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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(IDA-41990)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.0 MILLION  
(US\$ 23.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

FOR A

PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

February 26, 2015

Governance Practice, GGODR  
Eastern Africa Country Cluster 1, AFCE1  
Africa Region

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## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2014

UGX 1.00 = US\$ 0.0003846163  
US\$ 1.00 = UGX 2599.9938858717

FISCAL YEAR  
July 1 – June 30

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAP	Africa Action Plan
CAO	Chief Accounting Officer
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CSC	Civil Service College
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DANIDA	Danish International Development Corporation
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DPs	Development Partners
EAC	East African Community
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ESAMI	Eastern and Southern African Management Institute
FM	Financial Management
GIZ	German Development Agency ( <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> )
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoU	Government of Uganda
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	Human Resources
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	Information, Communication, and Technology
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEC	Information, Education, and Communication
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management System
IFR	Interim Financial Report
ILI	Intensive Learning ICR
IPPS	Integrated Personnel and Payroll System
JBSF	Joint Budget Support Framework
LG	Local Government
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries, and Fisheries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals

MOFPED	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MOPS	Ministry of Public Service
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NRCA	National Records Center and Archives
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environmental Management Authority
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System
OOB	Output-Oriented Budgeting
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PDO	Project Development Objective
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PEF	Performance Enhancement Facility
PHRD	Policy and Human Resources Development
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PS	Permanent Secretary
PSC	Public Service Commission
PSMSWG	Public Sector-Management Sector Working Group
PSRP	Public Service Reform Program
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
QER	Quality Enhancement Review
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
ROM	Result-Oriented Management
SFIA	Strategic Framework for IDA'S Assistance to Africa
SDPs	Sector Development Plans
SES	Senior Executive Service
SWAP	Sector-Wide Approach Programs
SWGs	Sector Working Groups
TA	Technical Assistance
UJAS	Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy
UPSPEP	Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project
WBI	World Bank Institute

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**Republic of Uganda**  
**Public Service Performance Enhancement Project (UPSPEP)**  
**P050440**

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<b>A. Basic Information</b>			
Country:	Uganda	Project Name:	Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Program (UPS-PEP)
Project ID:	P050440	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-41990
ICR Date:	02/17/2015	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 48.70M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 13.47M
Revised Amount:	XDR 13.47M		
<b>Environmental Category: B</b>			
<b>Implementing Agencies:</b> Ministry of Public Service			
<b>Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:</b> Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) DFID Irish Aid			

<b>B. Key Dates</b>				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	09/19/2005	Effectiveness:	11/19/2008	11/19/2008
Appraisal:	03/13/2006	Restructuring(s):		11/20/2008 06/28/2013
Approval:	06/20/2006	Mid-term Review:	05/09/2011	05/09/2011
		Closing:	12/31/2011	06/30/2014

<b>C. Ratings Summary</b>	
<b>C.1 Performance Rating by ICR</b>	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Substantial
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Unsatisfactory

<b>C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)</b>			
<b>Bank</b>	<b>Ratings</b>	<b>Borrower</b>	<b>Ratings</b>
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Unsatisfactory
<b>Overall Bank Performance:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory	<b>Overall Borrower Performance:</b>	Unsatisfactory

<b>C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>Implementation Performance</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>QAG Assessments (if any)</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		

<b>D. Sector and Theme Codes</b>		
	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
General public administration sector	100	100
<b>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Administrative and civil service reform	33	100
Other accountability/anti-corruption	33	0
Other public sector governance	17	0
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement	17	0

<b>E. Bank Staff</b>		
<b>Positions</b>	<b>At ICR</b>	<b>At Approval</b>
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director:	Philippe Dongier	Judy M. O'Connor
Practice Manager/Manager:	Guenter Heidenhof	Helga W. Muller
Project Team Leader:	Barbara Kasura Magezi Ndamira	Denyse E. Morin
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## F. Results Framework Analysis

### Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The original Project Development Objective (PDO) of the UPSPEP project was to support the Recipient's efforts to: (a) improve and make its public service delivery affordable, efficient, accountable, and effective in use of public resources; and (b) improve the policy, institutional, and regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.

### Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

As per the 2008 re-stated financing agreement, the objectives of the UPSPEP Project remained the same as in the original financing agreement.

#### (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Percentage satisfaction with public service delivery.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	None Recorded	None Recorded	N/A	None Recorded
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> This indicator was not monitored during implementation as no public service delivery satisfaction survey was ever carried out.			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Percentage of MDAs and LGs that report full achievement of their annual performance (ROM) targets as verified through inspectorates.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	100%	N/A	72%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> As evidenced by annual government performance reporting, only 72% of MDAs and LGs targeted for ROM reported full achievement of their annual performance targets.			

#### (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Percentage of service standards in client charters which are met.			



Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	100%	N/A	None Recorded
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> This indicator was not monitored during implementation because a formal assessment process was only developed and agreed upon near the end of the project, which is currently under implementation in selected districts.			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	30%	100%	N/A	100%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> ROM and OOB systems have been implemented 100% of MDAs and LGs targeted for ROM/OOB, including 50 agencies, 23 ministries, and 111 district governments.			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	Percentage positions for internal promotion filled through open competition.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	35%	75%	N/A	100%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> This indicator was not monitored during implementation; however, at project closing the Public Service Commission (PSC) reported that 100% of positions for internal promotion are filled through open competition.			
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	Percentage of total establishment and wage bill captured in IPPS database.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	70%	N/A	100%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> 100% of the government establishment (207 MDAs and LGs) and their related wage bills are now captured in IPPS [N.B. the total number of MDAs and LGs captured in IPPS (207) is greater than the number targeted for ROM (184)].			
<b>Indicator 5 :</b>	Percentage of cost savings from payroll inspections and internal audits.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	70%	95%	N/A	None Recorded
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> This indicator was not monitored during implementation.			
<b>Indicator 6 :</b>	Estimated savings from efficiency and effective reviews for social sectors.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	16%	30%	N/A	25%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> The restructuring process was completed in November 2012, giving a potential estimated savings of US\$2.16 billion if all recommendations			

achievement)	were implemented. At time of ICR, the MoPS noted that only 25% of these potential savings were achieved.			
<b>Indicator 7 :</b>	Percentage of public service satisfied with its work environment.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None Recorded	60%	N/A	44%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> This indicator was only monitored once by a survey conducted in 2011, which noted the following satisfaction rates: ICT (17%), HIV/AIDS (43%), Equipment (29%), Disabilities (40%), Accommodation (78%), Sanitation (4%), and Internet (94%).			
<b>Indicator 8 :</b>	Percentage of women in the public service mid- to senior-level positions.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	12%	35%	N/A	22%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> This indicator was not monitored as part of the regular ISR monitoring during implementation. Values were obtained at project closure.			
<b>Indicator 9 :</b>	Percentage of semi-active records transferred to the NRCA.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	60%	N/A	0%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> Although the National Records Center and Archives (NRCA) facilities have now been constructed, they have not been operationalized and no records have been transferred.			
<b>Indicator 10 :</b>	Comprehensive public service pay reform policy adopted.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	Not Adopted	Adopted	N/A	Adopted
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> A pay reform policy was adopted in 2006 but was not fully implemented due to fiscal constraints; this pay reform policy was revised and adopted as part of a 2013 Public Service Transformation Paper.			
<b>Indicator 11 :</b>	Percentage real increase in pay each year at minimum level complemented with faster acceleration at technical, managerial and professional level.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	6.4%	13.3%	N/A	0%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> This indicator was not monitored as part of regular ISR monitoring. Data at project closure show that due to inflation rates during the implementation period, real pay increases amounted to 0%.			
<b>Indicator 12 :</b>	Percentage reduction in pension arrears.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	8.3%	40%	N/A	48%

Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> This indicator was not monitored as part of the regular ISR monitoring. Values were obtained at the end of the project period based on overall reductions to pension arrears.			
<b>Indicator 13 :</b>	Percentage of PEAP targets achieved.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	85%	N/A	72%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> This indicator was monitored as part of the regular PDO monitoring; however, at project closure, it was noted that 72% of PEAP targets were met.			
<b>Indicator 14 :</b>	Number of public officers that completed specific CSC training courses.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	0	600	2,545
Date achieved	06/20/2008	06/20/2008	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Achieved.</b> 2,545 public officers have completed specific CSC training courses as administered through the "caravan" approach and the newly refurbished CSC.			
<b>Indicator 15 :</b>	Number of local policy research and reviews conducted by CSC.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	0	None Recorded	1
Date achieved	06/20/2008	06/20/2008	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> The framework for policy research was only completed in December 2013, six months before the closure of project, and only one study was completed on the tourism sector. No targets were included in the original results framework.			
<b>Indicator 16 :</b>	Improvement in leadership and management skills in specific areas for industrialization and economic growth.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None Recorded	None Recorded	None Recorded	None Recorded
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/20/2008	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> Training in leadership and management development only commenced in 2013 with the launch of the "caravan" approach. A tracer study was launched in 2013; however, the study is not yet complete and no results are available.			
<b>Indicator 17 :</b>	Percentage of Client Service Charters Established			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0%	100%	N/A	43.5%
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Not Achieved.</b> By project closure only 23 MDAs and 57 LGs had Client Charters in place out of a total of 184 MDAs and LGs targeted for ROM.			
<b>Indicator 18 :</b>	Reduced Accumulation of Pension Arrears			

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	None Recorded	UGX 10 Billion	N/A	None Recorded
Date achieved	06/20/2006	06/30/2011	11/20/2008	06/30/2014
Comments (incl. % achievement)	<b>Indeterminate.</b> This indicator was not monitored as part of the routine ISR monitoring during project implementation.			

### G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	09/18/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	10/04/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	06/07/2007	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
4	12/18/2007	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0.00
5	06/30/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
6	12/31/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.00
7	06/30/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0.50
8	12/31/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3.90
9	06/30/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.73
10	04/20/2011	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	7.94
11	01/04/2012	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	7.94
12	11/14/2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	10.76
13	07/08/2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	10.76
14	01/23/2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	16.74
15	06/22/2014	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	18.19

### H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
11/20/2008	N	MS	MS	0.00	a. Limiting component 2 to three main activities, including (i) establishment of a Civil Service College (CSC); (ii) provision of targeted training and research in strategic areas of the growth agenda; and (iii)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
					<p>equip top public service managers with leadership skills.</p> <p>b. Reducing the Credit amount from SDR 48.7 million to SDR 14 million.</p> <p>c. Extending the closing date from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2013.</p>
06/28/2013		MS	MS	10.76	Extending the closing date from June 30, 2013 to June 30, 2014.

### I. Disbursement Profile



## **1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design**

### **1.1 Context at Appraisal**

#### ***Country, Macroeconomic, and Sector Background:***

1. Uganda had achieved remarkable economic progress with GDP growing at an average rate of 6.9 percent during the 1990s and 5.5 percent during the early 2000s. Over this period, solid macroeconomic management including fiscal discipline and effective monetary policies helped to facilitate Uganda's economic performance, which had a positive effect on poverty reduction. The proportion of the population living below the poverty line declined from about 56 percent in 1992 to 38 percent in 2003; the net primary education enrollment ratio rose to over 86 percent in 2005; the under-5 child mortality rate declined from 177 (per 1,000 live births) in 1990 to 155 in 2005; access to safe water improved from 45 percent to 55 percent in rural areas and to 65 percent in urban areas; and HIV prevalence dropped from 20 to 6.2 percent.

2. Despite this progress in poverty reduction and human development, performance in governance was not as impressive, with government effectiveness steadily declining since 1998. According to the World Bank Institute's (WBI) governance indicators, Uganda only improved in two out of six WBI indicators between 2000 and 2004, including voice and accountability and control of corruption. In contrast, there were no changes with respect to indicators for political stability and regulatory quality, and significant deterioration was apparent with respect to government effectiveness and the rule of law.

3. To address these governance challenges as well as to sustain economic growth and poverty reduction, the Government set out a strategy under its 2004 - 2008 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). Under the PEAP's 4<sup>th</sup> pillar, public sector management was identified as one of the key constraints to sustaining high rates of economic development and poverty reduction. Accordingly, the Government developed a comprehensive strategy to address challenges in public sector management through three major initiatives, including (i) financial management and accountability reforms; (ii) a decentralization and local government development program; and (iii) a Public Service Reform Program (PSRP).

4. While considerable progress was made with respect to the financial management and accountability reforms as well as the decentralization and local government development program, progress lagged on the first two phases of the PSRP. As a result, the Government revamped the PSRP strategy in 2006 and solicited the support of the World Bank and other Development Partners (DPs) for its implementation. The objective of the revamped PSRP was to develop an affordable, efficient, and accountable public service that would be used to steer rapid economic growth and poverty eradication. The revamped PSRP targeted six specific areas, which had emerged as obstacles during the previous

PSRPs<sup>1</sup>, including: (i) skills gaps and weak management; (ii) weak performance and accountability; (iii) inefficient and over-extended government organizations; (iv) a disabling work environment; (v) poor pay; (vi) and sustained support for reform among political and technocratic leadership. In parallel, the Government recognized a growing need to address capacity and performance issues in the public sector as a whole, particularly in the areas captured in the PEAP results-matrix and the associated Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) benchmarks.

5. In response, the Bank prepared the Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project (UPSPEP) to support the implementation of the PSRP through a basket funding arrangement with DFID, Irish Aid, and DANIDA. Implementation of the PSRP was supported through a sector wide approach (SWAp), which had been adopted by the Government as a way of planning and prioritizing interventions for different sectors and guiding the budgeting process. In addition to supporting the implementation of the PSRP, the UPSPEP project included, as its original second component, a Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF), which was designed as the Bank's response to provide a flexible approach to improve performance in the context of the reforms identified through the PEAP/PRSC dialogue.

