

Document of
The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 95199-BF

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

PROGRAM APPRAISAL DOCUMENT

ON A
PROPOSED CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF EUR 35.8 MILLION
(SDR 25.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO

BURKINA FASO

FOR A
PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

June 12, 2015

Governance Global Practice
Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization

BURKINA FASO - FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate as of April 30, 2015)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

US\$1.00 = CFAF 600

US\$1.00 = Euro 0.8935

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACG	Anti-Corruption Guidelines
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALIAS	On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration System (<i>Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié</i>)
ARMP	Procurement Regulatory Authority (<i>Autorité de Régulation des Marchés Publics</i>)
ASCE	High Authority for State Oversight (<i>Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle de l'Etat</i>)
BUNEE	National Agency in charge of Environmental Assessments (<i>Bureau National des Evaluations Environnementales</i>)
CAST	Designated Special Treasury Account (<i>Compte d'Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor</i>)
CDP	<i>Congres pour la Démocratie et le Progrès</i>
CEB	District Offices of MENA (<i>Circonscription d'Education de Base</i>)
CF	Financial Comptroller (<i>Contrôleur Financier</i>)
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CGCT	General Code for Local Government (<i>Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales</i>)
CID	Computerized Expenditure Circuit (<i>Circuit Intégré de la Dépense</i>)
CIE	Integrated Accounting System (<i>Comptabilité Intégré de l'Etat</i>)
CNMA	National Public Administration Modernization Committee (<i>Conseil National de Modernisation de l'Administration</i>)
CNSS	National Social Security Fund (<i>Caisse National de Sécurité Sociale</i>)
COGES	School Management Committee (<i>Comité de Gestion</i>)
CPAR	Country Procurement Assessment Report
CPIA	Country Poverty and Institutional Assessment
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DCMP	Central Directorate for Public Procurement (<i>Direction Centrale des Marchés Publics</i>)
DGB	General Directorate for the Budget (<i>Direction Générale du Budget</i>)
DGCF	General Directorate for Financial Control (<i>Direction Générale du Contrôle Financier</i>)
DGCMEF	General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (<i>Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers</i>)

DGMP	General Directorate for Procurement (<i>Direction Générale des Marchés Publics</i>)
DGPEDD	General Directorate of Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (<i>Direction Général de la Protection Environnementale et du Développement Durable</i>)
DGTCP	General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounts (<i>Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Comptabilité Publique</i>)
DIAN	Individual Employee File System (<i>Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé</i>)
DLI	Disbursement-Linked Indicator
DMP	Procurement Department (<i>Direction des Marchés Publics</i>)
DP	Development Partners
DPENA	Provincial Directorate of MENA (<i>Directions Provinciales de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation</i>)
DPO	Development Policy Operation
DRENA	Regional Directorate of MENA (<i>Directions Regionales de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation</i>)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESMS	Environmental and Social Management System
ESSA	Environmental and Social Systems Assessment
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GI	Global Integrity
HR	Human Resources
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDA	International Development Association
IFRS	International Financial Reporting Standards
IGE	General State Inspectorate (<i>Inspection Générale de l'Etat</i>)
IGF	General Finance Inspectorate (<i>Inspection Générale des Finances</i>)
INSD	National Statistics Institute (<i>Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie</i>)
MATDS	Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (<i>Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité</i>)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance (<i>Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances</i>)
MENA	Ministry of National Education and Literacy (<i>Ministère de l'Education National et Alphabétisation</i>)
MERH	Ministry of Environment and Water Resources (<i>Ministère de l'Environnement et des Ressources Halieutiques</i>)
MFPTSS	Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (<i>Ministère de la Fonction Publique du Travail et de la Sécurité Social</i>)
MJPDHC	Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (<i>Ministère de la Justice, de la Promotion des Droits Humains et Civiques</i>)
MOD	Specialized Procurement Agency (<i>Maître d'Ouvrage Delegué</i>)
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAP	Priority Action Plan
PAST	Three-Year Public Financial Management Action Plan

	<i>(Plan d'Actions Sectoriel Triennal)</i>
PDO	Program Development Objective
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM	Public Financial Management
PNJ	National Justice Policy (<i>Politique Nationale de Justice</i>)
PPP	Public-Private Partnerships
PRGB	Budget Management Reform Plan (<i>Programme de Renforcement de la Gestion Budgétaire</i>)
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSDMA	Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration (<i>Plan Stratégique Décennal de Modernisation de l'Administration</i>)
PSEF	Sectoral Program of Education and Training (<i>Programme Sectoriel de l'Education et de la Formation</i>)
PSG	Public Sector Governance
SADINA	Employee Access to Employment Files System (<i>Système D'Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents</i>)
SAI	Supreme Audit Institution
SCADD	Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (<i>Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable</i>)
SIGASPE	Integrated Human Resource Management System (<i>Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat</i>)
SIMP	Integrated Information System for Procurement (<i>Systeme Intégré des Marchés Publics</i>)
SPMA	Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration (<i>Secrétariat Permanent de la Modernisation de l'Administration</i>)
SRFP	Strategy for Strengthening Public Finance (<i>Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques</i>)
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TA	District Court (<i>Tribunal d'arrondissement</i>)
TAdmin	Administrative Tribunal
TD	Local Departmental Court (<i>Tribunal Départemental</i>)
TGI	Superior First Instance Court (<i>Tribunal de Grande Instance</i>)
TI	First Instance Court (<i>Tribunal d'Instance</i>)
TOFE	Government Financial Operations Table (<i>Tableau des Opérations Financières de l'Etat</i>)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
VAT	Value Added Tax
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union

Regional Vice President:	Makhtar Diop
Country Director:	Ousmane Diagana
Senior Practice Director:	Mario Marcel Cullell
Country Manager:	Mercy Miyang Tembon
Practice Manager:	Guenter Heidenhof
Task Team Leader:	Serdar Yilmaz

BURKINA FASO
PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Table of Contents

	Page
I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT	1
A. Country Context.....	1
B. Sectoral and Institutional Context.....	2
C. Relationship to CPS	13
II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.....	15
A. Program Scope.....	15
B. Program Development Objective/s	21
C. Program Key Results and Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs)	22
D. Key Capacity Building and Systems Strengthening Activities.....	23
III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION	24
A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements (See Annex 1).....	24
B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation.....	24
C. Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols (See Annex 3)	25
IV. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY	26
A. Technical.....	26
B. Fiduciary.....	29
C. Environmental and Social Effects.....	32
D. Integrated Risk Assessment Summary	33
E. Program Action Plan.....	34
 ANNEXES:	
Annex 1: Detailed Program Description	35
Annex 2: Program Results Framework and Monitoring	48
Annex 3: Disbursement Linked Indicators, Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols.....	56
Annex 4: Summary of Technical Assessment	67
Annex 5: Fiduciary Systems Assessment	93
Annex 6: Summary of Environmental and Social Systems Assessment	107
Annex 7: Integrated Risk Assessment	111

Annex 8: Program Action Plan	113
Annex 9: Implementation Support Plan.....	117
Annex 10: Development Partner Support	118

FIGURES:

Figure 1: Protest and riot activity in Burkina Faso, 1997 - 2014.....	1
---	---

TABLES:

Table 1: Regional Distribution of Civil Servants.....	5
Table 2: Program Financing (Euro Million)	21
Table 3: Program Key Results Indicators	22
Table 4: Disbursement-linked Indicators by Reform Path.....	23
Table 5: Overall Benefits of the Program	28

BOXES:

Box 1: The success of public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso.	3
Box 2: The strength of collective action of educational workers.....	9
Box 3: Rationale for Program Selectivity	18

PAD DATA SHEET			
<i>Burkina Faso</i>			
<i>Public Sector Modernization Program</i>			
PROGRAM APPRAISAL DOCUMENT			
<i>Africa</i> <i>Governance</i>			
Basic Information			
Date:	June 18, 2015	Sectors: General public administration (100%)	
Country Manager/ Director:	Mercy Tembon/ Ousmane Diagana	Themes: Administrative and civil service reform (100%)	
Practice Manager/ Sr. Practice Director:	Guenter Heidenhof/ Mario Marcel Cullell		
Program ID:	P132216		
Team Leader(s):	Serdar Yilmaz		
Program Implementation Period: 4 years Start Date: July 9 2015 End Date: December 31, 2019 Expected Financing Effectiveness Date: November 9, 2016 Expected Financing Closing Date: December 31, 2019			
Program Financing Data			
<input type="checkbox"/>	Loan	<input type="checkbox"/>	Grant
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	Other
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Credit		
For Loans/Credits/Others (US\$M):			
Total Program Cost : Euro 53,108,763		Total Bank Financing : Euro 35,800,000	
Total Co-Financing : Euro 5,347,088		Financing Gap : Euro 11,961,675	
Financing Source		Amount	
BORROWER/RECIPIENT		Euro 5,347,088	
IBRD/IDA		Euro 35,800,000	
Total		Euro 41,147,088	
Borrower: Burkina Faso			
Responsible Agency: Ministère de la Fonction Publique du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale			
Contact:	Jacques Sosthene Dingara	Title:	Secrétaire Permanent de la

			Modernization de l'Administration
Telephone No.:	226 70 28 73 16	Email:	dijaso@yahoo.fr

Expected Disbursements (in Euro Million)

Fiscal Year	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20
Annual	3,800,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	10,000,000	2,000,000
Cumulative	3,800,000	13,800,000	23,800,000	33,800,000	35,800,000

Program Development Objective(s)

To improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service

Compliance

Policy

Does the program depart from the CAS in content or in other significant respects?	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Does the program require any waivers of Bank policies applicable to Program-for-Results operations?	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Have these been approved by Bank management?	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?	Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	No	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Does the program meet the Regional criteria for readiness for implementation?	Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	No	<input type="checkbox"/>

Overall Risk Rating: Moderate

Legal Covenants: None

Team Composition

Bank Staff

Name	Title	Specialization	Unit
Serdar Yilmaz	Sr. Economist, TTL	Public Sector Management	GGODR
Anders Jensen	Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	Monitoring and Evaluation PforR	GPSOS
Adama Ouedraogo	Sr. Education Specialist	Education	GEDDR
Begnadehi Claude Bationo	Senior Operations Specialist	Impact Evaluation	AFMBF
Gabriel Dedu	Governance Specialist	Public Sector Governance	GGODR
Pierre M. Lenaud	Program Assistant	Public Sector	GGODR

		Governance	
Maimouna Mbow Fam	Senior Financial Management Specialist	Financial Management	GGODR
Mamata Tiendrebeogo	Senior Procurement Specialist	Procurement	GGODR
Fatou Fall	Social Development Specialist	Social Safeguards	GSURR
Abdoulaye Gadiere	Environmental Specialist	Environmental Safeguards	GENDR
Alain Hinkati	Senior Financial Management Specialist	Financial Management	GGODR
Ngor Sene	Financial Management Specialist	Financial Management	GGODR
Boubacar Diallo	Procurement Specialist	Procurement	GGODR
Suzanne Rayaisse	Procurement Assistant	Procurement	GGODR
Faly Diallo	Financial Officer	Loans Operations	WFALA
Maya Abi Karam	Senior Council	Legal	LEGAM
Non Bank Staff			
Name	Title	Office Phone	City
Bronwyn Grieve	Consultant--Governance/Public Sector Reform		Dakar
Celestin Bado	Consultant—Public Sector Reform		Ouagadougou


Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program

I. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

A. Country Context

1. **The social uprising that recently led to the sudden end of the almost three decade rule of President Blaise Compaore and the dominant *Congres pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP)* party marks a historic turning point for Burkina Faso.** President Blaise Compaore held the presidency since 1987, leading the CDP through successive presidential and legislative electoral victories. Until recently, the country enjoyed relative political stability in contrast to the other countries in the region. However, from 2011, citizen dissatisfaction with the government escalated (see Figure 1). By 2014, the governing party's attempt to extend the constitutional limitation on presidential tenure to allow President Compaore to stand for another term in 2015 was met with significant resistance from the population. Public protests across the country and the burning of the Parliament ultimately forced the President to step down. The government was dissolved, the Constitution suspended and a transitional government was installed, with the support of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to assist the country in moving towards peaceful and democratic elections.

Figure 1: Protest and riot activity in Burkina Faso, 1997 - 2014



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data source for Burkina Faso 1997 – 2014, <http://www.acleddata.com>

2. **This profound political change took place in a national context of persistent poverty, weak human development outcomes and declining citizen trust in government.** In the last two to three decades, sound macro-economic policies and steady investment have enabled Burkina Faso to sustain significant growth rates, maintain relative macro-economic stability and reduce poverty levels. The country has maintained higher than average growth rates relative to

the sub-region since 2000, the average growth rate per year has been 5.5 percent and annual growth rates in 2012 and 2013 reached 9 percent and 7 percent respectively. This provided opportunities for increased public expenditures on health, education and water and sanitation, as well as for more targeted social service provision.¹ Burkina Faso has also received significant aid flows in the last decade, being a relatively good performer in terms of its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score.² Yet a high population growth rate of 3.2 percent, a non-inclusive pattern of growth and the less than optimal performance of public administration have limited the impact of economic growth and stability on poverty reduction, anti-corruption and service delivery. Though poverty has declined from 51 percent in 2003 to 46.7 percent in 2010, Burkina Faso continues to be ranked among the poorest countries in the world. The country ranks third last in the United Nations Human Development Index³ and is unlikely to meet many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).⁴ The rise in unrest reflects, in part, a gradual decline in public trust and growing disillusionment in the government's capacity to deliver and to be held accountable to its citizens.

3. As the country begins anew, the critical challenge for the Burkinabe government will be to restore public confidence by strengthening governance institutions as well as developing a modern and accountable administration that is capable of delivering quality services and tangible development outcomes. Despite the cautious optimism that prevails during the transitional period, political and social stability remains fragile. There is lingering discontent with existing social and economic conditions and the population has high expectations of change. There remains a risk that potentially negative developments could unfold in the post-election period. Against this background, there is a need to strengthen public sector governance institutions as well as increase efforts to meet the development objectives outlined in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (*Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable - SCADD*) approved in June 2011.

B. Sectoral and Institutional Context

4. Government effectiveness in Burkina Faso is comparatively weak. The country scores poorly on a range of selected public sector and governance indicators (see Annex 1). In terms of the quality and professionalism of the public administration, Burkina Faso scores lower than other countries in the region (Ghana and Senegal) and lower than both the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and low income countries according to the Global Integrity Indicators. The Doing Business and Enterprise Survey indicators also highlight public sector inefficiencies

¹ The budget for pro-poor spending increased from 5.3 percent of GDP in 2006 to 7.6 percent in 2011 and is projected to reach 7.8 percent by 2015.

² Burkina Faso's CPIA score since 2010 has been 3.78, making it one of the best performers in West Africa.

³ In 2013, Burkina Faso's score on the United Nations Human Development Index was 0.343, giving the country a low ranking of 183 out of 186 countries.

⁴ The under-five mortality and infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births in 2012 were 102 and 66 respectively, well above the MDG targets of 69 and 35. Illiteracy rates also remain high at 28.7 percent. The proportion of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities in 2012 was 17 percent, compared to the MDG 2015 target of 54 percent.

in the country, notably with respect to judicial performance. These inefficiencies are reflected in the low execution rates of public investment budgets in key sectors.⁵

5. **Performance on public sector reform has been uneven.** On the one hand, the country is regarded as being one of the top performers on public financial management reform in the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) region (see Box 1). In addition, the country has been particularly successful in creating progressive legal and institutional foundations. The first and second generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso established the legal and regulatory framework and introduced modern systems for an effective and efficient administration. But, none of these reforms have translated into improvements in the performance of public administration in delivering services. Poor development outcomes are partly to blame for the recent popular insurrection, as the population is frustrated with the quality and quantity of public services. A rise in the level and number of civil servant strikes in recent years also points to growing levels of frustration amongst civil servants with regard to their working conditions.

Box 1: The success of public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso.

Since the 1990's, Burkina Faso has earned a reputation in the WAEMU as being at the pinnacle of progressive public financial management (PFM) reform. Across the region, Burkina serves as a model with respect to its budgetary and financial management and revenue mobilization systems. A joint analysis conducted in 2012 by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) identified the reasons behind the successful implementation of PFM reforms in Burkina Faso. Notwithstanding, rent-seeking in the administration was commonplace, within a system of entrenched clientelism and limited political contest. Despite capacity limitations, Burkina Faso made significant progress in introducing multi-year programmatic budgets. The report highlights three key factors that resulted in the successful implementation of these cross-cutting public sector reforms. First, a technical secretariat to manage the Ministry of Finance's Strategy for Strengthening Public Finances (*Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques* - SRFP) played a critical role in effectively coordinating PFM reforms across the ministries. Well-equipped and staffed with talented and reformist civil servants, the Secretariat coordinated with development partners and accompanied sectoral ministries in the roll-out of the PFM reforms. Second, the reforms were introduced on a progressive basis, starting with the introduction of programmatic budgeting in a handful of ministries. This allowed energies to be focused on supporting the sectoral ministries and it also facilitated the capitalization of lessons learned for scaling up the exercise. Finally, generous donor support was a key factor. The combination of technical assistance provided to support the implementation of the SRFP and general budget support over an extended period created effective incentives for the achievement of results, whilst ensuring institutional capacity was in place for implementation.

Source: Benoit Taiclet et al (2012) 'Burkina Faso: An Implementation Strategy for the Harmonized WAEMU Public Finance': WB, UNDP ÌMF.

6. **Past attempts at public sector reform have done little to improve the performance of the public administration:**

- a) Burkina Faso enacted the first generation of public sector reforms in the early 1990s. These reforms aimed at adapting the public sector to the changing economic environment – which involved a shift from a planned economy to a market-based economy. The reforms focused predominantly on technical improvements to the *modus operandi* of the central administration without necessarily addressing the highly centralized structure of the public administration system.

⁵ The execution rate of public investments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were respectively: 59 percent, 26 percent and 32 percent.

- b) The second generation of public sector reforms, which began in 1998, involved a focus on decentralization and civil service reforms. In 1998, the recommendations of the independent Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation informed a wave of legislation to advance decentralization reforms.⁶ The main objective of the new set of legislation was to devolve decision-making authority in order to improve allocative efficiency in service delivery. The General Code for Local Government (Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales - CGCT) adopted in 2004, envisaged a combination of decentralized and deconcentrated local government structures.⁷ Despite advances over the years, the implementation of these reforms has been slow and uneven.
- c) Civil service reforms introduced during the second generation of reforms principally involved strengthening the legal and regulatory framework,⁸ including the enactment of legislation governing civil servant employment which set forth the general conditions for employment as a civil servant. The reform efforts also focused on establishing systems to manage human resources and payroll. These reforms have taken time to implement and many have yet to yield significant impact in terms of administrative efficiency or in terms of creating appropriate incentives to optimize civil servant performance.

7. **The shortcomings of earlier reform efforts reflect a combination of political inertia, as well as strategic, institutional coordination and implementation failures.** Public sector reform is, by nature, a traditionally complex reform area. Despite government commitment to public sector reform in the past and the existence of reform-minded senior level bureaucrats, there was limited political engagement and weak institutional leadership during the reform implementation process. Accordingly, insufficient resources were allocated to the reform processes and successes were measured on the basis of outputs (usually in the form of legal and regulatory texts) rather than improvements in the performance of the public administration. At the same time, the process of developing consensus upstream and engaging potential opponents to reform, including the union movement, was underestimated. Resistance to reform not only slowed the pace of implementation, but resulted in policy reversals and extensive government efforts downstream to negotiate with unions. Reform shortcomings also reflected institutional coordination issues. In Burkina Faso, diffuse coordination of the Public Sector Governance (PSG) reform agenda by three central ministries (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Ministry of Civil Service) was compounded by the limited engagement of sectors in implementing the reforms. Sector ministries have incentives, driven by donor-financed projects, to focus on service delivery results rather than tackling institutional

⁶ The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 040/98/AN du 3 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) which defines basic principles for decentralization in Burkina Faso; (ii) Loi N°041/98/an du 06 août 1998 (JO N°38 1998) which establishes the distinction between administrative circumscriptions (village- department- province) and the decentralized entities (municipality and province); (iii) Loi n°042/98/AN du 06 août 1998 which describes governance structures (executive and legislative branches) of decentralized entities, local administrations, state agents in decentralized entities, consultative bodies at the local level; and (iv) Loi N° 43/98/AN du 6 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) which lays out the timetable for implementation of decentralization reform.

⁷ Deconcentrated units are the representatives of the central government and have supervision (tutelage) responsibility over decentralized units.

⁸ The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 10/98/AN du 21 avril 1998 which articulates state intervention modalities and allocation of powers between the state and other development actors; (ii) Loi N°013/98/an du 28 avril 1998 which establishes civil service; (iii) Décret N°2000-86/PRES/PM/MFPDI du 13 mars 2000 which establishes performance evaluation system for the civil service.

issues. The implementation of medium-term public sector reforms was, therefore, sidelined in favor of quick wins, e.g. school or clinic construction. Finally, as with all reform efforts in Burkina Faso, implementation challenges linked to limited resources and weak capacity played an important role.

8. **As a result, the performance of the public administration in Burkina Faso is presently hampered by a series of shortcomings.** First, the highly centralized nature of decision-making authority and the concentration of financial and human resources at the center limit the administration’s capacity to respond to the needs and expectations of citizens. The administrative system is built on a notion of *ex ante* controls rather than *ex post* performance monitoring. Decisions on budget and human resources are made by key ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS), and the role of other ministries is largely confined to carrying these out. As a result of the high level of concentration of decision-making power at the center, service delivery ministries have limited administrative authority to ensure effective implementation of public policies. At the same time, the central ministries, most notably the MFPTSS, lack sufficient capacity to provide strategic orientation to line ministries. Concentration of decision-making powers at the central level is accompanied by concentration of financial and human resources at the center. For example, more than 56 percent of civil servants reside in the central region where the capital city, Ouagadougou, is located (see Table 1). In the education and justice sectors, there are a disproportionately high proportion of front-line service delivery professionals (teachers and magistrates) working as administrators in each ministry.⁹ The combined effect of the concentration of financial and human resources is the lack of availability of resources for front-line service delivery.

Table 1: Regional Distribution of Civil Servants

Region	Number of Civil Servants	Share
Boucle du Mouhoun	4,588	4.91%
Cascades	1,834	1.96%
Centre	52,594	56.33%
Centre-Est	3,720	3.98%
Centre-Nord	4,823	5.17%
Centre-Ouest	4,437	4.75%
Centre-Sud	2,103	2.25%
Est	3,337	3.57%
Hauts-bassins	5,106	5.47%
Nord	4,088	4.38%
Plateau Central	1,716	1.84%
Sahel	2,346	2.51%
<i>Sud-Ouest</i>	2,668	2.86%
<i>Total</i>	93,360	100%

Source: European Union Report, 2010.

⁹ For example 30 percent of magistrates are assigned to administrative functions in the Ministry of Justice.

9. **Second, the process of decentralization/de-concentration has yet to yield measurable improvements in public service delivery.** While political decentralization has been consolidated in the last decade, with the last round of local government elections held in 2012, the central government, through its *tutelle* authorities, still retains large *ex ante* controls on most decisions taken by decentralized local governments. Local governments are constrained from carrying out their mandates by the limited (and often late) resources that are sent from the center and by the absence of qualified civil servants. The process of de-concentration was intended to: (i) accompany the new and poorly capacitated local governments in carrying out their mandates; and (ii) facilitate improved access by the population to services provided by the central government. Due to the slow and varied pace of de-concentration in the sectors, local governments do not receive adequate levels of support from regional offices of ministries and de-concentrated departments have not consistently succeeded in bringing public administration closer to local populations.

10. **Finally, the civil service environment lacks appropriate incentives to motivate administrators and front-line public service providers to deliver results.** Various attempts have been made by successive governments to improve human resource management and strengthen the institutional capacity of the public administration. However these efforts have not been particularly successful in attracting and motivating a capable and performance-driven body of civil servants or in optimizing the use of human resources for the efficient provision of services. Civil servant performance tends not to be results-oriented or focused on individual accountability and civil servants have become increasingly disgruntled by their working conditions. Critical factors that influence this civil service environment include:

- a) ***Weak civil service reform coordination and implementation capacity:*** From a strategic perspective, the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS) remains poorly equipped, both in terms of financial resources and in terms of expertise, to lead a coherent and results-oriented strategic direction for human resource management that is operationally relevant to the individual ministries. The devolution of responsibility for human resource management to the line ministries and the regional departments of the MFPTSS that started in 2005, paved the way for a more efficient and responsive management of the state's human resources. However, these de-concentrated structures have limited capacity or authority to manage human resources effectively.
- b) ***Inadequate information systems:*** Concerted efforts have been made to streamline and strengthen civil service information systems in recent years through the introduction of the Integrated Human Resource Management System (*Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat - SIGASPE*), however the government has not completely shifted to a consolidated system for capturing all human resource processes.¹⁰ Accordingly, recruitment, career management and retirement processes are often delayed and neither the MFPTSS nor the line ministries possess easily accessible

¹⁰ There are two major systems integration issues: (i) the coverage of SIGASPE is limited within the administration as several ministries, as well as deconcentrated ministerial departments are not connected to the system; and (ii) its interface with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system (*Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé - DIAN*), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, (*Système D'Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents - SADINA*) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (*Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié - ALIAS*) is not completed.

and up-to-date information on the civil service for planning, budgeting and monitoring of the wage bill.

- c) **Limited effectiveness of HR and career management processes:** Efforts to promote pay for performance are hampered by the lack of clearly defined job descriptions, career plans and poorly defined performance contracts. Furthermore, individual civil servants only have modest incentives for performance as there are very limited opportunities for in-service training and career advancement and there are few linkages between objective performance evaluation and promotions.
- d) **Low institutional capacity:** The weak capacity of mid to senior level managers within the civil service to strategically manage and monitor reform programs limits accountability for results. A lack of regular in-service training in planning, programming and monitoring and evaluation, as well as weaknesses in the systems and processes for developing, implementing and monitoring reform programs substantially contribute to this capacity deficit.
- e) **Poor working conditions** remain a particular concern at all levels of the civil service, particularly for front-line service delivery units. Deteriorated office spaces, restricted availability of basic office supplies, the uncontrolled, inefficient and limited use of information technology and the absence of reliable archiving facilities limit efficiency and impact upon morale.
- f) **Political economy factors**, including the prevalence of patronage within the administration, have had the effect of politicizing the civil service and creating entrenched rent-seeking interests. This has in turn minimized incentives for ensuring the effective implementation of civil service reforms, particularly amongst mid to senior level managers.

11. Shortcomings in public sector performance impact upon service delivery outcomes across the sectors and ultimately influence levels of trust in government. In Burkina Faso, cross-cutting efforts to modernize public administration and reform the civil service have often failed to make the nexus between public sector performance and improvements in service standards. Accordingly, the government's laudable efforts to improve capacity, strengthen legal and regulatory frameworks and improve internal processes have seldom been accompanied by perceptible changes in the manner in which services are provided to citizens. In the current national context, establishing service standards in *key sectors* and creating the appropriate incentives and operating environment for civil servants to meet those standards, would help to strengthen the compact between the government and the Burkinabe population. The proposed Program aims to improve selected service standards in the labor, primary education and justice sectors. Each of these three ministries provides services that are strategically relevant to strengthening public trust in government and enhancing social cohesion.¹¹

Situation in the Labor Sector:

12. The government's regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers. During the period under President Sankara's

¹¹ For further details on the strategic relevance and rationale behind the selection of the three ministries, refer to Annex 4 and Section 2 of the Technical Assessment.

leadership in the 1970s, the rights of workers became a central element of national discourse. Three decades later, this concern for the protection of worker's rights continues and is reflected in the influence of the trade union movement across public and private sectors. Labor problems in one sector often trigger solidarity strikes across public and private sectors. As an acknowledgement of the need to uphold labor standards for all workers, the government merged the ministries of civil service and labor together in 2011.

13. **However, in both the formal and informal sectors, compliance with labor laws by employers is weak and registration of employees in the National Social Security Fund remains limited.** In the formal private sector, only 42.5 percent of workers have a written contract of employment and 44.5 percent have a pay stub.¹² The situation is worse in the informal sector: only 7 percent of employees have a work contract and 3.8 percent a pay stub. In the formal private sector, 55.8 percent of high level executives do not have paid annual leave, 63.7 percent do not benefit from social security retirement contributions and only 13.7 percent benefit from healthcare coverage. As for employees and workers in formal private enterprises, 68.1 percent do not have paid annual leave and 79.5 percent do not benefit from social security retirement contributions. In order to provide social protection services (paid leave, social security, and retirement benefits) to workers in compliance with labor laws, there is a need to increase efforts to ensure that employers register them with the National Social Security Fund (*Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale- CNSS*).

