# PROGRAM INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) CONCEPT STAGE

July 20, 2017 Report No.: 117948

Operation Name	Second Agricultural Support and Fiscal Management DPO	
Region	Africa	
Country	Malawi	
Sector	Central government administration (70%)	
	General public administration sector (30%)	
Operation ID	P153753	
<b>Lending Instrument</b>	Development Policy Lending	
Borrower(s)	Republic of Malawi	
	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development	
	PO Box 30049	
	Capital Hill	
	Malawi	
	Tel: +265 1789 355/354 Fax: +265 1789 173/516	
	stfinance@finance.gov.mw	
Implementing Agency	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development	
Date PID Prepared	July 20, 2017	
<b>Estimated Date of Appraisal</b>	January 15, 2018	
<b>Estimated Date of Board Approval</b>	May 24, 2018	
<b>Corporate Review Decision</b>	Following the corporate review, the decision was taken to	
	proceed with the preparation of the operation.	

# I. Key development issues and rationale for Bank involvement

Exogenous climate induced shocks are a major source of vulnerability in Malawi, exacerbating macroeconomic instability, and making it harder for the country to break the cycle of dependency. Extensive reliance on basic farming methods and reliance on rain-fed agriculture, together with a growing population, has made food security a recurrent challenge as well as adding to pressures on land use, soil fertility and forest resources. In recent years Malawi has suffered from weather shocks at an increasing frequency, including simultaneous floods and droughts in early 2015, followed by another major drought in 2016.

The majority of the poor remain locked in low productivity subsistence farming, and this poor agricultural productivity is exacerbated by thin and distorted maize markets. Access to infrastructure, services, land, working capital, and market opportunities are all limited, but Malawi's current strategy for increasing agricultural productivity centers disproportionately on fertilizer and seed subsidies, particularly for maize through the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). FISP, however, is not poverty targeted and is inefficiently managed. It consumes more than half of total public spending in agriculture, crowding out expenditure in other important areas. While FISP reform is necessary, public spending must also be rebalanced and other productivity-enhancing measures that might reduce vulnerability, including irrigation, deserve greater attention. So too does diversification into off-farm activities and scaled-up social safety net programs: these help temper the price and weather shocks that can otherwise drive households into poverty, or prevent them from escaping it. Similarly, maize market interventions designed to promote price stability (through the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) and Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC)) in fact undermine incentives for agricultural commercialization, leaving the country overly dependent on a smallholder agricultural sector that is vulnerable to climatic shocks.

Weak public financial management transmits recurring shocks into fiscal indiscipline, in turn exacerbating macroeconomic instability. Besides a short period after 2005, when fiscal space opened up following debt relief, fiscal indiscipline has frequently been a source of instability and volatility in Malawi. There have been recurring instances of fiscal slippages, where realized deficits significantly exceeded those planned at the beginning of the year, and the central bank financed most of the gap. These slippages often result from both a shortfall in resources and unplanned expenditures undertaken during the year. Volatility in foreign aid receipts has also played a role in erratic fiscal management, with the 2013 "cashgate" public financial management scandal resulting in the most recent downturn in Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided on budget.

Malawi is thus confronted with twin pressures arising from vulnerability to climate shocks and weak fiscal management, both of which contribute to macroeconomic instability. The vulnerability to climate shocks is being manifested in the declining growth rate and deteriorating poverty outcomes. And adverse weather shocks, coupled with weak public financial management, exacerbate existing fiscal pressures and constrain the country's capacity to respond to shocks.

The recent food security crisis has added urgency to the need to undertake difficult and politically challenging reforms. The proposed program outlines a series of policy and institutional reforms that the Government of Malawi is undertaking to reduce distortions in, and improve the performance of, the agricultural sector; and to restore basic public financial management and accountability systems. It is a first, but critical, step towards breaking the cycle of vulnerability. The proposed operation, which is the second in a series of two, is high risk and intended to combine stabilizing measures with support to an emerging, forward looking reform agenda.

The operation is part of a multi-pronged World Bank Group response to help Malawi "break the cycle" of vulnerability. In the context of El Niño-induced drought conditions and a severe food security crisis, the Bank provided financing to address short-term needs via a Drought Recovery and Resilience Emergency Response Project and additional financing to the Strengthening Social Safety Nets Project. A new Agricultural Commercialization Project, as well as the Shire Valley Transformation Project aim to support medium-term investments in diversified and more drought-resistant agriculture. The proposed DPO series will catalyze these investments by addressing some of the key binding policy constraints that have amplified Malawi's vulnerability.

# II. Proposed Objectives

The objective of the proposed DPO series is to improve incentives for private sector participation in agricultural markets and to strengthen fiscal management through more effective expenditure controls and greater transparency. Creating an improved agricultural policy environment, scaling up social protection, as well as strengthening financial reporting, oversight and public expenditure management are essential parts of efforts to improve Malawi's ability to absorb shocks, as well as laying the foundations for future agricultural growth and productivity improvement.

