and sharing access to resources and services among different groups. This is yet another driver contributing to a marked increase in inter-communal violence and cattle raids, with over 60,000 new displacements in early 2019.[27]

16.   **Provision of basic services and managing social tensions, particularly in areas with high concentration of returnees, is a compelling priority in South Sudan.** With over a third of the population displaced and 60 percent severely food insecure, large numbers of returnees that may result with progress in government formation and stability will put a significant strain on already overstretched services. With mounting inter-communal tensions and deepened mistrust between groups, *how* services are provided is as important as *whether* they are provided. Establishing an inclusive and transparent planning process is thus essential. It will be particularly important to strengthen community institutions to manage their own development and make them more inclusive in order to reduce inter-communal tensions over

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[26] World Bank 2016
[27] UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Monitoring Report January – March 2019.

resources. It will also be critical to support local governments where they do exist and strengthen their relations – and their relevance - within communities.

Relationship to CPF

17.   **The proposed project is directly aligned with the Country Engagement Note (CEN) and the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) for South Sudan.** Whereas the Bank's FY13-14 Interim Strategy Note (ISN), approved on 28 February 2013, focused on building legitimate institutions over the long term, the FY18-19 CEN, approved on 16 January 2018, emphasizes meeting the immediate needs of the people. Specifically, the CEN focuses on two objectives: (i) supporting basic service provision for vulnerable populations; and (ii) supporting livelihoods, food security and basic economic recovery. The CEN also emphasizes the Bank's comparative advantage in seeking medium term development solutions i.e.- institution building. This is in line with the SCD, approved in October 2015, which stressed the importance of ensuring access to basic services, given the extremely low human development indicators that prevail in the country, the low infrastructure base, and significant gaps in basic service provision. The SCD also highlighted the importance of building citizen confidence through community engagement and reconciliation as a pathway out of cyclical fragility.

18.   **The proposed project contributes to the Bank's twin goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity.** FCV is a critical development challenge that threatens efforts to end extreme poverty, affecting low-income countries like South Sudan. Conflicts drive 80 percent of all humanitarian needs globally, while they reduce GDP growth by two percentage points per year on average. Unless FCV is addressed, it is difficult to put South Sudan back on a positive trajectory. Moreover, the Bank's new approach emphasizes prevention, where $1 spent on prevention saves $16 lost to the consequences of conflict.

19.   **The project is also well aligned with South Sudan's latest National Development Strategy (NDS) 2018-2021 which emphasizes local service delivery and social cohesion.** Through consultations with multiple stakeholders in the process of developing NDS, citizens prioritized access to basic services as a critical area for improvement. Consequently, NDS has prioritized restoration and expansion of local service delivery to re-establish the social contract between the government and citizens as one of the six priority strategic actions. Consistently, one of the goals in the Social Service Cluster is to provide equitable access to quality services through cohesive and accountable coordination among communities. Moreover, NDS acknowledges the degradation of subnational capacities for local service delivery in the wake of the creation of additional states and counties. The NDS has thus put forward capacity-building of local governments as one of its strategic goals.[28]

20.   **The international aid community's focus has largely shifted from institution-building to humanitarian assistance.** Before December 2013, international efforts were focused on strengthening state functionality. Since the breakout of the civil war, however, there has been little appetite among key donors for channeling assistance through or to government structures because of the scale of violence, levels of corruption and systemic institutional weaknesses.[29] This has led to most international donors channeling their aid to humanitarian assistance such as food aid and refugee/IDP support.[30] Limited development work focuses on resilience and recovery, most notably under the Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PfRR) spearheaded by USAID and UNDP.[31] Should the proposed project target these counties, the project

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[28] South Sudan National Development Strategy 2018-2012.
[29] CSRF (2018).
[30] UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Monitoring Report January – March 2019.
[31] PfRR aims to harmonize different partners' activities to collectively "reduce needs, risks, and vulnerabilities". It focuses on (i) rebuilding trust in people and institutions; (ii) re-establishing access to basic services; (iii) restoring productive capacities; and (iv) nurturing effective partnership. Initial focus areas include Yambio, Torit, Aweil, Wau, Rumbek, Bor, and Yei.