14. **Labor inspections are strategically significant to the government's efforts to enforce laws.** Labor inspections create visibility with respect to the conditions to which workers are subjected at the enterprise level. They also offer a valuable opportunity for the sensitization of employers with respect to their obligations towards employees. At present both the coverage and frequency of labor inspections are limited, leaving a significant proportion of the formal and informal workforce, including those in high risk sectors (mining, construction) with little to no government surveillance over their employers.

Situation in the Primary Education Sector:

15. **Primary education represents a core service provided by the government in Burkina.** Improving educational outcomes through the provision of accessible and quality education is vital to achieving the National Education and Training Sector Program (*Programme Sectoriel de l'Education et de la Formation - PSEF*) objective of strengthening human capital. The quality of service delivery in primary education also has a direct influence on citizen perceptions of the public administration and a spill-over effect on social cohesion. The closest contact that much of the population has with civil servants is through their interactions with primary school teachers. Teachers represent the most regionally disperse body of civil servants, providing front-line services at the village level. Teachers also make up over one third of all civil

¹² *Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie. BURKINA FASO - ENQUETE 1-2-3 2001-2003, PHASE 1 : ENQUETE EMPLOI, Dernière modification Nov 25, 2013 (National Institute of Statistics and Demography, Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie—INSD).*

servants in the country¹³ and have historically been amongst the most active and influential civil servants with regards to industrial action and strike activity (see Box 2 for further details).

Box 2: The strength of collective action of educational workers

Problems in the education sector in Burkina Faso have historically been at the core of broader civil unrest in the country. Events in the last decade serve to highlight this nexus. The strength and collective organization of trade unions in the education sector has resulted in a disproportionately high rate of collective action by teachers. Between 2007 and 2014, teacher strikes have accounted for over sixty percent of all industrial action by civil servants. Trade unions in the sector are closely united and strikes initiated in either the public or private sectors frequently develop into collective action across the sector. The disruptions to education services induced by this collective action have also led students and their parents to mobilize and voice their dissatisfaction. In 2010, for example, parents marched in solidarity with teachers over concerns regarding the quality of education.

Civil unrest amongst students has triggered some of the most significant incidents of political unrest in the country in recent years and has prompted emergency social measures to be adopted by the government. The death of Justin Zongo while in police custody in 2011 and the ensuing closure of schools and protests by students marked the beginning of the political crisis in 2011. More recently, in 2013, student protests in Ouagadougou over the cost of living forced the government to allocate public resources to short term measures to increase student loans.

16. **Notwithstanding significant improvements in access,¹⁴ the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes.** The completion rate, though improving significantly from 41.7 percent in 2008 to 55 percent in 2012, remains low, with vast regional disparities (including a 33 percent difference in completion rates between urban and rural areas). Poor learning outcomes are also observed in the sector. In grade 6 for example, about 65 percent of students do not acquire the basic competencies specified in the curriculum.¹⁵

17. **The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education.** Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. Under the current PSEF, a specific objective of Program 2 on improving the quality of education is increasing the hours of instruction in primary schools.¹⁶ In 2008, the then Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (MEBA), commissioned a report¹⁷ to assess actual instructional time and to identify the principal factors that limit teacher time on task. The report estimated that actual teacher time on task averaged 574 hours, representing a loss of 40 percent of time in the school calendar year. The report highlighted the linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. It concluded that institutional factors

¹³ 50,331 civil service agents were employed in the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (MENA) in 2012, representing 42 percent of the entire civil service: *Annuaire Statistique*, MFPTSS, 2012.

¹⁴ The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6 percent in 2012, up from 72.4 percent in 2008.

¹⁵ Country Status Report 2012.

¹⁶ Activities identified in the PSEF to support this objective include (i) the reorganization of the school week; (ii) the timely recruitment and placement of teachers to start the school year; (iii) the timely distribution of school supplies; (iv) the implementation of a mechanism to monitor teacher time on task; (v) the implementation of incentives to reward schools that demonstrate high levels of teacher time on task.

¹⁷ *Etude Relative au Volume Horaire effectif de l'Enseignement Primaire au Burkina Faso*, CTB/I&D. January 7, 2008

related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers accounted for almost half of the instructional time lost.

18. Government efforts to address teacher time on task have had limited success for the following reasons:

- a) *Difficulties in measuring instruction time.* The monitoring mechanism introduced in 2010 is not reliable. Reporting has not been undertaken in a detailed manner, there are no internal or external controls over reporting and the manual process is both cumbersome and susceptible to errors. These shortcomings are reflected in the 2011 report,¹⁸ in which the average actual instructional time in five pilot regions was reported at 930 hours, a figure that is well above the new national norm of 770 hours instruction time.
- b) *Substantial delays in teacher recruitment:* The process for teacher recruitment is regularly delayed and teachers are often not available in schools in time to start the school year in October. Registration for civil service examinations for teachers starts as early as April of each year and recruitment is now conducted on a regional basis. However, the sheer volume of applicants, the increased number of teacher recruits¹⁹ and the cumbersome and manual processes for registering applicants, marking examinations and hiring and allocating recruits present ongoing challenges for the MFPTSS and the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (*Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et Alphabétisation – MENA*).
- c) *Teacher management:* Inefficient and bureaucratic human resource management processes result in teachers having to spend significant periods away from classrooms attending to their administrative matters related to career and salary. Although the progressive de-concentration of human resource management and payroll have limited the distances that teachers have to travel to resolve these issues, challenges remain. For example, continued reliance on manual processes for teacher transfers and the payment of indemnities require teachers to invest time and resources in preparing hard copy dossiers for submission to human resource departments and payroll.
- d) *Control over absenteeism:* Absenteeism is rarely taken into account for the evaluation of teacher performance or promotion purposes. In addition, sanctions related to absenteeism are poorly defined and seldom applied by school principals or controlled by technical inspectors. Though performance evaluation was re-introduced for teachers since 2011, it remains embryonic. Controllers in MENA lack appropriate resources to conduct field missions and, at the de-concentrated level, they seldom have adequate office or archiving space.

Situation in the Justice Sector:

19. In Burkina Faso, the performance of the judicial branch of government has had a significant impact on citizen's trust in government and on levels of social cohesion. The

¹⁸ Monitoring Report of the Implementation of the Dispositive for Measuring Instructional Time in Primary Education, MENA, 20-24 September 2011.

¹⁹ In recent years, the government has undertaken a concerted recruitment drive to address poor teacher to student ratios and to take into account the rate of demographic growth. In 2014 alone, 7,000 teachers were recruited.

judiciary provides both (i) a critical accountability check on executive action and public administration and (ii) a formal channel through which the grievances of citizens, including civil servants, can be addressed. The two most significant incidents of socio-political unrest in Burkina Faso over the last two decades were precipitated, in part, by public dissatisfaction with the state of the justice system. The alleged assassination of a journalist, Norbert Zongo, in 1998 and the death of a student, Justin Zongo, while in police custody in 2011 sparked widespread protests over the perceived culture of impunity, executive influence over the judiciary and the shortcomings in judicial process and the rule of law. These incidents prompted national dialogue on justice reform which further highlighted deep-seated frustrations with regard to the performance of the judiciary.

20. In particular, the weak performance of the administrative tribunals hampers the extent to which the public administration is held accountable to citizens downstream and limits the formal recourse that civil servants have against the State as an employer. In Burkina Faso, administrative cases are dealt with either by the Superior First Instance Courts (TGI) or the Administrative Tribunals (TAdmin), in the case of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. These courts are vested with responsibility for all matters concerning civil servant employment, land tenure, public procurement, taxation and local elections.²⁰ Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens' rights *vis a vis* the State.²¹

21. The average time taken by administrative courts to issue judgments remains lengthy.²² In 2013, average case processing time was 1 year and 6 months, an increase of two months in comparison with the averages of 2011 and 2012. At the same time, demand in administrative jurisdictions has increased threefold in the last decade, with the highest case load concentrations in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. Improvements in case processing times in administrative jurisdictions are likely to have a significant impact upon individual litigants and upon broader civil service and public perceptions of the accountability of the public administration in Burkina. For example, the timely resolution of civil servant grievances would have significant effects on levels of civil servant motivation and accelerated resolution of land disputes could help to minimize the escalation of localized social tensions.

22. Furthermore, the poor performance of the local departmental (*tribunal départemental* - TD) and district courts (*tribunal d'arrondissement* - TA) in resolving local level conflicts affects social cohesion. The closest courts to rural populations are the local

²⁰ The jurisdiction of the courts include : (i) contentious matters between civil servants and the State regarding their employment from recruitment to retirement, (ii) procurement- related matters including attribution, execution, interpretation and termination of contracts between private entities and the State, (iii) fiscal matters related to taxation disputes, (iv) electoral matters including irregularities in electoral lists, voting and vote counting procedures, and (v) all other administrative law matters.

²¹ The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see "Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa", African Commission, DOC/OS 247, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ZIM%20Principles_And_G.pdf>.

²² There is however no absolute time limit in international law for the completion of administrative judicial proceedings, and the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is dependent on the particular circumstances of the individual case.167 *König v Germany*, ECtHR, 28 June 1978, para 99.

departmental (TD) and district courts (TA). These courts are responsible for delivering civil registry documents to citizens and they also have limited jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters to the value of US\$200 and over minor infringements (crop damage, animal wandering, and perimeter breaches). For civil and commercial disputes, local courts (TD/TA) are required to first attempt conciliation between the parties. If conciliation fails, the courts are required to proceed to a formal arbitration of the matter – at which point the case is legally termed ‘a contentious matter.’²³ TA and TD rarely exercise their jurisdiction over contentious matters and local populations are forced to resort to informal and unenforceable means of conflict resolution.

²⁴

23. The effective delivery of judicial services in Burkina is impeded by:

- a) **Limited capacity for coordination and implementation of reforms.** Poor systems and weak capacity for coordination within the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (*Ministère de la Justice, de la Promotion des Droits Humains et Civiques* - MJPDHC) and between the MJPDHC and the judiciary, combined with weak monitoring processes, hamper efforts to improve the quality of judicial services. At the level of the individual jurisdictions, performance is hampered by poor working conditions, continued reliance on inefficient case management systems, limited access to laws and jurisprudence, and rent seeking behavior.
- b) **Limited accountability for outcomes** in the judiciary which is induced by weaknesses in the production of sector statistics,²⁵ ineffective performance evaluation and heavily politicized career advancement processes.
- c) **Court coverage is insufficiently de-concentrated to ensure access to justice.** While the construction of Superior First Instance Courts (*Tribunal de Grande Instance* – TGI) in the regions has advanced in recent years, these regional jurisdictions are often poorly equipped and lack adequate and quality human resources. At the local level, the local district and departmental courts are presided over by the prefect of the department who is, in principle, assisted by appointed assessors. Prefects and assessors are poorly trained in conciliation and arbitration and they are seldom paid their sitting allowance.

24. The government’s vision for the third generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso is focused on developing a modern performance-oriented public administration system. The Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration 2011 - 2020 (*Plan Stratégique Decennal de Modernisation de l’Administration* - PSDMA) was approved in 2011. The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The strategic plan aims to provide a federating framework to improve public management across the

²³ Article 53, la loi 028-2004 portant modification de la loi 010/93 ADP, portant organisation judiciaire au Burkina Faso.

²⁴ While the local courts are in high demand for the processing of civil registry matters, they seldom exercise jurisdiction over civil and commercial disputes and rarely go beyond conciliation in such cases. According to information based on a quantitative background analysis of rural access to justice conducted in 2012, for civil and commercial disputes, local populations continue to resort predominantly to customary and informal avenues for the resolution of their disputes.

²⁵ The Ministry of Justice does not collect statistics on case load or case processing for the local courts.

administration and create the necessary foundations upon which sector policies can be pursued more effectively. The PSDMA was developed following an extensive and inclusive process of national consultation. It was recently endorsed by the new transitional government through the adoption of the Second Action Plan to facilitate its implementation.²⁶

25. **Implementation of the PSDMA needs to be reinvigorated.** The implementation of the PSDMA started with the first action plan covering the period 2011 to 2013. The budget allocation for the implementation of the first action plan was around US\$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) of which US\$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget. The implementation of the first action plan was fraught with many of the same challenges that earlier reform efforts had encountered. High level political commitment did not translate into adequate leadership. The National Public Administration Modernization Committee (*le Conseil National de Modernization de l'Administration*),²⁷ which is charged with overseeing the coordination of the PSDMA, did not convene once in the three year period as envisioned in the strategy document. The Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Administration (*le Secretariat Permanent de la Modernization de l'Administration - SPMA*), which is charged with day to day coordination, remained underfunded and poorly equipped to lead reform efforts. The continued lack of results orientation and weak monitoring and evaluation framework made the task of monitoring progress or keeping line ministries engaged and accountable for results difficult. The new government has developed a Second Action Plan for the period of 2015 to 2018. The objective of the Second Action Plan is to strengthen public management for improved service standards within the administration.

26. **The Program seeks to draw from the lessons learned from earlier public sector reform efforts to revive the implementation of the PSDMA in a new political era.** It harnesses the renewed political and social commitment to reform that has been induced by the recent political changes. It seeks to address institutional coordination and implementation failures that have previously affected implementation of the PSDMA and earlier public sector reform efforts. In particular, it will focus on strengthening reform coordination and creating incentives for selected line ministries to engage in the cross-cutting reform process and achieve results. It will also use many of the levers that proved successful to public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso.

C. Relationship to CPS

27. **The PSDMA and the proposed Program are aligned with the second strategic theme of the 2013-2016 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS).** The CPS is based on three strategic themes: (i) accelerating inclusive and sustainable economic growth; (ii) enhancing governance for more efficient social service delivery; and (iii) reducing economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities - and two cross-cutting themes: governance and gender equality. The Program

²⁶ The Council of Ministers adopted the Second Action Plan on April 8, 2015.

²⁷ The PSDMA is implemented under the guidance of the National Public Administration Modernization Committee which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The National Committee includes the ministers of MFTPSS, MEF, Communications and Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Security (MATDS) as vice-chairs. The day-to-day management of the modernization efforts under the leadership of the National Committee is trusted to a Permanent Secretariat.

features as a cornerstone operation in the second strategic theme and in the cross-cutting theme of governance. It aims at improving selected service standards in the education, justice and labor sectors.

28. **The proposed Program is also aligned with World Bank's corporate strategies.** The Africa Strategy (2011) is built around two pillars: (a) competitiveness and employment and (b) vulnerability and resilience - and a foundation: governance and public sector management capacity. Poor governance has been identified as one of the main challenges underlying Africa's development. Building on lessons learnt, the Africa Strategy highlights the importance of investing in both demand and supply-side governance to enhance accountability. By strengthening institutions and improving public sector service-delivery and promoting third-party monitoring and verification of results, this Program will improve governance and enhance social accountability. The Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy²⁸ aims to build capable and accountable states. More specifically, it focuses on strengthening institutions and fostering transparency, participation and accountability. It also emphasizes the importance of developing robust results frameworks for governance improvements.

Rationale for using the Program for Results (PforR) instrument

29. **Both the government and the World Bank consider the PforR instrument to be the most appropriate for supporting the country's program for the modernization of the administration.** The PforR instrument was selected to enhance the impact of the Bank's financial and technical support and strengthen the overall results orientation of the government's vision for the modernization of the public administration in Burkina Faso. In so doing it will facilitate:

- *Program ownership.* The PSDMA is an ongoing national program with ownership at the highest levels of government. Its implementation in pilot ministries will also involve support for existing sectoral strategies that have been developed and are owned by the respective ministries. The PforR instrument will accordingly allow the government to implement its own national program.
- *Improvements in coordination of public sector reform efforts.* The PforR supports improvements in the design of the PSDMA and in the use of the Program's systems. The Bank's assessment of the quality of the Program, including the results framework, expenditure framework, and supporting systems, is satisfactory and the Program systems meet OP 9.00 requirements. Although the PforR operation will support specific interventions, the Bank's contribution is anticipated to foster improvements in terms of effectiveness and efficiency in the overall program over the next 5-6 years (the implementation period for the PSDMA is 2011-2020). The ongoing policy dialogue with the government and the Bank Group's proactive support during the preparation of the Program is already improving the quality of dialogue within the administration as well as the linkages with the PSDMA and sectoral reform strategies, and the use of the country's

²⁸ World Bank, Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank's Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan, January 2012.

own systems. Several measures to strengthen these systems during implementation have been incorporated in the design of the Program's results framework.

- *Improvements in national systems and procedures.* Burkina Faso has made significant progress in PFM and procurement reforms. Through its Program Action Plan, the Program will continue to provide support to strengthen country systems related to financial and administrative controls, audits, and complaints handling. The Bank has assessed the Program's fiduciary and environmental and social management systems and deemed them satisfactory.
- *Results orientation.* The use of the PforR instrument will establish clear linkages between International Development Association (IDA) disbursements and the delivery of PSDMA results. In so doing, the PforR instrument reinforces the results orientation of the PSDMA. Each of the three results areas is linked to a set of simple and measurable intermediate indicators and protocols for monitoring and verification. This provides the necessary incentive for participating ministries to improve their capacity to plan, deliver and sustain public service delivery by implementing cross-cutting public sector reforms. The Program supports the gradual adoption of a results-based management in the public administration. The government recognizes the importance of focusing on results and wants to use this operation (as a demonstration effect), to support its ambition to develop and implement performance-based management throughout government as put forward in the PSDMA.
- *Coordination with other development partners.* The use of the PforR instrument and its focus on results make it easier to coordinate between development partners and the government. The PforR provides a platform to reinforce the importance of an outcome orientation for public sector reforms. The government intends to approach other development partners to finance the implementation of PSDMA in other ministries using the same outcome orientation.

II. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

A. Program Scope

30. **The PSDMA sets the short to longer term strategic orientations for the government to improve public sector performance in achieving the country's ambitious development goals.** The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The objective of the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA is specifically to strengthen public management for improved service standards within the administration. The Strategic Plan consists of five pillars:

Pillar No 1: Improving the Efficiency and the Quality of Public Service Delivery: The overall objective of this pillar is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration.

Pillar No 2: Upgrading and Improving Human Resource Capacity of the Public Administration: The purpose of the second pillar is to focus on the human resource

capacity framework and improve staff working conditions which are affected by outdated equipment and physical infrastructure.

Pillar No 3: Promotion of Accessibility and Transparency in the Public Administration: The objective of the third pillar is to improve access to services and to establish the principle of accountability across the entire public administration.

Pillar No 4: Promotion of E-governance: The fourth pillar seeks to improve the quality of public services through the use of ICT.

Pillar 5: Promotion of Deconcentration and Decentralization: The fifth pillar envisages deconcentration to support an effective decentralization in favor of local development.

31. **The PSDMA is a fully-developed and costed stand-alone government program.** It incorporates cross-cutting public sector governance reforms that are applicable horizontally across the entire administration. Given its broad coverage across public administration, the PSDMA operates as the foundational government program upon which sectoral reform strategies are developed and implemented. Vertically, individual ministries each have longer term sector strategies that articulate the vision of the government with respect to the particular sector and that identify specific service delivery outcomes. The effective alignment and coordination of sector strategies around the PSDMA ensures consistency across the Burkinabe public administration, whilst simultaneously better connecting public sector performance and public service delivery. The PSDMA is connected with all of the sectoral strategies in Burkina Faso. For the purposes of the IDA-financed Program (defined below), the following sectoral strategies are relevant:

The Strategy for Strengthened Capacity in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (Strategie de Renforcement des Capacities du Ministere de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de la Securite Sociale 2014-2025), was recently adopted as the long term strategic vision of the MFPTSS. The objective of the strategy is to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of public administration to ensure decent working conditions for all workers, including civil servants, by 2025.

The Sectoral Program of Education and Training (Programme Sectoriel de l'Education et de la Formation 2012-2021 - PSEF) articulates the government's vision for the entire education sector and incorporates the sub-sector strategies for preschool, primary, primary non-formal, post-primary and vocational training. The objective of the PSEF is to achieve an efficient and inclusive education system by 2021 whereby all citizens have the educational opportunities to enable them to contribute to the socio-economic development of the country.

The National Justice Sector Policy (Politique Nationale de Justice 2010-2019 - PNJ) reflects the government's justice sector priorities. The main objectives of the PNJ are to (i) improve the performance of the justice sector by reinforcing its capacities, (ii) promote access to justice by reducing the obstacles faced by users, and (iii) reinforce and reaffirm the rights and liberties of citizens. The policy was revised in 2013 to enhance its alignment with the PSDMA.

The PforR (“The Program”)

32. **The Program is a results-based approach to supporting selected aspects of the government’s public sector modernization program in ministries responsible for civil service, labor, primary education and justice.** Given the broad coverage of the PSDMA across all government ministries and across the national territory and given the finite resources available through the Program, a selective approach to supporting PSDMA implementation has been adopted. The Program is designed to support a subset of the PSDMA’s Second Action Plan (see Annexes 1 and 4). It will focus on implementation of this subset of government program reform activities in three ministries – MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC- and in selected regions.

33. **Notwithstanding its more narrow scope, the Program will contribute to both the achievement of targeted results in each of the three ministries and systemic improvements to the quality of the public administration as a whole.** The Program will provide incentives for the achievement of specific, measurable and strategically significant service standards in each of the selected ministries resulting from the targeted implementation of the PSDMA. In doing so, the Program will focus on strengthening the nexus between cross-cutting public sector management reform and tangible service delivery results in particular sectors. A detailed explanation of the results chain is provided in Annex 4. The Program will also support system-wide improvements by strengthening the institutional coordination of the PSDMA and the piloted implementation of cross-cutting PSG reforms.

34. **The Program will cover discrete elements of the Government’s PSDMA expenditure program.** The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting results areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. Each of these results areas corresponds to specific elements of the government’s PSDMA expenditure program. The scope of the PSDMA Second Action Plan expenditure program and the Program’s coverage of expenditures through the results areas are detailed in Annex 1 and in the Technical Assessment, which is summarized in Annex 4.

35. **The three ministries targeted by the Program were selected on the basis of their strategic relevance and on the basis of the World Bank’s engagement and expertise in the sector.** Each of the three ministries provides services that are strategically relevant to strengthening public trust in government and enhancing social cohesion. These ministries also face particularly challenging or acute public sector management weaknesses, which have a critical effect on the quality of service provision. The World Bank’s engagement and expertise in the selected ministries was also taken into account. Box 3 below provides a summary of the rationale for Program selectivity. Further details on the selection of ministries and regions for Program support is provided in Annex 4 and in the Technical Assessment.

Box 3: Rationale for Program Selectivity

MFPTSS:

Civil service: Enhancing the performance of public administration lies at the heart of improving government effectiveness and the delivery of public services. Civil service reform features as a critical element of public sector reform. The MFPTSS is responsible for the overall management of the civil service and for leading the public sector modernization agenda. The inclusion of the MFPTSS in the Program is therefore strategically pivotal for the effective implementation of the Program and the PSDMA. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on civil service reform in Burkina Faso and is strategically well-placed to support the country in consolidating and improving upon its earlier reform efforts. The Program provides incentives for the government to take the necessary policy and operational changes to transition further towards a unique and integrated human resource management and payroll system that will yield efficiency gains in processing recruitments, promotions, transfers and retirement.

Labor: The government's regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers. Government efforts to monitor and safeguard labor conditions in the private sector are also a necessary complement to efforts to improve civil servant working conditions. The Directorate General of Labor (*Direction Générale du Travail*) in the MFPTSS is responsible for monitoring compliance with the labor laws and regulations including registration of workers with the CNSS and employers' social security contributions. The Program's support to improve labor inspections and increase the number of workers registered with the National Social Security Fund is an important step in providing them with social protection services (paid leave, social security, retirement) and increasing employers' contributions to the Fund.

There is no geographical selection for the implementation of activities in the MFPTSS. Human resource management improvements will be system-wide covering the whole administration. Likewise, labor sector inspections will be conducted in all regions.

MENA

Notwithstanding significant improvements in access,²⁹ the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes in Burkina Faso. The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education. Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. There are clear linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. Institutional factors related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers are estimated to account for almost half of the instructional time lost. The present Program provides appropriate incentives to strengthen coordination between the government's public sector modernization and civil service reforms and the sectoral reforms envisaged in the education sector with respect to instruction time. In so doing, it will help to strategically address the institutional factors that limit instruction time. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on primary education reform in Burkina Faso³⁰ and is strategically well-placed to continue support for the sector. The Program draws upon existing expertise and engagement in the sector

²⁹ The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6% in 2012, up from 72.4% in 2008.

³⁰ P115264 Education for All Fast Track Initiative Project; P148062 Education Access and Quality Improvement Project

and seeks to complement earlier and ongoing vertical support to the sector. It also harnesses MENA's relatively successful experience with results-based lending through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI)³¹.

The regions selected for improving teacher time on task were identified on the basis of learning outcomes, with priority given to the regions with the lowest level of learning outcomes.

Justice:

From a public sector modernization reform perspective two areas of judicial reform are particularly pertinent and realizable in the short time frame of the Program. First, improving the performance of the administrative tribunals is critical to ensuring that, downstream, the public administration is kept accountable to citizens. It also provides civil servants with a formal avenue for recourse against the State as an employer. Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens' rights *vis a vis* the State.³² Second, improving the performance of local courts in resolving local level conflicts in a formal and objective manner is necessary to strengthening social cohesion and making core functions of the State relevant and visible to the predominantly poor and rural populations in Burkina Faso. While the World Bank has not extensively engaged in the justice sector to date, a recent background review of the justice sector in Burkina Faso, including a political economy analysis of reform implementation in the sector, has provided a strong rationale for strategic World Bank engagement. The Program will help the Ministry of Justice to reduce the delays involved in processing administrative law cases and to strengthen and scale up its pilot efforts to improve the performance of 50 local courts.

The jurisdictions and regions selected for support were chosen on the basis of the high demand for judicial services registered.

36. The Program will be complemented by existing and planned sectoral support to the three ministries provided by other development partners. While the Program will not receive the direct support of other development partners, it has been designed to ensure complementarity with other development partner support to the selected ministries. Annex 10 provides detailed information on development partner support. It is anticipated that the Program will also stimulate additional donor financing for the implementation of the PSDMA.

Program Activities

37. The Program provides financing for specific activities identified in the PSDMA Second Action Plan. The Program's three results areas incorporate the following PSDMA activities (more detailed information on activities is included in Annex 1):

38. *Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance:* Under the Program, the MFPTSS will lead efforts to modernize and harmonize human resource management processes and to strengthen the capacity of de-concentrated human resources (HR) departments in the relevant ministries. The MFPTSS will support: (i) the elaboration and application of sector specific HR tools (in-service training, needs projections and staff planning, career plans, sectoral motivation strategies, job profiles etc.); (ii) the improvement of HR information systems, including an expansion of the coverage of the SIGASPE internally within the three ministries, the up-dating and computerization of personnel files and an upgrading of the

³¹ Fast Track Initiative Grant for Basic Education - P115264 ; Fast Track Initiative Grant II for Basic Education - P119413 ; Fast Track Initiative Grant III for Basic Education - P127166 .

³² The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see "Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa", African Commission, DOC/OS 47, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ZIM%20Principles_And_G.pdf>.

SIGASPE functionality, including its interfacing with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system (*Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé - DIAN*), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, (*Système D'Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents - SADINA*) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (*Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié - ALIAS*); (iii) the training of personnel in the human resource departments of each ministry and the further de-concentration of certain HR responsibilities; and (iv) the refinement and implementation of modern and merit-based civil servant performance management and promotion processes to further entrench a results-based focus in the public administration.

39. *Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation:* The Program will promote strengthened institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies. Emphasis will be placed upon: (i) strengthening the capacity of civil servant agents through in-service professional training (including managerial training in policy formulation, program budgeting, monitoring and evaluation), (ii) enhancing the systems and processes involved in policy planning, implementation and monitoring evaluation (including statistical systems, coordination and review mechanisms), (iii) improving the working environments of civil servants at the central and de-concentrated levels; and (iv) further developing the use of information and communication technology (ICT) (e-Government) to improve the efficiency of information management and dissemination.

40. *Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms:* The activities will assist the Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration (SPMA) in coordinating the implementation of the Program and the overall PSDMA. The activities make up a significant proportion of the Program Action Plan (see Annex 8 for details) and will seek to (i) improve the technical dimensions of the PSDMA and the formal rules and procedures governing the organization and management of the systems used to implement the Program; (ii) enhance the capacity and performance of the SPMA and sectoral focal points in each selected ministry; and (iii) address the fiduciary, social and environmental risks identified in the integrated risk assessment of the Program. The activities will also strengthen national *ex ante* control systems for fiduciary oversight with respect to the Program. The external audit institution, the Court of Accounts (*Cour des Comptes*), will be supported to effect external controls over the Program in the later years of implementation. The High State Control Authority (*Autorite Supérieure de Contrôle d'Etat - ASCE*) and the ministerial technical inspectorates will also be supported to strengthen the capacity for internal controls in the three ministries.