***Rationale for Bank Assistance:***

6. Over the years, the World Bank supported the implementation of Uganda's PEAP through PRSCs and sector development programs (SDPs). During the preparation and monitoring of the PRSC the need for a complementary intervention to enhance public sector capacity and performance to deliver quality services was flagged as a key area for engagement. In the 2005 Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), the predecessor document to the 2010-2015 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the need for comprehensive public service reforms was cited as one of the four key elements in DPs' support for strengthening governance institutions. At the time of appraisal, reforms in this area were viewed as critical for improving efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in the use of public resources, improving service delivery, and reducing poverty. The Bank's international experience and global perspective in the areas of capacity development and, more specifically, its technical expertise in public service reform was regarded by government and donors as key to ensuring the quality and utility of policies, strategies, and results in these areas.

***Higher Level Objectives:***

7. As reflected in the 2005 World Bank Africa Action Plan (AAP), the World Bank pledged support to countries undertaking public service reform, with a particular focus on human resources management, and pay and incentive systems. In line with the results and accountability agenda, the UPSPEP project was designed as the instrument for

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<sup>1</sup>MoPS (2005). Public Service Reform Programme Strategic Framework (2005/6-2009/10). Government of the Republic of Uganda

operationalizing Bank support to public service and financial management reforms. In addition, the UPSPEP project supported PRSC and Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF) policy triggers including key issues of pay reform, efficiency of government spending and wage bill controls, and equity in the distribution of services around the country. To achieve these triggers, the project prioritized the implementation of the IPPS, review of the pay reform strategy, approval of a new public service strategy under the transformation paper, development of a framework to support retention of staff in hard to reach and hard to stay areas, and implementation of the ROM/OOB initiatives. For its part, the second component (PEF and subsequent support to the refurbishment and operationalization of a Civil Service College CSC)) was consistent with the Strategic Framework for IDA's Assistance to Africa (SFIA) and AAP, both of addressed the need to develop instruments to build capacity.

## **1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators**

8. The original Project Development Objective (PDO) of the UPSPEP project was to support the Recipient's efforts to: (a) improve and make its public service delivery affordable, efficient, accountable, and effective in use of public resources; and (b) improve the policy, institutional, and regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.<sup>2</sup>

9. The UPSPEP project had 18 original indicators in the PAD to measure the progress on PDO and intermediate outputs:

### **Project Development Objective (PDO) Indicators:**

- Percentage satisfaction with public service delivery.
- Percentage of MDAs and LGs that report full achievement of their annual performance (ROM) targets as verified through inspectorates.

### **Intermediate Outcome Indicators:**

- **Component 1**
  - Percentage of Client Service Charters established
  - Percentage of service standards in Client Charters which are met
  - Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented
  - Percentage of positions for internal promotion filled through open competition

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<sup>2</sup> Since there were some minor semantic differences in the formulation of the Project Development Objective (PDOs) between the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), Results Framework, and Financing Agreement, the text of the Financing Agreement will be used for the purposes of this ICR as it represents the legal agreement between the Bank and Borrower.



- Percentage of total establishment and wage bill captured in IPPS database
  - Percentage of cost savings from payroll inspections and internal audits
  - Estimated savings from efficiency and effective reviews for social sectors
  - Percentage of public service satisfied with its work environment
  - Percentage of women in the public service mid- to senior-level positions
  - Percentage of semi-active records transferred to the National Records Center and Archives (NRCA)
  - Comprehensive public service pay reform policy adopted
  - Percentage real increase in pay each year at minimum level complemented with faster acceleration at technical, managerial, and professional level
  - Reduced (current) pension arrears
  - Reduced accumulation of pension arrears
  - Percentage of PEAP targets achieved
- **Component 2**
    - Number of PEAP/PRSC benchmark activities benefiting from the PEF.

### 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The project underwent a level one restructuring, which was approved by the Bank's Executive Directors on June 20, 2008. As per the re-stated financing agreement, the PDO of the UPSPEP Project remained the same as in the original financing agreement. However, as described in detail below, the scope of the second component (PEF) was reduced and the results framework was adjusted to reflect new indicators.

<b>Table 1 : Changes to UPSPEP Key Indicators</b>	
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Action Taken</b>
<b><i>Original Component 2 Intermediate Indicators:</i></b>	
Number of PEAP/PRSC benchmark activities benefiting from the Performance Enhancement Fund	<b>Dropped</b> as a result of cancelling the entire PEF component.
<b><i>Revised Component 2 Intermediate Indicators:</i></b>	
Number of public officers that completed specific CSC training courses.	<b>Added</b> to monitor activities in the revised second component
Number of local policy research and reviews conducted by CSC.	<b>Added</b> to monitor activities in the revised second component
Improvement in leadership and management skills in specific areas.	<b>Added</b> to monitor activities in the revised second component

## 1.4 Main Beneficiaries

11. The primary beneficiaries<sup>3</sup> of the UPSPEP project were the Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) and Local Governments (LGs) who applied the reforms in the delivery of their mandates and who benefited from capacity building activities under the CSC. Secondary beneficiaries included the civil service staff and citizens of Uganda that benefitted from enhanced service delivery arising from the introduction of ROM (sub-component 1.1), better payroll management related to the introduction of the IPPS (sub-component 1.2), efficiency and restructuring reforms related to the rationalization and restructuring of public sector organizations (sub-component 1.3), enhancement of work environment (sub-component 1.4), pay and pension reforms (sub-component 1.5), and leadership and management development initiatives (sub-component 1.6).

## 1.5 Original Components

12. The UPSPEP project originally comprised two components with a total IDA allocation of US\$70 million. The first component was designed to support the implementation of the government's Public Service Reform Program (PSRP) through a sector-wide approach (SWAp) totaling US\$31.5 million. The SWAp involved a pooled funding arrangement or "basket" among IDA (US\$15 million) and several Donor Partners through a 2007 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which included DfID (US\$10.5 million), Irish Aid (\$4.2 million), and DANIDA (US\$5.6 million). The second component was designed to support a Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF) of US\$55 million, funded solely by IDA and intended to foster demand-driven performance enhancement initiatives.

**COMPONENT 1: Public Service Reform Program (PSRP):**  
**(Total Cost at Appraisal: US\$31.5 million of which US\$15 million funded by IDA)**

*Sub-Component 1.1: Performance and Accountability (Total Cost: US\$1.6 million)*

13. To enhance performance and accountability of the public service, sub-component 1.1 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Cultivating the commitment of top level political and technical leadership;
- Empowering and enabling MDAs and LGs to drive Results Oriented Management (ROM) in their respective organizations;
- Integrating ROM with planning and budgeting systems;

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<sup>3</sup> While the PAD and Restructuring Project Paper did not explicitly identify UPSPEP beneficiaries, the entities included in this section include those that can be logically extrapolated from the project's objectives.

- Strengthening the demand for performance and accountability; and
- Facilitating de-bureaucratization and enhancing client focus in service delivery.

***Sub-Component 1.2: Human Resources Capacity (Total Cost: US\$7.0 million)***

14. To address issues of performance, accountability, and appraisal of personnel, sub-component 1.2 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Developing and institutionalizing a meritocratic system across the public service;
- Installing an Integrated Personnel and Payroll System (IPPS) closely linked to the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS);
- Introducing a comprehensive approach to human resources development; and
- Launching a senior executive service in the medium- to long-term.

***Sub-Component 1.3: Efficiency and Restructuring (Total Cost: US\$1.1 million)***

15. To improve public service efficiency and support government restructuring efforts, sub-component 1.3 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Reviewing roles and functions across government;
- Rationalizing and restructuring public sector organizations; and
- Providing for efficient deployment of personnel.

***Sub-Component 1.4: Work Environment (Total Cost: US\$19.3 million)***

16. To enhance the work environment in the public service, sub-component 1.4 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Developing policies on crosscutting issues to enhance work environment;
- Making demand-driven improvements to the work environment; and
- Improving records management and decongestion of registries through the establishment of a National Records Center and Archives (NRCA).

***Sub-Component 1.5: Pay and Pension Reforms (Total Cost: US\$0.3 million)***

17. To support pay and pension reforms, sub-component 1.5 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Developing a comprehensive public service pay policy;
- Designing a strategy for the new pay scheme and the funding of current arrears;
- Conducting job evaluations for the public service;
- Monitoring the progress and impact of pay reform;
- Developing and implementing a framework for the advancement and retention of staff in hard-to-reach areas;
- Reviewing pension legislation and its administrative framework; and

- Verifying pension arrears and developing a strategy for clearing arrears.

***Sub-Component 1.6: Leadership and Management Development (Total Cost: US\$2.2 million)***

18. To support the overall PSRP reform and to improve policy making capacity, sub-component 1.6 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Conducting awareness and sensitization sessions to reinforce and sustain political and stakeholder support for the PSRP;
- Strengthening the government’s policy-making capacity; and
- Implanting the capacity for managing change within the public service.

**COMPONENT 2: Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF)  
(Total Cost at Appraisal: US\$55 million of which US\$55 million funded by IDA)**

19. The original second component of the UPSPEP project was designed to create a Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF), which would support a flexible, comprehensive, and programmatic approach for performance enhancement of public sector organizations. The overriding aim of the PEF was to help MDAs meet performance targets and attain the service delivery objectives that underpin the national strategies for economic performance and poverty reduction as documented in the PEAP. At appraisal, potential PEF projects included: (i) Support to Statistical Capacity Development (US\$10 million); (ii) Support to Procurement Reforms (US\$20 million); and (iii) Support to Financial Sector Technical Assistance Program (US\$17.4 million).

**1.6 Revised Components**

20. After an 18 month effectiveness delay due to a lag in Parliamentary approval, the UPSPEP project underwent a level one restructuring in order to better respond to government’s need for capacity building. No changes were made to the first component, but component two was redesigned to focus on core capacity building initiatives for which the MoPS had direct responsibility. In particular, the PEF was dropped and new activities and interventions were added that would: (i) establish a Civil Service College (CSC) to provide a sustainable source of skilled workforce for the public service; (ii) provide targeted training and research in strategic areas of the growth agenda; and (iii) equip public service managers with more strategic skills to manage the public service.

***Sub-component 2.1: Establishment of a Civil Service College (CSC) (US\$6 Million)***

21. To provide targeted training for public officers, to support policy research and reviews, and to encourage innovative ideas for enhanced performance in public service delivery, subcomponent 2.1 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Upgrading existing CSC premises and equipping the facility as necessary;
- Operationalizing the CSC by developing a business plan and curriculum;

- Strengthening policy research and engaging in twinning arrangements; and
- Creating and implementing innovative ideas to streamline government processes.

***Sub-component 2.2: Strategic Capacity Development for the Transformation of Uganda (US\$2.0 Million)***

22. To support strategic capacity development to help boost industrialization and economic growth, subcomponent 2.1 focused on the achievement of the following:

- Supporting training and research in strategic areas
- Bridging the existing gaps in leadership and management

**1.7 Other Significant Changes**

23. In addition to the substantive changes to the second component, the restructuring reduced the total credit amount from SDR 48.7 million (US\$70 million equivalent) to SDR 14 million (US\$23 million equivalent). This reduction pertained to solely to IDA resources committed to the original second component (PEF), which at project appraisal was allocated US\$55 million, and not to the IDA resources committed to the first component (PSRP), which remained the same at US\$15million. As a result of the restructuring, the revised second component (CSC) was reallocated US\$8 million, which represented a total cancellation of US\$47 million, or nearly two thirds of the original credit amount. This reduced resource envelope for capacity building activities under the second component came as a response to the substantial delay in parliamentary approval given the government’s desire to focus on more targeted capacity building activities which were better related to its current development priorities. As such, the restructuring was adaptive in nature, since it occurred before implementation began, and not as a result of the need to correct poor performance or to opportunistically scale-up the intervention.

24. Finally, the 2008 restructuring extended the closing date from June 30, 2011 to June 30, 2013. A second extension of the closing date from June 30, 2013 to June 30, 2014 was subsequently approved in 2013 to allow for the completion of key activities.

**2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes**

**2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry**

***Soundness of the Background Analysis:***

25. The design of the UPSPEP project was informed by a large body of analytical work produced by the Government of Uganda, the World Bank, and a variety of external think tanks, consulting firms, and NGOs. Key analytical inputs included documents that established the strategic framework for the UPSPEP program, including the Public Service Reform Program Strategic Framework, the PSRP Annual Work Plan, the PSRP Operations Manual, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan, as well as the 2005 Institutional Review of the Ministry of Public Service. The project design also benefitted from funding from the

Japanese Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) grant, which provided resources to undertake the following studies in relation to challenges identified: “Skills Gap Study in Public Service” (PWC, 2003), “Implications of HIV/AIDS on Public Service Capacity and Performance” (MoPS, 2003), “Implications of Gender Issues on Capacity Building and Performance in Public Service” (Kabonesa, 2003), “Study on Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness in Human Resources Deployment in Social Sectors (PWC, 2003), and “Leadership and Management Development Needs for Top and Senior Management Study” (Crown Agents, 2003). Background analysis on implementation arrangements included the “IEC Strategy for Capacity and Performance Enhancement Program,” the “Report of the Monitoring and Evaluation Study for the Capacity and Performance Enhancement Program,” as well as the World Bank’s Procurement Capacity Assessment Report (2006) and the Financial Management Assessment Report (2006).

26. Drawing on this large analytical foundation, the design of the UPSPEP project also reflected lessons learned from the Ugandan domestic context, as well as from similar operations across the region. First, previous Bank experience suggested that a programmatic approach fosters more ownership and greater coordination. Accordingly, UPSPEP provided support to the PSRP through a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) arrangement that defined public sector priorities and budget needs for both Government and donor resources. Secondly, to avoid the potential of a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) draining the public service of its best human resources, the implementation of UPSPEP components was mainstreamed in the work plans of the MoPS, which eliminated the need for a separate PIU. Third, since it can take decades to assess the impact of a public service reform program and its associated capacity-development activities, UPSPEP was designed to use the M&E system of the PSRP to track outputs and outcomes from the outset in order to provide another avenue to assess the progress of public service reforms. Finally, since low salaries persisted as a pervasive constraint to increasing public service productivity and effectiveness, a pay reform component was fully integrated into the PSRP.

