

**PROGRAM-FOR-RESULTS INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID)
CONCEPT STAGE**

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Country	<i>Burkina Faso</i>
Sector	<i>PREM</i>
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Implementing Agency	Ministere de la Fonction Publique du Travail et de la Securite Sociale
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Concept Review Decision	Following the review of the concept, the decision was taken to proceed with the preparation of the operation.

I. Introduction and Context

A. Country Context

1. **The principal development challenge in Burkina Faso remains the persistence of poverty, despite sustained economic growth and relative political stability.** President Blaise Compaore has held the presidency since 1987, leading the *Congres pour la Democratie et le Progres* (CDP) party through successive presidential and legislative electoral victories. Until recently and with the exception of isolated incidents, the legitimacy of the political status quo has seldom been challenged. Long-term political stability combined with the introduction of important economic reforms have enabled the country to maintain higher than average growth rates relative to the sub-region – since 2000, the average growth rate per year has been 5.5 percent and annual growth rates in 2012 and 2013 reached 9 percent and 7 percent respectively. These growth gains have provided opportunities for increased public expenditures on health, education and water and sanitation, as well as for more targeted social service provision.¹ Yet a high population growth rate of 3.2 percent, the non-inclusive pattern of growth and the sub-optimal performance of the public administration have limited the impact of economic growth and stability on poverty reduction, anti-corruption and service delivery. Burkina Faso continues to be ranked among the poorest countries in the world, with 46.7% of the population living below the poverty line in 2010, a modest improvement since 2003 when the poverty incidence was 51 percent.

¹ The budget for pro-poor spending increased from 5.3 percent of GDP in 2006 to 7.6 percent in 2011 and is projected to reach 7.8 percent by 2015.

2. **Notwithstanding favorable public expenditure trends, Burkina Faso ranks towards the bottom of the United Nations Human Development Index and is unlikely to meet many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).** Burkina has received significant aid flows in the last decade, being a relatively good performer in terms of its CPIA score.² Social expenditures in education, health and water sector expenditures have all increased steadily.³ However, notwithstanding significant improvements in certain areas of social development, the country's development outcomes are generally weak. In 2013, Burkina Faso's score on the United Nations Human Development Index was 0.343, giving the country a low ranking of 183 out of 186 countries. The under-five mortality and infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births in 2012 were 102 and 66 respectively, well above the MDG targets of 69 and 35. Illiteracy rates also remain high at 28.7 percent. And the proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities in 2012 was 17 percent, compared to the MDG 2015 target of 54 percent.

3. **Partly reflecting public frustration with the country's persistent levels of poverty and poor development outcomes, the political environment in Burkina is becoming increasingly strained.** In 2011, the alleged police killing of a student, Justin Zongo triggered a tide of civil unrest and precipitated a military mutiny, as well as sustained protests by students, the military, the judiciary and small traders. While the 2011 crisis was allayed with a series of Government measures to address specific grievances, it exposed fissures in the ruling elite's control. It also highlighted the population's deep-seated concerns regarding the unequal redistribution of resources, the Executive's monopolization on power, the perceived lack of accountability and the sub-optimal performance of the government and the judiciary in particular. Since the crisis, civil unrest has escalated and public trust in the Government appears to have further declined in the lead up to the Presidential elections slated for 2015. Regional instabilities, including the conflict in Mali pose additional risks to political stability in the country. Beyond the upcoming elections, the challenge for the Burkinabe government will be to restore public confidence by developing a modern and accountable administration that is capable of delivering quality services and tangible development outcomes.

B. Sectoral and Institutional Context

4. **Burkina Faso scores poorly on a range of selected public sector and governance indicators (see Table 1).** In terms of the quality and professionalism of the public administration, Burkina Faso scores lower than other countries in the region (Ghana and Senegal) and lower than both the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and low income countries according to the Global Integrity's Integrity Indicators. The Doing Business and Enterprise Survey indicators also highlight public sector inefficiencies in the country, notably with respect to judicial performance. These inefficiencies are reflected in the low execution rates of public investment budgets in key sectors.⁴

Table 1: Selected Governance Indicators

² Burkina Faso's CPIA score since 2010 has been 3.78, making it one of the best performers in West Africa.

³ The country has allocated an average of 52 percent of budget to the sectors of education, health and agriculture in the last decade. For example, in education, expenditures reached 5.6% of GDP in 2007 from 3.8% in 2000 and in health expenditures reached 1.8% of GDP in 2008 from 1.3% in 2000.

⁴ The execution rate of public investments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were respectively: 58,55 %, 25,76 % et 31,76 %.