Program Financing

41. Program expenditures are estimated to total Euro 41 million and the implementation period is anticipated to be four years from 2016 to 2019. Program expenditures will finance a subset of activities in the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA, including activities which have been drawn from the three sector strategies to populate the Second Action Plan and which are directly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDOs. The Program expenditure amount represents the full cost of direct modernization efforts in the selected three ministries,

excluding wages and salaries as well as recurrent operating expenditures.³³ However the complementarity of Program expenditures on sectoral activities in the government’s budget makes the potential impact of the Program on sectoral outcomes greater in value than the estimated amount of Program expenditures. For example, the Program activities to achieve the results in the primary education sector complement the activities of the MENA financed through the government budget. As such, the achievement of 770 annual hours of instruction in primary public schools in the selected three regions requires resources that are traditionally allocated to MENA’s budget, such as teacher salaries, operating expenditures of schools as well as expenditures on educational materials. It is impossible to delineate the expenditures of sectoral ministries (i.e. MENA, MJDHPC) according to geographical allocation and cost out a proportion that are only related to the achievement of the Program objectives. Because of these difficulties the government share of Program financing presented below represents only the direct budgetary allocation of the government for the implementation of the PSDMA. It doesn’t include sectoral ministries’ budgetary allocations for service delivery in the selected areas of the Program. Accordingly, the Program Financing depicted in Table 2 below underrepresents the government’s contribution to the Program as the indirect contribution of the government for the achievement of the program development objectives cannot be captured.

Table 2: Program Financing (Euro Million)

Source	Amount	% of Total
Government	5,347,088	12.8
IBRD/IDA	35,800,000	87.2
Total Program Financing	41,147,088	100

42. The proposed operation would consist of a credit of EUR 35.8 million (US\$40 million equivalent) for Burkina Faso, to be made available upon effectiveness and disbursed on the basis of a withdrawal application upon achievement of DLIs. The credits will be financed under Single Currency IDA credit terms, with a 38-year maturity including a 6-year grace period. The single currency amounts (EUR 35,800,000) will be converted to the final SDR amounts (SDR 25,800,000) for commitment authority and country allocation management purposes on the day of project approval.

B. Program Development Objective/s

43. The proposed program development objective is to improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service.³⁴

³³ The Program (and PSDMA) aim to support institutional strengthening of the targeted ministries. In that sense, they finance activities for public sector modernization, which are mainly non-wage and salary expenditure. The salaries of the civil servants are not part of the PSDMA or the Program.

³⁴ The improvements are in the labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in the civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this Program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens.

C. Program Key Results and Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs)

44. **The results framework for the Program incorporates the three key results areas that are relevant to the achievement of each of the PDO level results.**³⁵ Five indicators have been selected to measure progress towards the PDO. These indicators capture the service standard improvements in the three ministries in selected regions that are expected to be achieved through enhanced human resource management capacity, strengthened institutional capacity for policy formulation and implementation and strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms. The core indicator on direct program beneficiaries is also included in the program results framework.

Table 3: Program Key Results Indicators

<i>Type</i>	<i>Objective</i>	<i>Indicator</i>
PDO Level Indicator 1	Improved management of entry and promotion of civil servants	Share of transactions in the civil service completed within a certain period: hiring and promotion within 28 calendar days (disaggregated by: recruitment and promotion)
PDO Level Indicator 2	Improved effectiveness and efficiency in private sector labor force inspections	Workers registered with the Social Security Fund (<i>Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale</i>)
PDO Level Indicator 3	Improved management of teaching time	Share of classes with at least 770 annual hours of instruction in public primary schools in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions
PDO Level Indicator 4	Improved efficiency in the delivery of judicial services	Share of judgments delivered in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions with respect to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • administrative law cases within 12 months • contentious matters³⁶ by the 50 pilot local departmental and district courts in conformity with relevant procedures

45. **The PDO service standard outcomes are each associated with a results chain or reform path which is clearly mapped through the Program’s results indicators.** Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs) are designed to provide incentives to each ministry for (i) either achieving progress along the reform paths that lead towards the attainment of the service standards that have been identified as PDO level results or (ii) actually achieving the PDO level results. The selection of specific DLIs reflects the assessment of critical challenges facing the public administration that are considered essential to the achievement of Program results through the reform paths. Moreover, they are important ingredients in the implementation of the PSDMA. The relationship between the PDO level results, their reform paths, the selected DLIs and intermediate indicators, the Program expenditures and the activities identified in the government’s Second Action Plan for the PSDMA is detailed in Annex 4 and Section 2 of the Technical Assessment.

³⁵ Each results area consists of a set of intermediate indicators that are necessary and sequential steps to achieve the PDO outcomes as defined by the PDO indicators. The results framework and monitoring arrangements are provided in Annex 2.

³⁶ Contentious matters are legally defined in Article 53 of loi 028-2004 portant modification de la loi 010/93 ADP, portant organisation judiciaire au Burkina Faso as the civil and commercial cases that are registered by a local court for which conciliation has failed and for which a hearing and an arbitrated decision of the local court are required.

Table 4: Disbursement-linked Indicators by Reform Path

Reform path 1: human resources management	Reform path 2: labor	Reform path 3: education	Reform path 4: justice
DLI 1: Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected human resources departments.	DLI 4 : Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security (<i>Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale</i>)	DLI 5: Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	DLI 7: Establishment of a uniform case tracking system in selected departmental and district courts.
DLI 2: Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (<i>engagement/ intégration</i>) and/or promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) completed within a 28 calendar-day period.		DLI 6: Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	DLI 8: Share of judgments issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso
DLI 3: Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31.			DLI 9: Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient’s rules and procedures

46. **The disbursement amounts associated with the DLIs**, the definition of the DLIs, the verification protocols and the basis for the calculation of disbursements are provided in Annex 3, and will be further detailed in the program operational manual (POM). The amount assigned to each DLI reflects the mutually reinforcing relationships between improved human resource management capacity, institutional strengthening and strengthening the implementation of the PSDMA.

D. Key Capacity Building and Systems Strengthening Activities

47. The Program envisages a more structured and systematic approach to developing the systems and capacity needed to enhance the performance of the public administration. Capacity building, for the purposes of the Program, is defined as a process by which the selected ministries will increase their ability to perform core functions and contribute to solving the development problems of the country in a sustainable manner. Due to the cross-cutting nature of the program design, the capacity building support envisaged by the Program will involve cross-cutting capacity development in a wide range of areas that are relevant to the administration generally. This will include training and coaching in human resource management, public policy making and implementation, program planning and budgeting, audit, ethics, fraud and corruption and monitoring and evaluation. It will also include efforts to strengthen various management

systems (human resources, IT, M&E systems). At the same time, capacity development will also be tailored to the needs of each ministry at the institutional and individual level to support the achievement of specific ministerial service standards.

III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements (*See Annex 1*)

48. The Permanent Secrétariat for the Modernisation of the Administration, as the designated coordinator of the PSDMA, will be the lead agency for the Program and act as the interlocutor with the Bank on behalf of the government. The SPMA will develop the Implementation Strategy for the PSDMA. The SPMA is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the activities that will produce the results targeted by the Program, in coordination with the Ministries of Education and Justice and other agencies (such as the Court of Accounts, the ASCE and the ministerial technical inspectorates). The SPMA is also directly responsible for activities identified under Results Area three of the Program. These responsibilities are detailed in Annex 1.

49. The World Bank will disburse funds based on the submission of consolidated, verified information on the performance of the DLIs.

B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation

50. The Results Framework (Annex 2) is the basis of the Program which will guide implementation and SPMA support to the participating ministries to assist them in achieving progress. It is made up of the PDO indicators and intermediate level indicators, some of which are DLIs. Each indicator has annual targets and a protocol for verification and assessment of progress. Monitoring of the indicators in the results framework will be conducted annually during the program implementation period for both DLIs and non-DLIs. This will ensure effective tracking of progress so that corrective measures can be taken to ensure the achievement of DLIs.

51. The Program will not use a dedicated/stand-alone M&E system. The M&E function will be assumed by the SPMA which has the overall coordination and responsibility for M&E for the PSDMA and the Program. The SPMA will coordinate with the ASCE as regards verification of DLIs.³⁷ Currently the M&E capacity of the SPMA to monitor the implementation of the PSDMA is weak. To address these weaknesses, two M&E specialists will be hired to fill the capacity gap

³⁷ The ASCE was selected as verification agency to verify Program results, which will be done in accordance with the verification protocol. This choice is based on ASCE's role as a constitutional body with both the independence and the mandate to conduct audits of the ministries. ASCE comprises 21 internal auditors and has progressively introduced a risk-based approach, starting with the risk mapping of key ministries including civil service, justice and education which are part of this Program. ASCE is also adding value to the Program by improving internal control environment in the targeted ministries. ASCE will coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations.

and a review of the PSDMA results will be conducted as part of the PSDMA Second Action Plan expenditure program.

52. During implementation, the SPMA will provide continuous supervision of Program implementation and will closely support the participating ministries to meet their monitoring and reporting obligations under the Program. The World Bank will also provide implementation support to SPMA and the participating ministries on all aspects of implementation, monitoring, and reporting as outlined in the implementation support plan (Annex 9), including supporting the SPMA in the verification aspects of its mandate and its relationship with ASCE.

C. Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols (*See Annex 3*)

53. Once satisfied with the accuracy of the reporting, the SPMA will present annually by May 30, evidence of the DLI achievement (covering the period of January 1 to December 31 of the previous year)³⁸ to the ASCE, which will verify the results by no later than June 30 each year in the form of the program results verification report. In order to validate the disbursement request submitted by the SPMA, the ASCE will verify all DLI target indicators through both a desk review and physical inspection of all sub-projects under the Program. These verified results will accompany any disbursement request to the World Bank by the MEF, which is expected to be submitted once a year (June of each year).

Baseline and Verification

54. While baselines are drawn from existing data within the participating ministries and the SPMA, an assessment will be undertaken by the ASCE to validate the baseline information of all DLIs during the first year of the implementation.

55. Results will be verified according to the verification protocols which may include financial audit, procedural verification, and physical inspection that test the accuracy and quality of the results claimed. In accordance with good audit practice, physical verification will take place against a sampling framework and frequency. The level of calibration will be detailed in the verification protocol. On this basis, a program results verification report will be prepared to be shared with the SPMA and the World Bank. The program results verification report will be used to determine the amount of the eligible disbursement based on the results achieved. If the World Bank finds that the disbursement request meets the terms of the Financing Agreement, the corresponding funds will be disbursed to the MEF.

Advances

56. The government has informed the World Bank that advances will be needed to provide the participating ministries with sufficient liquidity to begin sub-project implementation. Advances up to 25 percent of the total IDA credit can be made by the World Bank to the MEF. After consulting with the participating ministries, the SPMA and MEF will jointly determine how much of an advance will be requested, within the 25 percent limit. When the DLIs are achieved, the amount of the advance will be recovered. The advance amount recovered by the

³⁸ For education DLIs (DLI 3.1) school year runs October 1 to June 30.

World Bank is then available for additional advances (“revolving advance”). The World Bank requires that the government refund any advances (or portion of advances) if the DLIs have not been met (or have been only partially met) by the closing date, promptly upon notice thereof by the World Bank.

57. The SPMA shall prepare Program consolidated financial statements annually. The Program report will include consolidated financial statements that will cover all Program activities, expenditures and sources of funds, in accordance with the applicable international public sector accounting standards (IPSAS). Each ministry will prepare the financial statements for the Program component implemented by the ministry and submit it to the SPMA for consolidation and audit. The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), the Court of Accounts, will audit the consolidated Program financial statements. The Program Audit Report and audited consolidated Program financial statements shall be submitted to the World Bank within nine months after the end of the financial year.

Assessment of Achievement

Achievement of the DLIs will be assessed according to the data sources and methodologies outlined in the verification protocol at the date of assessment. The assessment will determine whether the target of the DLI has been achieved. For non-scalable DLIs, the achievement is assessed as ‘Achieved’ if the verification determines a ‘Yes’ and ‘Not Achieved’ if the verification determines a ‘No’. For scalable DLIs the achievement will be expressed in percentages and proportional disbursement will be made according to disbursement tables in the footnote of the Annex 3 Bank Disbursement Table. If the achievement of a scalable DLI is less than the previous year, no disbursement will be made in that year.

Program Reconciliation

58. Although PforR operations do not link disbursements to individual expenditure transactions, the aggregate disbursements under such operations should not exceed the total expenditures by the Recipient under the Program over its implementation period. The World Bank will ensure that the amount of IDA financing disbursed does not exceed the total amount of expenditures under the Program, taking into account contributions from other financing sources (including any other IDA/IBRD credits/loans). If, by Program completion, IDA financing disbursed exceeds the total amount of Program expenditures, the Government is required to refund the difference to the World Bank with this amount subsequently being cancelled.

IV. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

A. Technical

59. **The assessment concludes that the proposed sub-projects are technically appropriate to achieve the global indicators of the Program.** The summarized findings of the technical assessment are included in Annex 4.

60. **The Government has demonstrated a clear commitment to reforming the public administration.** As a reflection of its strategic importance, the steering of the PSDMA is anchored at the highest level of governmental authority, in the Prime Minister's Office.

61. **The PSDMA is strategically relevant.** As in all countries, the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in Burkina is pivotal to the success of development efforts. In Burkina, notwithstanding relatively high economic growth rates in the last decade and increasing investments in service delivery, inefficiencies in the public service and low levels of productivity have resulted in poor development outcomes and growing public dissatisfaction with the government. The PSDMA is at the heart of the government's efforts to reform the public sector to achieve better service delivery. The premise of the PSDMA is that an efficient and effective public administration is a prerequisite for good public service delivery. The PSDMA aims to improve the administrative capacity of ministries to increase the development impact of their activities. Accordingly, the government's effort to modernize the public administration system is firmly rooted in the country's broader development strategy and constitutes a critical element of the World Bank's Country Partnership Strategy's focus on public sector governance. The PSDMA also represents a cornerstone for the successful implementation of the government's sector strategies.

62. **In terms of technical soundness, the PSDMA and the selected sectoral strategies have been appropriately designed to achieve their development objectives through mutually reinforcing reform initiatives.** The PSDMA was developed following extensive consultations with stakeholders and support from development partners, including the World Bank and the UNDP. It is also based upon a series of background studies and surveys targeting beneficiaries of public services. The PSDMA recognizes that the most critical and difficult part of public sector reform relates to changes in behavior and organizational culture. It identifies organizational, operational and behavioral dysfunctions of the Burkinabe public administration system and establishes broad-based policy objectives and general results that are applicable across public sector institutions. The sectoral strategies for each of the three ministries selected are aligned with the PSDMA. The critical implementation challenge is to ensure that the PSDMA and sectoral strategies are coordinated in a results-focused manner. The Program seeks to support the government in tackling this challenge.

63. **The Program is structured to provide the necessary vertical incentives to encourage the selected ministries to achieve measurable improvements in sectoral service standards through the implementation of cross-cutting PSDMA reforms.** The Program will support the implementation of the government's public sector modernization strategic plan in three ministries by leveraging new resources and apportioning responsibility to individual ministries through targeted results. Particular emphasis will be placed on strengthening the institutional capacity of the SPMA and participating ministries to coordinate reform efforts across ministries.

64. **International experience.** The interventions supported by the Program draw upon lessons learned from international experience and previous World Bank and donor projects,

including those developed in Burkina Faso.³⁹ Longstanding engagement on public sector reform in Burkina Faso has provided the motivation for the Program.

65. **Sustainability.** In compliance with the WAEMU directives, the Government has introduced a global Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as well as sectoral MTEFs in several pilot ministries, including those supported through the Program. The Program’s expenditure framework will be anchored in the national budget programming process. The Program will also rely upon country systems for complaints handling and internal and external controls.

66. **M&E Capacity.** Lack of baseline data on the PSDMA results and the weakness of the information management system represent major concerns for the implementation of the Program. The Program Action Plan (Annex 8) incorporates several activities to address these shortcomings. Program interventions will focus on building M&E systems in the SPMA and participating ministries. The Program will provide technical assistance to implementing ministries, to either support the use of existing monitoring systems or to develop new systems for monitoring Program results. Each ministry will provide dedicated staff and resources to ensure that the indicators are effectively monitored according to an agreed monitoring method and plan. Additionally, the SPMA will be responsible to ensure that each implementing ministry meets its monitoring requirements and makes adequate progress.

67. **Economic analysis.** The economic impact of the proposed Program is expected to be positive. The Program seeks to modernize the public administration, with the aim of improving the administration’s human resource management practices and service delivery standards in selected areas. While efficiency gains from improved services in human resource management can be estimated by using proxies, the improvements in service standards in the justice sector do not easily translate into monetary terms. Moreover, the transversal nature of reforms in policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and the fact that these reforms are implemented alongside sectoral strategies make it difficult to attribute the expected outcomes to a single intervention. Despite these difficulties, and based on certain assumptions, the expected impact of the proposed interventions is positive. The analysis assumes an exchange rate of FCFA 500 per US dollar and a 5 percent discount rate. The overall benefit is valued to be an estimated US\$56,091,515 to US\$72,734,040.

Table 5: Overall Benefits of the Program

Reform Path 1/Cost savings from efficiency gains	US\$13,075,626
Reform Path 2/Increase in contributions to CNSS	US\$4,933,932 – 14,801,795
Reform Path 3/Increase in efficiency	US\$7,280,000 – 14,560,000
Reform Path 4/Savings from social spending	US\$30,296,619
Total	US\$56,091,515 – 72,734,040

³⁹ An overview of the lessons learned is contained in Table 2 of the Technical Assessment summary in Annex 4.

B. Fiduciary

68. An integrated fiduciary systems assessment has been undertaken that incorporates financial management, procurement and governance issues (with a focus on anti-corruption). The assessment concludes that there is reasonable assurance that Burkina's financial management systems for the Program (planning, budgeting, accounting, internal controls, funds flow, financial reporting, and auditing arrangements) will ensure appropriate use of Program funds and will safeguard Program assets. The Government has requested to use a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (*Compte d'Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor*— CAST)⁴⁰ in order to achieve a smooth implementation of the Program. In addition, the assessment recommends appointment of a resident financial and public procurement controller to SPMA who is fully dedicated to the Program to ensure timely fiduciary controls.

69. *Financial Management.* The PFM systems and institutions have been assessed as sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the financing under the Program will be used for intended purposes, with due regard to the principles of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. PFM systems in Burkina Faso have undergone positive changes, as evidenced by the high Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) and CPIA scores; however the low rate of capital budget execution and delays and duplication in the control of transactions represent ongoing weaknesses.⁴¹ The design of the Program relies on the existing financial management systems and institutions in Burkina Faso. Additional measures have been built into the Program design to mitigate the risks associated with cash rationing and slow budget execution.

70. The defined program expenditures are directly linked to reform activities. Therefore recurrent expenditures such as salaries and operating costs which would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts are not included in the Expenditure Framework. The Program will finance the implementation of a subset of activities within the PSDMA's Second Action Plan in three ministries. The estimated financing needed for the Second Action Plan is Euro 53,108,763 (US\$59,339,400)—(Table A.4.2), while total secured financing amounts to Euro 41,147,088 (US\$45,974,400). The Program financing will be Euro 35,800,000, which is 87 percent of the total secured financing. The share of government financing is 13 percent of the total secured amount (Euro 5,347,088). The government has presented the Second Action Plan to other development partners to raise the additional funding required; there is no firm commitment from other development partners yet.

71. The MFPTSS is the main stakeholder responsible for coordinating the implementation of Program reforms with the sectoral line ministries. The SPMA is the lead implementation agency for the Program. The MEF is the primary government institution responsible for the elaboration and execution of the budget and as such has a central role to play in achieving the Program

⁴⁰ The CAST is provided for under the Organic Finance Law and is already used by the Government for sectoral budget support provided by other donors. It has been chosen for this Program to facilitate the monitoring of Program resources and their related expenditures in the national budget and carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, to avoid delays in the implementation of activities.

⁴¹ Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries, 2013.

results in terms of releasing funds and elaborating the standards and processes for program financial management.

72. The ASCE will assume the overall internal audit function of the Program and coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations. The program action plan includes support for capacity building and for the strengthening of the internal audit function.

73. The Program financial statements will be audited by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), the Court of Accounts. If the SAI faces audit backlog and capacity constraints, a private external auditor will be hired under the supervision of the SAI. The audited Program financial statements will be sent to the Bank no later than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. The capacity and performance of the Court of Accounts will be reassessed during the mid-term review of the Program. The Program Action Plan includes support for the restructuring and strengthening of the Court of Accounts.

74. *Procurement.* Procurement activities to be undertaken in the Program are modest and consist of: (a) small works of rehabilitation and new constructions; (b) IT and other equipment and (c) consultant services for some studies and development of training tools.

75. The procurement planning process is well managed in Burkina. As part of the annual budget preparation process, ministries draft a procurement plan which is joined to their budget. Once the budget is approved by the National Assembly, ministries finalize procurement plans and send them for publication to the General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (*Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers* - DGCMEF). The assessment of the national procurement system conducted by the Bank in 2009 for the Piloting the Use of the Country System Report found the following aspects of the system to be particularly strong: (i) the start of the procurement process when sufficient budgetary allocations are made for the duration of the contract execution and (ii) the existence of a computerized expenditure circuit (*Circuit Intégré de la Dépense* - CID).

76. The following measures are recommended to strengthen the Program procurement environment: (a) nomination of experienced procurement specialists to the SPMA and (b) establishing deadlines to be respected in the procurement process and using them as indicators to evaluate performance. This last measure will help to identify the different bottlenecks and address them effectively during the lifetime of the Program.

77. *Fraud and Corruption.* The Bank has several large ongoing engagements in Burkina Faso and the country's financial management systems are deemed to be satisfactory in mitigating fraud and corruption risks. An assessment of the legal and institutional framework for anti-corruption together with the effectiveness of country systems for tackling fraud and corruption was undertaken as part of the Program's Technical Assessment – a summary of which is included in Annex 4. The assessment concluded that while levels of corruption remain high, the institutional and legal framework for tackling corruption is progressively improving and existing government commitment to addressing corruption is high.

78. The Borrower will implement the Program in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Corruption Guidelines (ACG) applicable to PforR operations. The ASCE will be the government's focal office for the purposes of ACG application. The modalities for implementing the ACG are detailed in Annex 5.

79. *Complaints Handling and Grievance Redress.* Citizens' complaints and grievances pertaining to the Program will be coordinated and addressed by the Ombudsman, the *Médiateur du Faso* (the Ombudsman) and the ASCE, using the grievance redress systems and administrative structures of these institutions. Full details of the role of each institution are provided in the Program Technical Assessment. Through focal points established at the local level and regional delegations, the *Mediateur* will be responsible for (i) receiving & responding to, and resolving complaints pertaining to rules, procedures and unfair treatments under the Program; (ii) forwarding all complaints related to fraud and corruption to the ASCE in accordance with the terms defined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and Grievance Redress Manual of the Program; and (iii) maintaining the register of complaints, preparing reports annually on grievance redress activities specifically for the project. Technical support will be provided to the *Médiateur* to support the implementation of key aspects of the *Médiateur's* action plan to improve capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points for communes. The ASCE's role in the grievance redress process will consist of receiving complaints on fraud and corruption, not only from the *Médiateur*, but also directly from citizens through its normal processes and taking steps to investigate and take action in accordance with its operation manual, regulations and the terms of the MoU.

80. The existing country grievance redress systems have been assessed as functioning reasonably well (for a detailed assessment, refer to Annex 5). The *Médiateur du Faso* is a classical, single-purpose, complaint handling body, with relatively strong capacity at the center and weak decentralized units in the regions. The ASCE is legally mandated to investigate corruption cases and refer substantiated cases either to the prosecutor's office for criminal acts or to the relevant Ministries and public institutions for administrative breaches. Though investigative capacity needs to be strengthened and sanctions need to be followed through, the ASCE is assessed as having demonstrated relatively strong ability to perform its legal mandates.

81. A memorandum of understating will be signed between the *Mediateur* and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two focal institutions in handling complaints and mismanagement of the Program funds. The MoU will provide institutional and operational guidelines for compliance with the Bank's governance and anti-corruption requirements on respecting the Bank debarment list, transparent reporting and effective handling of grievances, including fraud and corruption allegations.

82. With the support of the Program, a communications strategy will be developed to promote awareness of citizens on the proposed Grievance Redress Mechanism and technical support will be provided to the *Médiateur du Faso* to improve capacity of its regional offices and appointment of focal points for communes.

C. Environmental and Social Effects

83. In accordance with the requirements of OP 9:00, *Program-for-Results Financing*, a comprehensive technical assessment (Environmental and Social Systems Assessment – ESSA) was conducted to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the Program’s Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) with a view to assessing the adequacy of the ESMS for PforR financing and identifying key actions to improve the environmental and social management performance of the Program. A summary of the objectives, methodology and findings of the assessment is included in Annex 6.

84. The ESSA was conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders. During the preparation of the ESSA two consultation workshops were organized in June and August 2014. The final ESSA was validated during the national validation workshop on April 7, 2015 and was disclosed in the Infoshop on April 29, 2015. The objectives of the ESSA are to : (i) verify that the potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Program are subject to an adequate initial screening, (ii) ensure that environmental and social mitigation measures to avoid, minimize, offset, and/or compensate any adverse impacts and promote environmental and social sustainability will be applied to activities that will have potential environmental and social negative impacts; and (iii) identify suitable measures to strengthen the ESMS for inclusion in the program action plan.

85. To date, two key social risks have been assessed:

- a. *Involuntary land acquisition*: Some building construction and rehabilitation are planned under the Program. Though the government plans to mobilize and use only public land, the ESSA considers potential impacts in terms of loss of revenues, habitats and sources of revenues, in particular in rural areas where land titling is not systematic and customary laws are still practiced.
- b. *Gender and inclusion*: The Program is gender informed and there are no major gender and inclusion risks deriving directly from the implementation of the program activities. However, the ESSA considers a few potential indirect impacts due to inherent system weaknesses, including: (i) insufficient representation of female civil servants in particular in management positions in rural areas; (ii) limited access of beneficiaries to administrative services due to lack of adequate communication and transport material and staffing; and (iii) limited physical accessibility of buildings for handicapped persons.

86. The ESSA concludes that the Program ESMS is adequate for PforR financing and that the activities to be funded under the Program should, by their nature, characteristics and size, generate low-to-moderate social impact and generally bring beneficial and positive social impact. The national project screening system in place provides adequate mitigation measures in the case of minor infrastructure and rehabilitation activities. The ESSA further concludes that, subject to the adoption of the recommendations outlined below, the ESMS is appropriately equipped with the necessary tools and processes to identify, mitigate, and report on possible social impacts of Program activities. Accordingly, it finds that the risk of negative social impacts is addressed through the relevant ESMS provisions and operational procedures (subject to the incorporation of Bank recommendations).

87. The overall recommendation of the ESSA is that the ESMS needs to:
- a. reinforce coordination and harmonization between relevant administrative stakeholders in rural areas in terms of land administration and procedures,
 - b. avoid and/or minimize resettlement of people,
 - c. take into account informal occupants/squatters (this point is still under review),
 - d. include monitoring and evaluation processes in case of resettlement,
 - e. prepare a positive discrimination mechanism in teacher hiring to give priority to female teachers.
88. Specific recommendations include the need to:
- a. develop monitoring processes and tools (screening sheets, compensation mechanisms and other relevant documentation included in the ESSA),
 - b. establish institutional mechanisms (focal person at central and local levels in charge of monitoring social related impacts and mitigation measures),
 - c. for gender and inclusion, include accessibility structures (ramps) in planning and construction of buildings financed under the Program and raise gender awareness amongst civil servants for better service delivery.
89. The Bank has agreed with the Borrower on the above recommendations which have been built into the program action plan. The Bank team will work closely with the Borrower throughout the implementation support period to assist toward the effective implementation and completion of any agreed actions to improve and strengthen the ESMS. Based on the climate and disaster risk screening, there is no potential negative impact of the Program activities.
90. Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected as a result of a Bank supported PforR operation, as defined by the applicable policy and procedures, may submit complaints to the existing program grievance redress mechanism or the WB's Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address pertinent concerns. Affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the WB's independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of WB non-compliance with its policies and procedures. Complaints may be submitted at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and Bank Management has been given an opportunity to respond. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank's corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS), please visit <http://www.worldbank.org/GRS>. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit www.inspectionpanel.org.

D. Integrated Risk Assessment Summary

1. Integrated Risk Assessment Summary

Risk	Rating
Technical	Moderate
Fiduciary	Moderate

Environmental and Social	Moderate
Disbursement Linked Indicator	Moderate
Other	
Overall Risk	Moderate

2. Risk Rating Explanation

91. A detailed technical assessment of the Program, including a risk assessment was undertaken during the preparation of the Program (see Annex 4 for a summary). The overall implementation risk is considered moderate. The technical risk has been assessed as moderate because of weak coordination capacity of the SPMA and limited implementation capacity in the participating ministries. The proposed interventions are not technically complex, but the implementation of Program activities require strong coordination between ministries and their deconcentrated offices. Appropriate mitigation actions have been identified to minimize these risks and are described in Annex 7. The proposed institutional arrangements aim at facilitating such coordination and provide leadership to the overall reform effort through the third result area. The Bank will work closely with the government to monitor implementation and progress.