#### ***Assessment of the Project Design:***

27. The PDO of the UPSPEP focused on outcomes for which the project’s activities and components could be reasonably attributable. In particular, the intention of the PDO was to respond to the overall PSRP agenda, which the Bank supported together with other partners. As such, the PDO contained seven constitutive elements to which the various sub-components of the UPSPEP project were aligned, namely, to improve the (i) affordability, (ii) efficiency, (iii) accountability, and (iv) effectiveness in the use of public resources, as well as to improve the (v) policy, (vi) institutional, and (vii) regulatory environment of Uganda’s public service institutions. Table 2 demonstrates the link between the PDO’s constitutive objectives and the project’s various sub-components and indicators.

Table 2: Relationship between PDO, Individual Project Components, and Indicators		
PDO Sub-Objective	Related Components	Related Indicators
To improve and make service delivery more <b>affordable</b> in use of public resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.3</b>, which supports the restructuring and rationalization of public sector organizations as well as providing efficient deployment of personnel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-5:</b> Percentage of cost savings from payroll inspections and internal audits</li> <li>• <b>II-6:</b> Estimated savings from efficiency and effective reviews for social sectors</li> <li>• <b>ADDED:</b> Degree of discrepancy between staff paid through payroll and actual staff</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.5</b>, which supports the development of a new pay scheme and pension legislation to clear arrears</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-10:</b> Comprehensive public service pay reform policy adopted</li> <li>• <b>II-11:</b> Percentage real increase in pay each year at minimum level complemented with faster acceleration at technical, managerial and professional level</li> <li>• <b>II-12:</b> Reduced (current) pension arrears</li> <li>• <b>II-18:</b> Reduced accumulation of pension arrears.</li> <li>• <b>ADDED:</b> Public Service on Transformation of the service adopted</li> </ul>
To improve and make service delivery more <b>efficient</b> in use of public resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.1</b>, which supports the integration of ROM in planning and budgeting systems.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-2:</b> Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.2</b>, which supports the installation of an Integrated Personnel and Payroll System and its interface with IFMIS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-4:</b> Percentage of total establishment and wage bill captured in IPPS database</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.3</b>, which supports the restructuring and rationalization of public sector organizations as well as providing efficient deployment of personnel</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-5:</b> Percentage of cost savings from payroll inspections and internal audits</li> <li>• <b>II-6:</b> Estimated savings from efficiency and effective reviews for social sectors</li> <li>• <b>ADDED:</b> Degree of discrepancy between staff paid through payroll and actual staff</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.4</b>, which supports the decongestion of public records through the NRCA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-9:</b> Percentage of semi-active records transferred to the NRCA</li> </ul>
To improve and make service delivery more <b>accountable</b> in use of public resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.1</b>, which supports the implementation of the ROM/OOB, sanctions framework, performance contracts, and Client Charters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-17:</b> Percentage of Client Service Charters established</li> <li>• <b>II-1:</b> Percentage of service standards in Client Charters which are met</li> <li>• <b>II-2:</b> Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.2</b>, which supports the use of a meritocratic recruitment system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-3:</b> Percentage of positions for internal promotion filled through open competition</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.3</b>, which supports systematic payroll inspections and audits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-4:</b> Percentage of total establishment and wage bill captured in IPPS database</li> <li>• <b>II-5:</b> Percentage of cost savings from payroll inspections and internal audits</li> <li>• <b>ADDED:</b> Degree of discrepancy between staff paid through payroll and actual staff</li> </ul>
To improve and make service delivery more <b>effective</b> in use of public resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.1</b>, which supports the implementation of the ROM/OOB, sanctions framework, performance contracts, and Client Charters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-17:</b> Percentage of Client Service Charters established</li> <li>• <b>II-1:</b> Percentage of service standards in Client Charters which are met</li> <li>• <b>II-2:</b> Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented</li> <li>• <b>PDO-1:</b> Percentage satisfaction with public service delivery</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>PDO-2:</b> Percentage of MDAs and LGs that report full achievement of their annual performance (ROM) targets as verified through inspectorates</li> </ul>
To improve the <b>policy environment</b> of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.6</b>, which supports efforts to improve the government's policy-making capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-13:</b> Percentage of PEAP targets achieved</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 2.1</b>, which supports policy research under the CSC related to government priorities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-15:</b> Number of local policy research and reviews conducted by CSC</li> </ul>
To improve the <b>institutional environment</b> of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.4</b>, which supports an enhanced work environment and cross-cutting policies for vulnerable groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-7:</b> Percentage of public service satisfied with its work environment</li> <li>• <b>II-8:</b> Percentage of women in the public service mid- to senior-level positions</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-component 2.1</b>, which supports the development of the CSC to properly train civil servants and enhance capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-14:</b> Number of public officers that completed specific CSC training courses</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 2.2</b>, which supports training and research to bridge gaps in management and leadership skills</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-16:</b> Improvement in leadership and management skills in specific areas</li> </ul>
To improve the <b>regulatory environment</b> of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.1</b>, which supports the implementation of the ROM/OOB, sanctions framework, performance contracts, and Client Charters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-17:</b> Percentage of Client Service Charters established</li> <li>• <b>II-1:</b> Percentage of service standards in Client Charters which are met</li> <li>• <b>II-2:</b> Percentage of MDAs and LGs where ROM is implemented</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sub-Component 1.2</b>, which supports the use of a meritocratic recruitment system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>II-3:</b> Percentage of positions for internal promotion filled through open competition</li> </ul>

28. While the components and activities of the UPSPEP project were appropriately tailored to the achievement of the PDO, the overall complexity of the project design—both in terms of the scope of components and the number of indicators—was highly ambitious. Since many of the project activities were second generation governance reforms, which focused on the implementation of key systems (e.g. ROM, IPPS, etc.), implementation was inherently more complex than earlier PSRP reforms, which focused on retrenchment and downsizing of the public service. Given the limited capacity of the Ministry of Public Service, which functioned as the key implementation and coordination agency of the project, a more selective project design may have been more appropriate.

***Adequacy of Government's Commitment:***

29. The commitment of the government at the preparation and approval stage was adequate despite initial some challenges. After an 18 month effectiveness delay, caused by Parliament's reticence to approve what was perceived to be a large-scale capacity building project, the President of Uganda wrote to the World Bank to emphasize the importance of the UPSPEP project to help the government strengthen its public service. Subsequently, the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) worked with the Bank to retroactively extend the effectiveness deadline and restructure the project. In addition, a Public Sector Working Group was established in 2007 to coordinate technical working groups and share information with all donor partners.



30. The project was prepared through a fully consultative process which ensured the effective participation of all the government stakeholders, including the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labor, Gender and Social Development, as well as the judiciary, various service commissions, the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet Secretariat under the Office the President. For safeguard related issues, extensive consultations were undertaken by the Bank, Ministry of Public Service (MoPS), National Environment Authority, as well as citizens affected by the construction of the NRCA and CSC.

### ***Assessment of Risks:***

31. During the preparation and design process, a number of risks were assessed, including: (i) continued commitment and support of top political leadership; (ii) potential resistance from public service leaders and managers toward results-orientation, accountability, and integrity in resource management and service delivery; (iii) limited technical capacity of MoPS and MDAs to implement UPSPEP; (iv) potential capture of the basket fund for the PSRP and component two by narrow interests; (v) complexity with respect to disbursement and funds flow arrangements for the PSRP component given the multiple donors involved; and (vi) potential of below market pay and a poor working environment which might demotivate personnel.

32. To address these risks, the project design incorporated a number of mitigation measures which included: (i) the preparation of a change management strategy to kick start the implementation of UPSPEP; (ii) the completion of an institutional review of the MoPS structure and functions in order to put in place the optimal structure to implement the PSRP; (iii) the conducting of audits to ensure full compliance with the procedures and controls in the operations manuals for the PSRP; (iv) involvement of the Bank's country Financial Management (FM) specialist to streamline the disbursement and funds flow arrangements; and (v) policy dialogue on the PSRP/PEAP to accelerate pay and pension reforms. At the appraisal stage, these mitigation measures were deemed adequate to address the identified risks.

## **2.2 Implementation**

33. Following the project preparation process described above, the IDA Board approved UPSPEP on June 20, 2006, and the Government of Uganda (GoU) signed the Financing Agreement on December 18, 2006. However, there was a considerable delay in the project becoming effective as Ugandan law required Parliamentary approval for all government external borrowing on a loan-by-loan basis. At this time, there were several other Bank projects pending Parliamentary approval, some of which were delayed by more than 16 months in becoming effective. Despite the creation of detailed Information, Education, and Communications (IEC) strategy to raise government and stakeholder awareness during the project preparation stage, limited implementation of the strategy resulted in a lack of visibility and understanding of the project's activities and scope, which further delayed effectiveness.

34. As a result, the project effectiveness deadline was extended three times from April 17, to July 17, to October 16 and finally to December 20, 2007, due to delayed approval by Parliament. In December 2007, the Parliamentary Committee on the National Economy discussed and recommended that the project components be revisited to limit the capacity building elements to those strategic areas that could be effectively monitored by the MoPS and provided skills leading to a more strategic approach to managing the public service. On April 21, 2008, the Bank approved the extension of the Effectiveness Deadline to August 20, 2008, after which the project was restructured and approved by Parliament later in the year.

35. By the time the restructured UPSPEP project became effective in November 2008, the Donor Partners (DfID, DANIDA, and Irish Aid) had been disbursing funds to the PRSP (component one) under a basket (SWAp) arrangement for nearly two years, as per an MoU signed in August 2007. As they prepared to exit the sector in July 2010, the basket fund partners decided to front-load their contributions in the last two quarters of FY 10/11, and released a total of \$6.9 million during that period. As a result of this front loading, as well as procurement delays for several large activities, IDA resources were largely crowded-out. As of mid-2010 DfID, DANIDA, and Irish Aid has disbursed 100% of their committed resources whereas only 20% of IDA resources were disbursed. At the same time, the MoPS informed the Bank that a funding gap had emerged, and that the remaining funding under the basket was not sufficient for the full implementation of the IPPS, National Records Center and Archives (NRCA), and support for the implementation of other PRSP reforms.<sup>4</sup>

36. The Bank team undertook a Mid-Term Review (MTR) in May 2011 to provide a detailed assessment of the projects implementation to date. While the Bank noted that the overall PDO was still relevant and achievable, the team noted that an extension of the project completion timeframe would be needed as a result of implementation delays related to the IPPS and NRCA, as well as delays in the construction of the CSC, since planning and site selection did not start until after the project had already become effective. At that point in time, the team suggested that the government seek a resolution to funding gap issues through a possible additional financing operation.

37. Following the 2011 MTR, project implementation slowed considerably due to consistent delays over key procurement contracts, submission of financial management reports, and overall poor management of the IPPS sub-component. In addition to these issues, limited implementation of risk mitigation measures included in the project design -

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<sup>4</sup> The largest item affected was roll out and implementation of the IPPS, which had a funding gap of \$16.5 million as budgeting was done in 2002, whereas the project was not approved until 2006, and work only commenced in 2010. As a result of the eight year period that elapsed between planning and implementation, prices for hardware /software systems and civil works rose substantially, changes in government organization resulted in an increased number of sites to be connected to the IPPS, and the cost for technical consulting services substantially increased. In addition to the resource challenges for the IPPS, a significant funding gap had also emerged with respect to the NRCA in the amount of \$10.6 million, largely due to the need to create electronic records as well as increasing costs of construction and building materials, which were estimated to have increased some 15-20 percent per annum over the period.

such as implementing a change management strategy and hiring additional staff - resulted in additional delays. For example, just two months before the restructured closing date of June 2013, only 50% of project funds had been disbursed, the full rollout of IPPS to phase one and two sites was not completed, and ground had not yet been broken on the construction of the NRCA. As a result, the government requested a second extension of the project closing date of 24 months to allow for the completion of all activities in the project and thus to more fully achieve the PDO. However, given the poor performance of the project to that date, and the declining ratings noted in successive ISRs, the Bank only approved a 12 month extension until June 30, 2014.

38. The project closed on June 30, 2014 with a final disbursement ratio of 95.78%. By project closure, a number of activities were completed, including the adoption of ROM across the public service, capturing the establishment wage bill in the IPPS system, enhancing the capacity of the MoPS to implement the PSRP, and constructing a Civil Service College. However, a considerable number of project activities remained unfinished, most notably the IPPS system, which only had two out of eight modules functioning; the completion of the NRCA, which has yet to be operationalized; and the construction of phase two of the CSC campus. Prior to official project closure, the government provided written confirmation to the Bank affirming its commitment to complete these activities.

### **2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization**

#### ***Overall M&E Rating: Unsatisfactory***

#### ***M&E Design: Unsatisfactory***

39. A large number of indicators included in the project results framework, along with complex monitoring arrangements, led to considerable challenges in data collection and evaluation. Project indicators were chosen from among those included in the PSRP results framework in order to track the progress of various components within the UPSPEP project. While some of the indicators related well to the outcomes/outputs they were tracking, relationships with the sub-component objectives for a number of intermediate indicators were weak. After the restructuring, the project had a total of 20 indicators, two at the PDO level and 18 at the intermediate level. Responsibility for collecting data was highly decentralized with various departments within the MoPS tracking different indicators, and external MDAs individually responsible for monitoring agency-specific data. As a result of this complex M&E design—both in terms of the number of indicators and the monitoring arrangements—a number of problems emerged which negatively impacted M&E implementation and utilization.

#### ***M&E Implementation: Unsatisfactory***

40. In addition to flaws in M&E design, M&E arrangements were not effectively executed throughout the project implementation period. In particular, the original M&E arrangements were overly complex, and the Government underestimated the cost and effort

required to conduct service delivery, client satisfaction, and other surveys. As a result, of the two PDO level indicators identified in the PAD, only one was tracked during the implementation of the project. Likewise, of the 16 intermediate indicators originally identified in the PAD for component one (PRSP), only 3 were tracked on a regular basis. For component two, the original intermediate indicator related to the PEF was replaced by 3 intermediate indicators related to the CSC, of which only 1 was monitored during implementation.