			Burkina Faso	Ghana	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income
Source	Year	Overall Governance					
GI	2008/11	(Quality of) IV. Public Administration & Professionalism (0=lowest, 100=highest)	48	55	57	57	58
BTI	2012	3. Rule of law (1=lowest, 10=highest)	4.0	7.5	5.3	4.7	4.0
POLITY IV	2010	Executive constraints (1=lowest, 7=highest)	3	6	5	4	4
Judicial and Legal System							
GI	2008/11	III-3. Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Judicial Branch (0=lowest, 100=highest)	35	53	67	48	53
BTI	2012	3.2 Independent Judiciary (1=lowest, 10=highest)	4	8	6	5	4
FH-FIW	2011	(Prevalence of) F. Rule of Law (0=lowest, 16=highest)	7	12	10	6	5
ES	2011	Court impediment (% of firms identifying courts as a major constraint)	25.7	1.7	3.8	14.7	14.4
DB	2011	(Efficiency of) Enforcing contracts (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	108	45	145	117	118
Governance and the Private Sector							
DB	2011	(Ease of) Starting a business (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	116	104	93	123	116
DB	2011	(Ease of) Registering Property (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	111	36	171	120	118
ES	2011	% Senior Management time to deal with regulations	22.2	3.2	2.9	7.5	7.9
ES	2011	Time to clear imports from customs (de facto days)	16.4	6.8	8.8	13.5	13.5

GI: Global Integrity; BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index; POLITY IV: Political Regime Characteristics; FH-FIW: Freedom House -Freedom in the World; ES: Enterprise Surveys; DB: Doing Business

5. **Past attempts at public sector reform have done little to improve the performance of the public administration.** Burkina Faso enacted the first generation of public sector reforms in the early 1990s. These reforms aimed at adapting the public sector to the changing economic environment – which involved a shift from a planned economy to a market based economy. The reforms focused on predominantly technical improvements to the *modus operandi* of the central administration without necessarily addressing the structural problems arising from the highly centralized structure of the public administration system. The second generation of public sector reforms began in 1998 with a decision to establish a legal framework for decentralization. The independent *Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation* recommendations informed a wave of legislation to advance decentralization reforms.⁵ The main objective of the new set of legislation

⁵ The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 040/98/AN du 3 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant orientation de la décentralisation au Burkina Faso which defines basic principles for decentralization in Burkina Faso; (ii) Loi N°041/98/an du 06 août 1998 (JO N°38 1998) portant organisation de l'administration du territoire au Burkina Faso which establishes the distinction between administrative circumscriptions (village- department- province) and the decentralized entities (municipality and province); (iii) Loi n°042/98/AN du 06 août 1998, portant organisation et fonctionnement des collectivités locales which describes governance structures (executive and

was to give a more coherent orientation to decentralization and to design a strategic implementation program. In 2004, The General Code for Territorial Collectivities (*Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales--CGCT*) was adopted. It envisaged a combination of decentralized and deconcentrated local government structures.⁶ However, the implementation of these reforms remains slow and lacks synchronicity.

6. **One of the key factors affecting the performance of the public administration in Burkina Faso is the highly centralized nature of decision-making authority.** The administrative system is built on a notion of *ex ante* controls rather than *ex post* performance monitoring. Decisions on budget and human resources are made by key ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Civil Service, and the role of other ministries is largely confined to carrying these out. As a result of the high level of concentration of decision-making power at the center, service delivery ministries have limited administrative authority to ensure effective implementation of public policies. At the same time, the central ministries, most notably the Ministry of Civil Services, are poorly equipped to provide strategic orientation to the line ministries. The emphasis on *ex ante* controls is, in part, driven by weaknesses in the current financial and administrative *ex post* control systems. Technical inspectors lack the necessary profiles, training and resources to exercise effective and regular internal controls. And while the framework for controls has been strengthened in recent years, with the creation of the external audit institution *Cour des Comptes* (2000) and state inspection body *l'Autorite Superieure de Controle d'Etat* (2007), these institutions have limited resources and capacity to provide assurance that the public management systems are operating well.

7. **Concentration of decision-making powers at the central level is accompanied by concentration of financial and human resources at the center.** Burkina Faso's wage and salary spending is not higher than the regional average, at 5.9 percent of GDP and 24.1 percent of total public expenditures (see Annex 4). However, there is a concentration of civil servants at the center. For example, more than 56 % of the civil servants reside in the Centre region where the capital city Ouagadougou is located (see Table 2). In the education and justice sectors, there are a disproportionately high proportion of front-line service delivery professionals (teachers and magistrates) working as administrators in the ministry.⁷ The combined effect of concentration of financial and human resources is the lack of availability of resources to front-line service delivery.