will coordinate closely with the PfRR to ensure that the project activities are well aligned with the PfRR activities. Where PfRR "project areas" (PAs) and the project overlap, both projects will work under the umbrella of the Resilience and Recovery Framework, utilize the same customary and local government bodies, will utilize similar consultative methods in the course of implementation and local action plan development, and will contribute data to (and consult with PfRR's existing local action plans and resilience profiles) as part of the PfRR's Area-Based Programming workstream. By promoting community ownership of the planning process and assets, as well as contributing to local government responsiveness and more sustainable approaches to service delivery, the proposed project contributes to each of the PfRR's three anticipated project outcomes in the illustration below.[32]

21.   **The proposed project fills in the critical gap between emergency response and resilient recovery by addressing immediate service needs in areas with high concentration of returnees while strengthening local institutions to better manage their own development in the future.** The value-added of the World Bank's engagement lies in its ability to work along the humanitarian-development nexus. It can address immediate development needs while laying the foundation of pathways for longer-term solutions to conflict prevention and poverty reduction. This project maximizes the Bank's comparative advantage by providing services where demand is high while building community resilience by strengthening formal and customary local institutions to better manage social tensions and resources in a sustainable manner. By collaborating with PfRR where possible, the project can also maximize its impacts and seek synergy with other development programs.

22.   **The proposed project will coordinate closely with and complement other World Bank-financed projects, e.g.**: (i) the South Sudan Safety Net project (SSSNP), the South Sudan Resilient Agricultural Livelihoods Project (SSRALP) and the proposed project (ECRP) will follow similar community mobilization principles, methodology and technical guidelines building on what were developed under the LGSDP; (ii) the three projects will form and/or utilize BDCs and PDCs with the same representation; (iii) in areas where SSSNP and ECRP overlap, community prioritized infrastructure to be financed under this project can be used for cash-for-work purposes under the SSSNP, as feasible; (iv) ECRP will follow the SSSNP's selection methodology of community members for unskilled labor; and (v) all three projects prioritize the participation of women in subproject prioritization, implementation and maintenance with specific actions to identify and mitigate gender-specific risks and barriers, including GBV issues, to women's full engagement. In areas where the three projects overlap, the projects can help provide a more integrated package of services by combining short-term employment opportunities, productive livelihoods and larger-scale infrastructure aimed at broader service delivery. By utilizing the same local institutions, they will avoid creating similar yet parallel structures; and (vi) the three projects will utilize a harmonized approach to addressing GBV issues, share service providers where appropriate, and utilize the same trauma-informed training approach and materials. Where appropriate, the project will connect with the on-going Provision of Essential Health Services Project (PEHSP), given that the PEHSP will be strengthening access to information and services for GBV survivors.

23.   The proposed project will aim to add value by: (i) financing larger-scale community infrastructure that the SSSNP cannot finance given its objectives and focus on labor intensive activities and SSRALP's focus on productive livelihoods strengthening; (ii) targeting areas with high concentration of returnees and less access to basic services where needs are high; (iii) investing time and resources into local institution strengthening including the county government; and (iv) joining the SSSNP and SSRALP in raising the profile of, and strengthening the relevance of, PDCs and BDCs. The project will also work with the MoF to revitalize the inter-ministerial coordination meetings to foster inter-ministerial and inter-development partner coordination.

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[32] USAID, Partnership for Recovery and Resilience Overview. September 2019

C. Proposed Development Objective(s)

To improve access to basic services and to strengthen the service delivery capacity of local institutions in selected areas.

Key Results (From PCN)

24.   The achievement of the PDO would be measured against the following proposed key results, which will be further refined as project preparation progresses.[33]

(i)   Number of beneficiaries with improved access to socio-economic infrastructure (disaggregated by type of service, age group and gender)

(ii)   Number of person days generated in short-term employment opportunities (disaggregated by type of service/infrastructure, disability, age group and gender)

(iii)   Improvement of beneficiaries' perceptions of local government and BDCs/PDCs' capacity to manage service delivery (disaggregated by gender and age group)

D. Concept Description

25.   The proposed project aims to address immediate needs for basic services in selected areas of the country, while strengthening local institutions' capacity to better manage inter-communal tensions and resources. Priority will be given to areas with high concentration of returnees, which are likely to experience increased demands for services. To ensure flexibility and adaptability to accommodate changing population dynamics and fluctuations in the status of the local government and conflict dynamics, block grants will be allocated on a yearly basis and activities will be implemented in a phased manner. The project will finance the activities described below with a preliminary budget estimate of US$65 million. A project period of 36 months is proposed – short enough so as not to perpetuate direct third-party implementation, but long enough to allow sufficient time for community mobilization, new patterns of interaction to emerge, and local institutional strengthening.