***M&E Utilization: Unsatisfactory***

41. Since data was not able to be collected for many of the indicators originally contained in the PAD or formal restructuring documents, they were supplemented by an additional two indicators collected in the ISRs. The replacement of these indicators was not done through a formal restructuring, as it was felt that further revisions would undermine the relationship with the government. Due to the effectiveness delay, the indicators that were monitored—one PDO level indicator and six intermediate level indicators—were not able to be tracked in the first six ISRs. Once the project became effective in 2008, it was not until March 2011—nearly five years after the Board approval of the original project—that any of the indicators showed results that could be quantified. At project closure, a majority of the original results indicators had not been tracked throughout the implementation period of the project, and as a result, the extent to which appropriate M&E data was utilized to inform decision-making and resource allocation was presumably low<sup>5</sup>.

**2.3 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance**

42. Based on the original components of the project at appraisal, the project was given an environmental category rating of B (partial assessment). In the original project design, the construction of the NCRA triggered two safeguards policies: Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement. As the construction of the NCRA could have had a potential impact in terms of traffic disruption, dust, and noise pollution, a site-specific Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was prepared, approved, and disclosed by the World Bank and Government. In addition, since there were people currently living at the site identified for the NCRA who had to be relocated, an abbreviated Resettlement and Compensation Action Plan (RAP) was also developed by MoPS, approved by the World Bank and Government, and submitted for public disclosure.

43. The preparation of both documents was guided by consultations with key stakeholders including the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the MoPS, residents at the identified site where the NCRA was planned, as well as the construction company, and supervising consultant for the NCRA. The MoPS took the

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<sup>5</sup> For the purposes of this ICR, data on a number of indicators was able to be collected ex post during the ICR mission.

responsibility to ensure that all key stakeholders had access to the EIA and held meetings with the people residing at the site to implement the recommendations of the RAP.

44. Following the restructuring of the project, there was no change in the environmental category, nor were any new safeguard policies triggered. However, an ESIA was prepared and disclosed to cover the additional infrastructure activities related to the refurbishment of the Civil Service College in Jinja. The existing facilities and the site were allocated to the MoPS by Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries, and Fisheries (MAAIF) and ownership of land was duly transferred. During the ICR mission, it was noted by the project environmental and social specialists that no major safeguards issues arose during the implementation of the project. Similarly, project financial management and procurement specialists confirmed that there were no fiduciary issues related to procurement, financial management, or disbursements, other than delays related to the production of Interim Financial Reports (IFRs).

## **2.4 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase**

45. As of present, there is no formally approved post-completion or next phase operation. The government has committed to finance the remainder of the construction and subsequent operationalization of the NRCA. Furthermore, the Government has also provided funding for implementation of phases 3, 4, and 5 of the IPPS as part of the broader public financial management program, as well as support to CSC operations. As part of the UPSPEP project, the government developed a transformation paper which outlines key reforms that need to be sustained to ensure an effective and accountable public service that is able to deliver on the National Development Plan (NDP). Accordingly, it is envisaged that this will form the starting point for further reforms in the public sector. Presently, the Bank is engaged in dialogue with the government in order to consider future support to the service delivery agenda as part of a broader governance program.

## **3. Assessment of Outcomes**

### **3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation**

*Overall Relevance Rating: Substantial*

*Relevance of Objectives: High*

46. UPSPEP's objectives took into account the government of Uganda's development priorities both at the time of appraisal and at the time of the ICR assessment. As discussed above, the project drew heavily on the 2002-2013 PEAP, which was the government's Poverty Reduction strategy; the PSRP, which was the key governance Sector Development Plan (SDP); the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), which was the country strategy document developed by the Bank and Donor Partners; the ongoing PRSC 5-7 series; as well as the recommendations from the 2005 World Bank Africa Action Plan (AAP) and IDA's Assistance to Africa (SFIA) strategy. At project closure, UPSPEP's objectives continue to be relevant with respect to the government's NDP I (2011-2015), which

prioritizes the strengthening of public sector management through building on the achievements of the PRSP. These development priorities are consistent with the 2011-2015 CAS, and were reaffirmed in the 2013 CAS progress report, which prioritized a cross-cutting theme aiming to strengthen accountability and improve public financial management (PFM), public procurement, and public sector management at both local and national levels. Finally, the objectives of the UPSPEP project continue to remain relevant with respect to the Bank's 2011 Africa Strategy, which places governance and public sector capacity at its foundation.

***Relevance of Design: Moderate***

47. As noted in the discussion on Quality at Entry, the project's design was relevant to its stated objectives and the various components were appropriately linked to the PDO (see Table 2). However, while the design was relevant to the achievement of the PDO, it was less relevant to the capacity context of the MoPS, which was charged with managing this relatively ambitious reform project. As mentioned above, a lack of procurement capacity in the MoPS led to significant delays in the procurement process and frequent reshuffling of procurement staff undermined efforts to build capacity in Bank procurement procedures. Likewise, financial management capacity was low, accounting systems were not automated, and the quality of reporting was poor. These capacity challenges were especially acute given the ambitious number of project sub-components and complex M&E arrangements designed to cover a variety of reform areas, from HR management, to the implementation of a complex pay and personnel system, to two large scale construction projects. As a result, the complex nature of project design and the lack of implementing capacity led to uneven implementation, as evidenced by a number of key activities not being fully achieved by project closure.

***Relevance of Implementation: Substantial***

48. The relevance of the UPSPEP project was maintained throughout the implementation period, as the operation was responsive to changing needs. Given the 18 month effectiveness delay, the objectives of the government changed with respect to the scope and extent of capacity building initiatives. During the design and appraisal phases, the project was intended to target large scale capacity building through a US\$ 55 million Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF), which was intended to provide capacity building initiatives to MDAs and LGs on a demand-driven basis. However, given the Parliament's reticence to approve a project that focused on such *en masse* capacity building, as well as the changing development context, the scope of capacity building activities was tailored to more selective interventions to improve key competencies of the public service. Accordingly, through a level one project restructuring, the relevance of implementation was maintained through a switch from large scale capacity development under PEF to targeted training programs under the Civil Service College.

## 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

### *Efficacy Rating: Moderate*

49. The PDO of the UPSPEP project is to support the government “to improve and make its public service delivery affordable, efficient, accountable, and effective in use of public resources; and to improve the policy, institutional, and regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.” Formulated as such, the achievement of the PDO can be measured through the achievement of its constitutive objectives, namely the extent to which the various components of the UPSPEP project improved and contributed to the (i) affordability, (ii) efficiency, (iii) accountability, (iv) and effectiveness of the use of public resources, as well as the extent to which the various components improved the (v) policy, (vi) institutional, and (vii) regulatory environment of Uganda’s public service institutions.

50. Table 3 highlights key achievements and shortcomings on an objective-by-objective basis, and Annex 2 provides a detailed description of implementation of activities, achievements of key outputs, and performance of PDO and intermediate indicators with respect the project’s seven constituent objectives. Only six indicator targets were met, eight were not met, and additional six indicators were indeterminate as they were not tracked during implementation. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the PDO was fully achieved. As a result, the overall efficacy of the UPSPEP project can only be considered moderate.

<b>Table 3: Key Achievements (+) and Shortcomings (-) of the UPSPEP</b>	
<b>Project</b>	
<i>To improve and make service delivery more <b>affordable</b> in use of public resources.</i>	
(+)	Partial implementation of restructuring recommendations for government institutions resulting in “quick win” restructurings in multiple MDAs and LGs (sub-component 1.3).
(+)	Development of a new pay policy through a Public Service White Paper (sub-component 1.5).
(-)	Incomplete implementation of restructuring recommendations resulting in only 25% cost savings of a potential total savings of US\$2.16 billion (sub-component 1.3).
(-)	Incomplete implementation of the new pay policy due to fiscal constraints (sub-component 1.3).
(-)	Limited progress on the revision of pension legislation to support the management of pension arrears (sub-component 1.5).
<i>To improve and make service delivery more <b>efficient</b> in use of public resources.</i>	
(+)	Development, sensitization, and roll-out of the ROM/OOB framework in 100% of MDAs and LGs (sub-component 1.1).
(+)	Implementation of Integrated Payroll and Personnel System (IPPS) in 39 MDAs and operationalization of the payroll payment module in all 207 MDAs and LGs—representing 100% of the government establishment (sub-component 1.2).
(+)	Removal of approximately 9,000 ghost workers from the government’s payroll resulting in annual savings of US\$10 million as a result of payroll cleaning exercises (sub-component 1.2).
(+)	Partial implementation of restructuring recommendations for government institutions (sub-component 1.3).
(+)	Construction of National Records Center and Archives (sub-component 1.4)
(-)	Only 72% of MDAs and LGs report full achievement of ROM targets against a target of 100% (sub-component 1.1).
(-)	Limited connectivity whereby only select MDAs have LAN connections for using the IPPS system (sub-component 1.2).
(-)	Only two IPPS modules (staff records management and payroll) of eight functional at project closing (sub-component 1.2)
(-)	Incomplete implementation of restructuring recommendations resulting in smaller cost savings (sub-component 1.3)
(-)	National Records Center and Archives not furnished or operationalized and no records transferred (sub-component 1.4).
<i>To improve and make service delivery more <b>accountable</b> in use of public resources.</i>	
(+)	Client Charters have been put in place in 23 MDAs and 57 LGs—nearly half of all institutions targeted for ROM—in for communicating expected service standards as well as improving service delivery.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(+) Development of a more transparent and meritocratic recruitment system across the public service whereby 100% of all government jobs are now filled through open competition (sub-component 1.2).</li> <li>(+) Systematic payroll inspections and audits to determine whether internal audits are being carried out before changes to payroll are approved, which has reduced payroll discrepancies by 10% (sub-component 1.3).</li> <li>(-) Annual ROM targets and Client Charters targets have not been fully met in MDAs and LGs (sub-component 1.1).</li> </ul>
<i>To improve and make service delivery more effective in use of public resources.</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(+) Improved performance management culture which relies on service delivery standards, client charters, annual performance agreements, and individual staff performance appraisals (sub-component 1.1).</li> <li>(+) ROM is now implemented in 100% of MDAs and LGs, and 72% of annual performance objectives are now being met (sub-component 1.1).</li> <li>(-) Annual ROM targets and Client Charters targets have not been fully met in MDAs and LGs (sub-component 1.1).</li> <li>(-) No information on satisfaction of public service delivery or service standards which have been met (sub-component 1.1).</li> </ul>
<i>To improve the policy environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(+) MoPS was effectively restructured and a change management strategy was prepared (sub-component 1.6).</li> <li>(+) Cabinet Committee System was established so that reforms can be fully more debated (sub-component 1.6).</li> <li>(+) Policy Research Framework was developed and targeted research was conducted in tourism sector (sub-component 2.1).</li> <li>(-) Limited visibility of the PRSP reform agenda as a result of not fully implementing IEC strategy (sub-component 1.6)</li> </ul>
<i>To improve the institutional environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(+) Construction and development of the Civil Service College facilities (sub-component 2.1).</li> <li>(+) Development of a core curriculum for civil servants delivered through a “caravan” approach whereby a mobile training unit has trained 2,545 civil servants in core competency areas (sub-component 2.1).</li> <li>(+) Development of guidelines to bring a “gender lens” into the HR management, recruitment, and budgeting decisions in the public service (sub-component 1.4).</li> <li>(+) Creation of HIV focal points in each ministry so that those affected can seek anonymous counseling and revision employment policies in light of HIV/AIDS considerations (sub-component 1.4).</li> <li>(+) Creation of a MBA program to better train and equip top managers with leadership skills (sub-component 2.2).</li> <li>(-) Construction of phase two of the CSC has not commenced due to cost overruns and fiscal constraints (sub-component 2.1)</li> </ul>
<i>To improve the regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(+) Mainstreaming ROM and OOB across the public service (sub-component 1.1).</li> <li>(+) Regulations to better guarantee the meritocracy in the recruitment of public sector workers (sub-component 1.2).</li> <li>(+) Development of a new pay policy through a Public Service White Paper (sub-component 1.5).</li> </ul>

### 3.3 Efficiency

#### *Efficiency Rating: Moderate*

51. The costs involved in achieving the project’s development objectives appear to be moderately efficient with respect to the benefits derived by the project. At the time of project appraisal, no economic analysis was completed to determine Net-Present Value or Economic Rate of Return estimates related to the project’s key areas of intervention. As a result, it is not possible to recalculate efficiency estimates *ex post* and compare them to anticipated returns at project appraisal. However, for the purposes of providing an estimate of efficiency and value for money in this ICR, a number of key project outputs are worth noting:

52. As noted above, the introduction of ROM into 100% of MDA and LGs has resulted in 72% of MDAs and LGs reporting full achievement of their annual performance targets. At the same time, service standards have been explicitly enumerated through Client Charters in a majority of MDAs, which have resulted in decreased waiting times, more streamlined procedures, and reduced processing steps for certain services (e.g. passports,



vital records, and other government documents). In addition, OOB has in principle made budgeting more efficient and performance reviews have enhanced the accountability of civil servants.

53. Through the implementation of the IPPS system the UPSPEP project has contributed to enhancing the integrity of the payroll system, resulting in savings of 3.7 billion Ugandan Shillings (US\$1.3 million equivalent) within the first three months of decentralizing the payroll payment system. Likewise, due to the related payroll cleaning and supervision activities, there has been a substantial reduction in the number of ghost workers on the payroll. The discrepancy between staff paid through payroll versus actual staff (as revealed through payroll inspections as audits), has been reduced from 15 to 5 percent over the life of the project. While the GoU was unable to provide details regarding the 10% decrease in payroll discrepancies, Irish Aid estimates that payroll cleaning exercises have resulted in the removal of approximately 9,000 ghost workers from the government's payroll, representing an annual savings of \$10 million.