Table 2: Distribution of Civil Servant across regions

Region	Number of Civil Servants	Share
Boucle du Mouhoun	4,588	4.91%
Cascades	1,834	1.96%
Centre	52,594	56.33%
Centre-Est	3,720	3.98%
Centre-Nord	4,823	5.17%
Centre-Ouest	4,437	4.75%
Centre-Sud	2,103	2.25%
Est	3,337	3.57%

legislative branches) of decentralized entities, local administrations, state agents in decentralized entities, consultative bodies at the local level; and (iv) Loi N° 43/98/AN du 6 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant programmation de la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation which lays out the timetable for implementation of decentralization reform.

⁶ Deconcentrated units are the representatives of the central government and have supervision (tutelage) responsibility over decentralized units.

⁷ For example 30 percent of magistrates are assigned to administrative functions in the Ministry of Justice.

Hauts-bassins	5,106	5.47%
Nord	4,088	4.38%
Plateau Central	1,716	1.84%
Sahel	2,346	2.51%
Sud-Ouest	2,668	2.86%
<i>Total</i>	<i>93,360</i>	<i>100.00%</i>

Source: European Union Report, 2010.

8. **Decentralization and de-concentration processes have been slow to take hold.** While political decentralization has been consolidated in the last decade, with the recent round of local government elections held last year, the central government, through its *tutelle* authorities, still retains large *ex ante* controls on most decisions taken by decentralized local governments. Local governments are constrained from carrying out their mandates by the limited resources that are devolved from the center and by the absence of qualified civil servants. The CGCT envisages the creation of a local-level civil service and the Ministry of Decentralization has recently appointed a director general to lead this process. However, there are limited resources to finance the recruitment of civil servants and existing civil servants are resistant to being transferred. The process of de-concentration was intended to (i) accompany the new and poorly capacitated local governments in carrying out their mandates and (ii) facilitate improved access by the population to services provided by the central government. The slow, and varied, pace of de-concentration in the sectors has ultimately limited the utility of de-concentrated services *vis-a-vis* local governments and the general public.

9. **Public sector performance is further hampered by the weak motivation, limited capacity and poor working environment of the civil service.** Various attempts have been made by successive governments to introduce systems to improve human resource management and strengthen monitoring and evaluation within the public administration. However, these have ultimately failed to attract and motivate capable and performance-driven staff. Instead, a culture of evasion of responsibility and lack of accountability persist within the administration. Several factors underlie the sub-optimal performance of the civil service:

- a) ***The Ministry of the Civil Service remains poorly equipped*** both in terms of financial resources and in terms of expertise, ***to lead a coherent strategic direction*** for human resource management that is operationally relevant to the individual ministries.
- b) The lack of clearly defined job descriptions, and career plans and poorly defined performance contracts combined with the sparse opportunities for in-service training and the limited linkages between objective performance evaluation and career advancement have ***weakened individual civil servant motivation to perform***. Earlier efforts to (i) support the introduction of performance evaluation; and (ii) shift the focus of career advancement from seniority-based to merit-based have met with resistance from trade unions. As a result, since 2011, civil servants have been promoted automatically with no reference to the evaluation of their performance. Line ministries need further support to ensure a consistent application of human resource management processes.
- c) The ***weak capacity of mid to senior level managers*** within the civil service to strategically manage and monitor reform programs limits accountability for results. A lack of regular in-service training on planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation and weaknesses in the systems and processes used to develop, implement and monitor reform programs substantially contribute to this capacity deficit.
- d) ***Poor working conditions*** remain a particular concern at all levels of the civil service and

at the level of service delivery provision. Deteriorated office spaces, restricted availability of basic office supplies, the uncontrolled, inefficient and limited use of information technology and the absence of reliable archiving facilities limit efficiency and impact upon morale.

- e) Finally, *political economy factors*, including the prevalence of patronage within the administration, have had the effect of politicizing the civil service and creating entrenched rent-seeking interests. This has in turn limited incentives for ensuring the effective implementation of civil service reforms, particularly amongst mid to senior level managers.

10. Shortcomings in service delivery in Burkina Faso are intricately connected with these public sector inefficiencies:

Education sector:

11. **In the education sector, notwithstanding significant improvements in access⁸, the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes.** The completion rate, though improving significantly from 41.7 percent in 2008 to 55 percent in 2012, remains low, with vast regional disparities (including a 33 percent difference in completion rates between urban and rural areas). Poor learning outcomes are also observed in the sector. In grade 6 for example, about 65% percent of students do not acquire the basic competencies specified in the curriculum⁹.