This objective will be achieved through two pillars of policy and institutional reforms aimed at: (a) making agricultural markets work better; and, (b) strengthening accountability and restoring confidence in public finances. These reforms support the Government's priorities as outlined in the Second Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS II), as well as the broader World Bank Group goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity.

The proposed operation is the second in a series of two programmatic development policy financing operations, and builds on a number of reforms already undertaken across the two pillars and supported under the first operation.

# III. Preliminary description

Two successive years of weather related shocks have highlighted the need to build resilience and "break the cycle" of vulnerability in Malawi. Floods, followed by two years of drought conditions, have stimulated demand for reforms to increase buffers and rebalance public expenditure towards areas that will improve climate resilience, particularly in the agricultural sector. Reforming agricultural incentives is also a necessary step towards removal of distortions and the creation of positive incentives for commercialization and diversification.

The repeated impact of climatic shocks has also prompted a critical review of Malawi's current agricultural policies, opening up space for policy dialogue in politically challenging areas. These include sensitive areas such as the FISP, as well as the way that ADMARC and the SGR intervene and shape prices and incentives in Malawi's maize markets.

The proposed operation also supports some of the critical reforms drawn from Malawi's public financial management and public service reform programs. Rebuilding integrity and oversight in Malawi's PFM systems is a key step towards restoring macroeconomic stability, which in turn is the foundation upon which sustainable growth and poverty reduction can be achieved.

# IV. Poverty and Social Impacts and Environment Aspects

The overall net poverty and social impact of policy and institutional reforms supported under this DPO is expected to be positive (with some negative distributional effects arising from the reforms to the FISP). Reforms supported under the DPO will both directly and indirectly contribute towards improving living standards of the poor. Improved and lower cost access to formal land titles will benefit poor and vulnerable land owners, particularly women, who have disproportionately had weaker access to legal ownership of land. Transparency around grain reserve management and ADMARC operations, by reducing price volatility, could have a positive poverty and social impact, especially on those households which are currently food insecure. Similarly, the public financial management reforms will help strengthen expenditure management and budget execution, public accountability and transparency.

# However, reforms to FISP supported under the program are expected to have distributional effects.

The current FISP is justified on the basis that most smallholders in Malawi lack the cash resources or access to credit that would enable them to purchase inorganic fertilizer at commercial market prices and soil nutrients, particularly nitrogen, are essential for maize production. These nutrients are in short supply, and inorganic fertilizer is the most effective short-term method for farmers to add nutrients to the soil. The FISP has multiple stated objectives, including: (i) increasing smallholder maize yields and overall levels of production; (ii) achieving reductions in poverty levels; (iii) promoting food security; and, (iv) enhancing rural incomes. However, households who should be targeted to increase maize productivity are likely not the same households who should be targeted to reduce rural poverty. Therefore, though the FISP was never intended to serve as a social safety net, it has in effect acted as a form of cash transfer for land and labor constrained households who have cashed out their coupons, so the reforms that reduce the subsidy will have distributional consequences.

Because of these distributional consequences, the DPO supports an expansion of the Social Cash Transfer program as a means towards putting in place an effective safety net for the extreme poor. The SCT therefore offers an important alternative and set of advantages to reach the extreme poor compared

to the FISP. First, the SCT is a targeted intervention, with repeated rounds of payments devised to smooth consumption. Notwithstanding challenges in targeting logistics, the SCT offers a predictable stipend to beneficiaries compared to the lottery protocol that has existed under FISP. In this context, the DPO supports the progressive strengthening of the SCT program as a means of providing a responsive safety net that meets the needs of the extreme poor.

The prior actions supported by the DPO are not expected to result in significant effects on the environment. The implementation of measures to strengthen the management of public finances, improve accountability in the public sector and reform subsidy programs are expected to have a neutral effect on the environment. However, there are clear linkages between environment degradation and weak macroeconomic management and governance. Hence, it is expected that there will be positive indirect effects on the environment associated with policy and institutional reforms supported under the program.

# V. Tentative financing

Source:		(\$m.)
International Development Association (IDA)		80.0
	Total	80.0

# VI. Contact point

#### **World Bank**

Contact: Richard Record

Title: Senior Country Economist

Tel: 5784+6247

Email: rrecord@worldbank.org Location: Lilongwe, Malawi (IBRD)

### **Borrower**

Contact: Ben Botolo

Title: Secretary to the Treasury Tel: +265 1789 355/354

Email: stfinance@finance.gov.mw

### VII. For more information, contact:

The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20433 Telephone: (202) 458-4500

Fax: (202) 522-1500

Web: http://www.worldbank.org/infoshop