54. In addition to the reduction of payroll discrepancies, the IPPS system has reduced the time needed for Chief Accounting Officers (CAOs) to process the monthly payrolls; improved the capacity to engage in forward budgetary and HR planning; eliminated the need for paper pay statements; reduced the scope for fraudulent pay and pension claims; improved staff transitions from payroll to pension systems; and ultimately resulted in the more timely and accurate payment of civil servants.

55. Based on the results of an independent study conducted by Adam Smith International in 2012, it was found that the GoU could save approximately US\$2.16 billion by restructuring its MDAs and LGs in line with the report's recommendations. Although the recommendations have presently not been implemented in full due to funding constraints, a number of "quick win" restructurings have taken place that have resulted in the government recouping 25% of the estimated potential savings (intermediate indicator 6). In addition to formal restructuring, MDAs and LGs have benefitted from the innovation activities of component two of the UPSPEP project, and have implemented recommendations to make business processes more efficient.

56. Finally, through the CSC, the government of Uganda will be able to more efficiently and effectively train civil servants. While the construction of the CSC facilities was ongoing, the MoPS developed a "caravan approach" whereby a mobile unit containing all necessary instructional supplies (e.g. computers, speakers, chairs, tables, projection screens, etc.) traveled to various cities across the country, particularly to remote locations, to offer core courses and trainings. This training delivery innovation has yielded significant efficiencies as it has reduced cost of transport for participants by 97.5%, translating into total training cost saving of 19%.

57. Despite these potential and estimated efficiency gains, there are still areas of the project that are not delivering their expected economic benefits. First, while the IPPS system is yielding cost savings through better payroll management, the majority of HR modules are not functional, which reduces the government's ability to manage

Recruitment, Leave, Pension, Career Planning, Performance Management, and Training. Second, given that the NRCA has not been fully operationalized, the government is still bearing the costs of an inefficient records storage and retrieval system, and many national records continue to be lost and degraded. Third, since the government restructuring program remains largely unfunded and unimplemented, there is a potential for the government to benefit from greater cost savings by further rationalizing its structures. Finally, although the CSC is fully operational at present, cost savings will not be realized until phase two of the facilities are complete to include dining and boarding facilities.

### **3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating**

**Overall Outcome Rating:** Moderately Unsatisfactory

**Relevance:** Substantial

**Efficacy:** Moderate

**Efficiency:** Moderate

58. As noted above, the overall relevance of the UPSPEP project was Substantial. The relevance of objectives was high, as they were closely related to the government's development priorities at appraisal, throughout implementation, and at project closing. Although the project's design provided a strong link between the project components and the PDO, the relevance of project design was only moderate as it was overly ambitious and did not sufficiently account for the capacity constraints of the implementing agency, which contributed to significant delays and ultimately resulted in uneven implementation of activities. Relevance of implementation was substantial as an adaptive restructuring early in the life of the project ensured that it remained relevant to the government's changing priorities and needs.

59. Based on the achievement of the PDO, and the performance of the PDO and intermediate indicators, the overall efficacy of the UPSPEP project was Moderate. The project had a number of notable achievements, including the completion of the CSC which will leave a lasting impression on the Ugandan Civil Service, the improved performance culture which was supported by ROM and OOB reforms, and improved payroll management resulting from the implementation of the IPPS. At the same time, little progress has been made on implementing other HR modules of the IPPS system; the government has not made much progress with respect to pay, pension, and restructuring reforms under the PRSP; and the National Records Centre and Archives risks becoming a white elephant if it is not properly operationalized. In addition, poor M&E made it difficult to decipher if the project has actually delivered the desired outcomes, as numerous indicators were not tracked during the life of the project.

60. The overall efficiency of the UPSPEP project was moderate. While efficiencies in some project areas can be quantified, as with respect to improved payroll management, a majority of the project's efficiency gains must rely on qualitative estimates. For instance, while the project has resulted in improved service delivery through ROM and OOB approaches, the value of cost savings and benefit has not been systematically calculated.

Likewise, while there are a number of project areas that have potential benefits through costs savings and efficiency gains—including the full rollout of the IPPS system, the construction of the NRCA and phase two of the CSC, and the implementation of the government restructuring recommendations—incomplete implementation means that these potential gains have not been currently realized.

61. Given the ratings for Relevance (Substantial), Efficacy (Moderate), and Efficiency (Moderate), the overall rating of the project is Moderately Unsatisfactory with respect to IEG’s harmonized rating criteria.<sup>6</sup>

### **3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts**

#### **(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development**

62. While the UPSPEP project did not have a direct poverty impact, it did substantially address gender and social issues within the context of the public service. As mentioned above, efforts were taken to mainstream gender considerations into the recruitment and retention policies of the civil service. Likewise, similar considerations were addressed with respect to civil servants living with HIV/AIDS. As noted in detail above, the project improved access to counseling and treatment by establishing HIV/AIDS focal points in each MDA to anonymously provide support to civil servants.

#### **(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening**

63. Improving the country’s capacity and institutions was at the very core of this project and these issues were individually addressed by the project’s two components. UPSPEP support for the PRSP helped to strengthen institutions through its focus on results, accountability, and efficiency in the public service. Through these reforms, MDAs and LGs have been strengthened and their services delivery has improved through the introduction of ROM and OOB approaches. Likewise, MDAs and LGs now have increased capacity to monitor and manage payroll transactions, even though the related HR modules are yet to come on line. With respect to its second component, UPSPEP’s support has helped to rehabilitate and operationalize the Civil Service College, which will provide continued support to developing capacity in the public service.

#### **(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts**

64. In addition to the outcomes and impacts noted above, the 2008 level one restructuring of the UPSPEP project had a number of unintended consequences which impacted overall outcomes both positively and negatively. A notable positive unintended

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<sup>6</sup> Although the project underwent a level one, Board-approved restructuring, the PDO was not substantively changed in the amended Financing Agreement. In addition, the project was restructured before it became effective, and the only funds disbursed with \$500,000 related to the Project Preparation Facility. After consulting with IEG, it was determined that a split rating would not be required.

impact was the development of the “caravan” approach while the construction of the CSC facilities was ongoing. This adaptation represents a true innovation as it was responsible for the majority of trainings that took place during the life of the project. Even though the Civil Service College campus has now since opened, the caravan approach will be retained to provide relevant and cost efficient trainings for civil servants in hard to reach areas.

65. While the effects of the restructuring of the second component had a positive impact with respect to the development of the caravan approach, it had negative ramifications with respect to the capacity of the MoPS to manage the project. The original design of the project had envisaged an elaborate implementation structure for the original second component (PEF), which called for an enhanced capacity building team in MoPS, which would have been responsible for reviewing applications from various MDAs for funding. Under these arrangements, the MoPS would have had many opportunities to interact with different sectors while marketing and supervising the PEF, which would have also complemented the dissemination of PSRP initiative. However, the removal of PEF component and decrease in IDA resources reduced opportunities for MoPS to market the PSRP and UPSPEP project as well as to coordinate with other MDAs and LGs.

66. Aside from the unintended impacts surrounding the restructuring, the Bank dialogue around public sector and financial management reforms benefitted from project supervision missions and all triggers under the PRSC 7, 8 and 9 and the JBSF were supported by the project. As noted, PRSC policy triggers included key issues of pay reform, efficiency of Government spending and wage bill controls, and equity in the distribution of services around the country. To achieve these triggers, the project supported the implementation of the IPPS, review of the pay reform strategy, approval of a new public service strategy under the public service transformation paper, development of a framework to support retention of staff in hard to reach and hard to stay areas, and implementation of the ROM/OOB initiatives.

### **3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops**

67. As this was not an Intensive Learning ICR (ILI), no beneficiary surveys and/or stakeholder workshops were conducted.

## **4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

### ***Risk Rating: Substantial***

68. A first key challenge to the sustainability of the PDO is whether sufficient government commitment will remain to support the reforms initiated under the UPSPEP project. Elections in 2016 will likely bring new policies and legislation, so it remains to be determined how relevant the reforms under the PRSP will continue to be to the government’s post-election priorities. In particular, the restructuring of government agencies, to the extent to which they occurred under sub-component 1.3, remains tenuous as the newly created structures and agencies have not had sufficient time to stabilize. Likewise, continued commitment is needed to meet pay and pension reform commitments

under sub-component 1.5. Finally, strong commitment will be needed to ensure that top-level government support for ROM and OOB will be sustained.

69. Second, in order to ensure the sustainability of certain project activities, continued government financial support is needed to maintain investments made under the UPSPEP project. Due to implementation delays and the subsequent closure of the project, a number of key items remain unfinished, including: (i) the furnishing and operationalization of the NRCA; (ii) the construction of phase two of the Civil Service College; and (iii) implementation of policy research and innovation initiatives. In order to ensure the sustainability of these project investments, especially the completion of the NRCA, the Government has committed funding through the Ministry of Finance to continue to activities started under the project. This commitment has been affirmed by letter to the Bank and commitments confirmed in the MTEF and budget for Financial Year 2014/2015.

70. Third, discussions with basket fund DPs, particularly Irish Aid and DANIDA, suggest that future support from development partners will be needed to maintain reform momentum. However, the sustainability of current reforms remains a concern, particularly with regard to the growing number of public service staff and increasing salaries despite current resource levels. In this context, a key risk to the sustainability of PSM reforms is that some DPs are moving support away from Public Sector Management as results are hard to demonstrate in the short-run and declining aid budgets make it increasingly difficult to demonstrate to constituents that value-for-money is being achieved. A final and related risk is that other government policies, such as the recent anti-gay legislation, may make future partnerships with the certain DPs more difficult.

## **5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance**

### **5.1 Bank Performance**

#### **(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry**

##### ***Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory***

71. As noted above, the UPSPEP project drew on a diverse array of relevant background analyses that supported the project's various components and sub-components. In addition, the project design incorporated lessons learned within the country and region, as well as from the governance sector more broadly. Additional levels of review were assured through a QER process and the Project Preparation Facility, which helped to launch key activities. As a result of the preparatory work conducted, the project's components were aligned with the PDO's intended outcomes, and the outcomes matched the government's development priorities at time of appraisal. The project design also benefitted from an extensive analysis of related risks and a thorough evaluation of fiduciary capacity, sustainability, and safeguards issues.

72. At the same time, however, the design of the project was over-ambitious given the large number of components and indicators as well as the existing procurement and

financial management capacity of the implementing agency at time of appraisal. Although the Bank utilized the PPF to build these capacities, the implementation of the project proved difficult as delays resulted in several large items not being completed by project closing. In addition to the overly complex design of the projects sub-components, a poorly designed M&E system contained numerous indicators which could not be adequately monitored by the government. Had the M&E system been more appropriately designed and had the original project design focused on more selective interventions in the PSRP, quality at entry could have been significantly improved and implementation of project components would have been more even at project closure.

## **(b) Quality of Supervision**

### ***Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory***

73. During the implementation period, the Bank conducted a total of 16 ISR missions and completed an intensive MTR in 2011. Both DANIDA and Irish Aid acknowledged that the Bank's support missions were frequent and helpful in identifying key implementation challenges, which were essential for removing road blocks and helpful in targeting areas for greater attention. While there was an initial delay in the Bank providing resources to the basket fund, feedback from DPs suggested that the SWAp arrangement was well implemented and that the Bank was able to bring a great deal of technical expertise to the implementation of the PSRP. As a lead donor partner in the SWAp arrangement, it was noted that intensive Bank supervision often ensured that key project management and fiduciary issues were adequately addressed, and that relevant documents were eventually submitted despite initial delays.

74. However, during implementation there were serious issues related to the quality of M&E arrangements and the systematic monitoring of results. As noted above, of the two PDO indicators and 18 intermediate indicators in the results framework, only one PDO and three intermediate outcome indicators were regularly tracked through the implementation period. Of the six indicators that were tracked during the life of the project, only four were from the originally approved indicators listed in the PAD, and an additional two indicators were added on an ad hoc basis. Despite the filing of regular ISRs and the completion of an intensive MTR, the discrepancy between the indicators tracked and those listed in the PAD was never noted by the task team, nor was it detected by management. As a result, this impaired the ability of the Bank to monitor progress on the diverse areas of the project, and inherently undermined the capacity for results-based decision making. Had the team adhered to the original results framework and had management ensured that the indicators be formally restructured, the quality of supervision could have been greatly improved.

## **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance**

### ***Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory***

75. As Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry was Moderately Unsatisfactory and Quality of Supervision was Moderately Unsatisfactory, the Overall Bank Performance

for the UPSPEP project is Moderately Unsatisfactory with respect to IEG's Harmonized Ratings Criteria.

## **5.2 Borrower Performance**

### **(a) Government Performance**

#### ***Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory***

76. As noted above, the government commitment to the UPSPEP project was generally adequate in some areas. Although there was a substantial effectiveness delay, the government reiterated its support for the PSRP and the Civil Service College, as evidenced by a letter of continued commitment by the President, by emphasizing the centrality of the UPSPEP project in helping the government strengthen its public service. Likewise, during implementation, the MoFPED firmly supported the implementation of the IPPS by signing a MoU with the MoPS to ensure that the remaining IPPS modules were made operational and that the IPPS properly interfaces with the IFMIS system. This commitment was reiterated at project closing, with the MoFPED indicating that it will continue to support the PRSP reforms, especially the ROM and performance contracts.

77. Despite these areas of notable commitment, however, other areas of the project were not given the same support. Although risk mitigation measures were included in project design, limited implementation of key elements, such as the government's IEC and change management strategies, greatly undermined the visibility and support of the project. Similarly, while the Civil Service College was built and operationalized at the request of the government, the MoFPED noted during the ICR mission that it only intends to fund CSC operations for the short term, and that the continued existence of the CSC will be predicated on its ability to sustain itself in the next 3-5 years. Likewise, a majority the recommendations of the extensive government restructuring exercise that took place under the PSRP have not been implemented despite huge potential efficiency gains and cost savings. Had the government supported the UPSPEP project more fully and evenly, these and other key reforms would have been complete by project closing.