12. **From a human resources management perspective, the time spent by teachers in classrooms has a significant impact on the quality of education.** Average instruction time in Burkina Faso is only 736 hours per year compared to the standard of 1,000 hours. The Ministry lacks institutional capacity to manage the size and the regionally disparate location of its workforce, which represents over 50 percent of the entire civil service. The Ministry lacks institutional capacity to manage teachers and civil servants administrators. This is particularly so given the additional responsibilities for pre-primary and post-primary education conferred upon the Ministry of Primary Education in 2012. Time on task is impeded by limited evaluation of teacher performance, weak human resources management capacity for monitoring teachers and teacher absenteeism induced by low motivation and centralized training and career management processes.

13. **Inefficient and centralized bureaucratic procedures and practices place a further burden on the administration in managing the workforce.** Many human resource management processes, including decisions on leave, leave of absence, advancement and professional decorations are heavily centralized, which creates delays and limits the incentives of civil servants to follow appropriate procedures. The environment for pedagogical control is not conducive to effective monitoring. Controllers in the Ministry lack appropriate resources to conduct field missions and, at the de-concentrated level, they seldom have adequate office or archiving space. The restructuring of the Ministry of Primary Education in 2012 to include pre-primary and post-primary responsibilities has further compounded the challenge of pedagogical control.

⁸ The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6% in 2012, up from 72.4% in 2008.

⁹ Country Status Report 2012.

Justice Sector

14. **In the justice sector, public dissatisfaction with the performance of the judiciary has influenced social unrest in recent times and constitutes a disproportionately significant constraint to private sector investment** (see Table 1). Lengthy delays in the delivery of judgments (see Table 3 below) and the production of civil registry documents, costly procedures and court processes that are inaccessible to the majority of citizens represent major challenges in the sector. Annual budget allocations to the justice sector since 2000 have remained under one percent of the national budget. The ratio of magistrates to inhabitants of 1:40,400 is well below the international ratio of 1:10,000 and the ratio of less than one court clerk to every judge is below the internationally recognized optimal ratio of three clerks to every judge.

Table 3: Average rates of delay for judgments in the TGIs in Burkina Faso

Jurisdiction	2009	2010	2011
Civil	4 months 15 days	3 months	2 months 25 days
Commercial	7 months 15 days	5 months	9 months
Criminal	4 years	3 years 8 months	4 years

Source: MOJ Annual Statistical Report 2012

15. The effective delivery of judicial services in Burkina is impeded by:

- a) **Limited capacity for coordination and implementation of sectoral reforms.** Poor systems and weak capacity for coordination within the administration and between the administration and the judiciary, combined with fallible monitoring processes, hamper efforts to achieve reform targets.
- b) **Human resource management is complicated by the heterogeneous nature of the workforce.** The Ministry of Justice has the unique challenge of managing both standard civil servants and the constitutionally independent judicial corps under different legal and regulatory frameworks.
- c) **Limited accountability for service delivery results** in the judiciary induced by weaknesses in the production of statistics on judicial decisions, ineffective performance evaluation and heavily politicized career advancement processes.
- d) **Court coverage is insufficiently de-concentrated to ensure access to justice.** While the construction of Superior First Instance Courts (Tribunal de Grande Instance – TGI) in the regions has advanced in recent years, these regional jurisdictions are often poorly equipped and lack adequate and quality human resources. At the local level, the departmental courts that are presided over by the provincial prefect are barely functional.

16. **The Government’s vision for the third generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso is focused on developing a modern performance-oriented public administration system.** The Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration was approved in 2011-- *Plan Strategique Decennal de Modernisation de l’Administration* 2011 - 2020 (PSDMA). The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development (see Annex 5). The strategic plan aims to reorganize ministries to manage resources more effectively based on efficiency and performance evaluation. It seeks to shift from a highly centralized system of administration with ex ante controls, to a results-oriented system, with emphasis on ex

post monitoring. Under the new system, ministries will be expected to focus on sectoral policy-making, planning, and coordination and will be held responsible for outcomes. To do this, there is a need to strengthen the capacity of the ministries to: (i) manage their financial and human resources; (ii) hold staff accountable for results; (iii) allocate staff and resources where the need is greatest; and (iv) attract and retain skilled staff.

17. **The PSDMA has political support at the highest level.** The PSDMA was adopted by the Government in 2011 by a decree signed by the President¹⁰. The PSDMA is implemented under the guidance of the National Public Administration Modernization Committee (*le Conseil National de Modernization de l'Administration*), which is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes the ministers of Civil Service, Finance, Communications and MATDS as vice-chairs. A Permanent Secretariat (*le Secretariat Permanent de la Modernization de l'Administration*), which operates under the leadership of the committee, is established for the day-to-day management of the modernization efforts.