Component 1. Local Service Delivery (US$43 million)

26.   This component will support the construction and rehabilitation of community infrastructure in selected areas. Eligible investments include water supply and sanitation, community roads, health and education facilities, and public market facilities, and public goods that proved to have high demand under LGSDP. Selection of counties will be based on the World Bank's Targeting Framework but using different indicators that are relevant for the project. The following four pre-agreed criteria: (i) needs; (ii) feasibility; (iii) equity; and (iv) quick wins. (See Figure 3) Financing "quick wins" in the first year would be important to garner people's buy-in for the proposed project. For this purpose, areas with a substantial number of unfunded subprojects from the predecessor LGSDP will be selected. Areas where returnees have relocated to a third destination rather than home areas will not be targeted due to concerns regarding political sensitivity which could exacerbate the existing conflict. The relative emphasis of the project on rural or urban areas will be determined by the findings of the ongoing in-depth population movement analysis being undertaken by International Organization for

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[33] Strengthening the capacity of local institutions to mitigate inter-communal social tensions over access to services is an important intermediate objective of the project. Given the difficulty of measuring such an outcome, however, the project will undertake a baseline assessment at the outset of project implementation to identify measurable and meaningful indicator(s) of these social processes that can be added to the Results Framework.

Migration (IOM). Particular attention will be paid to ensure equity between conflict-affected areas and more stable areas. To this end, the project will engage an implementing partner (IP) that can access both areas.

Figure 3. Geographic Targeting Principles

Needs	Feasibility	Equity	Quick Wins
• % of returnees (Sept. 2019) • Access to basic services (Oct. 2019) • Food insecurity (Aug. 2019)	• Security (Sept. 2019) • Accessibility (Sept. 2019) • No "relocation" areas	• Both conflict-affected areas and more stable areas	• LGSDP unfunded subprojects

27.   The block grant allocation formula will be a combination of equal per capita allocation with additional allocations weighted by a composite index of needs/vulnerability proxied by food insecurity, concentration of returnees, and access to basic services. Block grants will be allocated annually, allowing the selection of the most appropriate counties from the list of target sites [counties], and adjustment as necessary according to current conditions and needs. There will be two rounds of block grants in order to maximize communities' opportunity for learning-by-doing. To make the most of the short implementation period, target sites will be grouped. The first group is a subset of LGSDP counties in which communities have undertaken participatory planning and identified priority subprojects in 2015-16, but where these were not funded due to a funding gap and ongoing insecurity over the course of the previous project. After a validation exercise to ensure the current relevance of these previously identified priorities in LGSDP communities, subprojects in these 9 counites will serve as "quick wins", since their implementation can begin in year 1. The second group will be newly selected sites where communities will be mobilized and go through the planning process in year 1, followed by implementation of subprojects in years 2 and 3.

28.   The project will adopt labor-intensive construction methods so as to generate as many short-term employment opportunities as possible for community members. Particular emphasis will be given to the inclusion of various social groups facing marginalization or barriers to participation (e.g. women, youth, returnees, ethnic minority groups etc.) and ensuring their access to community infrastructure and daily wage labor opportunities. The project will identify employment opportunities and options that fit the capacities and skills of all prospective laborers with special attention to how to meaningfully utilize the skills and interest of different groups. Labor conditions will be designed to accommodate different needs of workers in order to create a conducive work environment.[34] In parallel, substantive preparation and consultations with communities, including women, people with disabilities and youth, will identify the risks to labor participation and solutions to mitigate them.[35]

Component 2. Local Institution Strengthening (US$12 million)

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[34] For example, the project will provide shade, water, accessible work places for people with disabilities, consideration to work hours for those with domestic or caretaking responsibilities and other factors.

[35] Such measures could include communications strategies to mitigate the risk of intimate partner violence experienced by women who bring cash and income into the household).