### **(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance**

#### ***Rating: Unsatisfactory***

78. While the implementing agency adequately managed certain reform components, such as the ROM/OOB activities as well as the construction and operationalization of the CSC, other aspects of the project, such as the rollout of the IPPS and the construction of the NRCA, were very poorly executed by the MoPS. As mentioned earlier, there was no dedicated Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for this project and the responsibility for implementation was mainstreamed in the MoPS and the relevant MDAs and LGs. Given its low procurement, M&E, and financial management capacity, these activities were further delayed by frequent rotation of relevant staff, poor project management for key

components, and weak leadership within the MoPS during the first stages of project implementation.

79. These issues were echoed by the DPs, who noted that while there was sufficient commitment, ownership, and clarity at the policy level, the technical capacity of the MoPS was weak with respect to timely implementation. In particular, there were substantial delays in the MoPS preparing annual work plans, consistent issues with procurement and the timely submission of Interim Financial Reports (IFRs), and a lack of capacity in the unit responsible to the implementation of the IPPS. It was also noted that for a majority of the project implementation there was a leadership deficit, with the original Permanent Secretary (PS) not being responsive to reporting requirements as well as not taking appropriate remedial actions. After the removal of the PS, and despite recommendations by the Bank to hire a project manager to help speed implementation of key reform areas, no additional human resources were committed to the project. Finally, the MoPS did not appropriately monitor the project indicators, which inhibited its ability to take corrective actions. Had overall leadership, project management, and M&E been better during the implementation period, it is likely that the project would have likely achieved more of its objectives and demonstrated greater efficacy at project closing.

### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance**

#### ***Rating: Unsatisfactory***

80. As Government Performance was Moderately Unsatisfactory and Implementing Agency Performance was Unsatisfactory, the Overall Borrower Performance for the UPSPEP project is Unsatisfactory with respect to IEG's Harmonized Ratings Criteria.

## **6. Lessons Learned**

81. Implementation of second-generation public sector reforms requires a sustained commitment in order to achieve long-term impact, which raises important lessons about how to best design and implement projects and how to effectively engage with the government. The World Bank's 2010-2020 Public Sector Management Approach<sup>7</sup> emphasizes the need to better understand the context within which public sector reforms are implemented and the processes required to effectively implement them. In this context, analysis of the successes and shortcomings of the UPSPEP raises a number of important lessons.

82. **A first lesson learned is the importance of investing time and effort in aligning and securing both political and technical support for the life of the project.** The UPSPEP project was aligned with the Government's PSRP agenda, and during preparation a great deal of effort was invested in consulting stakeholders and developing an

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<sup>7</sup> The World Bank's Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020: "Better Results from Public Institutions" February 2012



Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) strategy to market the reforms to both lawmakers and the public. However, the strategy was not fully implemented due to funding reallocations, which made it difficult to raise awareness and sustain political support for the PSRP, and which may have been a contributing cause to the delay in Parliamentary approval of the project.

83. **A second lesson learned is that appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are required to proactively track the impacts of reforms.** A strong focus on developing a tailored M&E framework should be established from the concept stage and extended throughout project implementation. As evidenced by the UPSPEP project, there is a tendency for public sector operations to over-promise with respect to indicators in order to prove their status as an "all of government" intervention. Results frameworks should be prepared with great caution, focusing on realistic outcomes and indicators, ensuring links between activities, outputs, and outcomes, and investing in baseline data. It is also important to anticipate the cost and effort required by both the Government and Bank teams in collecting data, and to include this in the activity and budget plans.

84. **A third lesson learned is the importance of focusing on context and process in project design, taking into account political economy factors as well as existing and potential capacity constraints.** The World Bank's 2010-2020 PSM approach clearly states that "the process of PSM reform is increasingly emphasized as key for success, to the extent that it helps uncover the real incentives and interests of the actors involved in conducting PSM reform change and finds a compromise between them." As noted, the design of the UPSPEP was overly ambitious given the existing procurement, financial management, and project management capacity challenges of the implementing agency at the time of appraisal. Mainstreaming implementation of the project directly in the MoPS further exacerbated the capacity challenges forcing the staff to choose between the project activities and their day-to-day work. In addition, the level of the political commitment shown during preparation did not last throughout project implementation and reforms frequently encountered resistance to change, which was exacerbated by the failure to implement the communication and change management strategies.

85. **A fourth lesson learned is the need for flexible and iterative approaches in project implementation.** A key success of the project was the implementation of the "caravan" approach in providing training to civil servants in advance of the completion of the CSC. This approach proactively addressed the delays in the completion of the CSC and made it possible to achieve tangible results by project closing. Although the CSC has begun offering on-campus trainings, the caravan approach will be continued as a means to offer cost effective training in hard to reach areas. Accordingly, the success of the "caravan" approach demonstrates that the proactive development of "second best" options can still allow for the achievement of substantial results.

86. **A fifth lesson learned is the importance of adequate leadership, capacity, and authority in the implementing agency.** Given the cross cutting nature of the reforms, the government acknowledged that it was necessary to create a talent pool of indispensable positions in all MDAs during the project period. It was also critical to ensure that the

implementing agency had the authority to enforce or encourage the implementation of reforms that require committed participation of other agencies. For example, the need to enforce the role of accounting officers in various MDAs was essential to the success of the IPPS. However, absenteeism has remained high at the local level, in particular in schools and hospitals, which undermined the impact of project interventions on service delivery. Accordingly, it is important that the risk assessment framework captures risks related to inadequate capacity, not only at approval, but also throughout project implementation, as capacity can evaporate very quickly.

87. **A sixth lesson learned is that clear and simple implementation arrangements are essential to smooth implementation during the life of a project and to the eventual achievement of project objectives.** The UPSPEP project showed how challenges can emerge when components are too numerous and complex to be effectively managed. Accordingly, improved design of a multi-sectoral public sector project requires: (i) developing simpler and focused project components to achieve tangible results; (ii) understanding the political economy of the country, which will enable the team designing the project to develop more appropriate implementation arrangements; (iii) creating incentives for government buy-in; (iv) developing flexible implementation arrangements depending on political economy considerations; and (v) considering the appropriate timeframe to implement the project.

## **7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners**

88. The Government of Uganda's MoPS provided a full government completion report of the UPSPEP project as well as comments on the draft Bank ICR. Likewise, comments on the draft ICR were provided by Irish Aid and DANIDA, who served as co-financiers of the basket funding (SWAp) arrangement that supported component one of the UPSPEP project; no comments were received from DfID who was the third funding partner of the SWAp. Borrower comments on the draft ICR and the UPSPEP project as a whole are summarized in Annex 7; co-financer comments on the draft ICR are summarized in Annex 8; and comments on key issues raised are noted below.

### **(a) Borrower/implementing agencies**

89. The Bank acknowledges GoU's concurrence with the report findings and notes issues with regard to the reduced scope of the project following the first adaptive restructuring. Whereas the reduction in scope only affected component two of the project, it is assumed that the implementation structures originally intended for this component would have supported the implementation of component one as such its removal could have affected overall implementation capacity. The report discusses this upfront under context and in the lessons learnt picked up this issue in the lessons learned. With regard to the results framework and overall M&E, the Bank acknowledges the Government's concern on lack of effective monitoring of all indicators during project implementation and the poorly selected indicators. This is well elucidated in the lessons learned section.

90. Whereas the Bank retains the overall rating in the ICR as Moderately Unsatisfactory, the Government has recommended an upgrade to Moderately Satisfactory

given the project's achievements. In addition, the Government recognized that realization of impact from PSM reforms takes considerable time and capacity and other implementation challenges make the transition from outputs to outcomes difficult in such a short period of time. Likewise, this is acknowledged by the Bank.

**(b) Cofinanciers**

91. The Bank acknowledges and concurs with all comments raised by development partners as summarized in Annex 8. Comments have been incorporated in the ICR text.

**(c) Other partners and stakeholders**

92. None

## Annex 1: Project Costs and Financing

### (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	70.00	019.8.00	28%
Physical Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Project Costs</b>	70.00	19.8.00	
Front-end fee PPF	0.5.00	0.5.00	100%
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total Financing Required</b>	70.500	020.3	29%

### (b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Co-financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		0.00	0.00	.00
International Development Association (IDA)		23.00	19.8	86.2%0
FOREIGN SOURCES (UNIDENTIFIED)	Basket Funds	16.57	16.00	98.58%

## **Annex 2: Outputs by Component**

93. The PDO of the UPSPEP project is to support the government “to improve and make its public service delivery affordable, efficient, accountable, and effective in use of public resources; and to improve the policy, institutional, and regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions for sustainable economic growth.” Formulated as such, the achievement of the PDO can be measured through the achievement of its constitutive objectives, namely the extent to which the various components of the UPSPEP project improved and contributed to the (i) affordability, (ii) efficiency, (iii) accountability, (iv) and effectiveness of the use of public resources, as well as the extent to which the various components improved the (v) policy, (vi) institutional, and (vii) regulatory environment of Uganda’s public service institutions.

94. Due to the support of the UPSPEP project, there were a number of key achievements in making public service delivery more affordable, efficient, accountable, and effective in the use of public resources. These include, among others: the adoption of ROM/OOB across the public service, which has supported the development of Client Charters, performance contracts, and a sanctions frameworks to improve service delivery (sub-component 1.1); fully capturing the establishment wage bill in the IPPS system, which has improved HR management, increased efficiencies and cost savings, and reduced opportunities for fraud and waste in public resources (sub-component 1.2); and support for payroll inspections, which has reduced the discrepancy between the number of staff paid thorough the payroll and actual staff (component 1.3).

95. Likewise, much has been done to improve the policy, institutional, and regulatory environment of public service delivery institutions. These achievements include, among others: the development and implementation of HR policy and guidelines for vulnerable groups (sub-component 1.4); the successful implementation of activities to improve the government’s policy-making capacity (sub-component 1.6); and the construction of a Civil Service College that has successfully trained thousands of public servants (sub-component 2.1).

96. Despite these successes, there were also a number of shortcomings in the implementation of the UPSPEP project caused by price escalations due to initial delays in project effectiveness and implementation, as well as a lack of capacity and committed leadership to properly manage the project. Key shortcomings include, among others: a failure to operationalize all eight IPPS modules in all phase 1 and 2 locations (sub-component 1.2); limited progress on implementation of recommendations related to the government restructuring exercise, which has limited the achievement of the projected potential efficiency gains (sub-component 1.3); incomplete operationalization of the National Records Center and Archives, which has inhibited efforts to decongest public records (sub-component 1.4); and limited implementation of the pay and pension reform agenda despite the approval a pay policy (subcomponent 1.5).

97. In the analysis below, each objective is discussed with respect to the various component activities and outputs that support them, and Table 4 provides a summary of key outputs achieved on a component-by-component basis.

(i) ***To improve and make service delivery more affordable***;

98. The UPSPEP project aimed to improve the affordability of service delivery through the restructuring and rationalization of public sector organizations. Under sub-component 1.3, an external consulting firm identified approximately US\$2.16 billion in cost savings by restructuring its MDAs and LGs in line with the report's recommendations. However, the costs of implementing the new structures were considered prohibitively high given the fiscal constraints faced by the government and only a number of MDAs were reorganized or rationalized. Restructuring achievements include a review of the Uganda Land Commission and revitalization of six district land offices under Ministry of Land, Housing and Urban Development; revitalization of the Petroleum Institute and creation of the Department of Petroleum in the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development; and the reorganization of the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development, Ministry of Public Service, and Ministry of Education. Although the recommendations have presently not been implemented in full due to funding constraints, a number of "quick win" restructurings have taken place that have resulted in the government recouping 25% of the estimated potential savings.

99. Beyond the restructuring and review of the public service, the UPSPEP project supported the development of a new pay policy under subcomponent 1.5 in order to ensure the principles of equity and attract qualified staff in competition with the private sector. Due to fiscal constraints and despite the adoption of the White Paper on Civil Service Reform, however, these activities have not been fully implemented. In addition, challenges have been experienced with the revision of pension legislation and creation of a public sector pension fund to support management of pension arrears.

100. Despite the lack of M&E during the life of the project, *ex post* evaluations estimate savings from restructuring efforts at only 25% of the potential savings of US\$2.16 billion, as restructuring recommendations were only implemented in a few MDAs (intermediate indicator 6). Likewise, it was determined *ex post* that real pay increases remained at 0% through the life of the project due to inflation rates (intermediate indicator 11). An additional indicator—the adoption of Public Service White Paper on Pay and Pension reform—to benchmark the adoption of comprehensive pay reforms was added and achieved; however, this was not done through a formal restructuring process. In addition, information on the reduction of pension arrears suggests that arrears were reduced by 48% over the life of the project (intermediate indicator 12); however, information on the accumulation of new pension arrears (intermediate indicators 18) was not collected during the life of the project.

*(ii) To improve and make service delivery more efficient;*

101. The UPSPEP project aimed to improve efficiency in the use of public resources primarily through integrating Results Oriented Management (ROM) and Output Oriented Budgeting (OOB) in planning and budgeting systems and introduction of the IPPS. Under sub-component 1.1, the project successfully supported the development, sensitization, and roll-out of the ROM/OOB framework in Education, Health, Works, and transport, Water, and Environment sectors, as well as to Local Governments. Anecdotal evidence from the health sector suggest that ROM activities and Client Charters in Regional Referral Hospitals has resulted in greater efficiencies, including decreased waiting times to see health care professionals, better availability of medicines, a more efficient referral system that reduces unnecessary treatments, and more efficient budgeting.