C. Relationship to CPS

18. **The PSDMA Program and the proposed Program are aligned with the second strategic theme of the 2013-2016 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS).** The CPS is based on three strategic themes: (i) accelerating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; (ii) enhancing governance for more efficient social service delivery; and (iii) reducing economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities - and two cross-cutting themes: governance and gender equality. The Program features as a cornerstone operation in the second strategic theme.

19. **The proposed Program is also aligned with the World Bank's corporate strategies.** The new Africa Strategy (2011) is built around two pillars: (a) competitiveness and employment and (b) vulnerability and resilience - and a foundation: governance and public sector management capacity. Poor governance has been identified as one of the main challenges underlying Africa's development. Building on lessons learnt, the Africa Strategy highlights the importance of investing in both demand and supply-side governance to enhance accountability. By strengthening institutions and improving public sector service-delivery and promoting third-party monitoring and verification of results, this Program will improve governance and enhance social accountability. The Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy¹¹ aims to build capable and accountable states. More specifically, it focuses on strengthening institutions and fostering transparency, participation and accountability. It also emphasizes the importance of developing robust results frameworks for governance improvements.

D. Rationale for Bank Engagement and Choice of Financing Instrument

20. **The proposed Program represents a continuation of the World Bank's engagement in public sector reform in Burkina Faso.** The World Bank has supported the Government through successive waves of public sector reform, through both investment operations (the Public Institutional Development Project 1992 – 2000 (PID) and the Administrative Capacity Building Project 2005 - 2011 (PRCA)) and through development policy lending. It has also remained a leading partner in the education sector. The proposed program would also ensure complementarity with existing projects on decentralization (PACT) and service delivery in the

¹⁰ Decret no 2011-535/PRES/PM/MFPTSS.

¹¹ World Bank, Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank's Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan, January 2012.

education sector. The World Bank has not traditionally engaged extensively in justice sector reform in Burkina Faso. However, a Justice Sector Review produced in 2012, prompted a shift towards engagement by highlighting the sector's significance in the restoration of public confidence in the administration, as well as its impact upon traditional areas of Bank engagement.

21. **The Program builds on important lessons learned from the World Bank Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020.**¹² Recent consultations concluded that there are often gaps between policy, legislation and rules guiding public sector reforms and actual public sector practices. Addressing these reform gaps requires an integrated approach along the public sector results chain.¹³

22. **The proposed Program consists of a P4R loan in the amount of US\$25 million.** The P4R will ensure sustained funding to pre-existing priority government programs (under the umbrella over the PSDMA) and create incentives for the achievement of identified policy objectives. The P4R will incorporate Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs) that establish a performance-based framework to measure progress in reform implementation. To strengthen government implementation capacity and country systems for the purposes of the P4R, a Program Action Plan will be financed either through the P4R or through a subsidiary IPF (see Component 5 for details).

23. **The P4R instrument was selected to enhance the impact of the Bank's financial and technical support and strengthen the overall results orientation of the Government's vision for the modernization of the public administration in Burkina Faso.** In so doing it will facilitate:

- *Program ownership.* The PSDMA is an ongoing national program with ownership at the highest levels of the government. Its implementation in three pilot ministries will involve support for existing sectoral strategies and Priority Action Plans (PAPs) that have been developed and are owned by the respective ministries.
- *Improvements in national systems and procedures.* Burkina Faso has made significant progress in public finance management (PFM) and procurement reforms. Based on previous experience with investment lending operations, the use of a PforR instrument will help to further align the Bank's operational policies with national systems to allow for a reduction of transaction costs induced by the adoption of Bank procedures.
- *Results orientation.* The P4R will further promote the results orientation of the PSDMA by establishing clear links between Bank disbursements and delivery of results.

II. Program Development Objective(s)

A. Program Development Objective(s)

24. The Program Development Objective is improved human resources management and enhanced efficiency in the delivery of critical services by the civil service in the Ministry of

¹² World Bank, The World Bank Approach to Public Sector Management 2011: Better Results from Public Sector Institutions, Final Draft for Review, October 2011.

¹³ See World Bank Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020: Better Results from Public Sector Institutions for the definition of public sector results chain.

Primary Education, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Civil Service and Labor.