E. Program Action Plan

92. A number of assessments (technical, integrated fiduciary systems, environmental, and social) have been undertaken to assess the capacity of the Program’s implementing agencies and to identify gaps that may require action. The critical actions necessary for enhancing Program systems and mitigating risks have been included in the program action plan (Annex 8).

Annex 1: Detailed Program Description

The Government's Reform Program

1. **Burkina Faso's past attempts at public sector reforms have not led to significant improvements in public sector/governance and service delivery outcomes** (see Table A.1.2). Over the years, public sector inefficiencies have resulted in poor social outcomes and low execution rates for sectoral budgets. In terms of the quality and professionalism of the public administration, Burkina Faso scores lower than other countries in the region (Ghana and Senegal) and lower than both the averages for Sub-Saharan African countries and low income countries according to the Global Integrity Indicators. At the same time, weaknesses in public sector management, particularly in the justice sector, have created an impediment to private sector investments. The Doing Business and Enterprise Survey indicators highlight public sector inefficiencies in the country, notably with respect to judicial performance.

2. **The PSDMA represents the government's vision for public sector modernization as a vehicle for achieving the country's development goals.** The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. It aims to (i) bring the government closer to the people; (ii) share resources more equitably between the center and localities; (iii) establish a culture of results and accountability for results in the public administration; (iv) allocate resources for socio-economic development of the Burkinabe society according to national priorities; and (v) create favorable conditions for the participation of all stakeholders in decision making.

3. **The PSDMA focuses on strengthening public sector management and creating a modern operating environment for improved public service delivery.** Details of the logical framework are presented in the Technical Assessment document of the Program. The strategic plan consists of five pillars:

Pillar No 1: Improving the Efficiency and the Quality of Public Service Delivery: The objective of this pillar is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration. The pillar strives to (i) improve the performance and productivity of the administration; (ii) improve the satisfaction of public service users; (iii) streamline public administration structures and procedures; and (iv) introduce new approaches, methods and procedures to the public administration.

Pillar No 2: Upgrading and Improving Human Resource Capacity of Public Administration: The purpose of the second pillar is to focus on human resource capacity framework and improve staff working conditions which are affected by outdated equipment and physical infrastructure. This pillar focuses on two issues: (i) improving operational and human resources capacities and (ii) strengthening the administration's capacity for human resource policy development.

Pillar No 3: Promotion of Accessibility and Transparency in the Public Administration: The objective of the third pillar is to improve access to services and to establish the principle of accountability across the entire public administration. It aims to develop mechanisms for civil servants to be more effective and to be at the service of

clients/citizens. The pillar targets improving accessibility and transparency of the public administration.

Pillar No 4: Promotion of E-governance: The fourth pillar seeks to improve the quality of public services through the use of ICT. It aims to increase the ICT capacities of the administration by promoting the use of ICT tools and online services.

Pillar 5: Promotion of Deconcentration and Decentralization: The fifth pillar envisages the deconcentration of the central ministries for an effective decentralization in favor of local development. It aims to address local governance capacity and inadequate delegation of power from the center to deconcentrated units. The strategy plans to promote deconcentration and decentralization by strengthening the capacities of decentralized services to enable them to be able to effectively support the implementation of the decentralization process.

4. The effective alignment and coordination of sector strategies around the PSDMA is critical to ensuring consistency across the Burkinabe public administration and to bridging the gap between public sector reform and public service delivery in order to improve service standards. The PSDMA is a unifying framework that identifies cross-cutting reforms that are applicable horizontally across the entire administration. It provides the foundations for the development and implementation of sectoral reform strategies in Burkina Faso, including the following sector strategies which are specifically relevant to the Program:

- Civil Service and Labor Sectors: *The Strategy for Strengthened Capacity in the Ministry of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (Stratégie de Renforcement des Capacités du Ministère de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de la Sécurité Sociale (MFPTSS) 2014-2025)*, was recently adopted as the long term strategic vision of the MFPTSS. The objective of the strategy is to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of the public administration to ensure decent working conditions for all workers, including civil servants, by 2025.
- Justice Sector: *The National Justice Sector Policy (Politique Nationale de Justice 2010-2019)* reflects the government's justice sector priorities. The main objectives of the PNJ are to (i) improve the performance of the justice sector by reinforcing its capacities, (ii) promote access to justice by reducing the obstacles faced by users, and (iii) reinforce and reaffirm the rights and liberties of citizens. The policy was revised in 2013 to enhance its alignment with the PSDMA.
- Education sector: *The Sectoral Program of Education and Training (Programme Sectoriel de l'Éducation et de la Formation 2012-2021--PSEF)* articulates the government's vision for the entire education sector and incorporates the sub-sector strategies for preschool, primary, primary non-formal, post-primary and vocational training. The objective of the PSEF is to achieve an efficient and inclusive education system by 2021 whereby all citizens have the educational opportunities to enable them to contribute to the socio economic development of the country. It is based on the following basic principles: (i) free basic education; (ii) increasing the linkages between formal and informal education; (iii) skills development; (iv) improving the relevance of skills development; (v) development of national languages and their inclusion in the new

curricula; (vi) improving the legal framework of education and training system; (vii) optimum mobilization of domestic and external resources; and good governance.

5. **The implementation of the PSDMA is guided by action plans.** The PSDMA started with the First Action Plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013. Inadequacies in the prioritization of activities and the linkages between sector strategies and the PSDMA, together with limited resources, including development partner support, slowed the pace of implementation over this period. A Second Action Plan has recently been developed and approved by the Transitional Government to guide the implementation of the PSDMA over the next four years covering the period of 2015 to 2018. The objective of the Second Action Plan is to strengthen public management to improve service standards within the administration.

Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program

6. **The Public Sector Modernization Program (Program for Results) is a results-based approach to supporting the implementation of the PSDMA's Second Action Plan in three ministries.** The Program is designed to support the government with the implementation of the PSDMA and to improve coordination between the PSDMA's national public sector modernization objectives and sectoral reform efforts in the Ministries of Civil Service, Labor and Social Security (MFPTSS), National Education and Literacy (MENA) and Justice (MJPDHC). The program expenditure framework is designed to finance a subset of activities in the Second Action Plan to achieve service standard improvements along reform paths in each of these sectors.

7. **The proposed Program Development Objective is to improve selected service standards in the selected regions of the ministries responsible for civil service, labor, primary education and justice.**⁴² The Program will provide incentives for the achievement of specific, measurable and strategically significant service standards in each of the selected ministries resulting from the targeted implementation of the PSDMA. In doing so, the Program will focus on strengthening the nexus between cross-cutting public sector management reform and tangible service delivery results in particular sectors. It will contribute to both the achievement of targeted results in each of the three ministries and systemic improvements to the quality of the public administration as a whole. The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting results areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms.

8. **The Program will cover discrete elements of the Government's PSDMA expenditure program.** Table A.1.1 below presents the pillars of the PSDMA and the sub-programs (and examples of activities) envisaged in the Second Action Plan and their linkages with the results areas (and examples of activities) covered by the Program. The full scope of the PSDMA Second

⁴² The improvements are in labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens.

Action Plan expenditure program and the Program's coverage of expenditures through the results areas are further detailed in the Technical Assessment of the Program.

The Program's three results areas incorporate the following PSDMA activities (further details of Program activities are included in Table A.1.1 below):

9. Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance: Under results area one, the Program will support the MFPTSS in leading efforts to modernize and harmonize human resource management processes and to strengthen the capacity of the de-concentrated HR departments in the relevant ministries. This results area will support three kinds of activities:

1. It will support capacity development of personnel in the human resource departments of each ministry. It will also assist the selected ministries in elaborating human resource management tools to better motivate and build the capacity of personnel. The tools will include in-service training needs projections and plans, career plans, sectoral motivation strategies, job profiles etc.
2. The Program will support efforts to consolidate and improve the existing, functional HR information systems. It will facilitate an expansion of the coverage of the civil service information system (SIGASPE) internally within the three ministries, the up-dating and computerization of personnel files and an upgrading of the SIGASPE functionality, including its interfacing with other information systems, such as the Individual Employee File system (*Dossier Individuel des Achevé Numérisé*, DIAN), the Employee Access to Employment Files system, (*Système D'Access Dossiers Individuel Numérisé des Agents*, SADINA) and the On-line Pay and Civil Service Employment Administration system (*Access en Ligne Information Administratif et Salarié*, ALIAS).
3. It will support the refinement and improved application of performance evaluation processes in the three ministries, as a foundation for the shift to modern and merit-based civil servant performance management and promotion processes to further entrench a results-based focus in the public administration. These activities are expected to improve the efficiency of human resource management in the selected ministries and create the necessary conditions and incentives for civil servants to perform better.

10. Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation: The Program will promote improvements in the institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies. This results area will have three principal points of focus:

1. First it will support the ongoing in-service professional training of mid to senior level bureaucrats to strengthen their managerial and technical capacities with respect to policy formulation, program budgeting and monitoring and evaluation.
2. Second, the Program will support the government in strengthening the systems and processes used by ministries in policy planning, implementation and monitoring evaluation. In particular, it will focus on activities that are relevant to the attainment of

the service standard results identified for each ministry.⁴³ Accordingly, it will facilitate improvements in statistical systems, communication and sectoral mechanisms for coordination, reporting and review.

3. Third, the Program will focus on expenditures to improve the working environments of civil servants at the central and de-concentrated levels. This will include rehabilitation of administrative and court facilities and provision of office, communication and transportation equipment.

11. Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms: The institutional coordination failures and successes of earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso served as a valuable lesson for the design of the third results area. Limitations in the design of the technical aspects of the PSDMA, capacity constraints in the SPMA to effectively coordinate the PSDMA program,⁴⁴ as well as insufficiencies in the steering function the National Public Administration Modernization Committee impacted upon the implementation of the First Action Plan of the PSDMA. The Third Results Area supports the government’s expenditure program and Program Action Plan (PAP) activities to assist the Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Public Administration (*Secrétariat Permanent de la Modernisation de l’Administration—SPMA*) in coordinating the implementation of the Program and the overall PSDMA. Activities will cover the following:

1. Improve the technical dimensions of the PSDMA as well as the formal rules and procedures governing the organization and management of the systems for the implementation of the Program.
2. Strengthen particular functions (monitoring and evaluation, reporting, information management) of (i) the SPMA (ii) the focal points established in each of the selected ministries and (iii) the National Public Administration Modernization Committee in the Prime Minister’s Office. These activities will also help the Government address the fiduciary, social and environmental risks identified in the integrated risk assessment of the Program. The majority of these activities are also included in the Program Action Plan (PAP).
3. Enhance national internal and external control systems to strengthen fiduciary oversight with respect to the Program. The external audit institution--*Cour des Comptes*—will be supported to effect external controls over the Program. The High State Control Authority (*Autorite Supérieure de Contrôle d’Etat—ASCE*) and the ministerial technical inspectorates will also be supported to strengthen the capacity for internal controls in the three ministries. The *Mediateur du Faso* will be supported in strengthening the existing country systems for complaints handling.

Implementation Arrangements

12. The Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Administration (*le Secrétariat Permanent de la Modernisation de l’Administration--SPMA*) will be responsible for the day-to-

⁴³ For example, with respect to labor inspections, the Program will support the MFPTSS to improve the system for risk-based targeting of enterprises for inspection.

⁴⁴ As identified in decree no 2011-1138/MFPTSS/CAB/SP-MA

day management of program activities, facilitating coordination across ministries, monitoring results and generating performance and financial reports on Program implementation. The SPMA as the designated coordinator of the PSDMA,⁴⁵ will be the lead agency for the Program and act as the interlocutor with the Bank on behalf of the Government. The SPMA is also directly responsible for activities identified under results area three of the Program.

13. The Program will have three implementing agencies—the ministries of Civil Service (MFPTSS), Education (MENA) and Justice (MJPDHC). These ministries will work with their deconcentrated structures to implement the Program activities in the regions. The Program implementing agencies will be directly responsible for the technical quality of implementation and for fiduciary management. Other agencies (such as the external audit institution—*Cour des Comptes*, the High State Control Authority—*Autorite Superieure de Controle d'Etat*—ASCE, and the ministerial technical inspectorates) will play complementary roles in accordance with their current functions.

Coordination Arrangements

14. The overall oversight responsibility of the Program is with the National Public Administration Modernization Committee. However, the SPMA will be spearheading the program implementation and ensuring the achievement of the results. It will ensure that the Program is implemented according to the program operations manual. A program coordination committee will be established under the leadership of the SPMA and with the participation of DGESSs of the three ministries. The program coordination committee will ensure strong coordination of issues on planning, allocations, flow of funds and approval of results. There will be a technical sub-committee in each of the three ministries to coordinate the implementation of program activities in their ministries.

⁴⁵ The SPMA will also develop the Implementation Strategy for the PSDMA.

Table A.1.1: Scope of Government and Program Expenditures

Scope of PSDMA Second Action Plan and examples of activities		Scope of Program and examples of activities
Pillar 1 IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY AND THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY	Sub-Program 1 Promoting Greater Performance in the Public Administration	Results Areas 1 and 2
	Adaptation of personal evaluation and grading system for the public administration: - Computerization of evaluation process; training; MFPTSS controls over ministerial evaluations	Adaptation of personal evaluation and grading system for the public administration: - Computerization of evaluation process in selected ministries - Training on performance evaluation in selected ministries - MFPTSS controls over selected ministerial evaluations - Analysis of performance of evaluation of magistrates, revision of evaluation criteria and training
	Rational utilization of human resources: - Global and ministerial human resource audits; review civil service recruitment processes and timeframes; initial civil servant training; procedural changes to enhance efficiency of recruit transfers to Ministries	Organize timely recruitment of teachers: - Establish and monitor deadlines for recruitment milestones, establish dedicated interministerial team, acquisition of supplies and equipment, verification of teacher placement in classrooms and availability of pedagogical material Define and apply staffing norms (number of magistrates per court) to selected jurisdictions Extend coverage of biometric enrollment of civil servants: - Acquire information system license, develop operating guide, purchase of equipment for controls (vehicles etc).
	Elaboration and implementation of total quality control in the public administration - Elaboration of service quality charters - Sectoral reviews of adherence to charters	
	Enforcing service hours and regulations dealing with absenteeism - Conduct global study on service hours and apply recommendations	- Develop and implement teacher time on task monitoring mechanism in selected regions
	Sub-Program 2: Streamlining Decision-making Processes, Procedures and Structures in the Public Administration	Results Areas 1 and 2
	Improve institutional and legal frameworks governing the Administration - Support ministries with the elaboration of new laws and decrees on organizational structures and processes	Feasibility study for adopting an Administrative Appeals Court – Ministry of Justice
	Elaboration of public administration manuals : - Develop guide for elaborating manuals, elaborate procedural manuals; sensitization and training	Elaboration of public administration manuals : - Develop guide for elaborating manuals, elaborate procedural manuals in selected ministries; sensitization on procedural manuals adopted in selected ministries

	Implementation of an administrative organizational system with well-defined structures and competences - review of existing ministerial organigrams and development of standardized departmental organigrams	
	Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Programming: - Elaboration and revision of sectoral strategies, action plans, budget programs, training	Strategic Planning, Budgeting and Programming: - Elaboration and revision of sectoral strategies, action plans, budget programs, training in selected ministries
Pillar 2 RECOGNIZING AND IMPROVING HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	Sub-Program 1 Civil Servant Working Conditions	Results Areas 1 and 2
	Measures to improve performance motivations for civil servants: - analysis of existing civil service performance motivations / incentives; elaboration of legislative and regulatory provisions for civil servant motivation; elaboration of ministerial motivation strategies and implementation; monitoring of implementation	Evaluation of the workforce morale and motivations: - motivation strategies and monitoring of implementation in selected ministries
	Measures to improve working environments: - Construction and rehabilitation of priority ministerial buildings; acquisition of materials and equipment	Measures to improve working environments: - Physical audit of working environments in selected ministries - Rehabilitation of selected administrative buildings and acquisition of materials for selected central departments of selected ministries
	Sub-Program 2: Improving Human Resources Management	Results Areas A and 2
	Improvements to career management processes: - Review existing system for career management of civil servants, update and computerize individual career profiles of all civil servants (DRH DGFP), improve DGFP archiving facilities	Improvements to career management processes: - Update career profiles of civil servants in selected ministries (interministerial team to report on irregularities in SIGASPE); computerize civil servant career documentation (DRH DGFP) for selected ministries (DIN), improve DGFP archiving facilities
	Distribution of equipment and software to deconcentrated ministerial units for human resource management: - Define a minimum package of equipment for DRH; acquisition of materials and equipment	Acquisition of equipment and materials for DRH in selected ministries
	Development of modern human resource management tools: - Guides for developing HR tools; HR programming tool, elaboration of career plans, training plans, job profiles	Development of modern human resource management tools: - Guides for developing HR tools, HR programming tool - Career plans, training plans and job profiles for selected ministries
	Coordination of HR managers: - Organization of regular coordination meetings and annual conference for ministerial HR department managers	- Organization of coordination meetings on processing of civil servant promotion, transfer and retirement files in the selected ministries - Organization of dedicated sessions on processing of teacher recruitment files
	Capacity building for human resource managers on modern HR management techniques - Training on results-based management, SIGASPE; performance contracts and	Capacity building for human resource managers on modern HR management techniques: - Training on results-based management, SIGASPE; performance

	evaluation processes	contracts and evaluation processes
	Sub-Program 3: Strengthen the capacity of public administration in development policy design and monitoring	Results Areas 1 and 2
	Capacity building for civil servants responsible for conceptualization and implementation of development policies: - Top management training, targeted training (on certified scholarship basis) for ministerial departmental managers, study tours	Capacity building for civil servants responsible for conceptualization and implementation of development policies: - Top management training, targeted training (on certified scholarship basis) for ministerial departmental managers, study tours in selected ministries
	Improve coordination between training institutions: - Create information sharing network; regularize coordination meetings between institutions; regularize coordination meetings between MFPTSS and training institutions	Support for regular coordination between MFPTSS and training institutions
	Sub-Program 4 : Promoting Expertise in Public Administration	Not covered
Pillar 3 PROMOTION OF ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	Sub-Program 1: Improving Hospitability and Accessibility in the Public Administration - Identification of accessibility norms and introduction of building security measures, information desks, guidelines for service provision etc.	Not covered
	Sub-Program 2: Improving Transparency in the Public Administration	Results Areas 1, 2 and 3
	Implementation of training and sensitization program for public servants on service delivery	
	Introduction of attendance controls: - Develop system for controlling civil servant attendance and interconnect it with SIGASPE; acquire equipment, training and sensitization	Pilot attendance controls in selected ministries: - Develop system for controlling civil servant attendance and interconnect it with SIGASPE, acquire equipment; training and sensitization
	Biometric ID cards for civil servants: - Acquire equipment for production of cards, biometric enrollment campaigns for new recruits, distribution of ID cards	Biometric ID cards for civil servants: - Acquire equipment for production of cards; biometric enrollment campaigns for new recruits, distribution of ID cards
	Improve communications between Administration and service users: - Develop interfacing fora for the Administration and users; support ministerial communication strategy elaboration and implementation	
Preparation and dissemination of ministerial reports for strategic planning, management and evaluation: - Annual publication of ministerial statistics; report on administrative delays in processing civil servant dossiers; report on compliance with WAEMU program budgeting directives; sectoral strategy monitoring and evaluation reports and annual action plan implementation reports, organization of strategic monitoring reviews in ministries / sectors, methodological guide and training on evaluating public policy implementation	Preparation and dissemination of ministerial reports for strategic planning, management and evaluation in selected ministries: - Annual publication of ministerial statistics; sectoral strategy monitoring and evaluation reports and annual action plan implementation reports: - Review of court registries to enhance data collection on case management - Review of statistical databases in selected ministries	

		<p>Publication of</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organization of strategic monitoring reviews in selected ministries - Annual report on administrative delays in processing civil servant dossiers
	<p>Improve internal ministerial controls</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain risk-based auditing cartography, develop and implement risk mitigation plans in ministries, annual performance audits and controls, training of inspectors 	<p>Improve internal ministerial controls:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain risk-based auditing cartography, develop and implement risk mitigation plans in ministries, annual performance audits and controls, training of inspectors
Pillar 4 PROMOTION OF E-GOVERNANCE	Sub-Program 1: Strengthening of the Institutional and Security Framework for E-Governance	Results Areas 1 and 2
	<p>Reinforcement of IT coordination between departments:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduce coordination fora 	
	<p>Securitization of information and data exchanges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop a certification strategy and acquire equipment for data exchanges; Establish a national agency for information system security; Introduce a policy on information system; Acquire servers; Introduce back-up and safeguard measures, Introduce electronic authentication processes for administrative dossiers 	<p>Securitization of information and data exchanges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop a certification strategy and acquire equipment for data exchanges; establish a national agency for information system security; introduce a policy on information system; acquire servers; introduce back-up and safeguard measures, introduce electronic authentication processes for administrative dossiers
	Sub-Program 2: Strengthening of the Communication Infrastructure and the Administration's Information Systems	Results Areas 1 and 2
	<p>Extension of intranet network (RESINA) to all administration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - cabling and interconnection of administrative buildings, sensitization; maintenance 	<p>Extension of intranet network (RESINA) to parts of the administration</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - cabling and interconnection of administrative buildings, sensitization; maintenance
	<p>Introduce computerized processes for improving internal coordination communication in ministries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elaborate IT strategies for each ministry; create a datacentre and back-up; introduce electronic application for managing ministerial mail and information exchanges 	<p>Introduce computerized processes for improving internal coordination communication in selected ministries</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation IT strategy in the MJPHDC - Create a Datacentre and back-up - Pilot electronic application for managing ministerial mail and information exchanges in selected ministries
	<p>Acquire information system equipment and licenses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Licenses for biometric data management and SIGASPE, maintenance agreements and anti-viral software; computer equipment (scanners, printers, hard drives, computers, regulators etc.) for all ministries 	<p>Acquire information system equipment and licenses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Licenses for Biometric data management and SIGASPE, Maintenance agreements and anti-viral software; Computer equipment (scanners, printers, hard drives, computers, regulators etc.) for selected ministries
	Sub-Program 3 Improving Administrative Procedures and Development of Online Services	Results Areas 1 and 2
<p>Development of custom-made applications and integration of IT systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review SIGASPE functionality, introduce new modules in SIGASPE and interfacing with DIAN and ALIAS 	<p>Development of custom-made applications and integration of IT systems</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review SIGASPE functionality 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduce an integrated information system for management of Burkinabe Orders - Develop an on-line ‘annuaire’ of civil servants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduce new modules in SIGASPE and interfacing with DIAN and ALIAS - Introduce computerized case management system for selected administrative courts - Introduce computerized case management system for selected local courts
	<p>Implementation of a unified and consolidated on-line portal of the Burkinabe administration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop a Guichet Virtuel de l'Administration Publique (GVAP), sensitization, training of users, acquisition of equipment, controls, inclusion of existing e-services and civil servant on-line applications in portal, introduction of personal identification numbers for portal users, publication of ministerial statistics in portal 	<p>Implementation of a unified and consolidated on-line portal of the Burkinabe administration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop a Guichet Virtuel de l'Administration Publique (GVAP), sensitization, training of users, acquisition of equipment, controls
	<p>Enhance user and citizen IT skills and improve access to E-Governance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitization and training on IT applications and GVAP, guide in different languages - Establish community access points (computer centres) - Develop online training modules, train cyber-café managers - Implement ‘one civil servant one computer’ policy 	<p>Enhance user and citizen IT skills and improve access to E-governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sensitization and training on IT applications and GVAP, guide in different languages - Establish community access points (computer centers) - Implement ‘one civil servant one computer’ policy in selected ministries
Pillar 5 DECONCENTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION	Sub-Program 1 Strengthening the Operational Capacities of Deconcentrated Structures	Results Area 2
	<p>Providing resources to deconcentrated offices:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Acquisition of materials, IT, communication and office equipment, construction and rehabilitation of deconcentrated office buildings; develop human resource redeployment and motivation strategies in selected ministries; training of deconcentrated civil servants 	<p>Providing resources to deconcentrated offices of the selected ministries in selected regions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Construction and rehabilitation of deconcentrated office buildings, acquisition of materials, IT, communication and office equipment for: Superior First Instance Courts and selected local courts (TD/TA) in pilot jurisdictions; and structures of MENA (DRFP, DRT, CEB, DPENA and DRENA) in the selected regions - Training of selected DRT offices in technical controls and report-writing - Training of selected CEB, DPENA and DRENA on use of monitoring system for teacher instruction time - Training of local court presidents and <i>assesseurs</i> in arbitration and conciliation.
	Sub-Program 2 Promotion of Advice/ Support /Assistance Provided to Local Governments	Results Areas 1 and 2
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training of local government officials and de-concentrated agents; Operationalization of local civil service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to MATDS in the development of local civil service
IMPLEMENTATION	Sub-Program 1: Strengthen the Steering Function of the PSDMA	Results Area 3

OF THE STRATEGY	steering organs	
	- Update legal texts; acquire equipment and materials for SPMA (vehicles, office supplies, IT, communication); recruitment of safeguard, accounting and procurement specialists, training and study tours of SPMA staff	Acquire equipment and materials for SPMA (vehicles, office supplies, IT, communication); recruitment of safeguard, accounting and procurement specialists, training and study tours of SPMA staff
	Sub-Program 2: Enhance Coordination of PSDMA Implementation	Results Area 3
	- Support for steering committee meetings, semester reviews, monitoring missions; elaboration of PSDMA action plans and reviews, PSDMA communications strategy	- Support for steering committee meetings, semester reviews, monitoring missions; elaboration of PSDMA action plans and reviews, PSDMA communications strategy Monitoring and evaluation software - Elaboration of project manual

Table A.1.2: Selected Governance Indicators

			Burkina Faso	Ghana	Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low income
Source	Year	Overall Governance					
GI	2008/11	(Quality of) IV. Public Administration & Professionalism (0=lowest, 100=highest)	48	55	57	57	58
BTI	2012	3. Rule of law (1=lowest, 10=highest)	4.0	7.5	5.3	4.7	4.0
POLITY IV	2010	Executive constraints (1=lowest, 7=highest)	3	6	5	4	4
Judicial and Legal System							
GI	2008/11	III-3. Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Judicial Branch (0=lowest, 100=highest)	35	53	67	48	53
BTI	2012	3.2 Independent Judiciary (1=lowest, 10=highest)	4	8	6	5	4
FH-FIW	2011	(Prevalence of) F. Rule of Law (0=lowest, 16=highest)	7	12	10	6	5
ES	2011	Court impediment (% of firms identifying courts as a major constraint)	25.7	1.7	3.8	14.7	14.4
DB	2011	(Efficiency of) Enforcing contracts (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	108	45	145	117	118
Governance and the Private Sector							
DB	2011	(Ease of) Starting a business (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	116	104	93	123	116
DB	2011	(Ease of) Registering Property (rank) (1=highest, 183=lowest)	111	36	171	120	118
ES	2011	% Senior Management time to deal with regulations	22.2	3.2	2.9	7.5	7.9
ES	2011	Time to clear imports from customs (de facto days)	16m.4	6.8	8.8	13.5	13.5

GI: Global Integrity; BTI: Bertelsmann Transformation Index; POLITY IV: Political Regime Characteristics; FH-FIW: Freedom House -Freedom in the World; ES: Enterprise Surveys; DB: Doing Business

Annex 2: Program Results Framework and Monitoring

BURKINA FASO: PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (P132216)

Project Development Objective (PDO): To improve selected service standards in targeted regions of the ministries responsible for primary education, justice, labor and civil service												
PDO Level Indicators*	DLI	Cor	UoM	Baseline	Y1 ⁴⁶	Y2 ⁴⁷	Y3 ⁴⁸	Y4 ⁴⁹	Frequency	Data source and methodology	Responsibility	Description
PDO Indicator 1: Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (<i>engagement/ intégration</i>) and/or promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) completed within a 28 calendar-day period. (disaggregated by: recruitment, promotion)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	Recruitment : 4.38 Promotion: 4.6	20	30	40	50	Annual	Onboarding records or data entry forms (<i>le bordereau de saisie</i>) of the DGC of the MFPTSS for the civil servants to be hired and promoted Appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>), hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>), and reclassification letter (<i>arrête de reclassement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS Calculation by: (1) Generate the list of hiring (<i>integration/engagement</i>) and promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) decisions in a year (through SIGASPE) (2) Generate the list of hiring (<i>integration/engagement</i>) and promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) decisions completed within 28 days in a year (through SIGASPE) Calculate the proportion by 2/1 Verification agency: ASCE	MFPTS S / SPMA	DLI#1.1 or years Y2, Y3 and Y4 The indicator concerns all civil service hiring and promotion transactions irrespective of staff category, number of agents and duty station in a calendar year (1 January – 31 December) Recruitment includes hiring of new graduates ('integration') and more experienced professionals ('engagement') as procedure is the same. Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year.
PDO Indicator 2: Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Number	298 000	324 000	360 000	380 000	400 000	Annual	Annual statistics book of the CNSS Validated data from CNSS on workers registered (before publication of the	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI#2 for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is May the year after