102. In addition to these efficiency enhancing restructuring reforms, the UPSPEP project was able to support the implementation Integrated Payroll and Personnel System (IPPS) under sub-component 1.2. As a result, civil servants from 207 MDAs and LGs—representing the whole of the government establishment—are now captured in the IPPS database as is 100% of the establishment payroll. This has resulted in more regular and timely payment of salaries for civil servants, and accounting officers are now able to generate pay slips, verification reports, and forecasts with less effort. Likewise, payroll cleaning exercises which took place during project preparation have resulted in the elimination of approximately 9,000 ghost workers from the government’s payroll, which according to estimates by Donor Partners, represents an annual savings of US \$10 million per year.

103. While significant efficiency gains were made with respect to the implementation of ROM/OOB and IPPS, there were a number of shortcomings which undermine the project’s ability to generate greater efficiencies for the public service. These include: (i) connectivity issues whereby only 39 MDAs currently have the necessary hardware and LAN connections for using the IPPS system; (ii) little progress on the implementation and rollout of other IPPS modules, with only two modules (staff records management and payroll) of eight functional at project closing; and (iii) limited implementation of government restructuring recommendations as noted above. In addition, there were a number of shortcomings with respect to sub-component 1.4, which was designed to improve records management and decongestion of registries through the construction and operationalizing of a National Records Center and Archives. Although the construction of the facility was completed by project closing, the NRCA has not been furnished or operationalized and no records have been transferred, thus limiting its functionality as a national data repository.

104. Given the mixed performance of the sub-components aimed at generating efficiency in the use of public resources, the achievement of intermediate outcome indicator targets is likewise mixed. Good implementation of sub-component 1.1 has resulted in 100% of MDA and LGs having implemented ROM initiatives, including 23 ministries, 50 agencies, and 111 Local Governments (intermediate indicator 2). In addition, the government was able to meet its target related to the percentage of the establishment and wage bill captured in the IPPS database, which currently stands at 100% (intermediate

indicator 4). However, this indicator does not capture the poor performance related to the implementation of the other modules which are critical in ensuring the long-term sustainability of the IPPS system and delivering value for money. Likewise, since the NCRA remains un-operationalized, the percentage of transferred archives stands at zero and it is questionable whether the NCRA will help to decongest public records (intermediate indicator 9).

***(iii) To improve and make service delivery more accountable;***

105. While ROM and OOB has helped to enhance the efficiency and performance of civil servants and MDAs, as noted above under sub-component 1.1, the implementation of Client Charters has also increased the level of government accountability. As part of the implementation of the ROM/OOB framework, the majority of MDAs and more than half of LGs have been able to develop Client Charters, which are a valuable means for communicating expected service standards as well as improving service delivery. In an interview with INFOC, a leading anticorruption and public accountability CSO in Uganda, the implementation of Client Charters was cited as “instrumental” in increasing awareness of available public services, helping individuals become more confident to demand accountability, and providing whistleblowers a channel to have their complaints and concerns properly addressed.

106. In addition to the increased accountability as a result of ROM, sub-component 1.2 supported a number of notable achievements with respect to HR reforms, including the development of a more transparent and meritocratic recruitment system across the public service. Under the UPSPEP project, the government developed exams targeted to specific positions and introduced a computerized recruitment system, which is significantly more transparent and efficient than a paper-based application system. In addition to these efforts to increase transparency, the UPSPEP project has enhanced government accountability through sub-component 1.3, which supported systematic payroll inspections and audits. As a result of project support, MoPS officers now travel to local districts on a monthly basis to conduct inspections to determine whether internal audits are being carried out before changes to payroll are approved.

107. The progress made on increasing accountability in the use of public resources is reflected in the achievement of several indicators. As noted above, 100% of MDA and LGs have implemented ROM initiatives (intermediate indicator 2), and while the final target was not met by project closure, 72% of MDAs and LGs have reached their annual objectives ROM performance objectives (PDO indicator 2). Likewise, 100% of all government jobs are now filled through open competition at project closure (intermediate indicator 3). In addition, increased use of payroll audits and inspections has reduced the discrepancy between staff paid through the government’s payroll and the number of actual staff working for the government. Although this indicator was not formally approved in the PAD or in the project restructuring, it would appear that payroll discrepancies were reducing by 10%.

***(iv) To improve and make service delivery more effective;***



108. In addition to the achievements noted above, sub-component 1.1 has also helped to make more effective use of public resources. As mentioned, UPSPEP support has enabled the MoPS to introduce a performance management culture which relies on service delivery standards, client charters, annual performance agreements, and individual staff performance appraisals. Again, the health sector provides an example of the impact of this initiative as ROM activities and Client Charters in Regional Referral Hospitals have resulted in decreased waiting times to see health care professionals, better availability of medicines, less instances of stock-outs, and greater availability of staff.

109. Despite the anecdotal evidence provided during the ICR mission, however, there is not much quantitative evidence to demonstrate that public resources are being used in a more effective manner. Again, while ROM is now implemented in 100% of MDAs and LGs, and 72% of annual performance objectives are now being met, the percentage satisfaction with public service delivery (PDO indicator 1) was never tracked during the life of the project nor is information available on the percentage of service standards which have been met (intermediate indicators 1 and 17). Presently, the Government is in the process of finalizing the performance score card as part of the broader initiatives to assess achievement of performance targets in the ROM/OOB framework; however this information was not available at the time of the ICR.

*(v) To improve the policy environment of its public service delivery institutions*

110. The UPSPEP project aimed to improve the policy environment through sub-component 1.6, which was designed to enhance the capacity of the MoPS, and more generally, to increase the policy making capacity of the government. To this end, the MoPS was effectively restructured on the basis of an approved MOPS/ARS restructuring report and a change management strategy was prepared and implemented. In addition, the Cabinet Secretariat was very active in supporting efforts to strengthen the government's policy-making capacity and enhance awareness of reform objectives. To this end, a Cabinet Committee System was established so that reforms can be fully debated before coming to full cabinet discussion, and training was provided to Permanent Secretaries in the drafting of policy.

111. Other efforts to improve the policy environment were addressed by sub-component 2.1, which supported policy research under the CSC related to key government priorities. The MoPS, with the support of the Ontario Public Service, developed a framework to guide its policy research. As a result of this initiative, the targeted research has been conducted in the tourism sector, which has resulted in the creation of two tourism and investment centers in Jinja and Entebbe.

112. Despite the activities undertaken to improve the policy environment, the UPSPEP project has produced few outputs that can be measured by the intermediate indicators. The key intermediate indicator related to this sub-component was the percentage of PEAP targets achieved (intermediate indicator 13); however, this information was not tracked during PRSP implementation due to the fact that the PEAP ended in 2008 and the

government began monitoring targets through a different methodology. Ex-post evaluations suggest that 72% of PEAP targets have been met; however this is below the target value and it is unclear whether the activities under this component can have a direct causal effect with respect to the implementation of the PEAP. Likewise, one policy research initiative was conducted under the auspices of the CSC (intermediate indicator 15); however, no target values were set which makes it difficult to evaluate the efficacy of these activities.

(vi) *To improve the institutional environment of its public service delivery institutions*

113. The UPSPEP project made significant achievements in improving the institutional environment of its public service delivery institutions through capacity building activities under sub-component 2.1, which supported the construction and development of a Civil Service College. With the support of the project, MoPS was able to successfully upgrade and refurbish a facility in the city of Jinja, which includes a main campus building, classrooms, conference facilities, library resources, and all necessary ICT to conduct a full range of trainings<sup>8</sup>. Under phase 1, the college now has the capacity to train 10,000 civil servants per year, although given present training demand, it is likely that only 3,000 civil servants will be trained during the first year of operation. Going forward, the Government has provided for resources to operationalize the college and construction of phase 2, which would include building of dining and dormitory facilities for the trainees.

114. In addition to these capacity building initiatives, the project also supported institutional improvements by developing cross-cutting HR policies for vulnerable groups within the civil service. Under sub-component 1.4, the MoPS successfully developed and put in place guidelines to bring a “gender lens” into the HR management, recruitment, and budgeting decisions in the public service. In addition, substantial progress has been made to better mainstream, sensitize, and budget for HIV/AIDS issues in the workplace. To this end, the MoPS has created HIV focal points in each ministry so that those affected can seek anonymous counseling and treatment when necessary. In addition, employment policies have been reviewed in light of HIV/AIDS considerations so that affected employees can take extended periods of leave for treatment and not be forced into early retirement based on medical reasons.

115. With respect to the indicators, the construction of the CSC and its operationalization has been one of the most successful elements of the UPSPEP project. As a result of these efforts, and through the pioneering caravan approach, 2,545 civil servants have been trained in core competency areas, far exceeding project targets (intermediate indicator 14).

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<sup>8</sup> With the support of the project the MoPS has established twinning and partnership arrangements with the Ontario Public Service, the Tallinn Development and Training Centre (Estonia), and GIZ, and has been able to develop a seven core courses, including: (1) Induction for Public Officers, (2) Leadership and Change Management, (3) Competence-Based Recruitment, (4) Performance Management, (5) Public Procurement and Contract Management, (6) Innovation Management, and (7) Pre-Retirement Training.

While the CSC and its training programs have been highly successful, the local production of policy research (intermediate indicator 15) was not tracked and no target values were set, nor were improvements in leadership management skills tracked (intermediate indicator 16). Likewise, while no information was collected during the implementation phase related to work satisfaction or the percentage of women in the workforce (intermediate indicators 7 and 8), ex-post figures of 44% and 22% respectively were provided at project completion.

*(vii) To improve the regulatory environment of its public service delivery institutions*

116. A final element of the UPSPEP project set forth in the PDO was to improve the regulatory environment for public service delivery institutions. Under sub-component 1.1, the mainstreaming of ROM and OOB across the public service, development of performance contracts, and a framework to reward and sanction on the basis of the achievements of performance objectives provided for a more effective management of the human resources in the public service. At the same time, sub-component 1.2 ensured that regulations were put in place to better guarantee the meritocracy in the recruitment of public sector workers. Finally, regulations were put into place under sub-component 1.3 to allow the MoPS to conduct systematic payroll inspections and audits, which have greatly reduced incidences of ghost workers on the payroll.

117. As a result of these initiatives, indicators show that these additional regulations have had some tangible impact. As aforementioned, the use of performance contracts and sanctions framework is now universally applied in the public service and inspections have reduced significantly reduced payroll discrepancies.

<b>Table 4: Outputs by Component</b>	
<b>COMPONENT 1 – PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM PROGRAM (PSRP)</b>	
<b>• Subcomponent 1.1 – Performance and Accountability</b>	Status
○ <b>Strategy 1.1:</b> Institute an integrated public service performance management system based on ROM	
▪ Clear roles, responsibilities, and commitment to ROM of all relevant partners	Achieved
▪ Revise laws and regulations	Achieved
▪ Service delivery standards developed	Achieved
▪ Incentives and Sanctions framework established	Achieved
▪ ROM systems integrated with other systems and fully operational	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 1.2:</b> Strengthen the demand for accountability for service delivery	

▪ Client service charters developed	Achieved
▪ Inspection manual consolidated	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 1.3:</b> Facilitate de-bureaucratization and enhance client focus in public service delivery	
▪ Systems and procedures streamlined and enhanced	Partially Achieved
▪ Alternative modes of service delivery identified for selected functions	Partially Achieved
▪ Innovations introduced	Partially Achieved
<b>Subcomponent 1.2 – Human Resources Capacity</b>	
○ <b>Strategy 2.1:</b> Ensure efficiency, cost-effectiveness and meritocracy in recruitment and promotions	
▪ Appropriate selection instruments	Achieved
▪ A more efficient and effective PSC	Partially Achieved
▪ Competent personnel recruited	Partially Achieved
▪ More efficient and effective sector and district service commissions	Partially Achieved
▪ Capacity of women and other disadvantaged groups in the public service enhanced	Partially Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 2.2:</b> Install systems to enable efficient deployment and utilization of human resources in service delivery	
▪ IPPS operational at target sites	Partially Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 2.3:</b> Strengthen human resources development	
▪ Succession plans in place	Achieved
▪ Human Resource planning conducted	Achieved
▪ Skills gaps established	Achieved
▪ Staff with scarce skills focus for recruitment and pay reform	Partially Achieved
▪ Options outlined in study report	Achieved
▪ Revised schemes of service	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 2.4:</b> Explore feasibility of SES scheme	
▪ Decision on whether to adopt schemes	Not Achieved
<b>• Subcomponent 1.3 – Efficiency and Restructuring</b>	
○ <b>Strategy 3.1:</b> Undertake a comprehensive rationalization of ministries, departments, agencies and local governments	
▪ Review roles and functions	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 3.2:</b> Undertake a comprehensive review and rationalization of roles, functions and structures across MDAs and LGs	
▪ Restructuring guidelines produced	Achieved

▪ Pending restructuring initiatives completed	Partially Achieved
▪ Appropriate structures implemented in local governments	Partially Achieved
▪ Review reports produced	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 3.3:</b> Develop processes and procedures to enable efficient deployment and utilization of	
▪ Human Resources in service delivery	Partially Achieved
▪ Payroll inspections/internal audit reports	Partially Achieved
▪ Rationalize structures and staffing positions in sectors	Achieved
▪ Cost-effectiveness and efficiency studies in MDAs conducted and reports produced	Achieved
<b>• Subcomponent 1.4 – Work Environment</b>	
○ <b>Strategy 4.1:</b> Spearhead policies that enhance the work environment	
▪ Public service HIV/AIDS policy in place	Achieved
▪ Gender issues identified and incorporated in public service regulations	Achieved
▪ ICT policies in place	Not Achieved
▪ ICT capacity within the MoPS and the public service built	Not Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 4.2:</b> Support ministries in identifying disabling factors in the work environment and preparing plans to close gaps	
▪ Demand driven fund designed and launched	Not Achieved
▪ Records Center operational	Not Achieved
<b>• Subcomponent 1.5 – Pay and Pension Reforms</b>	
○ <b>Strategy 5.1:</b> Enhance public service pay with more rapid increase for the technical, professional and managerial cadres as per existing policy	
▪ New pay policy	Achieved
▪ Policies and/or other incentives for hard to reach/work environments	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 5.2:</b> Reform the pension system to restore the status of pensions as an important post-employment benefit for public service employees	
▪ Revise pension legislation	Not Achieved
▪ New pension fund	Not Achieved
<b>• Subcomponent 1.6 – Leadership and Management Development</b>	
○ <b>Strategy 6.1:</b> Develop an awareness and sensitization strategy to sustain broad and strong political leadership and stakeholder support for the program	

▪ Leaders sensitized	Partially Achieved
▪ White paper	Achieved
▪ Feedback reports	Achieved
▪ Speeches/presentations by leaders on the program's progress and performance	Achieved
▪ IEC plan developed	Achieved
▪ Information disseminated	Partially Achieved
▪ Report on impact	Partially Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 6.2:</b> Strengthen policy capacity	
▪ Policy capacity assessment report	Achieved
○ <b>Strategy 6.3:</b> Development and implement change management interventions	
▪ Approved MoPS restructuring report	Achieved
▪ MoPS restructured	Achieved
▪ Change management strategy	Achieved
▪ Change management interventions implemented	Not Achieved
<b>COMPONENT 2 – CIVIL SERVICE COLLEGE</b>	
• <b>Subcomponent 2.1 – Establishment of a Civil Service College as a center of excellence for policy research/training</b>	
▪ Upgrade existing premises	Achieved
▪ Operationalizing the CSC	Achieved
▪ Strengthening policy research	Partially Achieved
▪ Supporting the implementation of innovative ideas	Partially Achieved
• <b>Subcomponent 2.2 – Strategic capacity development for the transformation of Uganda</b>	
▪ Supporting training and research in strategic areas	Partially Achieved
▪ Bridging the current gaps in leadership and management	Partially Achieved

### **Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis**

As noted above, at the time of project appraisal, no economic analysis was completed to determine Net-Present Value or Economic Rate of Return estimates related to the project's key areas of intervention. As a result, it is not possible to recalculate efficiency estimates *ex post* and compare them to anticipated returns at project appraisal.