B. Key Program Results

25. The following key results indicators have been selected to measure success in achieving the program development objective:

<i>Type</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
PDO Level Indicator 1	Improved management of promotions civil servants in selected ministries	Proportion of promotions of civil servants in the selected ministries that are merit-based (percentage)
PDO Level Indicator 2	Improved management of entry and retirement of civil servants in the three select ministries	Average time taken to process civil service entries and retirements in the selected ministries (disaggregated by entry and retirement) (days)
PDO Level Indicator 3	Improved efficiency in private sector labor force inspections	Average time taken to undertake labor force inspections (TBD) (days)
PDO Level Indicator 4	Improved management of teaching time	Teacher time on task in the Sahel, South East and East regions (percentage)
PDO Level Indicator 5	Improved efficiency in the delivery of first instance administrative law decisions	Time taken to deliver administrative law judgements in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso by the: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tribunaux de Grand Instance 2. Tribunaux Administratives (days)
PDO Level Indicator 6	Improved efficiency in the formal resolution of local disputes	Case resolution time in selected local departmental and district courts Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso (supplemental data collection; number of cases) (type of cases TBD) (days)
PDO Level Indicator 7	Core indicator	Direct project beneficiaries (of which female)

26. Details on the proposed strategic objectives, results, and indicators are indicated in the results framework provided in Annex 6.

III. Proposed Program-for-Results Operation Context

A. Description

27. The Program will support the implementation of the Government’s flagship reform effort, the “Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration” (PSDMA). It will target three ministries for the initial phase of implementation – the Ministry of Civil Service, the Ministry of Primary Education and the Ministry of Justice. It will assist in strengthening the institutional and human resource capacity of these three ministries to make and implement public policies and to deliver quality public services.

28. The PSDMA has five pillars focused on: (i) improvements in the efficiency and quality of public services; (ii) improvements in the human resource capacity of the administration; (iii) promotion of the accessibility and transparency of the public administration; (iv) promotion of e-governance; and (v) promotion of deconcentration and decentralization. In each of these pillars, there are specific objectives, expected results and activities identified (see Annex 5 or a detailed description of the PSDMA logical framework). The strategic policies of the selected ministries¹⁴ are also aligned with the PSDMA and each identifies sectoral objectives and results related to service delivery. The Program will support selected government sub-programs that either fall directly under the PSDMA or that are incorporated in the sectoral programs of the three ministries. It will target the results identified in these existing government programs. There will be no modification to the PSDMA or the sectoral programs targeted.

29. **The Program will reward the three ministries for results achieved in implementing the selected government sub-programs that are aligned with the PSDMA.** It will disburse against the achievement of clearly defined and agreed intermediate indicators along the identified State Modernization reform path. The DLIs will target service delivery outcomes in the primary education, justice and civil service, as identified in the existing sectoral strategic policies of these ministries. They will also consist of intermediate outputs and actions that are necessary to achieve the sectoral outcomes. A tentative results matrix, including tentative DLIs, is proposed in Annex 6.

30. The P4R will consist of the following five components:

Component 1: Improving human resource management capacity and performance

31. **This Component will focus upon improving human resource management processes in the three targeted ministries.** In line with the second strategic pillar of the PSDMA, the Ministry of Civil Service will lead efforts to modernize and harmonize human resource management processes and to strengthen the capacity of the de-concentrated HR departments in the relevant ministries. The Component will support (i) the elaboration and of sector specific HR tools (in-service training needs projections and plans, career plans, sectoral motivation strategies, job profiles etc.); (ii) the improvement of HR information systems, including an expansion of the coverage of the civil service information system (SIGASPE) internally within the three ministries, the up-dating and computerization of personnel files and the biometric registration and census of civil servants; and (iii) the training of personnel in the human resource departments of each ministry and the further de-concentration of certain HR responsibilities.

32. **The Component will also target the refinement and implementation of modern and merit-based civil servant performance management and promotion processes to further entrench a results-based focus in the public administration.** Notwithstanding the enactment of a law for the evaluation of civil servant performance in 1998, significant resistance from civil servants resulted in a delayed application of the law. The law was first applied only in 2006. At present most civil servants are subjected to a rudimentary form of performance evaluation. Existing performance evaluation, however, tends to be unduly subjective and lacks results-orientation. This arises from limitations in the training of superiors on evaluation and the fact that the vast majority of civil servants have performance contracts that are poorly defined and not connected with clearly articulated job descriptions. Furthermore, merit-based promotion linked

¹⁴ Politique Nationale de la Justice 2010 – 2019 (PNJ) ; Politique Sectorielle de l'Éducation 2014 – 2023 (PSE) ; note that the Civil Service Ministry does not presently dispose of a sectoral policy other than the PSDMA – a policy specific to the Ministry will be developed during the preparation of the Program.

to the performance evaluation process was suspended in 2011, after a brief introduction in 2009, and automatic promotion was reinstated. Under this Component, the Ministry of Civil Service will support the pilot ministries in developing the necessary tools (job profiles, code of ethics, quality charter, evaluation guides etc.), training and systems (including IT systems) to strengthen performance evaluation processes, while the three ministries will focus upon implementing the new processes in annual performance reviews of ministerial personnel. An on-line performance evaluation system will be piloted in selected departments within each ministry in this regard. The Ministry of Justice will also support the Superior Council of Magistrates (*Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*) in improving the performance evaluation process for the judiciary and will promote its application in 4 pilot jurisdictions. The merit-based advancement processes will also be strengthened and monitored. Tentative DLIs for this sub-component include:

- a. Number of human resource management tools adopted in each of the three selected ministries (e.g. career plans, workforce planning, in-service training plans).
- b. Proportion of civil servants in the selected ministries that have: (i) a formal job description; (ii) a performance contract; (iii) an evaluation of performance and score; and (iv) an up-dated employment file captured in SIGASPE.
- c. Proportion of TGIs and TAs in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso that conform to established national staffing norms.