29.   This component will support activities related to: (i) community mobilization and participatory planning which includes local conflict mitigation training; (ii) support for community institutions on infrastructure construction/rehabilitation/monitoring and local conflict mitigation; and (iii) diagnostic of the functionality of and technical assistance for local governments. This component supports Component 1 as the participatory planning process generates the investment priorities as well as supports community monitoring during subproject implementation. The local conflict mitigation training will build on LGSDP's successful training, but also be strengthened by working with a local conflict research institute and gender/GBV specialists with expertise on conflict mitigation/resolution on the methodology. To ensure flexibility, the component will be implemented in a phased manner where a participatory social and conflict analysis, as well as local government institutional assessment are undertaken first, and detailed interventions will be elaborated based on the findings.[36] Such an approach will allow the project to tailor the activities depending on how local contexts may evolve.

30.   Community mobilization and participatory planning will be undertaken based on a participatory social and conflict analysis. Communities will be mobilized into BDCs and PDCs in line with the LGA. The guidelines for the composition of PDCs and BDCs call for broad and inclusive membership including traditional authorities, civil society, and require gender balance. These institutions have already been established in many areas (including those served by LGSDP and SSSNP). Where BDCs and PDCs already exist, the institutional assessment mentioned above will indicate whether they are in line with the provisions of the LGA and the Participatory Planning and Budgeting Guide for Local Governments in Southern Sudan (2010). Any deficits will be addressed with interventions based in these findings. PDCs and BDCs will serve as umbrella local governance institutions whose remit goes beyond a specific project to a vision of local development as a whole, and which also serve as an interface between community and the county government. The proposed project will help strengthen BDCs/PDCs' inclusiveness, accountability, sustainability and functionality (including familiarity with planning, mapping and project identification methods) so that these skills can be utilized as other development partners approach these bodies. Efforts will be made to engage with segments of the community that do not traditionally or currently have a voice in decision-making, such as women, youth, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities. The project will engage with other social networks like women's organizations or youth groups to identify how to increase meaningful participation of these groups in project planning at the local level.

31.   For county governments, proposed interventions will be based on the functionality assessment to be undertaken during the first year. Should they be found functional, the project will design appropriate capacity building activities on the following areas: (i) ability to articulate the needs of their respective counties; (ii) community engagement/participatory planning; (iii) effective coordination of humanitarian/development activities; and (iv) project oversight. Given the likely spatial variation in the functionality of the local governments, project interventions are likely to differ across target areas.

Component 3: Project Management and Learning (US$10 million)[37]

32.   This component will support: (i) project management including technical planning, financial management, procurement, social and environment risk management, and communications; (ii) project monitoring which includes geo-enabled monitoring system, social audit, and beneficiary feedback/grievance redress mechanism; (iii) continuous data collection on beneficiary impacts and local conflict dynamics; and (iv) just-in-time studies as and when needs arise. Such studies may include operation and maintenance (O&M) study, technical assessment of the subprojects, gender-based violence (GBV) assessment etc.

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[36] Conflict assessment and planning for priority infrastructure will be undertaken during project preparation so that the first batch of subprojects ready to roll-out immediately after approval, while these studies will be undertaken for the second batch during project implementation.
[37] The cost is high for project management, but this is based on LGSDP experience.

Component 4: Contingency Emergency Response (US$0 million)

33.   A contingency emergency response component (CERC) will initially have no budget allocation but would allow for rapid reallocation of project funds in the event of natural crisis during the implementation of the project. This will allow the proposed project to remain flexible and better adapt to emergencies.

Legal Operational Policies	Triggered?
Projects on International Waterways OP 7.50	Yes
Projects in Disputed Areas OP 7.60	No

Summary of Screening of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts

CONTACT POINT

World Bank

Makiko Watanabe
Sr Urban Spec.

Borrower/Client/Recipient

UNOPS

Implementing Agencies

IOM
Jean-Philippe Chauzy
Chief of Mission
jpchauzy@iom.int

FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT

The World Bank
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20433
Telephone: (202) 473-1000
Web: http://www.worldbank.org/projects

APPROVAL

Task Team Leader(s):	Makiko Watanabe

Approved By

Practice Manager/Manager:		
Country Director:		