⁴⁶ 1 January 2016 – 31 December 2016

⁴⁷ 1 January 2017 – 31 December 2017

⁴⁸ 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2018

⁴⁹ 1 January 2019 – 31 December 2019

(Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale - CNSS)										yearbook) Methodology: Count of number of workers registered Verification agency: ASCE		the reporting year.
PDO Indicator 3: Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	50	60	80	Annual	List of all classes in three regions established by MENA records of primary schools and number of class based on school report cards at the beginning of the academic year Reports by DPRENA and DGEB and consolidated by SPMA ASCE with MENA verifies validity of the DPRENA and DGEB reports and based on review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools establishes the share of classes Verification agency: ASCE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI#3.1 for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is September of the reporting year.
PDO Indicator 4: Share of judgments • issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso • involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient's rules and procedures	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	29	35	40	50	60	Annual	DLI#4.1: Administrative law cases: Date of lodgment as registered on the receipt document (<i>recipissé</i>) issued by the tribunal containing a unique identification number of the case which is provided to claimants and a copy of which is retained in the registry of the relevant administrative tribunal. Calculation by: number of administrative court cases that have been resolved within 12 months administrative court cases and 3 out of 4 with written judgment by total number of administrative court cases lodged in the respective calendar year x 100 DLI#4.2: Contentious matters: Registry entries of civil and commercial matters lodged in the local court by a claimant Records of hearings of civil and commercial matters lodged in the court	MFPTS S/SPM A	DLI#4.1 and DL#4.2 for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. Pilot local departmental and district courts: 50 selected courts identified in the Technical Assessment

										that are resolved by conciliation (date of the process-verbal) and those for which an arbitrated written judgment has been handed down Calculation by : total number of cases that are resolved by conciliation (date of the process-verbal) and those for which an arbitrated written judgment has been handed down by total number of cases for which written judgments are registered as having been handed down in a given calendar year x 100 Verification agency: ASCE		
Intermediate results												
Results Area 1: Improved human resource capacity and performance												
IR Indicator 1.1: Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected human resources departments.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes / No	No	Yes				Annual	Review of technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS verifying the functionality of the updated and newly developed modules (report) Technical inspection report after installation of new modules in SIGASPE Review of technical inspection report	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI#1 for year Y1 Assessment will be conducted as soon as the update is concluded.
IR Indicator 1.2: Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	25	50	60	75	Annual	Onboarding records or data entry forms (<i>le bordereau de saisie</i>) of the DGC of the MFPTSS for the teachers to be hired Appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>) and/or hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS Division of the total number of teachers whose appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>) and/or hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS by August 31 by the total number teachers to be hired in that year Verification agency: ASCE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI#1.2 for Y2 and Y4

IR Indicator 1.3: Share of DRFP offices satisfying defined criteria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	60	80	100	Annual	Technical inspection report of the technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS on all DRFP offices including staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register)	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Defined criteria: Office working conditions
IR Indicator 1.4: Share of civil servants in selected ministries with an updated employment record in SIGASPE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	50	60	75	Annual	Sample-based surveys of SIGASPE records and checked through on-the-ground and face-to-face verification List of total number of civil servants in the selected ministries in SIGASPE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Baseline
IR Indicator 1.5: Share of civil servants in the civil service with on-line access to administrative and personnel HR information	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	50	75	100	Annual	Sample-based survey based on SIGASPE records and checked through on-the-ground and direct observation	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Baseline
IR Indicator 1.6: Share of civil servants in the selected ministries with Individual Employee File system (<i>Dossier Individuel Normalise --DIN</i>) updated and available on-line	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	50	60	70	Annual	Data from MFPTSS; sample-based survey based on SIGASPE records	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Baseline
IR Indicator 1.7: Share of civil servants in the three selected ministries with job description, performance contracts and annual performance evaluation.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	40	60	70	Annual	Ratio between the number of agents with job description, performance contract and annual performance evaluation	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Baseline
IR Indicator 1.8: Share of transactions in the civil service carried out within a certain period: retirement completed two (60 calendar days) months before the retirement date	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	12	20	40	50	60	Annual	Retirement letters Transcript from the General Service History Transcript (Relevé General de Service – RGS) Calculation by: division of total number of retirement completed within 60 days by total number of retirements in a year.	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Indicator establishes a service standard for retirement, i.e. at least two months before retirement date records in the HR management system, i.e. SIGASPE, are updated including the personal employment

												record needed to determine monthly pension. Since SIGASPE is interconnected to the Ministry of Finance payment system, this will ensure timely payment of pensions to new retirees. Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year.
Results Area 2: Strengthened institutional capacity for policy formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation												
IR Indicator 2.1: Share of DRT satisfying defined criteria in the Centre, Centre-West, Cascades and Upper Basin regions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	50	75	100	Annual	Technical inspection report of the technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS on all DRT offices including staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register)	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Defined criteria: Office working conditions
IR Indicator 2.2: Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes/ No	No	Yes				Annual	Reports by DGESS/MENA and DPRENA consolidated by SPMA on the new system Sample-based survey in public primary schools by ASCE ASCE verifies with MENA functionality of the system based on review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools Verification agency: ASCE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI#3 for year Y1 Assessment will be conducted as soon as the mechanism is established.
IR Indicator 2.3: Share of CEB, DPENA and DRENA satisfying defined criteria in the regions Sahel, Upper Basin and East	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	CEB 60 % DPENA 83 % DRENA 67 %	70 85 75	80 90 90	85 95 95	90 100 100	Annual	Technical inspection report of all District (<i>Circonscriptions d'Education de Base – CEB</i>), Provincial (<i>Directions Provinciales de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation - DPENA</i>), and Regional Offices (<i>Directions Régionales de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation - DRENA</i>) including	MFPTS S/ SPMA	

										staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register)		
IR Indicator 2.4: Share of new teachers assigned to schools in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions on or before 25 September	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	25	50	75	80	Annual	Custom-made report in SIGASPE on new primary school teachers on post in communities on or before 25 September List of new teachers made available to MENA on or before 31/08 (DLI 1.3) New teachers with appointed letters from CCEB before September 25 divided by total number of newly hired teachers Audit trail of SIGASPE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	
IR Indicator 2.5: Share of public primary schools having at least two visits per academic year by circuit supervisor (CCEB) in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	25	50	60	75	80	Annual	Circuit supervisors reports (deposited at CEB) List of number of primary schools in the three regions based on information DGESS	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Baseline
IR Indicator 2.6 : Share of written judgments handed down in the pilot jurisdictions in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions for which the case management process is automated (TGI : TAdmin)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	0	30	75	80	Annual	Existing manual registries maintained in jurisdictions with all cases registered and for which written judgments are registered in a given year (including dates and unique identification numbers) Custom report generated by automated system of all written judgments handed down for cases in which all of the case management steps have been automated in that system including dates and unique identification numbers	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. Definition of automated procedure: all steps after receipt of documents are dematerialized; documents can be followed and reports generated from the system
IR Indicator 2.7: Share of pilot jurisdictions in Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions that satisfy 80 percent of the defined criteria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	75	80	100	Annual	Technical inspection report of the technical inspection unit of the MJPDHC of all pilot jurisdictions including staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register)	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Defined criteria: Office working conditions

(TGI/Tadmin)												
IR Indicator 2.8: Share of 115 most frequently used laws and jurisprudence publicly accessible online	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	40	70	80	100	Annual	List of most frequently used laws and jurisprudence identified on the basis of an inclusive survey of administrative court users (judges, clerks, prosecutors, lawyers, claimants) from Ministry of Justice and Official Gazette website Direct observation on Ministry of Justice website	MFPTS S/ SPMA	
IR Indicator 2.9: Share of 50 pilot local departmental (TD) and district courts (TA) in in the Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions that satisfy 80 percent of the defined criteria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	20	75	80	100	Annual	Technical inspection report of the technical inspection unit of the MJPDHC of all pilot courts including staff skills, logistics, IT and office facilities and equipment (including asset register)	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Defined criteria: Office working conditions Pilot local departmental and district courts: 50 selected courts identified in the Technical Assessment
IR Indicator 2.10: Share of 50 pilot local departmental (TD) and district courts (TA) in in the Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dédougou and Bobo-Dioulasso regions that have the presidents, secretaries and assessors trained	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	50	100	100	100	Annual	Report of training providers List of all presidents and assessors in the three regions. Ration between the number of the 50 selected TD/TA who received a training on a given topic and the total number of members	MFPTS S/ SPMA	Pilot local departmental and district courts: 50 selected courts identified in the Technical Assessment
IR Indicator 2.11 : Establishment of a uniform case tracking system in selected departmental and district courts	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Yes/ No	No	Yes				Annual	Reports by DGESS/MJPDHC consolidated by SPMA on the new system Sample-based survey in pilot jurisdictions by ASCE ASCE verifies with MJPDH functionality of the system based on review of the uniform registers used in the pilot jurisdictions. Verification agency: ASCE	MFPTS S/ SPMA	DLI for Y1 Assessment will be conducted as soon as the mechanism is established.
IR Indicator 2.12: Share of female teachers hired each year	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	40	40	50	50	50	Annual	Appointment letters and calculation of female share	MFPTS S/ SPMA	

Results Area 3: Strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms												
IR Indicator 3.1: Rate of execution of the PSDMA Second Action Plan.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	15	35	55	70	Annual	Review of the progress report submitted to the CNMA	MFPTS S/SPM A	
IR Indicator 3.2: Publication of annual performance reports in conformity with WAEMU Directive 7	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes/ No	No				Yes	One-time	Ministry of Finance website	MFPTS S/SPM A	
IR Indicator 3.3: Rate of execution of the risk-based audit of the ASCE in MENA, MFPTSS and MJPDHC.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0		40	60	75	Annual	Review of ASCE reports	MFPTS S/SPM A	
IR Indicator 3.4: Rate of execution of the internal ministerial technical inspectorates' recommendations in the MENA, MFPTSS and MJPDHC	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	20	60	70	75	80	Annual	Review of ASCE reports	MFPTS S/SPM A	
IR Indicator 3.5: Grievances responded by the Ombudsman in compliance with the Operational Manual of the Program	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	%	0	5	20	30	50	Annual	Review of ASCE and Ombudsman reports	MFPTS S/SPM A	
IR Indicator 3.6: Direct project beneficiaries (of which female)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Num ber (%)	138 000 (32)	140 000 (33)	160 000 (34)	170 000 (35)	180 000 (36)	Annual	Activity and project records	MFPTS S	

Annex 3: Disbursement Linked Indicators, Disbursement Arrangements and Verification Protocols

	<i>Total Financing Allocated to DLI (Euro)</i>	<i>As % of Total Financing Amount</i>	<i>DLI Baseline</i>	<i>Indicative timeline for DLI achievement-planned disbursements</i>			
				<i>Year 1 (2016)</i>	<i>Year 2 (2017)</i>	<i>Year 3 (2018)</i>	<i>Year 4 (2019)</i>
DLI 1: Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected human resources departments.	2,698,800	% 7.5	No	2,698,800			
DLI 2: Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (<i>engagement/ intégration</i>) and/or promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) completed within a 28 calendar-day period (disaggregated by recruitment, promotion)	7,148,000	% 20	5		1,648,000	2,750,000	2,750,000
DLI 3: Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31	4,467,500	% 12.5	0		2,767,500		1,700,000
DLI 4 : Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security (<i>Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale</i>)	2,680,000	% 7.5	298,000		894,000	893,000	893,000
DLI 5: Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	3,598,400	% 7.5	No	3,598,400			
DLI 6: Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	5,361,000	% 15	N/A		1,961,000	1,700,000	1,700,000
DLI 7: Establishment of a uniform case tracking system in selected departmental and district courts.	2,698,800	% 7.5	No	2,698,800			
DLI 8: Share of judgments issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso	4,467,500	% 12.5	29		1,700,000	1,700,000	1,067,500
DLI 9: Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient's rules and procedures	2,680,000	% 7.5	N/A			1,786,000	894,000
Total Financing Allocated:	35,800,000	100		8,996,000	8,970,500	8,829,000	9,004,500

Annex 3A: DLI Verification Protocol

	Indicators	Definition/description	Scalability (Yes/No)	Draft Protocol to Evaluate Compliance of the DLI and Data/Result Verification		Remarks (include timing of DLIs and amount attached, PPF, date of assessment, annual data collection)
				Data source	Procedure	
1	Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected human resources departments.	<p>Improved automated HR processes</p> <p>DLI measures improved HR management in the civil service through improved functionality of the SIGASPE based on a demand analysis of users</p>	No	Technical inspection report after installation of new modules in SIGASPE	<p>Review of technical inspection unit of the MFPTSS verifying the functionality of the updated and newly developed modules (report)</p> <p>Verification agency: ASCE</p>	<p>DLI for year Y1</p> <p>Assessment will be conducted as soon as the update is concluded.</p> <p>Conditions to be met for 'Yes': 80% of the modules for demanded by DGFP and AGRE installed and 80% of the existing modules for DGFP upgraded</p>
2	Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (<i>engagement/intégration</i>) and/or promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) completed within a 28 calendar-day period.	<p>Improved HR service standards in the civil service</p> <p>DLI establishes a service standard for processing recruitments and promotions in the civil service from date of completion of the selection process for recruitment and promotions to update in the HR management system, i.e. SIGASPE, that is interconnected to the Ministry of Finance payroll</p>	Yes	<p>Onboarding records or data entry forms (<i>le bordereau de saisie</i>) of the DGC of the MFPTSS for the civil servants to be hired and promoted</p> <p>Appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>), hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>), and reclassification letter (<i>arrête de reclassement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS</p>	<p>Calculation by:</p> <p>(1) Generate the list of hiring (<i>integration/engagement</i>) and promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) decisions in a year (through SIGASPE)</p> <p>(2) Generate the list of hiring (<i>integration/engagement</i>) and promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) decisions completed within 28 days in a year (through SIGASPE)</p> <p>Calculate the proportion</p>	<p>DLI for years Y2, Y3 & Y4</p> <p>The indicators concern all civil service transactions irrespective of staff category and duty station in a calendar year (1 January – 31 December)</p> <p>Hiring includes hiring of new graduates ('integration') and more experienced professionals ('engagement') as procedure is the same.</p> <p>Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year.</p>

					by 2/1 Verification agency: ASCE	
3	Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31.	Improved efficiency in HR management in primary education DLI measures improved management of process between hiring of new teachers by the MFPTSS and their allocation to MENA	Yes	Onboarding records or data entry forms (<i>le bordereau de saisie</i>) of the DGC of the MFPTSS for the teachers to be hired Appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>) and/or hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS	Division of the total number of teachers whose appointment letter (<i>arrête d'intégration</i>) and/or hiring decision (<i>décision d'engagement</i>) signed by the Secretary-General of the MFPTSS by August 31 by the total number teachers to be hired in that year Verification agency: ASCE	DLI for years Y2 and Y4 Assessment date is October after the education year
4	Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security	Increased coverage of social protection services for the labor force DLI establishes a service standard for labor force inspections as CNSS registration of workers is proxy for coverage and effectiveness of these.	Yes	Annual statistics book of the CNSS Validated data from CNSS on workers registered (before publication of the yearbook)	Count of number of private sector workers registered Verification agency: ASCE	DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year.
5	Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	Improved monitoring of annual hours of instruction delivered in primary education DLI captures revision and introduction of a new and improved monitoring system for teacher time on task.	No	Reports by DGESS/MENA and DPRENA consolidated by SPMA on the new system Sample-based survey in public primary schools by ASCE	ASCE together with the technical inspection unit of the MENA verifies the functionality of the system based on review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools Verification agency:	DLI for year Y1 Assessment will be conducted as soon as the mechanism is established.

					ASCE	
6	Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	Improved service standards in primary education DLI establishes a service standard in primary education with respect to hours of instruction (by teacher or substitute)	Yes (%)	List of all classes in three regions established by MENA records of primary schools and number of class based on school report cards at the beginning of the academic year Reports by DPRENA and DGEB and consolidated by SPMA	ASCE together with the technical inspection unit of the MENA verifies the validity of the DPRENA and DGEB reports and based of review of results from sample-based survey in public primary schools Verification agency: ASCE	DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is September of the reporting year.
7	Establishment of a uniform case tracking system in selected departmental and district courts.	Improved monitoring of case management DLI captures revision and introduction of a new and improved monitoring system for case management.	No	Reports from new system Reports from DGESS/MJPDHC consolidated by SPMA	Review of new system, its functionality and reports generated to whether it meets defined standards (registration, data collection and data capture, report generation and case documentation) Verification agency: ASCE	DLI for year Y1 Need to revise registries to ensure appropriate information is registered. Assessment will be conducted as soon as the mechanism is established.
8	Share of judgments issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso	Improved service standards and effectiveness in justice sector DLI establishes a service standard for time between the lodgment of a legal case in an administrative jurisdiction and the delivery of a written judgment regarding that case by the administrative tribunal	Yes	Date of lodgment as registered on the receipt document (<i>recipissé</i>) issued by the tribunal containing a unique identification number of the case which is provided to claimants and a copy of which is retained in the registry of the relevant administrative tribunal. Date that written judgment is submitted by the judge or judges in the administrative	Calculation by: division of count of administrative court cases that have been resolved within 12 months administrative court cases (numerator) by count of total number of administrative court cases lodged (irrespective of when complaint was lodged as long as this happened after project effectiveness) (denominator) in the	DLI for years Y2, Y3 and Y4 Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year. The indicator does not take into account cases that have been lodged before project start.

				tribunal to the court clerk for submission to the claimant – as registered in the judgment registry of the relevant administrative tribunal (Cahier de Reception des Decisions)	<p>respective calendar year x 100</p> <p>The target figures set include at least 75 percent of written judgments are issued by the court. For example, for the target year of 2018, of the 50 percent target figure at least 75 percent of the cases must be written judgments handed in.</p> <p>In the case of administrative tribunals, the baseline figure is judgment rendered not written judgment issued by the court.</p> <p>Verification agency: ASCE</p>	
9	<p>Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient's rules and procedures</p> <p>50 pilot local courts in 4 regions:</p> <p><u>I. Région du Center</u> Ouagadougou : (1) Arrondissement 9 ; (2) Arrondissement 11 ; (3) TD de Komsilga ; (4) TD de Pabré ; (5) TD de Saaba ; (6) TD de Tanghin Dassouri ; (7) TD de Koubri ; (8) TD de Komki-Ipala</p> <p><u>II. Hauts-Bassins</u> Bobo-Dioulasso : (9)</p>	<p>Improved service standards and effectiveness in justice sector</p> <p>DLI measures the improved engagement of the local courts in formally arbitrating local complaints over which the courts have jurisdiction</p>	Yes	<p>Registry entries of civil and commercial matters lodged in the local court by a claimant</p> <p>Registry entries of civil and commercial matters lodged in the court that are resolved by conciliation (date of the process-verbal) and those for which an arbitrated written judgment has been handed down</p>	<p>Calculation by : total number of cases for which no conciliation is achieved by total number of cases for which written judgments are registered as having been handed down in a given calendar year</p> <p>Verification agency: ASCE</p>	<p>DLI for years Y3 & Y4</p> <p>Assessment date is May the year after the reporting year.</p> <p>The indicator does not take into account cases that have been lodged before project start.</p>

	<p>Arrondissement 6 ; (10) Arrondissement 3 ; (11) TD de Karangasso-sambla ; (12) TD de Faramana ; (13) TD de Péni ; (14) TD de Toussiana</p> <p>Houndé : (15) TD de Houndé ; (16) TD de Koumbia ; (17) TD de Béréba</p> <p>Orodara : (18) TD de Orodara ; (19) TD de Banzon</p> <p>KoloKo : (20) TD de Kourignon ; (21) TD de Samorogouan ; (22) TD de N'Dorola ; (23) TD de KoloKo</p> <p><u>III. Centre-Est</u></p> <p>Tenkodogo : (24) TD de Bagré ; (25) TD de Bané ; (26) TD de Bittou ; (27) TD de Niaogho</p> <p>Koupéla : (28) TD de Koupéla ; (29) TD de Baskouré ; (30) TD de Yargo</p> <p>Ouargaye : (31) TD de Ouargaye ; (32) TD de Yondé</p> <p>Yargetanga : (33) TD de Yargetanga</p> <p><u>IV. Boucle du mouhoun</u></p> <p>Dedougou : (34) TD de Bondokuy ; (35) TD de Ouarkoye ; (36) TD de Safané ; (37) TD de Tchériba</p> <p>Boromo : (38) TD de Boromo ; (39) TD de Bagassi ; (40) TD de PA ; (41) TD de Poura</p> <p>Tougan : (42) TD de Lanfiéra ; (43) TD de Tougan</p> <p>Nouna : (44) TD de Nouna ; (45) TD de Madouba ; (46) TD de Bonborokuy</p> <p>Solenzo : (47) TD de Kouka ; (48) TD de Solenzo</p> <p>TOMA : (49) TD de Toma ; (50) TD Gassan</p>					
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Annex 3B: Bank Disbursement Table

#	DLI	Bank financing allocated to the DLI (in Euro)	Of which Financing available for		Deadline for DLI Achievement	Minimum DLI value to be achieved to trigger disbursements of Bank Financing	Maximum DLI value(s) expected to be achieved for Bank disbursements purposes	Determination of Financing Amount to be disbursed against achieved and verified DLI value(s)
			Prior results	Advances				
1	Update of the SIGASPE for better use by selected human resources departments.	2,698,800	0%	100%	December 2016	Achieved/Not Achieved	N/A	Achieved/Not Achieved
2	Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (engagement/intégration) and/or promotion (reclassement) completed within a 28 calendar-day period.	7,148,000	0%	100%	Closing date	11	50	Linear Per percentage point increase is 178,700 (see disbursement table below)
3	Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31.	4,467,500	0%	100%	Closing date	26	75	Linear Per percentage point increase is 89,350 (see disbursement table below)
4	Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security	2,680,00	298 000	100%	Closing date	324 000	400 000	Linear Per percentage point increase is 134,000 (see disbursement table below)
5	Improvement of the monitoring mechanism for instruction time on task in public primary school in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	3,598,400	0%	100%	December 2016	Achieved/Not Achieved	N/A	Achieved/Not Achieved

6	Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.	5,361,000	0%	100%	Closing date	21	80	Linear Per percentage point increase is 89,350 (see disbursement table below)
7	Establishment of a uniform case tracking system in selected departmental and district courts.	2,698,800	0%	100%	December 2016	Achieved/Not Achieved	N/A	Achieved/Not Achieved
8	Share of judgments issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso	4,467,500	0 %	100 %	Closing date	36	60	Linear Per percentage point increase is 178,700 (see disbursement table below)
9	Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient's rules and procedures	2,680,000	0 %	100 %	Closing date	41	70	Linear Per percentage point increase is 89,350 (see disbursement table below)

- Achievement of the DLIs will be assessed according to methodology in the verification protocol at the date of assessment. The assessment will determine whether the target of the DLI has been achieved. For non-scalable DLIs, the achievement is assessed in a binary manner: the amount in the Disbursement Table will be disbursed if the verification determines that a DLI is achieved. If a non-scalable DLI is assessed as “Not Achieved” in the second assessment, the disbursement amount will be cancelled. For scalable DLIs the achievement will be expressed in percentages. The disbursement amount in the first year for a scalable DLI is proportional to the percentage achievement on condition that the minimum target has been achieved. For the following years, the disbursement amount will be determined by subtracting the disbursement amount of preceding year from the disbursement amount corresponding to the percentage achievement. For example, for DLI2, if the initial year disbursement amount is eight hundred ninety three

thousand five hundred euros (15 percentage), if the achievement in the following year is 24 percent only 1,608,300 will be disbursed (2,501,800 - 893,500) will be disbursed.

Disbursement Table for DLI 2: Share of civil services transactions involving hiring (<i>engagement/ intégration</i>) and/or promotion (<i>reclassement</i>) completed within a 28 calendar-day period.							
Percentage	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement amount	Percentage	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement amount
11	178,700	21	1,965,700	31	3,752,700	41	5,539,700
12	357,400	22	2,144,400	32	3,931,400	42	5,718,400
13	536,100	23	2,323,100	33	4,110,100	43	5,897,100
14	714,800	24	2,501,800	34	4,288,800	44	6,075,800
15	893,500	25	2,680,500	35	4,467,500	45	6,254,500
16	1,072,200	26	2,859,200	36	4,646,200	46	6,433,200
17	1,250,900	27	3,037,900	37	4,824,900	47	6,611,900
18	1,429,600	28	3,216,600	38	5,003,600	48	6,790,600
19	1,608,300	29	3,395,300	39	5,182,300	49	6,969,300
20	1,787,000	30	3,574,000	40	5,361,000	50	7,148,000

Disbursement Table for DLI 3: Share of new primary school teachers appointed to the MENA by August 31									
Percenta	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement	Percentage	Disbursement
26	89,350	36	982,850	46	1,876,350	56	2,769,850	66	3,663,350
27	178,700	37	1,072,200	47	1,965,700	57	2,859,200	67	3,752,700
28	268,050	38	1,161,550	48	2,055,050	58	2,948,550	68	3,842,050
29	357,400	39	1,250,900	49	2,144,400	59	3,037,900	69	3,931,400
30	446,750	40	1,340,250	50	2,233,750	60	3,127,250	70	4,020,750
31	536,100	41	1,429,600	51	2,323,100	61	3,216,600	71	4,110,100
32	625,450	42	1,518,950	52	2,412,450	62	3,305,950	72	4,199,450
33	714,800	43	1,608,300	53	2,501,800	63	3,395,300	73	4,288,800
34	804,150	44	1,697,650	54	2,591,150	64	3,484,650	74	4,378,150
35	893,500	45	1,787,000	55	2,680,500	65	3,574,000	75	4,467,500

Disbursement Table for DLI 4 : Number of private sector employees registered with the national social security			
Number	Disbursement amount	Number	Disbursement amount
324,000	134,000	364,000	1,474,000
328,000	268,000	368,000	1,608,000
332,000	402,000	372,000	1,742,000
336,000	536,000	376,000	1,876,000
340,000	670,000	380,000	2,010,000
344,000	804,000	384,000	2,144,000
348,000	938,000	388,000	2,278,000

352,000	1,072,000	392,000	2,412,000
356,000	1,206,000	396,000	2,546,000
360,000	1,340,000	400,000	2,680,000

Disbursement Table for DLI 6: Share of public primary school classes with at least 770 hours of instruction time annually in the Sahel, Upper Basin and East regions.

Percentage	Disbursement amount	Percentage	Disbursement amount	Percentage	Disbursement amount
21	89,350	41	1,876,350	61	3,663,350
22	178,700	42	1,965,700	62	3,752,700
23	268,050	43	2,055,050	63	3,842,050
24	357,400	44	2,144,400	64	3,931,400
25	446,750	45	2,233,750	65	4,020,750
26	536,100	46	2,323,100	66	4,110,100
27	625,450	47	2,412,450	67	4,199,450
28	714,800	48	2,501,800	68	4,288,800
29	804,150	49	2,591,150	69	4,378,150
30	893,500	50	2,680,500	70	4,467,500
31	982,850	51	2,769,850	71	4,556,850
32	1,072,200	52	2,859,200	72	4,646,200
33	1,161,550	53	2,948,550	73	4,735,550
34	1,250,900	54	3,037,900	74	4,824,900
35	1,340,250	55	3,127,250	75	4,914,250
36	1,429,600	56	3,216,600	76	5,003,600
37	1,518,950	57	3,305,950	77	5,092,950
38	1,608,300	58	3,395,300	78	5,182,300
39	1,697,650	59	3,484,650	79	5,271,650
40	1,787,000	60	3,574,000	80	5,361,000

Disbursement Table for DLI 9 : Share of judgments involving litigation matters issued by selected departmental and district courts, in a manner consistent with the Recipient's rules and procedures

Percentage	Disbursement amount	Percentage	Disbursement amount
41	89,350	56	1,429,600
42	178,700	57	1,518,950
Disbursement Table for DLI 8 : Share of judgments issued by administrative tribunals in a 12 month period (75% of which through a written judgment) in the regions of Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Dedougou and Bobo-Dioulasso			
44	1,697,650	60	1,787,000
Percentage	Disbursement amount	Percentage	Disbursement amount
36 ⁴⁶	178,700	48	2,323,100
37 ⁴⁷	357,400	49	2,501,800
38 ⁴⁸	536,100	50	2,680,500
39 ⁴⁹	714,800	51	2,859,200
40 ⁵⁰	893,500	52	3,037,900
41 ⁵¹	1,072,200	53	3,216,600
42 ⁵²	1,250,900	54	3,395,300
43 ⁵³	1,429,600	55	3,574,000
44 ⁵⁴	1,608,300	56	3,752,700
45 ⁵⁵	1,787,000	57	3,931,400
46	1,965,700	58	4,110,100
47	2,144,400	59	4,288,800
		60	4,467,500

Annex 4: Summary of Technical Assessment

Burkina Faso Public Administration Modernization Program

Strategic Relevance of the Program

1. **Strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in Burkina is pivotal to the country's future stability and development outcomes.** Notwithstanding relatively high economic growth rates in the last decade and increasing investments in service delivery, inefficiencies in the public service and low levels of productivity have resulted in poor development outcomes and significant public dissatisfaction with previous governments. Buoyed by recent events, the Burkinabe population has high expectations of a new government. The new government will need to deliver on development commitments in order to regain citizen trust and rebuild social cohesion. Public sector performance is, more than ever, under the spotlight. The sudden rupture of the political settlement which had endured for almost three decades affords unique opportunities for public sector reform. While the political economy constraints that impacted earlier public sector reform efforts, including pervasive clientelism, are unlikely to disappear entirely, their influence is expected to be significantly diminished in the current context.