Component 2: Improving institutional capacity for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation

33. **This Component will support the implementation of the first pillar of the PSDMA by strengthening the institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies.** It will focus on: (i) a revision of initial and in-service training modules and the implementation of in-service training plans; (ii) extensive training of department managers in policy formulation, budget programming, implementation and evaluation; (iii) improved sectoral frameworks and systems for planning, programming, monitoring and reporting (including statistical capacity); and (iv) improved working environments, including the rehabilitation and construction of office space and the purchase of equipment. Tentative DLIs for this sub-component include:

- a. Adoption of medium term expenditure frameworks by the three ministries in conformity with the requirements of the 2011 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment.
- b. Execution rate of annual Priority Action Plans (PAPs) in the three ministries.
- c. Number of sectoral mid-term reviews of PAPs prepared (by a defined date).
- d. On-line publication of annual ministerial statistical handbooks in the three ministries (by a defined date).

Component 3: Expanding e-government

34. In line with the fourth strategic pillar of the PDSMA, the Component will support the development of e-government in Burkina Faso. E-government in Burkina Faso refers to the use of ICT for internal government administrative processes and for the provision of public services on-line. The Component will assist the implementation of the National Strategy for the Development of Information and Communication Infrastructure (NSDICI) in the public

administration and the national and sectoral information technology strategies. Under this Component, the MDENP will provide strategic direction and steer that implementation of the NSDICI. The Component will reward the three ministries for enabling civil servants to access and use sectoral intranet interfaces, formal government email accounts and sectoral information management and archiving systems. It will also provide incentives for the three ministries to develop: (i) appropriate systems for on-line management of civil servant employment and (ii) systems to facilitate on-line access to services offered by each of the ministries (e.g. laws and jurisprudence data-base, on-line training for teachers). These systems will assist ultimately enhance the efficiency of administrative processes and of discrete areas of service delivery. Tentative DLIs for this sub-component include:

- a. Intranets developed in the three ministries (including electronic management of correspondence, archives and personnel email address directory).
- b. Audit and revision of SIGASPE and its interconnections (including electronic performance evaluation system and ALIAS ...).
- c. Information management system for administrative cases developed in the TGI and TAs in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso.
- d. Proportion of laws and jurisprudence publicly accessible on-line.
- e. Proportion of teachers receiving on-line in-service training of more than forty hours in selected regions.

Component 4: Enhancing administrative de-concentration and decentralization

35. This sub-component will support the implementation of the National Strategy for Administrative De-concentration (NSAD) adopted by the Government in November 2013.¹⁵ It will facilitate a better alignment of the legal and institutional framework for deconcentration to ensure consistency with the decentralization process, whilst encouraging all three ministries to develop detailed sectoral de-concentration plans to align with the NSAD. It will enable the three ministries to strengthen the capacity of their de-concentrated departments to deliver services (both internal administrative services and external services) more efficiently. In particular, it will create the necessary incentives to ensure that selected de-concentrated structures function optimally. The sub-component will support the Ministry of Decentralization in developing a territorial civil service¹⁶, through clarification of the legal and regulatory framework. Tentative DLIs for this sub-component include:

- a. Proportion of TGI and TA in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso functional according to defined criteria (e.g. basic office and ICT equipment, electricity, court space ratio).
- b. Proportion of selected local departmental and district courts in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso functional according to defined criteria (e.g. basic office and ICT equipment, electricity, court space ratio).
- c. Training program for members of selected local departmental and district courts in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Kedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso completed.

¹⁵ Décret N° 2013-1336/PRES/PM/MFPTSS/MEF/MATD/MATS du 31 décembre 2013 portant adoption de la stratégie nationale de déconcentration administrative (2014-2023).

¹⁶ Territorial civil service refers to the civil service developed at the decentralized level, which is distinct from the national civil service and is managed directly by the local governments.