Accordingly, section 3.3 provides anecdotal and qualitative evidence on a number of key project outputs for the purposes of providing an estimate of efficiency and value for money in this ICR.

## Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

### (a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
<b>Lending</b>			
Modupe A. Adebawale	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTME – HIS	
Sarah Nankya Babirye	Program Assistant	GMFDR	
Reynaldo P. Castro	Consultant	GGODR	
Serigne Omar Fye	Senior Environmental Specialist	AFTN1 – HIS	
Barbara Kasura Magezi Ndamira	Senior Public Sector Specialist	GGODR	
Denyse E. Morin	Senior Operations Officer	OPSOR	
Edith Ruguru Mwenda	Senior Counsel	LEGAM	
Richard Olowo	Lead Procurement Specialist	GCFDR	
Patrick Piker Umah Tete	Sr Financial Management Specialist	GGODR	
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>			
Gladys Alupo	Program Assistant	AFMUG	
Constance Nekessa Ouma	Social Development Specialist	GSURR	
Howard Bariira Centenary	Senior Procurement Specialist	GGODR	
Paul Kato Kamuchwezi	Financial Management Specialist	GGODR	
Barbara Kasura Magezi Ndamira	Senior Public Sector Specialist	GGODR	Team Leader
Christine Makori	Senior Counsel	LEGAM	
Rajat Narula	Sr Financial Management Specia	GGODR	
Patrick Piker Umah Tete	Sr Financial Management Specia	GGODR	
Antonius Verheijen	Country Manager	ECCYU	
Herbert Oule	Environmental Specialist		
Arleen Seed	Senior ICT Policy Specialist	GTIDR	
Janet Christine Atiang	Team Assistant	AFMUG	
Michael Jelenic	Operations Analyst	GGODR	ICR Author



**(b) Staff Time and Cost**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
FY99		5.95
FY00		36.95
FY01		142.37
FY02		39.29
FY03		114.67
FY04		92.21
FY05		228.65
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
<b>Total:</b>		660.09
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY99		3.24
FY00		0.00
FY01		0.00
FY02		0.00
FY03		0.00
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
FY06		108.69
FY07		64.18
<b>Total:</b>		176.11

## **Annex 5: Beneficiary Survey Results**

As this was not an Intensive Learning ICR (ILI), no beneficiary surveys and/or stakeholder workshops were conducted.

## **Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results**

As this was not an Intensive Learning ICR (ILI), no beneficiary surveys and/or stakeholder workshops were conducted.

## **Annex 7: Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR**

### **COMMENTS ON THE WORLD BANK IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT FOR THE UGANDA PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PROJECT: P050440**

Government of Uganda generally agrees with the report; however the following comments are made on the specific sections of the report:

#### **1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design**

While the Project was restructured, reducing it in scope and funding, the original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and indicators were maintained in the restructured project. The restructured project therefore was unrealistic and ambitious by design. Therefore, Project objectives and indicators should have been reviewed to match the reduced scope and funding.

In addition to the above, while PSRP and UPSPEP were separate Programs with different objectives, indicators, timelines and financing mechanisms, these were fused during implementation and this caused implementation challenges especially relating to financial management, reporting and accountability.

#### **2. Results Framework and M&E**

The Ministry appreciates the set-up of the M&E system in the Ministry under the project. However, the design and implementation of the Results framework for the project was ambitious and unattainable under the restructured project. While the project was restructured and reduced in scope, the original indicators were maintained in the restructured project. In addition, during implementation, only few indicators relevant to the restructured project were monitored. This has therefore had an impact on the overall rating of the project.

#### **3. Capacity issues**

The report indicates that the Ministry lacked the capacity to implement the project outcomes. The Ministry asserts that there was adequate human resource capacity in terms of numbers and competencies; however their productivity was hampered by inadequate facilitation and motivation. It should be noted that the staff who were undertaking project activities were in addition performing the mainstream activities of the Ministry. In order to motivate them, they should have been paid a top up allowance/honoraria for undertaking extra duties and working beyond normal working hours to execute project activities, like their counterparts in other donor - funded projects. It should be noted that payment of Top Up and Honoraria is acceptable under the Government of Uganda Regulations and it should have been upheld under the project.

#### **4. Overall outcome rating of the project**

The Ministry observes that in many of the interventions, outputs were achieved, but moving from outputs to results, proved a major challenge due to inadequate Government resources. In addition, it should be noted that realization of impact/results from PSM reforms takes time. Suffice to note that the necessary requirements to transform the Public Service are now in place as a result of the project interventions. Notable among these are: ROM/OOB framework, Client Charters, Integrated Personnel and Payroll System, Policy Paper on Transformation of the Public Service, Civil Service College Uganda and related trainings conducted, Innovations Management and awareness creation for improved service delivery and the Human Resource Strategy.

The results/ outcomes should have been assessed against the reduced scope and funding of the project. In this regard, the Ministry's view is that the overall outcome rating of the project should be moderately satisfactory and not moderately unsatisfactory as indicated in your report.

#### **5. Lessons Learned**

The Ministry agrees with the lessons learned as indicated in the report. These must be factored into the next project during the design stage.

#### **6. Way Forward**

The project has been able to put in place conditions necessary to achieve the earlier intended project objectives of supporting the transformation of the public service so that it is affordable, efficient and accountable in the use of public resources; and improving the policy, institutional and regulatory environment in targeted areas for sustainable growth and service delivery. In order to consolidate the above achievements, we request for further technical and financial support from the World Bank to pursue the following:

- a) Implementation of the interventions under the Policy Paper on Transformation of the Public Service;
- b) Implementation of the Human Resource Strategy;
- c) Completion of Phase 2 of Civil Service College Uganda;
- d) Operationalization of the National Records Centre and Archives;
- e) Technical Support and equipping of the 11 IPPS Regional Centers;
- f) Establishment of One Stop Government Service Centers;
- g) Strengthening M&E at Ministry of Public Service; and
- h) Strengthening Project Planning and Management capacity at Ministry of Public Service.

## **Annex 8: Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders**

Comments on the draft ICR were provided by Irish Aid and DANIDA, who served as cofinanciers of the basket funding (SWAp) arrangement that supported component one of the UPSPEP project; no comments were received from DfID who was the third funding partner of the SWAp. Overall development partners noted that the consistency and clarity of the ICRs storyline is adequate, the lessons learned are appropriate, and the overall ratings are accurate as many indicators were not measured and many targets were not met. Co-financer comments are summarized in below around key issues.

### **1. Development Partners' Relations:**

Donor relations and engagement on the project was strong and focused during the initial years of implementation. However, this level of engagement gradually diminished when funding from the bilateral donors came to an end and their institutions' priorities shifted away from PSM reforms. As a result, it was noted that the DP working group at a certain point became dysfunctional and ineffective. With regard to GoU relations, Irish Aid noted that engagement with the government and MoPS was greatly enhanced under the UPSPEP project due to the strong and active role provided by WB. Likewise, it was noted that the MoPS and the donor working group greatly benefited from the regular Bank supervision missions, through which it was possible to conduct deep, qualitative analyses and assessments of progress by a multiple professionals in the Bank's team.

### **2. Consistency and Coherence of the Storyline:**

Development partners agree with the storyline and noted that the ratings of the ICR were largely in line with the project completion exercise they conducted at the conclusion of its participation in the PSRP basket fund arrangement. In particular, it was noted that there is a great deal of coherence on key issues, including: (i) the design and operational (internal and external) challenges highlighted; (ii) the limited political economy analysis completed during the design stage; (iii) inadequate baseline data and ineffective M&E system as well as the results framework not being updated in line with the JAR outcomes and recommendations; (iv) poor sequencing of the reforms; and (v) the need to broaden ownership of public service reforms beyond MoPS, Public Service Commission, and Cabinet Secretariat to other MDAs & LGs through the NDP process. Given these shortcomings, Irish Aid agreed with DANIDA's comment that it would be useful to see a few concrete and workable recommendations to ensure that the investments under UPSPEP project and PSRP are sustained.

### **3. Implementation:**

Development Partners noted that the Joint policy dialogue on the PSRP strategy was not effectively coordinated under the Government-led Public Sector Management Sector Working Group and institutions active in the sector had other priorities which were not properly aligned or coordinated with the objectives of the PSRP. For example, it was noted that the proliferation of new local governments increased both the size and cost of public administration, which negated the goals of eliminating inefficient and over-extended

government organizations under the project. In addition, donor partners noted that the need to link public service reform interests to other funding modalities such as the social sector SIPS & PRDP became very apparent during UPSPEP implementation, and that the Bank was able to raise the PSR issues to the level of the JBSF/JAF initiative. It was also noted that the activities would have been more appropriate had they been adequately owned by the government; however, low levels of political commitment and financial support to the public sector reforms inhibited the pace of implementation.

#### **4. Ratings:**

Development partners generally concurred with the ratings provided by the ICR and raise concern with the following: (i) whether it would have been possible to drop the underperforming elements during the MTR or request for extension; (ii) what the implication is for the PDO as a considerable number of project activities remained unfinished; (iii) whether attempts were made to address poor indicator design and flawed data collection arrangements and how the Bank might address M&E to inform possible future support to Government's service delivery agenda; (iv) the time frame and cost required to complete the remaining project activities; and (v) why the recommendations of restructuring of MDAs were not implemented despite the significant savings & efficiency gains.

#### **5. Lessons Learned:**

Development partners concurred with all the lessons learned and encourage Government to incorporate these in the design of future PSM strategies.

## **Annex 9: List of Supporting Documents**

Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan for Household Affected by the Records Center. Government of Uganda, June 2006.

Accelerating Development Outcomes in Africa – Progress and Change in the Africa Action Plan. World Bank, April 15, 2007.

Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It. World Bank Africa Region, March, 2011.

Capacity Building in Uganda, H. Mule & K. Kiragu, July 2000.

Enhancing Capacity & Performance - Results of the Institutional Review of the Ministry, Ministry of Public Service, September 2005

Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Record and Archives Center, Report E1369 rev. Air, Water, and Earth (AWE) Limited, October 2005.

Financial Management Assessment Report, World Bank, January 2006

IEC Strategy for Capacity and Performance Enhancement Program (CAPEP) for the Ministry of

Public Service, Impact Associates & Communication for Development Foundation Uganda - December 2004.

Implications of Gender Issues on Capacity Building and Performance in Public Service, C. Kabonesa, August 2003

Implications of HIV/AIDS on Public Service Capacity and Performance, Ministry of Public Service, August 2003

Leadership and Management Development Needs for Top and Senior Management Study Crown Agents – 2003

National Development Plan (2010/11-2014/15). Government of Uganda, April, 2010. Procurement Capacity Assessment Report, World Bank, January 2006

Program Appraisal Document – Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project, Report No: 35616-UG. World Bank, May 23, 2006.

Project Paper - Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project, Report No: 44313. World Bank, June 13, 2008.



Performance Enhancement Fund -Operations manual June 2005,  
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005

Public Service Reform Program - Strategic Framework (2005/6 - 2009/10) - Detailed  
Program Budget-- June 2005, Government of Uganda - Ministry of Public Service

Public Service Reform Program - Annual Workplan (2005/6) - 2005, Government of  
Uganda - Ministry of Public Service Poverty Eradication Action Plan 2004/5 - 2007/8,  
Government of Uganda Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development -  
December 2004

Public Service Reform Program - Strategic Framework (2005/6 - 2009/10), Government  
of Uganda - Ministry of Public Service

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Manual June 2005, Government of Uganda - Ministry of Public Service

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The World Bank Africa Region - 2004

Study on Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness in Human Resources Deployment in Social  
Sectors, PricewaterhouseCoopers, November 2003

Taking on UPSPEP-Institutional Assessment of the Uganda Ministry of Public Service,  
Diana Goldsworthy & Kevin Brown, November 2002.

The Africa Action Plan – An IEG Evaluation. World Bank IEG, April 15, 2011.

Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy 2005-2009, Report No. 34310-UG. World Bank,  
December 14, 2005.

Uganda Country Assistance Strategy 2011-2015, Report No. 54187-UG. World Bank,  
April 27, 2010.