2. **Burkina Faso initiated the first generation of public sector governance reforms in the late 1980s.** These reforms aimed at adapting the public sector to the changing economic environment – which involved a shift from a planned economy to a market based economy. The reforms focused predominantly on technical improvements to the *modus operandi* of the central administration without necessarily addressing the structural problems arising from the highly centralized structure of the public administration system. The reforms laid the foundations for an organized civil service. In 1986, the General Statute of Public Employees establishing the legal classification of civil service was adopted. In 1988, a civil service reform effort defined the wage scale for civil servants. In 1991, as part of the public sector reform, efforts the Ministry of Civil Service and Modernization of the Administration was established.

3. **The second generation of public sector reforms began in 1998 with the adoption of a series of reform packages to improve public sector governance,** including the Master Plan for Institutional Development of the Public Administration 1998-2000 and the National Plan for Good Governance 1998-2003. A series of legislation was introduced to clarify state functions, the division of competencies between central and local governments as well as NGOs and the private sector. At the institutional level, the second generation of reforms gave rise to the establishment of several structures to strengthen the framework for good governance and accountable administration. These included the Economic and Social Council (*Le Conseil Economique et Social*)⁵⁰; the Ombudsman (*Le Médiateur du Faso*)⁵¹; the Higher Council of

⁵⁰ The Council has been, since then, restructured to provide a broader representation of the Burkinabe society, including NGOs.

⁵¹ The Mediator is an independent authority dealing with disagreements between private citizens, agencies, and the state institutions. The mediator is appointed by the President for a five-year term. The decisions of the Mediator are irrevocable and independent of directives of any other authority. The mediator has the power to instruct the public agencies to settle disputes amicably, revise their decision or make proposals for the improvement of the situation. The Mediator has the power to propose amendments to existing legislations.

Information (*Le Conseil Supérieur de la Communication*); the National Committee of Ethics (*Le Comité National d'Ethique*); the Independent National Electoral Commission (*La Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*); the High Authority of Coordination of Fight against Corruption (*La Haute Autorité de Coordination de la Lutte Contre la Corruption*); the General Inspectorate of the State (*L'Inspection Générale d'Etat*); Ministerial Inspection Units (*Des Inspections Ministérielles*). Constitutional amendments were also introduced to clarify the hierarchy of the court system.⁵²

4. The second generation of public sector reforms also focused on decentralization, civil service reform and public financial management. In 1998, the independent *Commission Nationale de la Décentralisation*'s recommendations informed a wave of legislation to advance decentralization reforms.⁵³ The main objective of the new set of legislation was to devolve decision-making authority in order to improve allocative efficiency in service delivery. The General Code for Local Government (*Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales--CGCT*) adopted in 2004, envisaged a combination of decentralized and deconcentrated local government structures.⁵⁴ Civil service reforms introduced during the second generation of reforms principally involved strengthening the legal and regulatory framework,⁵⁵ including the enactment of legislation governing civil servant employment which set forth the general conditions for employment as a civil servant. The reform efforts established systems to manage human resources and payroll. Burkina also embarked on an ambitious public financial management (PFM) reform agenda, the results of which earned the country the reputation of being a leading PFM reformer in the WAEMU zone.

5. The country's track record on public sector reform has been mixed. In addition to the exemplary efforts made in reforming public financial management processes, the main achievement of first and second generation public sector reforms was the establishment of legal, regulatory and administrative foundations for efficient and effective public sector management (decentralization, de-concentration, introduction of performance evaluation). However the effective implementation of the system that was intended to function from this framework has been comparatively weak. In particular:

⁵² The Supreme Court of Appeal is the high jurisdiction of the judiciary system, the Council of State is the high jurisdiction for administrative matters and the Audit Court is the high jurisdiction for financial audit (external audit).

⁵³ The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 040/98/AN du 3 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant orientation de la décentralisation au Burkina Faso which defines basic principles for decentralization in Burkina Faso; (ii) Loi N°041/98/an du 06 août 1998 (JO N°38 1998) portant organisation de l'administration du territoire au Burkina Faso which establishes the distinction between administrative circumscriptions (village- department-province) and the decentralized entities (municipality and province); (iii) Loi n°042/98/AN du 06 août 1998, portant organisation et fonctionnement des collectivités locales which describes governance structures (executive and legislative branches) of decentralized entities, local administrations, state agents in decentralized entities, consultative bodies at the local level; and (iv) Loi N° 43/98/AN du 6 août 1998 (JO 1998 N°38) portant programmation de la mise en œuvre de la décentralisation which lays out the timetable for implementation of decentralization reform.

⁵⁴ Deconcentrated units are the representatives of the central government and have supervision (tutelage) responsibility over decentralized units.

⁵⁵ The legislation enacted in this period included: (i) Loi N° 10/98/AN du 21 avril 1998 portant modalités d'intervention de l'Etat et repartition de compétences entre l'Etat et les autres acteurs du développement; (ii) Loi N°013/98/an du 28 avril 1998 portant régime juridique applicable aux emplois et aux agents de la Fonction Publique; (iii) (iii) Decret N°2000-86/PRES/PM/MFPDI du 13 mars 2000 portant fixation de la date d'entrée en vigueur du système d'évaluation des fonctionnaires et des agents contractuels de la Fonction Publique.

- decision-making authority remains highly centralized and financial and human resources are concentrated at the center.
- the process of decentralization / de-concentration has yet to yield measurable improvements in the administration of public service delivery. The civil service environment lacks appropriate incentives to motivate administrators and front-line public service providers to deliver results.

6. **A combination of political inertia, strategic, institutional coordination and implementation failures characterize earlier reform failures.** Despite government commitment to public sector reform in the past and the existence of reform-minded senior level bureaucrats, there was limited political engagement and weak institutional leadership during the reform implementation process. Accordingly, insufficient resources were allocated to the reform processes and successes were measured on the basis of outputs (usually in the form of legal and regulatory texts) rather than improvements in the performance of the public administration. At the same time, the process of developing consensus *upstream* and engaging potential opponents to reform, including the union movement, was underestimated. Resistance to reform not only slowed the pace of implementation, but it resulted in policy reversals and extensive government efforts downstream to negotiate with unions. Reform shortcomings also reflected institutional coordination issues. Diffuse coordination of the PSG reform agenda by three central ministries (Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Decentralization and Ministry of Civil Service) was compounded by the limited engagement of sectors in implementing the reforms. The donor-driven incentives of sectors was to produce visible service delivery results and the implementation of medium-term public sector reforms were therefore sidelined in favor of quick win vertical interventions (e.g. school construction). Finally, as with all reform efforts in Burkina Faso, implementation challenges linked to limited resources and weak capacity played an important role.

7. **The government's vision for the third generation of public sector reforms in Burkina Faso is focused on developing a modern performance-oriented public administration system.** The objective of the PSDMA is to improve the quality of the public administration system to provide better services for sustainable development. The strategic plan aims to provide a federating framework to improve public management across the administration and create the necessary foundations upon which sector policies can be pursued more effectively. The PSDMA was developed following an extensive and inclusive process of national consultation. It was recently endorsed by the new Transitional Government through the adoption of the Second Action Plan to facilitate its implementation.

8. **The Program is designed to revive the implementation of the PSDMA in a new political era.** Implementation of the PSDMA to date has been fraught with difficulties. The budget allocation for the implementation of the first action plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013 was insufficient (around US\$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) of which US\$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget). The National Public Administration Modernization Committee (*le Conseil National de Modernization de l'Administration*), which is charged with overseeing the coordination of the PSDMA, did not convene once in the three year period as envisioned in the strategy document. The SPMA, which is charged with day to day

coordination, remained underfunded and poorly equipped to lead reform efforts. And the continued lack of results orientation and weak monitoring and evaluation framework made the task of monitoring progress or keeping line ministries engaged and accountable for results difficult. The new government has developed a Second Action Plan for the period of 2015 to 2018. Its objective is to strengthen public management to improve service standards in the administration. The Program will support a subset of activities within the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA. It seeks to address the institutional coordination and implementation failures that have previously affected implementation of the PSDMA and earlier public sector reform efforts. In particular, it will focus on strengthening reform coordination and creating pecuniary incentives for selected line ministries to engage in the cross-cutting reform process and achieve results. It will also use many of the levers that proved successful to public financial management reforms in Burkina Faso.

9. There is a strong strategic case for a World Bank Program to support the government in their efforts to modernize the public sector at this time. The Program harnesses the renewed political and social commitment to reform that has been induced by the recent change in political settlement. The Program will help the selected ministries to achieve their sectoral objectives by strengthening human resource management and institutional capacities. It will complement sector ministries' efforts for achieving better service delivery outcomes by focusing on their institutional strengthening. Therefore the Program will directly contribute to the government's effort in modernizing its administrative systems to improve the quality and quantity of public services.

10. Based on the findings of a Technical Assessment undertaken for the preparation of the Program, the overall technical risk rating is moderate.

Technical Soundness of the Program

11. The technical design of the Program draws heavily from the Bank's extensive experience with public sector reform in Burkina and from international experience.⁵⁶ The World Bank has been engaged in public sector reform efforts through successive waves of public sector reform, through both investment operations (the Public Institutional Development Project 1992 – 2000 (PID) and the Administrative Capacity Building Project 2005 - 2011 (PRCA)) and through development policy lending. The implementation completion reports of the Public Institutional Development and Administrative Capacity Building Projects as well as a number of sector specific reports prepared by the Bank⁵⁷ and other donors are the body of knowledge that have informed the technical elements of the Program.

12. The lessons learned from these experiences and the guiding principles of the Program design are discussed in the table below:

⁵⁶ Mark Schacter. 2000. "Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries: Issues, Lessons and Future Directions" Institute on Governance: Ottawa, Canada; Zoe Scott. 2011. "Evaluation of Public Sector Governance Reforms 2001-2011: Literature Review" Oxford Policy Management.

⁵⁷ World Bank. 2013. "A Review of the Justice Sector in Burkina Faso"; EuroPlus Consulting and Management. 2010. "Rapport Diagnostic: Elaboration du document de plan strategique decennal de modernization de l'Etat." Europlus. 2010. "Elaboration of a Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of Administration."

Table A.4.1: Lessons Learned from PRCA and Other Donor Projects

Area	Lessons Learned	Action Taken
<p>Program Risk—What is driving the change and how complex is the change program?</p>	<p>The source of change is often ambiguous. In many cases, the driving force is donor pressure and the design of change process is complex. A shift in the institutional culture is often difficult to engineer and the complexity of change program doesn't help the internalization of change by stakeholders.</p>	<p>PSDMA suffers from similar pathologies of the past, i.e. donor pressure and complex design. However, the Program synchronizes sectoral reform actions with the national reform objectives of the PSDMA. This synchronization establishes the ownership of reform at the sectoral level and doesn't necessarily add another layer of complexity. The recent political changes have had an influence on managerial configurations within the administration and this has also created internal drivers for change that did not previously exist.</p>
<p>Knowledge Base—Do the impacted stakeholders have the skills or information for the change to succeed?</p>	<p>An organization needs to engage its stakeholders, in order to implement changes effectively. To do that, stakeholders need to understand the reasons why the change is happening and its benefits. They also need to have an opportunity to express their views and contribute their own ideas about how it might be implemented.</p>	<p>One of the most challenging and demanding aspects of PSDMA has been communications. There has been very little communication with the key stakeholders of change. Recognizing the fact that successful change relies heavily on how the participants in the change view it, the Program preparation process involved all of the stakeholders in the identification of program objectives, program activities as well as intermediate and disbursement linked indicators.</p>
<p>Institutional Framework—Is the organizational culture conducive to change?</p>	<p>Civil servants and public sector institutions find it difficult to get used to change. The impact of organizational culture on change is profound. Organization culture can be defined as what a group learns over time as it solves its problems of survival in an external environment and its problems of internal integration. Not anchoring the change into the organizational culture, norms, and shared values could diminish the chances for success.</p>	<p>The organizational culture of the Burkinabe administration is not necessarily conducive to change. The Program design has the following elements to address cultural barriers in front of change:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearly communicating the vision for change; • Outlining the benefits and impacts of change; • Ensuring that participating ministries' leadership communicate with the deconcentrated structures; • Providing opportunities to participate in managing the change; • Monitoring and measuring the impact of actions.
<p>Resources—Is funding, staff time and infrastructure in place to drive and sustain change?</p>	<p>Public sector organizations that embark on a transformation understandably have high hopes. Fixing broken processes, eliminating activities that don't add value, creating more fulfilling jobs, and delegating more power to the front line all hold out the promise of a better way of service delivery. Yet these initiatives do not</p>	<p>Although adopted in 2011, the implementation of PSDMA was very slow due to limited resources. The Program will provide the necessary impetus for the implementation of the PSDMA. More importantly, it will support the national effort to coordinate the change process through strengthening the SPMA. However, these interventions do not guarantee the sustainability of the change process.</p>

	always translate into sustainable improvements.	
Management Risk —How committed is the leadership and how effective are modes of communications?	Successful reforms typically are those that have the strong support of leadership and that are well understood by the key stakeholders. Increased stakeholder engagement in development and reform interventions enables people to acquire the new knowledge that will shape their attitudes and prompt them to adopt the positive behaviors. There is growing evidence that effective communication is critical to generating broad support for reforms.	With increasing citizen pressure on the government to perform accountably, the transitional government is under pressure to prioritize public sector reform. The confirmed commitment of the Transitional Government to the PSDMA is reflected in its adoption of the Second Action Plan. An important missing item in the picture is the weak monitoring and evaluation capacity of the SPMA and the lack of reporting lines to the National Public Administration Modernization Committee. The Program will address this weakness and support the SPMA to develop effective communications tools to communicate better with the key stakeholders.

Technical Assessment of the Results Areas

13. The three results areas of the Program represent priority reform areas that are strategically relevant to the successful modernization of the public administration in Burkina Faso and technically sound:

Results Area 1 – Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance

Strategic Relevance

14. Human Resources Management (HRM) encompasses the philosophy, strategic approach, principles, policies, procedures and practices related to the management of an organization’s employees; more importantly it is directly linked to their satisfaction and performance. In Burkina Faso, public sector inefficiencies, including HRM, are reflected in poor development outcomes. These inefficiencies present severe constraints to the Burkinabe government in developing their economy, utilizing and managing national resources effectively, promoting the social welfare of citizens, and delivering services. To counter and meet these challenges, the government is forced to rethink the organization and management of its human resources. The PSDMA strategically places HRM at the center of its efforts to modernize the public administration and results area one supports this priority reform area.

Technical Soundness

15. Civil service reforms are critical to improving the capacity and performance of the public administration. Historically, civil service reforms have been difficult to implement in many countries. They have often fallen prey to the countervailing incentives for the personalization and politicization of public office. Furthermore, staffing and remuneration is a central source of patronage.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Bukenya ànd Yanguas (2013) ‘Building state capacity for inclusive development. The politics of public sector reform’ Working Paper No. 25, <http://www.effective-states.org/publications>.

16. Civil service reforms in Burkina Faso have resulted in progressive improvements to human resource management, yet further efforts are required for these reforms to have an impact on civil servant performance. During the second generation of public sector reforms, in the early 2000s, efforts were made to develop more efficient systems for managing civil servants and contract workers:

- From 2005, certain human resource functions were delegated from the MFPTSS to the line ministries, through the creation of Human Resource Departments, and regional offices of the MFPTSS were established as an interface between civil servants situated outside of Ouagadougou and the administration. The devolution of responsibility for human resource management to the line ministries and the regional departments of the MFPTSS paved the way for a more efficient and responsive management of the state's human resources. However, these de-concentrated structures have limited capacity or authority to manage human resources effectively.
- The country also became one of the pioneers in francophone West Africa for the introduction of an integrated computerized system for human resource management (*Système Intégré de Gestion Administrative et Salariale du Personnel de l'Etat—SIGASPE*). In addition to this, the Government experimented with various software applications to electronically store and collate information on civil servants and make the information more accessible to civil servants. In comparison with the region, Burkina's electronic systems are well advanced and the administration has been called upon by other countries to provide technical assistance in this regard. Notwithstanding these innovations, the government has not completely shifted to a consolidated system for capturing all human resource processes. Accordingly, recruitment, career management and retirement processes are often delayed and neither the MFPTSS nor the line ministries possess easily accessible and up-to-date information on the civil service for planning, budgeting and monitoring of the wage bill.
- Efforts to introduce performance evaluation and merit-based promotion were slow-paced, but have started to gain traction. While performance evaluation has become routine across the ministries, the quality of the evaluation process is hampered by the absence of clearly defined job descriptions, annual performance contracts, effective controls on performance evaluation and training of personnel and management on the evaluation process. Transitioning from performance evaluation to real merit-based promotion will likely take time. As a next step, efforts need to be made to strengthen the evaluation process and cultivate trust in the process.

17. Under results area one, the Program seeks to target the technical shortcomings of earlier reform efforts. Activities are directed at modernizing and harmonizing human resource management processes and strengthening the capacity of the de-concentrated HR departments in the relevant ministries.

Results Area 2: Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation

Strategic Relevance

18. The design and delivery of public programs involve production of goods and services, or transfers of resources to individuals, organizations or other levels of government. Governments also use regulation – in areas such as workplace standards, consumer protection, the environment, foreign investment, transportation safety – as a tool for achieving policy goals. Effective institutional capacity lies at the heart of these core government functions. The government’s ability to react to changing economic, technological and social phenomena—and to shape these very same phenomena—requires ‘institutional capacity’ in the form of (i) modern and appropriate systems, (ii) adapted working environments; and (iii) strong management capacity and an appropriate skills mix of staff. The Program will promote improvements in the institutional capacity of the three selected ministries to develop, implement and monitor public policies.

Technical Soundness

19. The delivery of basic public services by the government is underscored by the capacity of the administration to effectively plan, implement and monitor its policies. Public sector reform failures have often been linked to failure to take political dynamics into account, weak diagnostics and no overarching framework, lack of theory of change, imported models, lack of ownership and short term approaches.⁵⁹ In Burkina Faso, the government has been relatively effective in analyzing development challenges and identifying development priorities and solutions. However, the mid to senior level civil bureaucrats that are responsible for implementation are often poorly equipped to undertake the task. The design of this results area takes these past failures into account. The results area supports the government in creating an administrative environment that is conducive to the effective design, implementation and monitoring of government-owned policies. In so doing, it avoids the tendency of donors to push for first-best technical solutions with little genuine support from the local bureaucratic and political leadership for the proposed reforms.

Results Area 3 – Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms

Strategic Relevance

20. The achievement of the country’s development objectives, as outlined in the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) requires a highly performing public sector, which is capable of delivering public goods and services and facilitating economic development by supporting public and private initiatives as well as providing social cohesion. As earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso have demonstrated (notably with respect to public financial management reforms), the cross-cutting nature of public sector reforms requires strong centralized coordination and clearly defined lines of reporting and responsibility. Results area three of the Program will accordingly focus on supporting the Permanent Secretariat for the Modernization of the Public Administration (SPMA) in coordinating the implementation of the overall PSDMA.

Technical soundness

⁵⁹ Zoe Scott. 2011. “Evaluation of Public Sector Governance Reforms 2001-2011: Literature Review” Oxford Policy Management.

21. The institutional coordination failures and successes of earlier public sector reform efforts in Burkina Faso (outlined earlier) served as a valuable lesson for the design of the third results area. Limitations in the design of the technical aspects of the PSDMA, capacity constraints in the SPMA to effectively coordinate the PSDMA program,⁶⁰ as well as insufficiencies in the steering function the National Public Administration Modernization Committee impacted upon the implementation of the First Action Plan of the PSDMA. The third results area supports PSDMA expenditure program and Program Action Plan (PAP) activities to address these insufficiencies.

Technical Assessment of Selected Sectoral Reform Paths

22. Given the cross-cutting nature of the results areas and their influence on specific sectoral service standards results, a technical assessment of the specific reform paths for each sectoral service standard result is summarized below. This assessment provides the strategic rationale for the selection of specific service standards in the three Ministries. It also incorporates a technical assessment of the sector-specific interventions and the pertinence of the cross-cutting interventions to the achievement of the service standard results. The assessment sets out the DLIs selected for each reform path and examples of the interventions (program and government-funded) that are envisaged to support the achievement of the DLIs.

Reform Path 1: Human Resource Management

23. *Strategic Relevance:* Enhancing the performance of the public administration lies at the heart of improving government effectiveness and the delivery of public services. Civil service reform features as a critical element of public sector reform. The MFPTSS is responsible for the overall management of the civil service and for leading the public sector modernization agenda. The inclusion of the MFPTSS in the Project is therefore strategically pivotal the effective implementation of the Program and the PSDMA. The MFPTSS has recently adopted a long term strategy to improve the human, infrastructural, technological and material capacity of the public administration. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on civil service reform in Burkina Faso, as outlined above, and is strategically well-placed to support the country in consolidating and improving upon its earlier reform efforts.

24. *Strategic Relevance to the PDO Level Indicator:* The MFPTSS is responsible for managing the careers of civil servants from recruitment through to retirement. The processes for recruiting, promoting, transferring and arranging the retirement of civil servants have an impact on (i) wage bill management; (ii) the efficient allocation of human resources across sectors and regions; and (iii) the motivation and performance of individual civil servants in contributing to the delivery for basic services. The complete transition from a highly centralized, manual system to a deconcentrated automated system for human resource management has yet to take place in Burkina. The SIGASPE, though more advanced and functional than other countries in the region, does not provide a comprehensive repository of up-dated information. The Program provides incentives for the government to take the necessary policy and operational changes to transition further towards a unique and integrated human resource management and payroll


⁶⁰ As identified in decree no 2011-1138/MFPTSS/CAB/SP-MA

system that is managed at the deconcentrated level. The PDO level indicator measures the efficiency gains in processing recruitments, promotions, transfers and retirement that will emanate from the application of such a system.

25. *Technical Soundness:* The Program activities related to this reform path (which are encompassed by results areas one and two), have been designed using existing analysis on the use of integrated human resource and payroll systems, as well as the experience gained through the initial installation of the system and the deconcentration of human resource management responsibilities under the Administrative Capacity Building Project. The Program will support both cross-cutting and vertical interventions to address many of the institutional and organizational factors that have prevented more efficient human resource management through consolidated ICT systems and enhanced deconcentration.

26. Figure A.4.1 presents the results chain for Result Area 1 in terms of sequencing of DLIs, program action plan activities, intermediate results and legal covenants. Activities undertaken in the input stage will contribute to outcomes and intermediate outcomes, all which will help the Program achieve DLI targets. For example, in the results chain analysis for Results Area 1, timely hiring of teachers in a teaching year, which is an activity of human resource management reforms, will help the Program achieve better results in the results area 3 for education. In order to demonstrate that relationship, the DLI 4, which an outcome for the education sector reform path, is represented by a dotted-line box.

Figure A.4.1: Results Chain for Results Area 1 – Human Resource Management Reform Path




Reform Path 2: Labor

27. *Strategic relevance of the sector:* The government's regulation and protection of labor standards represents a strategically critical service for workers, particularly in a country with strong socialist leanings. Government efforts to monitor and safeguard labor conditions in the private sector are also a necessary complement to efforts to improve civil servant working conditions. The Directorate General of Labor (*Direction Générale du Travail*) in the MFPTSS is responsible for monitoring compliance with the labor laws and regulations including registration of workers with the CNSS and employers' social security contributions. Compliance with the laws and with inspectors' orders and suggestions varies widely. Although there has been a steady increase in the number of workers registered with the CNSS between 2005 and 2018; the total number is still very low (see table 4). It stands at 298,648 workers at the end of 2013. In 2012, employer contributions to the CNSS amounted to around 110 million dollars (54,926,220,798 CFA).

28. *Relevance of the PDO level indicators:* The number of workers registered with the national Social Security Fund is an important step in providing them with social protection services (paid leave, social security, retirement) and increasing employers' contributions to the Fund.

29. *Technical Soundness:* Labor inspections are strategically significant to the Government's regulation and protection of labor standards. These inspections create visibility with respect to the conditions to which workers are subjected at the enterprise level. They also offer a valuable opportunity for the sensitization of employers with respect to their obligations towards employees. At present both the coverage and frequency of labor inspections are limited, leaving a significant proportion of the formal workforce, including those in high risk sectors (mining, construction) with little to no government surveillance of their employers. The Program will target the performance of the MFPTSS in improving the coverage, frequency and effectiveness of labor inspections.

Figure A.4.2: Results Chain for Results Area 2 – Labor Reform Path



Reform Path 3: Education

30. *Strategic relevance of the sector:* Primary education represents a core service provided by the Government in Burkina Faso and a priority development area. Despite remarkable progress,⁶¹ Burkina Faso still faces great challenges for providing quality primary education. The World Bank has long been a leading development partner on primary education reform in Burkina Faso⁶² and is strategically well-placed to continue support for the sector. The Program draws upon existing expertise and engagement in the sector and seeks to complement earlier and ongoing vertical support to the sector. It also harnesses MENA's relatively successful experience with results-based lending through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI)⁶³.

31. *Relevance of the PDO level indicator:* Notwithstanding significant improvements in access,⁶⁴ the quality of education represents a binding constraint to achieving educational development outcomes in Burkina Faso. The instructional time provided to students in classrooms has a particular impact on the quality of education. Student instruction time has featured as a priority area of reform in Burkina since 2001. There are clear linkages between instruction time, teacher management and broader civil service reform. Institutional factors related to the inefficient management of the school year and teachers are estimated to account for almost half of the instructional time lost. The present Program provides appropriate incentives to strengthen coordination between the Government's public sector modernization and civil service reforms and the sectoral reforms envisaged in the education sector with respect to instruction time. In so doing, it will help to strategically address the institutional factors that limit instruction time.

32. *Technical soundness:* From a technical perspective, the Program's proposed interventions will directly address inadequacies in the monitoring of instruction time. The Program will also support both cross-cutting and vertical interventions to address many of the institutional and organizational factors that continue to affect instruction time (e.g. late recruitment of teachers, inefficient human resource management processes, and controls over absenteeism).


⁶¹ The Ten-Year Plan for the Development of Basic Education (2001-2010) has greatly improved primary school outcomes. Between 2001-2010, the Gross Intake Rate (GIR) rose from 47.4 to 85.8 percent, the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER) from 45.9 to 74.8 percent, the Primary Completion Rate (TAP) from 27.4 to 45.9 percent and the success rate of Certificate of Primary Education (CEP) from 62.3 to 65.9 percent.

⁶² P115264 Education for All Fast Track Initiative Project; P148062 Education Access and Quality Improvement Project

⁶³ Fast Track Initiative Grant for Basic Education - P115264; Fast Track Initiative Grant II for Basic Education - P119413; Fast Track Initiative Grant III for Basic Education - P127166 .

⁶⁴ The Gross Enrollment Rate reached 79.6% in 2012, up from 72.4% in 2008.

Figure A.4.3: Results Chain for Results Area 3 – Education Reform Path



Reform Path 4: Justice Sector

33. *Strategic Relevance of the sector:* In Burkina Faso, the performance of the judicial branch of government has had a significant impact on citizen's trust in government and on levels of social cohesion. The judiciary provides both (i) a critical accountability check on executive action and public administration and (ii) a formal channel through which the grievances of citizens, including civil servants, can be addressed. Drawing on the lessons of past reform attempts, the MOJ recognized that there was a pressing need to tackle deeper institutional issues related to (i) the incentives of judges to perform; and (ii) to the Ministry's capacity to implement reform. The World Bank has traditionally had limited engagement in the justice sector in Burkina, yet there is increasing recognition as to the sector's pertinence and influence on the broader World Bank development program for the country.