- d. Proportion of regional and provincial primary education departments and CEBs in the select regions functional according to defined criteria.
- e. Proportion of regional departments of the MFPTSS and IRA functional according to defined criteria.
- f. Legal and regulatory framework for the territorial civil service adopted

Component 5: Strengthening coordination for the implementation of the PSDMA

36. A decision will be taken on whether this Component will be incorporated into the Program or will be developed as a subsidiary IPF linked to the Program.

37. This Component will assist the Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Public Administration in coordinating the implementation of the Project and the overall PSDMA. The Component will specifically support a Program Action Plan that is being developed to (i) improve the technical dimensions of the PSDMA and the formal rules and procedures governing the organization and management of the systems used to implement the Program; (ii) enhance the capacity and performance of the SPMA and sectoral focal points in each selected ministry; and (iii) address the fiduciary, social and environmental risks identified in the integrated risk assessment of the Program. A tentative proposal of the Program Action Plan is contained in Annex 7 and will be further developed during identification. The Component will also strengthen national ex ante control systems to strengthen fiduciary oversight with respect to the Program. The external audit institution--*Cour des Comptes*—will be supported to effect external controls over the Program. The High State Control Authority (*Autorite Supérieure de Contrôle d'Etat*—ASCE) and the ministerial technical inspectorates will also be supported to strengthen the capacity for internal controls in the three ministries.

III. Initial Environmental and Social Screening

Environmental aspects

Environmental aspects

38. No significant negative environmental impacts are expected from the proposed Program as its intention is to strengthen public sector capacity. Nevertheless, the Program is categorized as category “B” in accordance with the World Bank Environmental Assessment Policy (O.P. 4.01) as project resources might be used for construction and rehabilitation activities. In Burkina Faso, the Burkinabe legislative framework for mitigating the potential adverse environmental impact of public investment programs is in place. The Law N^O 006-2013/AN of 02 April 2013 provides the legal framework for environmental management and establishes the fundamental principles of environmental protection. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (*Ministère de l'Environnement et du développement durable*—MEDD) is responsible for the implementation of the law. It has deconcentrated offices in all of the 13 regions of the country.

39. As part of the project concept preparation, a preliminary draft Environmental and Social Management System Assessment (ESSA) framework was developed in coordination with other existing World Bank lending projects. During the project preparation stage a thorough Environmental and Social Systems Assessment will be carried out by the World Bank safeguard specialists (environmental and social specialists). This ESSA will be undertaken to examine the existing environmental management system. More specifically, it will assess the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework of Burkina Faso to enable the preparation of the

Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), Environmental Audit, Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), etc. Once this situation is known and weaknesses identified, measures will be proposed within the program to strengthen the system to make sure that the country has a strong legal, regulatory and institutional framework to handle environmental issues related to the public sector modernization program.

Social aspects

40. The program is expected to have a positive social impact on the population because of its public sector capacity building focus. Consultations will be carried out with local populations in the target areas and the preparation of each activity will be based on a participative process that will ensure that all stakeholders will be able to express their views.

41. As part of the World Bank support and in accordance with the requirements of OP 9:00, *Program-for-Results Financing*, a comprehensive assessment (Environmental and Social Systems Assessment - ESSA) will be conducted to identify the strengths, weaknesses and shortcomings of the Program's Environmental and Social Systems with a view to assessing the adequacy of the system for PforR financing and identifying key actions to improve the environmental and social management performance of the Program, based on the proposed components.

42. Land issues are very sensitive in the current context of Burkina Faso and the Bank has extensively reviewed the implication of land based intervention in World Bank projects. In any of the activities financed by the project involuntary resettlement of population is not expected. However, because of the sensitivity around land issues, the assessment of the involuntary resettlement framework will be included in the ESSA. In addition, the ESSA, with support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders, will have the following objectives, on social aspects:

- Assess the experience of the relevant main implementing entity(ies) and Bank counterpart(s);
- Verify that the potential social risks and impacts of the Program are subject to an adequate initial screening;
- Ensure that social mitigation measures to avoid, minimize, offset, and/or compensate any adverse impacts and promote social sustainability will be applied to components and activities that will have potential social negative impacts; and
- Identify suitable measures to strengthen the systems, as relevant.

43. Specific attention will be given to gender issues. The Social Specialist will coordinate all of the gender-related activities of the Program. The Social Specialist will also elaborate a specific road map for an explicit focus on the gender aspects in the Program.

44. The social and environmental measures identified during the ESSA phase will be implemented by the borrower. The proposed measures shall be part of the Program Action Plan. The ESSA process was launched in June 2014 with an identification mission. The mission has initiated consultations with all of the stakeholders. It will be followed by an assessment phase mission. The draft ESSA will be consulted upon and disclose prior to appraisal.

IV. Tentative financing

Source:

(\$m.)

Borrower/Recipient

IBRD
IDA: USD \$ 40 million
Others (specify)

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