34. *Relevance of the PDO level indicators:* From a public sector modernization reform perspective two areas of judicial reform are particularly pertinent and realizable in the short time frame of the Program:

A. Improving the Performance of Administrative Tribunals: First, improving the performance of the administrative tribunals is critical to ensuring that, downstream, the public administration is kept accountable to citizens. It also provides civil servants with a formal avenue for recourse against the State as an employer. Improving the administrative justice system is therefore a principal downstream element of enhancing public sector performance and a necessary condition for protecting citizens' rights *vis a vis* the State.⁶⁵

The average time taken by administrative courts to issue judgments remains lengthy.⁶⁶ In 2013, average case processing time was 1 year and 6 months, an increase of two months in comparison with the averages of 2011 and 2012. Improvements in case processing times in administrative jurisdictions are likely to have a significant impact upon individual litigants and upon broader civil service and public perceptions of the accountability of the public administration in Burkina.

B. Improving the performance of local departmental and district courts: Second, improving the performance of local courts in resolving local level conflicts in a formal and objective manner is necessary to strengthening social cohesion and making core functions of the State relevant and visible to the predominantly poor and rural populations in Burkina Faso. While the local courts are in high demand for the processing of civil registry matters, they seldom exercise jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters that require arbitration.⁶⁷ Drawing upon analysis conducted by UNICEF in 2011⁶⁸ the Ministry of Justice introduced a Local Court Reinvigoration Strategy in 2012 to strengthen the role of the local courts in resolving local

⁶⁵ The African Commission has determined that the right to a fair and public hearing is a general principle applicable to all legal proceedings, including administrative: see "Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa", African Commission, DOC/OS 47, section A – General Principles Applicable to All Legal Proceedings, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ZIM%20Principles_And_G.pdf>.

⁶⁶ There is however no absolute time limit in international law for the completion of administrative judicial proceedings, and the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is dependent on the particular circumstances of the individual case.¹⁶⁷ *König v Germany*, ECtHR, 28 June 1978, para 99.

⁶⁷ The Ministry of Justice does not collect statistics on case load or case processing for the local courts. However, in 2013, not a single case was referred from the local courts to a First Instance Tribunal (of a total of 486 cases).


⁶⁸ UNICEF (2011) « Access to Justice in Burkina Faso »

conflicts. The Program will help the Ministry of Justice to strengthen and scale up its pilot efforts to improve the performance of 50 local courts (see Table 11 in the Technical Assessment for the 50 selected local courts).

35. *Technical Soundness*: The Program draws upon a series of technical assessments of the justice sector conducted since 2008.⁶⁹ These assessments highlight that the limited capacity of the Ministry of Justice to strategically plan, coordinate and manage human and financial resources represents a critical constraint in the sector. In addition, the productivity of the administrative and local courts is affected by a combination of organizational shortcomings, capacity limitations and skewed incentive structures. The Program will support both cross-cutting and vertical interventions to address some of the critical institutional capacity and organizational factors that affect the performance of the administrative tribunals and the local courts.

⁶⁹ e.g. Justice Sector Review (2013), World Bank ; Minnegheer, Jacques and Smets Smets (December 2008) « *Évaluation du Programme d'appui au renforcement du processus démocratique, al bonne gouvernance, l'état de droit (PADEG) et Identification des lignes directrices de l'appui au Secteur de la justice dans le cadre du 10e FED, Rapport final* » : European Union ; Ouagadougou, Loada, Augustin (2012) « Background Paper on the Political Economy of the Justice Sector in Burkina Faso »: World Bank ; Kagan, Claudine (2007) « Rapport de Mission Justice 1 : Diagnostic des statistiques judiciaires et proposition d'un programme d'amélioration, » : European Union ; Ouagadougou. ; Kister, Janine (February 2012) « Mission de Suivi-Accompagnement de la Mise en Place du Bureau d' Execution des Peines au Tribunal de Grande Instance de Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso » : European Union ; Ouagadougou ; Caux, Olivier, Raynal, Jean-Jacques, Taberne, Jose Maria (March 2011) « Mission d'Identification et de Formulation d'Un Programme d'Appui à la Politique Nationale de la Justice » : European Union; Ouagadougou ; Centre Pour la Gouvernance Democratique au Burkina Faso (September 2011) “Rapport sur la Justice et l'Etat de Droit au Burkina Faso”.

Figure A.4.4: Results Chain for Results Area 4 – Justice Reform Path



Program's Expenditure Framework

36. The Public Sector Modernization Program will finance the implementation of a subset of activities in the PSDMA's Second Action Plan in three ministries. The estimated financing need for the Second Action Plan is Euro 53,108,763 (US\$59,339,400)—(Table A. 4.2) as total secured financing from the Program (Euro 35,800,000) and the Government (Euro 5,347,088) amount to Euro 41,147,088 (US\$45,974,400). The Program financing represents 87 percent of the total secured financing and the share of government financing is 13 percent of the total secured amount. The Program expenditure amount represents the full cost of direct modernization efforts in the selected three ministries, excluding wage and salary as well as recurrent operating expenditures. However the complementarity of the Program expenditures on sectoral activities in the government's budget makes the potential impact of the Program on the sectoral outcomes greater in value than the estimated amount of Program expenditures. For example, the Program activities to achieve the results in the primary education sector complement the activities of the MENA financed through the government budget. As such, the achievement of 770 annual hours of instruction in primary public schools in the selected three regions requires resources that are traditionally allocated to the Ministry of National Education and Literacy's budget such as teacher salaries, operating expenditures of schools as well as expenditures on educational materials. It is impossible to delineate the expenditures of sectoral ministries (i.e. MENA, MJDHPC) according to the geographical allocation and cost out a proportion that are only related to the achievement of the Program objectives. Because of these difficulties the government share of Program financing presented below represent only direct budgetary allocation of the government for the implementation of the PSDMA. It doesn't include sectoral ministries' budgetary allocations for service delivery in the selected areas of the Program. In that sense, the Program Financing table (Table 2) underrepresents the government's contribution to the Program as the indirect contribution of the government for the achievement of the program development objectives cannot be captured.

37. The government is presenting the Second Action Plan to other development partners to raise funds, but there is no firm commitment from other development partners yet. The Program activities are drawn from three sector strategies to populate the Second Action Plan and directly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDO.

38. The Second Action Plan consists of a series of sub-programs, each aligned with a pillar of the PSDMA. The sub-programs incorporate the following types of activities: (i) studies and technical assistance to analyze insufficiencies in existing administrative systems and processes, (ii) the elaboration of manuals, guides and other administrative tools to support human resource management, civil service administration and to establish service standards, (iii) the purchase of office equipment and supplies to strengthen the administrative capacity of the MFPTSS, the HR and planning departments of the ministries and regional departments (including those regions not covered by the Program), (iv) the extension of ICT, including the computerization of both internal and external administrative services in the ministries (e.g. applications for performance monitoring), and (vi) in-service training.

39. Table A.4.2 summarizes the allocation of funds across pillars of the PSDMA, as provided for under the Second Action Plan of the PSDMA. While the systems to be developed under the

Second Plan (i.e. performance evaluation system), can be applicable in all ministries, the Program will focus on their implementation in three ministries: MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC. The distribution of the Program financing across different pillars of the PSDMA is as follows: The first pillar of the PSDMA, which aims is to enhance public administration performance for sustainable development and streamline the decision-making processes, procedures and structures within the public administration, will receive 9 percent of the total Program funding Euro 3,201,219 (US\$3,586,560). The activities of the first pillar include: studies to analyze efficacy of the public administration, elaboration of a productivity strategy within the administration, development of performance evaluation system, development of modern HR management tools, designing training programs for senior managers on HR management, review of HR business processes and preparation of reports for the Council of Ministers.

40. The amount of financing for second pillar activities, which focus on improvements in human resource capacity and staff working conditions, will be Euro 6,541,286 (US\$7,328,680), around 18 percent of the total Program funding. The activities of the second pillar include: evaluation reports for the improvements in working conditions within the administration, studies the level of administrative resources (materials, infrastructure, logistics), procurement of material (computer, printer, furniture etc.) based on the analysis of deficiencies, analyses of deficiencies in the HR management units and diagnostic reports on career management within the administration.

41. Nearly 13 percent of total Program funding will go to the activities under the third pillar of the PSDMA, which aims to improve transparency with the administration Euro 4,798,913 (US\$5,376,572). The activities of the pillar include: studies to identify actions to improve hospitality and accessibility of public administration, elaboration of users' guide for public services, studies for the development of service standards within the administration, development of citizen charters, studies for streamlining administrative processes, and development of training programs for civil servants on citizen charters.

42. The activities under the fourth pillar of the PSDMA, which aim to improve efficiency, transparency and more accessibility of the administration through ICT technology, will receive 16 percent of the total Program funding Euro 5,778,629 (US\$6,474,220). The activities under the fourth pillar include: reviewing the organizational chart of ministries, establishment of IT teams within the ministries, training of IT staff in the ministries, development of on-line systems for e-government, and elaboration of legal texts for electronic approvals and payments.

43. The cost of the activities under the fifth pillar of the PSDMA, a pillar targeting deconcentration of the administration, is Euro 12,092,098 (US\$13,547,660), around 34 percent of the total Program funding. The activities include: elaboration of ministerial deconcentration plans, identification of material and human resource needs of the deconcentrated structures, rehabilitation of buildings in regions, and construction of new buildings in regions.

44. Finally, the Program will finance the implementation of the PSDMA for Euro 3,388,430 (US\$3,796,308), 9 percent of the total Program funding.

45. Program funding will be included in the annual budget, following the regular budget cycle, under the budget line for the Public Administration Modernization Program. All payments

of the Program will be made through the centralized Treasury system. All funding (regardless of the source) will flow through distinct budget line items. The Program funding will be used for only non-wage/salary related expenditures including non-wage related operating expenses and capital investments (small public works projects). The salaries of the civil servants are not part of the PSDMA nor the Program. The Program expenditures are narrowly drawn, excluding wage and salary expenditures. The Program expenditures are direct expenditures of the reform efforts whereas recurrent wage and salary expenditures would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts. They are financing activities clearly linked to the achievement of the DLIs and to the PDO.

46. Burkina Faso has a well-developed budget classification to track government expenditures under the Program. The Program budget for participating ministries will be incorporated in the PSDMA budget—under Title 5 Section 17 (MFPTSS)—of the annual budget which has provisions for both recurrent and capital budgets.

47. The Program will supplement PSDMA budget but will focus on implementation in the selected ministries. The total Program funds of Euro 35.8 million (US\$40 million) will be used only for financing of activities identified clearly within the PSDMA Second Action Plan to achieve the intended results.

48. Financial sustainability of the Program is not a major concern. The implementation of the PSDMA started with the first action plan covering the period of 2011 to 2013 for which an inadequate budget allocation of around US\$37,800,000 (18,619,000,000 CFA) was applied, of which US\$5,600,000 (2,800,000,000 CFA) came from the national budget. In order to ensure an adequate level of financial resources for reform coordination and the implementation of the PSDMA, the Program has a dedicated results area for coordination (Result Area 3) and Program resources will finance activities for reform coordination and monitoring and evaluation of outcomes.

49. Although the fiscal space in Burkina is likely to be tight over the next few years, a dedicated treasury special account (*Compte d’Affectation Spéciale ouvert au Trésor*, CAST) will be opened to avoid cash rationing and streamline payment process of the Program. It will enable linking program resources to spending by using the national public financial management system. It will facilitate the: i) monitoring of resources and their related expenditures in the national budget; ii) carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, which is an exception to the principle of the annual budgetary system; iii) managing of transactions directly through CID, and iv) having separate reporting on implementation, as well as an independent audit, since the transactions on the CAST can be extracted from the CID and the IT application for accounting (Integrated Accounting System, *Comptabilité Intégrée de l’Etat – CIE*).

50. An initial advance will be made to the Government once the Program becomes effective.

Table A.4.2: Program Expenditure Framework (in Euro)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total	Financing		
						Burkina	World Bank	Others
PILLAR No 1: IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY AND THE QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY	995,597	1,873,519	1,777,123	732,827	5,379,066	223,140	3,201,220	1,954,706
Program 1: Promoting Greater Performance in the Public Administration	288,333	934,546	975,604	338,316	2,536,798	17,851	1,742,420	776,527
Program 2: Streamlining Decision-making Processes, Procedures and Structures in the Public Administration	707,265	938,973	801,519	394,512	2,842,268	205,289	1,458,800	1,178,179
PILLAR No 2: RECOGNIZING AND IMPROVING HUMAN RESOURCE CAPACITY IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	3,387,105	2,495,259	2,275,689	1,528,616	9,686,668	1,644,096	6,541,287	1,501,286
Program 1: Improving Staff Working Conditions	1,330,985	377,553	288,297	168,694	2,165,529	103,537	1,945,959	116,033
Program 2: Improving Human Resources Management	1,297,443	1,381,344	1,247,460	668,188	4,594,435	772,957	3,424,289	397,189
Program 3: Strengthen the capacity of public administration in development policy design and monitoring	758,676	660,494	660,494	660,494	2,740,159	767,602	1,171,039	801,519
Program 4: Promoting Public Expertise		75,868	79,438	31,240	186,545			186,545
PILLAR No 3: PROMOTION OF ACCESSIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	2,798,308	2,349,939	2,277,642	1,501,472	8,927,360	427,001	4,798,913	3,701,446
Program 1: Improving Hospitality and Accessibility in the Public Administration	657,103	709,050	662,637	618,009	2,646,797	118,175		2,528,622
Program 2: Improving Transparency in the Public Administration	2,141,205	1,640,889	1,615,005	883,463	6,280,563	308,826	4,798,913	1,172,824
PILLAR No 4: PROMOTION OF E-GOVERNANCE	4,100,867	3,404,617	2,882,558	1,899,136	12,287,177	2,065,384	5,778,630	4,443,164
Program 1: Strengthening of the Institutional and Security Framework	94,611	299,900	182,082	17,851	758,676	556,957	148,165	53,554

	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total	Financing		
						Burkina	World Bank	Others
Program 2: Strengthening of the Communication Infrastructure and the Administration Information Systems	893,810	632,147	654,371	323,589	2,503,916	17,851	2,432,512	53,554
Program 3: Dematerialization of Administrative Procedures and Development of Online Services	3,112,446	2,472,570	2,046,105	1,393,465	9,024,585	1,490,575	3,197,953	431,999
PILLAR No 5: PROMOTION OF DECONCENTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION	3,925,532	6,288,299	1,953,975	904,324	13,072,130	740,825	12,092,099	239,206
Program 1: Strengthening the Operational Capacities of Deconcentrated Structures	3,634,558	5,799,177	1,687,992	638,341	11,760,067	133,884	11,547,638	78,545
Program 2: Promotion of the Advice/ Support /Assistance Provides to Local Governments	290,975	489,123	265,983	265,983	1,312,063	606,941	544,462	160,661
Implementation of the Strategy	1,415,957	880,421	773,589	541,605	3,611,573	133,884	3,388,433	89,256
TOTAL	16,683,366	17,392,052	11,932,572	7,100,783	2,963,975	5,347,088	35,800,000	11,961,675

Program's Results Framework and Monitoring & Evaluation

51. The Program Development Objective (PDO) is to improve selected service standards in selected ministries. The key outcomes to be achieved are the following:

- Improved human resource management processes;
- Improved institutional capacity for public policy making and implementation;
- Improved capacity for public sector reform implementation.

52. These results have been selected based on their strategic importance in their respective areas. The Program will be monitored and evaluated through the use of number of M&E tools throughout implementation including regular reports from the Ministries of Civil Service, Education and Justice as well as SPMA to ASCE, Cour des Comptes audits, value for money audits and the midterm review.

53. Internal administrative data collection capacity is relatively strong however additional efforts are needed to strengthen coordination and enhance the administration's capacity to analyze and use data in policy formulation and implementation. The Program Action Plan will support strengthened M&E capacity.

Governance Structure of the Program and Institutional and Coordination Arrangements

54. Adequate arrangements have been put in place for Program implementation. Details of the institutional and coordination arrangements for Program implementation can be found in Annex 1.

Fraud and Corruption

55. Existing anti-corruption measures and policies will be strengthened to avoid the negative impact of fraud and corruption in the achievement of program results. Detailed discussions of fraud and corruption within country context and mitigation measures are included in the Integrated Fiduciary Assessment (Annex 5).

Complaint Handling and Grievance Redress Capacity

56. Technical support will be provided to the Ombudsman to strengthen the grievance redress capacity of its regional offices and focal points. The objective is to ensure effective grievance redress and coordination with ASCE in handling fraud and corruption related complaints within the Program. The Program Operations Manual will have a Grievance Redress Section, as part of the capacity support to the Ombudsman. Further details of the grievance redress mechanisms proposed for the Program are outlined in Annex 5.

Economic Justification of the Program

57. The World Bank's Approach to Public Sector Management 2011-2020 'Better Results from Public Sector Institutions' provides a strong rationale for supporting public management improvements (2012). As the document states, the size and economic significance of the public sector make it a major contributor to growth and social welfare. The quality of services provided

by the government, and the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the public sector machinery are key areas that need improvement. The proposed reform areas provide a clear economic rationale for the intervention.

58. Economic evaluation of similar public sector reform programs elsewhere indicates that the economic benefits are wide-ranging and mutually strengthening. Emerging operational evidence of similar projects suggests that there are potential efficiency gains that can be derived from implementing public sector reforms supported by this program. Implementation of the program is likely to result in a reduction of transaction costs associated with the delivery of public services due to (a) improved human resource management capacity of government; (b) improved institutional capacity of selected sector ministries to design and implement public policies; (c) improved administrative capacity at the regional level resulting in improved responsiveness of service delivery agents to citizens' concerns, needs and requests; and (d) improved accountability linkages between decision makers and citizens, resulting in better living conditions and reduced social conflicts.⁷⁰

59. Although the expected economic impact of the proposed Program is difficult to quantify, it is expected to be positive. In the absence of hard evidence on economic rates of return and economic costs and benefits of institutional strengthening, cost effectiveness of these types of interventions elsewhere suggest that the benefits of the Program will outweigh the costs. In terms of a cost-benefit analysis, the Program seeks to modernize the public administration, leading to better management of civil servants and improved managerial efficiencies. The program resources will finance the implementation of activities within the PSDMA as well as sectoral plans with the aim of improving the human resource management practices and service delivery standards in selected areas.

60. While efficiency gains from improved services in human resource management can be estimated by using proxies, the improvements in service standards in the justice sector do not easily translate into monetary terms. Moreover, the transversal nature of reforms in policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation and the fact that these reforms are implemented alongside sectoral strategies make it difficult to attribute the expected outcomes to a single intervention.

61. Despite these difficulties, and based on certain assumptions, the expected impact of the proposed interventions is positive. The analysis assumes an exchange rate of FCFA 500 per US dollar and a 5 percent discount rate. The overall benefit is valued to be an estimated US\$56,091,515 to US\$72,734,040.

Evaluation of the Technical Risks

62. Based on the findings of assessments undertaken for the preparation of the Program, the overall technical risk rating is moderate.

⁷⁰ About the history of social conflicts in Burkina Faso see Harsch E. 2009. Urban Protest in Burkina Faso. *African Affairs* 108 (431): 263-288 and Hagberg S. 2007. Traditional Chieftaincy, Party Politics and Political Violence in Burkina Faso. In *State Recognition and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Buur, L. Kyed, H. M. (eds). Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire; 131-154.

63. The need for strong coordination between different ministries and their deconcentrated structures poses the biggest technical risk to the success of the Program. The Program mitigates this risk by setting up coordination committees (see discussions under Coordination Arrangements), strengthening the capacity of the SPMA and providing vertical incentives to encourage sectoral alignment with PSDMA objectives.

64. The weak monitoring and evaluation capacity of the SPMA and participating ministries also poses a technical risk. The Program Action Plan addresses the M&E risk by developing a robust capacity building plan.

65. With regards to fraud and corruption risks, the mitigation measures are taken at different levels. First, the ASCE will provide semi-annual internal audit reports, in cooperation with technical inspection units of the participating ministries. In terms of the external audit function, a private external auditor will audit the Program accounts initially while the capacity of the *Cour des Comptes* will be strengthened to assume the function following the mid-term review of the Program.

Annex 5: Fiduciary Systems Assessment

1. **A Fiduciary Systems Assessment (FSA) of the Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program was carried out in accordance with OP/BP 9.0.** An assessment of the financial management and procurement systems and capacities of the MFPTSS (the ministry in charge of the budget preparation and execution of the defined program expenditures), as well as the MEF, was carried out. The conclusion of the FSA is that the Program Fiduciary Systems have the capabilities to provide reasonable assurance that the funds under the Program will be used for the intended purposes.

2. **The Program will finance a subset of the Government’s Ten Year Strategic Plan for the Modernization of the Administration (PSDMA) over a period of four years (2016 – 2019).** The Program intends to support the operationalization of the PSDMA Second Action Plan in selected ministries. The Program aims to improve human resource management capacity of the Burkinabe administration and improve the operational efficiency of the selected ministries. The Program will promote the attainment of service standards in each of the selected ministries by focusing on three cross-cutting Results Areas: (i) improved human resource management capacity and performance; (ii) strengthened institutional capacity for policy planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation; and (iii) strengthened coordination capacity for public sector reforms.

3. **The Program will rely predominantly on the existing financial management and procurement systems and institutions in Burkina Faso.** Recent progress in the development of the country’s PFM systems and institutions has been assessed as sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the financing under the Program will be used for intended purposes, with due regard to the principles of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability. However, ongoing weaknesses in the existing systems were identified in the ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ report (including the risk of budget regulation and delays and duplication of controls) require that a series of measures need to be adopted. Accordingly the FSA recommends a series of activities which have been incorporated into the Program Action Plan to strengthen fiduciary aspects of Program implementation.

4. **The overall fiduciary risk for the Program has been assessed as moderate.** The risk will be mitigated by (i) the utilization of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (CAST)⁷¹, (ii) the appointment of a full time resident financial and public procurement controller, and (iii) the nomination of an experienced procurement specialist to the SPMA.

5. **The Program will be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Corruption (ACG) applicable to PforR operations.** Further details are provided below.

Institutional Arrangements for Program Implementation

6. The four most critical stakeholders involved in implementing the Program are the MFPTSS, MEF, MENA and MJPDHC. In the context of the Program, the MFPTSS is the

⁷¹ CAST is part of the government's existing procedures chosen for this program to facilitate the monitoring of Program resources and their related expenditures in the national budget and carrying forward unused but committed budgetary allocations, to avoid delays in the implementation of activities.

primary beneficiary that will be responsible for using the funds available through the Program in coordination with MENA and MJPDHC to support the implementation of a modern performance-oriented public administration system and the achievement of the results targeted by the Program. The SPMA is the lead agency for the Program and is also directly responsible for implementing activities contributing to targeted results. The Education and Justice ministries are not responsible for budget execution under the Program. The overall execution of the Program is centralized within the MFPTSS as the defined Program expenditures are directly linked to reform activities therefore the recurrent expenditures such as salaries and operating costs which would be incurred irrespective of reform efforts are not included the Expenditure Framework.

7. As the primary government institution responsible for elaboration and execution of the Program budget, the MEF has a central role to play in achieving the Program results in terms of release of funds and elaborating the standards and processes for program financial management.

8. The Program will be subject to the oversight of existing public sector oversight institutions in Burkina Faso. These include the Supreme Audit Institutions - the Court of Accounts (*Cour des Comptes*), the High State Control Authority (ASCE) and the ministerial technical inspectorates. The ASCE will be also responsible for conducting the annual performance audits and annual verification of results, which will consist of financial and technical audits and the verification of achievements measured by each of the DLIs in accordance with the verification protocol. The ASCE was selected as a result of its status as a constitutional body with both the independence and the mandate to conduct audits of the ministries. The ASCE will report the results of the verification audits to the MEF and the Bank.

Program Financial Management Systems

9. Financial management of the Program will be carried out using Burkina Faso's existing PFM systems and processes. The Program will be located within the country's budgetary framework and will rely on the existing systems for implementation.

Planning and Budgeting

10. The 2013 and 2010 PEFA assessments documented obvious progress made with respect to the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget, policy-based budgeting and internal controls, as well as the compliance of the budget preparation, approval and amendment procedures with good practices. According to the calendar set out in the Budget Act, at the end of May each year, the MEF issues Economic and Fiscal Policy Guidelines. All key indicators provided by the guidelines (including the limits of allocations set by the government) are then translated into instructions for drafting the state budget. A series of meetings with the MEF specifically targeted at programs means that they tend to be well integrated in the regular budget preparation process. When receiving budget instructions, program managers prepare their proposals of financial plans, within which they autonomously decide on the allocation of funds to programs and activities within the allocated limits. All approved programs have to produce their respective budgets for integration into the national Budget and the government's budget management application before Parliamentary approval. By the end of the year the Parliament adopts the annual budget. One key constraint is the in-year regulation of the budget allocation


that can create unavailability of resources to spending units due to budget rationing or mid-term revision of the Budget. In addition, the lack of multi-year budgeting does not allow carrying forward unutilized budget allocation of programs.

11. Program funds will be entirely reflected in the central government budget under the budget line for the Public Administration Modernization Program.

Payments and Flow of Funds

12. The PFM system in Burkina is based on the principle of the separation between those who order payments (ordonnateurs) and those who make the payments and record it in the accounting systems (public accountants).

13. Burkina Faso has selected the Euro as the currency for this operation. The GoB has analyzed the positive and negative of such choice and has concluded that the selection of Euro as the currency of choice is in their best interest reducing the country foreign exchange risk and aligning project financing currency (Euro) with its choice of disbursement currency and the repayment currency (Euro). Furthermore Burkina Faso local currency (FCFA) and international reserves are pegged to the Euro. All payments of the Program will be made through the centralized Treasury system. The government has requested to use a Dedicated Treasury Special Account (CAST) to avoid cash rationing and streamline the payment process of the Program. The CAST will enable resources to be directly linked to spending, in contrast to the general budget where resources cannot be allocated to specific expenditure. The creation of CASTs is provided for in the Public Finance Organic Law. The Parliament is responsible for approving the establishment of CASTs and their expenditure ceilings. CASTs use the existing public financial management system and are subject the same national fiduciary compliance requirements as other accounts. However, they facilitate: i) the monitoring of resources and their related expenditures in the national budget; ii) the carrying forward of unused but committed budgetary allocations, which is an exception to the principle of the annual budgetary system; iii) the management of transactions directly through the Integrated Financial Management System for budget monitoring (CID), and iv) separate reporting on implementation, as well as an independent audit, since the transactions on the CAST can be extracted from the CID and the IT application for accounting (CIE). The MEF is familiar with CASTs which are used for sectoral budget support by other development partners.



Accounting and Financial Reporting

14. The government’s budget management application is called the Integrated Financial Management System for Budget Monitoring (*Circuit Intégré de la Dépense - CID*) and it is fully interfaced with the accounting application (*Comptabilité Intégré de l’Etat – CIE*), which is used to produce annual financial statements. Both systems have been applied to all ministries at the central level, as well as to the regions. CID is an application that integrates a number of sub-systems including budgeting and internal controls. It is currently utilized to process the entire expenditure chain and has contributed to improving transparency, minimizing processing lead times and enhancing effectiveness. The Government’s other principle IT applications – the Integrated Information System for Procurement (*Système Intégré des Marchés Publics -SIMP*) and the Integrated Information System for Human Resource Management (*SIGASPE*) for civil servants’ payroll management – are also operational.

15. The government has adopted accounting standards approved by the WAEMU PFM directives since 2004. Though Burkina has not fully complied with the accrual accounting basis, it has applied double-entry accounting and records expenditures when these are incurred.

16. Budget execution reports: Since the implementation of the budget mid-term review, budget execution is reported on a bi-annual basis. This is complemented by bi monthly budget execution reports from line ministries to the Budget Directorate. These reports serve to identify how best to address issues encountered during budget execution and they include an update of the implementation of the procurement plan.

17. Annual financial statements and accounting reports: The annual financial statements prepared consist of a trial balance, a balance sheet, a P&L account, and a cash flow statement as well as annexes. These are complemented by the “comptes de gestion” produced by public accountants and sent systematically to the Court of Account. These end-of year-accounts provide the annual balance of all accounts used by the Treasury for collecting resources and incurring expenditures. As per the revised WAEMU PFM directives, government financial statements, annual accounts and supporting documents are made available to the Court of Accounts by 30 June of the following fiscal year.

18. The SPMA will be responsible for the compilation of Program financial statements and interim financial reports. Budget execution reports will be directly generated from CID, and transactions involving the Program’s CAST will be extracted from the CID and the CIE.

Controls and Audits

19. Burkina’s control framework comprises several layers:

20. Internal control procedures: The Public Finance Organic Law regulations and the IT applications (CID, CIE, SIGASPE, SIMP) are built upon sound principles of internal controls and segregation of duties. Checks and balances are incorporated at all stages of the budget cycle, from the requisition of funds to the spending, accounting and reporting phases and through different access and user rights within the IT applications. Any budgetary expenditure processed through CID requires the intervention and authorization of three distinct staff members: a budgetary execution officer, who will commit funds and verify the amount to be paid, a financial control officer, responsible for ensuring that all regulations have been complied with and documented, and an accountant officer, in charge of payment. To avoid duplication of similar controls and delay in processing the transactions, the MEF has issued a decree to clarify roles and attributions of different stakeholders, merge the public procurement controls and the financial control within the same unit and de-concentrate the verification units to the line ministries. However, these concrete measures have not yet impacted positively the processing lead time which is still very long. Program managers have reported delays and cancelations often due to excessive formalism of control procedures.

21. Internal audit: Ministerial inspections, such as General Finance Inspectorate (IGF), are responsible for applying audit systems and procedures, assessing risks, identifying the root causes of irregularities or inefficiencies and making recommendations for improvement in the management of the public administration. Notwithstanding the progress made, there is a need to enhance the audit methodology used by the ministerial inspections and ensure the effective implementation of the annual audit plans. Following the creation of the ASCE in late 2007, which merged the former General Inspection of State and the Anti-Corruption Commission, the country is progressively emerging as a good practice model for internal oversight within

Francophone Africa. The ASCE comprises 21 internal auditors and has progressively introduced a risk-based approach, starting with the risk mapping of key ministries including civil service, justice and education which are part of this Program. A three year audit plan for each of these ministries has also been elaborated for the period 2014-2016. The ASCE is also adding value in the internal control environment by addressing cross-cutting issues that have been hindering the effectiveness of the internal audit system, concentrating on the investigation of corruption cases and the identification of individual responsibilities when funds are misappropriated.

22. It has been agreed that capacity building support to ASCE will be provided under the Program to enable it to assume the internal audit function of the Program. The ASCE will coordinate with ministerial inspectorates involved to ensure effective implementation of audit plans, compliance with audit methodology and risk-based approach, quality reviews of their audit reports and adequate follow-up of audit findings and recommendations.

23. External audits: Set up in 2002, the Court of Accounts has 17 magistrates and three chambers, which are respectively in charge of the control over the State operations, decentralized entities and public enterprises. The Court of Accounts has been a member of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) since 2007 and needs to adapt its articles of agreement in line with the ethics and auditing standards. Despite backlogs in the delivery of judgments and delay in the revision of its organic law to create more attractive terms and conditions of work for Court staff, significant improvements have been achieved by the Court. These are evidenced by the regular publication of the annual report and the implementation of the action plan developed following the peer review performed by the Moroccan supreme audit institution and the recent organizational and financial audit of the institution. The program action plan includes support for the ongoing restructuring and strengthening of the Court of Accounts. The Bank will rely on a private external auditor to audit the Program's annual financial statements for the first two years of Program implementation to allow the Court of Accounts to clean up its backlog and strengthen its capacity. The audited Program financial statements will be sent to the Bank no later than 9 months after the end of the fiscal year. The capacity of the Court of Accounts will be reassessed by mid-term with the aim of transferring responsibility for the auditing of the Program's financial statements to the Court of Accounts in accordance with the country practices.

Disbursement arrangements from the Bank

24. Disbursements of the IDA credit will be made at the request of the borrower upon achievement of Disbursement-Linked Indicators (DLIs). Loan proceeds will be disbursed in Euro into a dedicated program account held at the Central Bank and then transferred to the Dedicated Treasury Special Account of the Program within the Treasury system. Disbursement requests will be submitted to the Bank using the Bank's standard disbursement forms through the e-disbursement functionality in the Bank's Client Connection system. An initial advance equivalent to 25% of the amount of the Financing will be made available upon project effectiveness in order to allow the borrower to achieve the results for one or several DLIs. This initial advance will be recovered against each DLI as per the instructions in the Disbursement Letter.

Program Procurement Systems

Procurement profile of the Program

25. Procurements to be undertaken in the Program are relatively modest and comprise of: (a) small works of rehabilitation and minor constructions; (b) IT and other equipment; and (c) consultant services for some studies and development of training tools.

Procurement planning

26. The Procurement planning process is well managed in Burkina. During the preparation of the annual budget, all ministries are invited to draft a procurement plan which is joined to the budget package and submitted to the approval of the National Assembly. Once the budget is approved, ministries are invited to adjust and finalize procurement plans and send for publication to the General Directorate for the Control of Public Tenders and Financial Engagements (*Direction Générale du Contrôle Des Marchés et des Engagements Financiers - DGCMEF*). The assessment of the national procurement system conducted by the Bank in 2009 for the ‘Piloting the Use of the Country System’ initiative found that proper budget implementation linked to procurement planning was made possible (i) because sufficient budgetary allocations for the duration of the contract execution were made at the start of procurement process; and (ii) through the existence of a computerized expenditure circuit (CID). But the ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ study in 2013 revealed that one of the main weakness of procurement planning is the poor implementation of procurement plans which is due mostly to the lack of anticipation in the preparation of bidding documents. It also highlighted that the midterm review of the annual budgets by the MEF results in a cutting of budget allocation and the cancellation of procurement activities on the annual plans.

27. The use of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST will mitigate the risks of loss of unused funds.

Procurement process and procedures

28. Following the transposition of WAEMU procurement directives, a Procurement Code was adopted in 2008, after review by IDA based on international practices. The Code of 2008, which was revised in 2013, promotes and establishes open competition, unrestrictive access to bidding broader publicity in advertising, minimum standards for standard bidding documents, including clearly specified evaluation criteria and measures to ensure the confidentiality of bids. In addition, new standard bidding documents were adopted in July 2009 to adhere to the provisions of the new procurement code. While the procurement framework is relatively robust, implementation and enforcement remain weak. The Boosting Budget Execution study report showed that there are a lot of delays in the procurement process as it takes more than 6 months to conduct a process from advertisement to contract award. The main reasons are: (i) the poor quality of bidding documents, (ii) redundant controls, and (iii) the low threshold of procurement methods and delegation of approval. The government is preparing to increase procurement, prior review and contract approval thresholds based on a proposal of the WAEMU.

29. Procurement under the Program will follow government procedures. The institutional arrangements of the Program reduce the risk of delays in procurement. To further mitigate the risk, the following measures need to be taken: (a) staff the SPMA with an experienced procurement specialist and (b) agree on deadlines to be respected by the SPMA in the procurement process and use these as indicators to evaluate their performance in procurement. This last measure will help to identify the different bottlenecks and address them efficiently during the Program life.

Controls and integrity

30. All contracts estimated to be above US\$10,000 for works, goods, non-consultant services and consultant services are submitted to the prior review of the General Procurement Directorate (*Direction Générale des Marchés Publics* - DGMP). Initially, this prior review was centralized in the MEF, but in 2010, the Bank' budget support operation proposed triggers on the decentralization of this function in some key ministries. The DGMP initiated a gradual process of decentralization of its review functions to the Ministries and Regions. Another improvement was introduced in 2013 with the merging of the DGMP and General Directorate of Financial Controls (*Direction General du Contrôle Financier* - DGCF) to create a new direction, the DGCMEF which combines procurement prior review and financial control. Today, a representative of the DGCMEF, a financial comptroller (*Contrôleur Financier* - CF) is assigned to each ministry and is responsible for conducting prior review of contracts under thresholds. An initial review of the impact of these changes noted some improvements but there are still challenges including: (i) the operationalization of the new function of CF through the implementation of the new Manual of Procedures and (ii) the training of DGCMEF agents.

31. Ideally, procurement audits are conducted by the Court of Accounts, but because of a lack of resources and capacity, the Court of Accounts does not systematically conduct procurement audits. The Procurement Regulatory Authority (ARMP) also has difficulty in conducting annual procurement audits. The last procurement audit covered the period of 2010 to 2013; but the final report is not available yet.

32. For the Program, the FSA recommends to contract out the procurement audit to a private external auditor by the SPMA to avoid backlog in the national audit system.

Procurement capacity

33. The MFPTSS, MJPDHC and MENA are the three beneficiary agencies. The assessment found that all the three ministries have an operational Procurement Department (*Direction des Marchés Publics* - DMP). All the DMPs are staffed with civil servants who have developed procurement capacity through practice and have an acceptable level of experience in procurement for goods and small consultant services contracts. However their experience and understanding of procedures for works is very limited. In addition, staff turnover in the DMPs is high. This can result in processing delays and poor results in procurement.

34. To mitigate these risks and reduce the work load of the DMPs, it is proposed to organize procurement training each year based on the finding of procurement audits for all procurement staff in central units as well as at the decentralized level.

35. The SPMA will coordinate the entire program and supervise its implementation in the three ministries. To play this role of coordination and supervision, it is recommended to staff the SPMA with an experienced general procurement specialist who has excellent communication skills to supervise and coordinate all work within the government and with the Bank. This person needs to be an experienced IT procurement person who can handle complex procurements and navigate the electronic civil service information system and its linkages with other government IT systems. Procurement staff in the SPMA will: (i) assist the DMPs in ministries to properly carry out procurement activities, (ii) consolidate and monitor the implementation of procurement plans, (iii) follow up on the use of procurement performance tools and indicators, (iv) organize procurement trainings, and (v) follow up on the implementation of recommendations from procurement audits.

Contract administration

36. The ‘Boosting Budget Execution in WAEMU Countries’ report noted that, most of the time, the contract amounts are underestimated by bidders because of the weak capacity of bidders to correctly estimate contract values in order to be awarded the contract. The main consequences of this are (i) failing in contract execution, (ii) poor quality of deliverables, and (iii) no respect for contract deadlines. The SPMA experience in contract administration consists of putting in place committees to follow up contract execution and ensure that deliverables are acceptable. It is essential for the procurement staff that will join the SPMA to have a minimum experience of contract management or to be trained in this.

Complaints handling mechanism

37. For Public Procurement, complaints are managed by the Public Procurement Regulatory Body (ARMP) which was established in 2008. Within the ARMP, an independent non-judicial appeals body with a tri-partite arrangement (public/private/civil society), the CRD, is specifically responsible for managing complaints. The decree no 2009-849/PRE/PM/MEF of December 24, 2009 on the attributions, organization and functioning of the ARMP, was modified on June 27, 2014. However additional recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the ARMP were tabled at the 2nd Public Procurement Forum held in September 2014.

Fraud and Corruption Risks and Mitigation

38. The political will and engagement of the government towards good governance and the fight against corruption is exemplified by their adoption of the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption in December 2005 and the African Union Convention of Prevention and Combating Corruption in August 2006. It is also highlighted by the government’s recent efforts to strengthen the institutional arrangements for tackling fraud and corruption, including (i) the creation within the ARMP of the CRD for the handling of complaints; (ii) the introduction in the new Procurement Code with specific provisions regarding fraud and sanctions; (iii) the creation in 2007 under the authority of the Prime Minister of the ASCE, to coordinate the fight against corruption and to conduct internal audits of State Institutions; (iv) the establishment of a public “hotline” to collect complaints at the ASCE level. Public perception of corruption in the public sector is however still relatively high. The country ranks 85 out of 175 economies on the Transparency International’s 2014 Index.

39. Despite the lack of a comprehensive law on right to information, the recently adopted anti-corruption law and supportive legislative frameworks provide assurances for fighting fraud and corruption in Burkina Faso. A National Anti-Corruption strategy exists and has received endorsement from both government and civil society organizations. Articles 154 to 160 of the Penal Code criminalize corruption, embezzlement, abuse of office and conflict of interest in the public sector. Sanctions for corruption range from fines and/or imprisonment to the removal of civic rights. Active and passive bribery offenders can be fined twice the value of bribes promised, received or demanded.⁷²

40. While limited capacity, particularly investigation skills, represents the key challenge facing the ASCE, the anti-corruption organization has demonstrated relatively strong ability to perform its legal mandates. The ASCE is currently concentrating on the investigation of corruption cases, focusing on the identification of individual responsibilities when funds are misappropriated. A major achievement of the progress made by ASCE is the elaboration of indicators to follow up the impact of anti-corruption actions and the adoption of a statistical reporting system on pending and closed corruption cases.

41. Despite this progress, the report of an anti-corruption NGO, REN LAC (*Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption*), on corruption perception in 2013 documented increasing of corruption levels, due to : (a) the lack of evidence that administrative sanctions are enforced in a systematic manner (an important number of corruption cases transmitted for judgment are still pending after several months and years) and (b) the government's reluctance to include certain provisions to the new draft anti-corruption law proposed by the civil society. The REN LAC 2013 report ranked procurement as the 4th most corrupt area of practice after customs, transportation and justice.

42. The following actions are identified to strengthen the system and improve its efficiency: a system of processing complaints through the existing country systems managed by the Ombudsman and ASCE (see further below) will be relied upon and improved and support to strengthen the effective monitoring of all corruption complaints by the ASCE.

43. The Program will be also implemented in accordance with the provisions of the Anti-Corruption Guidelines (ACG) applicable to PforR operations. The modalities for implementing the ACG will include the following:

- a. The ASCE will be the government's focal office for the purposes of ACG application.
- b. The government will undertake investigations, criminal and administrative, under the Program, of all material and credible allegations of fraud and corruption, and keep the Bank abreast of their progress and findings and make public the conclusions.
- c. The government will provide the Bank with reports annually or more frequently as warranted, reporting allegations of fraud and corruption under the Program received and registered, as well as related investigations and, as needed the actions taken. Reciprocally, if the Bank finds evidence of corrupt practices, the Bank will, to the extent

⁷² Finding The Right Balance - Scaling Up Complaints Handling Mechanism in the Burkina Faso Portfolio – A Blueprint. The report was authored by a World Bank team lead by Rima Al-Azar, Senior Operations Officer with the help of Souleymane Sere, Consultant, and Monique Ouffoue, Intern.

consistent with Bank policy, refer the case to the government for investigation under the relevant criminal and civil laws.

- d. If the Bank decides to conduct an administrative review into allegations or other indications of fraud and corruption in connection with the Program, conducted alone, together or parallel with the government investigation, the government will cooperate fully with representatives of the Bank and take all appropriate measures to ensure the full cooperation of relevant persons and entities subject to the government jurisdiction in such investigations, including, in each case, allowing the Bank to meet with relevant persons and to inspect all of their relevant accounts, records and other documents and have them audited by or on behalf of the Bank. If the Bank finds evidence of corrupt practices, the Bank will refer the case to the government for investigation under the relevant criminal and civil laws. The Bank may, however, debar private individuals and firms on its own.
- e. The Bank's right to investigate or conduct review does not extend to criminal investigations, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the government.
- f. The government will ensure that any person or entity debarred or suspended by the Bank is not awarded a contract under or otherwise allowed to participate in the Program during the period of such debarment or suspension. The SPMA will be responsible for the enforcement of the World Bank's debarment list.
- g. The bidding documents will serve as the bidders' source of information regarding the applicability of the ACG to the program. Compliance will be verified through the Program's annual audits.

Complaints Handling and Grievance Redress

44. Citizens' complaints and grievances pertaining to the Program will be coordinated and addressed by the *Médiateur du Faso* (the Ombudsman) and ASCE by using the grievance redress systems and administrative structures of these institutions. The existing country grievance redress systems have been assessed as follows:

- a. The governance of grievance redress by the *Médiateur du Faso* supports a redress service which, to a large extent, meets the principles of good complaint handling. The country's Ombudsman (*Médiateur du Faso*) created by decree in 1994, handles complaints from people who believe they have suffered injustice from maladministration by government and public institutions. Functionally, the *Médiateur du Faso* is a classical, single-purpose⁷³, complaint handling body, with relatively strong capacity at the center and weak decentralized units at the regions⁷⁴. In its strategic plan for 2013-2016, the *Médiateur du Faso* proposed to strengthen the capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points at commune level.
- b. The *Médiateur* offices receive complaints directly through writing, walk-in, phone call or through online submission. The ombudsman can independently initiate an investigation based on information reported in the media or upon request by the government. The institution has developed a grievance database and operational manual. It generates annual activity reports that provide data on the number and type of complaints; whether

⁷³ The Ombudsman's mandate in some countries includes handling of fraud and corruption allegations, in addition to handling complaints pertaining to administrative justice.

⁷⁴ Burkina Faso is unitary state. The country is divided into 13 administrative regions and 45 provinces

they were justified and successfully mediated, the geographical origin and are even disaggregated by gender. Between 1994 and 2010, the institution investigated 3,698 complaints related to conflicts between Burkinabe and non-Burkinabe nationals living in Burkina Faso and complaints involving government services. Approximately 3,500 cases, including 936 in 2009, were resolved. In 2013 the office registered 737 complaints, of which 82 percent were resolved. The Médiateur enjoys favorable public perceptions of its independence and impartiality and is generally perceived as a neutral and confidential moderator⁷⁵

- c. The ASCE receives complaints from several sources – walk-in, writing, or calling its hotline. The ASCE also investigates corruption cases published in the media. Between 2007 and 2013, ASCE received a total of 509 complaints of kinds. In 2013, for instance, 15 cases were referred to the courts for persecution. The ASCE also conducts its own investigations and controls government departments and agencies using a risk-based audit approach. Based on a variety of findings from its investigations, ASCE made 799 recommendations in 2013 of which 565 (representing 71%) were implemented by other government institutions. Technical support would be provided to ASCE under the Program to improve its operational capacity

45. The complaints handling in the Program will address the full spectrum of grievances that may arise through the implementation of the Program, including fraud and corruption:

- a. The Médiateur du Faso and ASCE would function as the focal institutions to receive and address citizens' feedback or complaints on the Program implementation. Full details of the role of each institution are provided in the Program Technical Assessment. Through Focal Points established at the local level and regional delegations, the Mediateur will be responsible for (i) receiving & responding to, and resolving complaints pertaining to rules, procedures and unfair treatments under the Program; (ii) forwarding all complaints related to fraud and corruption to the ASCE in accordance with the terms defined in the MoU and Grievance Redress Section of the program operations manual; and (iii) maintaining the register of complaints, preparing reports annually on grievance redress activities specifically for the project. Technical support will be provided to the Médiateur to support the implementation of key aspects of the Médiateur's action plan to improve capacity of its regional offices and appoint focal points for communes. The ASCE's role in the grievance redress process will consist of receiving complaints on fraud and corruption, not only from the Médiateur, but also directly from citizens through its normal processes and taking steps to investigate and take action in accordance with its operation manual, regulations and the terms of the MoU.
- b. A memorandum of understating will be established (MoU) between the *Mediateur* and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two institutions in handling complaints that relate to incidence of corruption and mismanagement of the Program funds. The MoU will provide institutional and operational guidelines for compliance with the Bank's ACG requirements on respecting the Bank debarment list, transparent reporting and effective handling of grievances, including fraud and corruption allegations.

⁷⁵ The Ombudsman is perceived to provide opportunity for informal discussion of problems and complaints outside formal channels. It listens, discusses, answers questions, provides information, and identifies options and strategies for resolving a conflict situation.

- c. A communications strategy will be developed to promote awareness of citizens on the proposed GRM processes, including methods of submitting complaints and expectations. The SPMA would facilitate the development of the communications strategy in coordination with ASCE and the Ombudsman.

Program Fiduciary Risk Assessment

46. The PFM systems in the country are generally solid by international standards as reflected in the 2013 and 2010 PEFA assessments. Obvious progress has been made on the comprehensiveness and transparency of the budget, policy-based budgeting and internal controls, as well as the compliance of the budget preparation, approval and amendment procedures with good practices. Other PFM diagnostics such as the country systems review for project financial management conducted in 2009 have confirmed the adequacy of the systems.

47. The PFM system is however undermined by delays in the authorization of payments resulting from bottlenecks in the expenditures chain and duplication of controls through the processing of transactions. In addition, in-year regulation of the budget and cash rationing are major weaknesses of the systems.

48. The creation of a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST, which has been envisaged for this Program could efficiently mitigate the risk of cash rationing and streamline payment process of the Program.

49. The four traditional steps (commitment, verification, approval for payment and payment) and *ex post* controls of financial and procurement controllers provide some level of fiduciary comfort but at the same time, create duplication and delays in processing transactions or failure to implement planned activities in a timely manner. An appointment of a resident financial and procurement controller fully dedicated to this Program and the adoption of a risk based approach as per the new WAEMU directives would contribute in mitigating the crucial issue of delay in the budget execution and processing of transactions.

50. It is assessed that the Program's PFM arrangements relying on existing country wide systems are acceptable in terms of procedures and results provided that the above-mentioned mitigation measures are adopted. The country PFM system gives reasonable assurance that the Program fiduciary risks would be maintained at a moderate level and could be mitigated through the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures.

Recommended Fiduciary Actions Included in the Program Action Plan (see Annex 8)

	Program Action	Responsibility	Schedule	Verification
1	Prepare and include in the annual Finance Law the annual plan and budget of the program and open a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST	Directorate of Budget Permanent Secretariat of the PSDMA	Starting from the first year of the Program	Unaudited financial report of the first quarter
2	Annually prepare a consolidated procurement plan accordingly to the budget allocated	Permanent Secretariat of the PSDMA	Starting from the first year of the Program	Consolidated procurement plan
3	Appoint a resident financial and public procurement controller fully dedicated to the Program to speed up processing of transactions and payments	Ministry of Economy and Finances	Starting from the first year of the Program	Annual performance assessment and program reports
4	Appoint an experienced general procurement specialist	Permanent Secretariat of the PSDMA	Completed	Annual performance assessment and program reports
7	Effective internal audit function established for the program in collaboration with ASCE; strengthening the ministerial inspection units of Public Service, Education and Justice to carry out ex-post reviews of the Program each semester and oversight the implementation of the three- year audit plans of the ministries involved	ASCE Ministerial inspections of Public Service, Education and Justice	Starting from the first year of the Program	Internal audit reports
8	Increase prior review, procurement methods and contract approval thresholds	Ministry of Economy and Finances	In the first year	Decree of the Ministry of Finance
10	Procurement capacity building program and conduct annual training to address weaknesses the identified weaknesses during audits	Permanent Secretariat of the PSDMA	Starting from the first year of the Program	Training reports
11	Definition of procurement deadlines and measure the performance of the DMPs (an sample will be provided and discuss during appraisal)	Permanent Secretariat of the PSDMA		Annual performance assessment and program reports
12	F & C cases reported on a semi-annual basis by the ASCE	ASCE / SP - PMA	An MOU signed between ASSCE, the Ombudsman and SPMA	

Annex 6: Summary of Environmental and Social Systems Assessment

1. This annex summarizes the Program's Environmental and Social Systems Assessment (ESSA), which was carried out following the PforR interim *Guidance Note on Environmental and Social Systems Assessment*. This annex presents: (i) the process, (ii) the environmental and social risks assessed to date, and (iii) initial conclusions.

2. The ESSA was conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders. During the preparation of the ESSA two consultation workshops were organized in June and August 2014. The final ESSA was validated during the national validation workshop on April 7, 2015 and was disclosed in the Infoshop on April 29, 2015.

A. The ESSA process

3. In accordance with the requirements of OP 9:00, *Program-for-Results Financing*, a comprehensive assessment was conducted to identify the strengths, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the Program's Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) with a view to assessing the adequacy of the ESMS for PforR financing and identifying key actions to improve the environmental and social management performance of the Program.

4. The ESSA, conducted by the World Bank with the support and collaboration of the borrower and stakeholders, had the following objectives:

- a) Verifying that the potential environmental and social risks and impacts of the Program are subject to an adequate initial screening,
- b) Ensuring that environmental and social mitigation measures to avoid, minimize, offset, and/or compensate any adverse impacts and promote environmental and social sustainability will be applied to activities that will have potentially environmental and social negative impacts; and
- c) Identifying suitable measures to strengthen the ESMS. These measures, which are to be implemented by the Borrower will be agreed upon between the Borrower and the World Bank. The proposed measures shall be part of the Program Action Plan.

5. The ESSA is based on:

- a. A desk review of relevant documents including: the Environmental Regulatory Framework, applicable laws and regulations governing the justice, education and public administration sectors, land laws and reforms and literature on the structure of the public administration, on gender and on social norms;
- b. Participatory assessments involving various stakeholders such as city councils, municipality representatives, unions, NGOs and the Program's institutional stakeholders (line ministries), staff of units in charge of environment and staff of the land management and decentralization ministry, MATDS;
- c. Field visits (Tenkodogo) and interviews with local stakeholders;
- d. An extensive consultation on the first ESSA draft through electronic dissemination to all stakeholders and separate meetings organized with stakeholders.

B. Environmental and social risks assessed to date

6. *Environmental aspects:* Potentially adverse impacts associated with Program activities are expected to be minor, site-specific and manageable at an acceptable level. The following risks have been identified:

1. There is a risk that activities might be implemented without an assessment of their environmental impact in order to speed up investments. To mitigate this risk, awareness campaigns need to be organized on the importance of conducting a systematic environmental impact assessment based on the screening mechanism contained in the ESSA for all activities and relevant safeguard measures taken before any implementation.
2. The capacity of environmental teams established in the selected ministries, which will be in charge of environmental impact management of the Program is weak. The staff in charge of these environmental cells are not environmental specialists. In addition, many of them do not have their own budget to allow them to build up their capacity or to organize field missions. From an organizational perspective, the environmental cell report to the Directorate General of Environment Protection and Sustainable Development (*Direction General de la Protection Environnementale et du Developpement Durable - DGPEDD*) and accordingly do not benefit from the National Agency in charge of Environmental Assessments (*Bureau National des Evaluations Environnementales - BUNEE*) training and capacity development initiatives. Furthermore, there is a risk of staff turn-over in the cells. To strengthen the capacity of the environmental cells, it is recommended that the Program facilitate training for the staff in the environmental cells of the ministries implicated by the Program and promote the reinforcement of professional relations with BUNEE to provide support and guidance. It is also recommended that the Program support field missions of the environmental cells. Finally, it is recommended that the Program provide work materials and other support to the environmental cell staff to interest them in the Program's activities.

7. *Social Aspects:* The main risks noted are as follows:

- 1) *Involuntary land acquisition:* Some building construction and rehabilitation are planned. Though the government plans to mobilize and use only public land, the ESSA considers potential impacts in terms of loss of revenues, habitats and sources of revenues in particular in rural areas where land titling is not systematic and customary laws are still practiced. Should involuntary land acquisition occur, the current national laws include processes similar or in line overall with OP 4.12 related procedures. However, it is recommended that the government: a) reinforce coordination and harmonization between relevant administrative stakeholders in rural areas, b) minimize resettlement of people, c) take into account informal occupants/squatters, d) ensure monitoring and evaluation in case of resettlement.

Based on the assessment of potential risks, the ESSA makes proposals in terms of monitoring processes and tools (screening sheets, compensation mechanisms, relevant documentation) and institutional mechanisms (focal person at central and local levels in charge of monitoring social related impacts and mitigation measures).

- 2) *Gender and inclusion:* There are no major gender and inclusion risks deriving directly from the implementation of the program activities. Nevertheless, the ESSA considers a few potential indirect impacts due to inherent system weaknesses such as: (i) insufficient representation of female civil servants in particular in management positions in rural areas, (ii) limited access of beneficiaries to administrative services due to lack of adequate communication and transport material and staffing, (iii) limited physical accessibility of buildings for handicapped persons. These existing weaknesses may impact on the quality of services rendered by the line ministries involved in the program.

To address potentially negative impact on gender and inclusion, the ESSA recommends the inclusion of accessibility structures (ramps) in planning and construction of buildings financed under the Program and an awareness-raising program on gender awareness for civil servants to improve service delivery.

- 3) *Grievance redress:* The potential risks pertaining to grievance redress are twofold: (i) the likelihood that investigation of corruption allegations may take a long time to complete and the possibility of the ASCE not following up to ensure that sanctions are implemented; (ii) weak capacity of the regional offices of the Ombudsman to address some grievances. These weaknesses may affect the effectiveness the handling of complaints and corruption cases in the Program. To mitigate these risks, an MOU will be established between the Ombudsman and ASCE to promote collaboration between the two institutions in handling fraud and corruption allegations and ensuring government compliance with the Bank's Governance and Anti-corruption guidelines on Program-for Results operations.

C. ESSA conclusions

8. The ESSA concludes that:

- The Program ESMS is adequate for PforR financing,
- The activities to be funded under the Program should, by their nature, characteristics, and size, generate, low-to-moderate environmental and social impacts and generally bring beneficial and positive environmental and social impacts,
- The ESMS is equipped with tools and processes to identify, mitigate, and report on possible environmental and social impacts of activities upon inclusion of Bank recommendations,
- The risk of environmental and social impacts is addressed through relevant ESMS provisions and operational procedures upon inclusion of Bank recommendations,
- The subproject screening system in place provides an effective mitigation process in the case of large infrastructure activities that would have significant and/or negative OP 4.01 and OP 4.12 related impacts.
- The Program does not entail any real risk related to cultural appropriateness but, on the other hand, entails positive effects on service delivery.
- Measures identified thus far to strengthen the Program ESMS include:
- Use of screening forms, identification and definition of appropriate mitigation measures,

- Strengthening the institutional arrangements to better include environmental and social aspects in the overall management of the Program which would include (i) capacity building of relevant staff on social and environmental aspects and (ii) designation of staff in charge of monitoring, documenting and reporting on environmental and social related aspects at central and decentralized levels including within the SPMA.

9. The Bank has agreed with the Borrower on these above measures which have been built into the Program Action Plan. The Bank team will work closely with the Borrower throughout the implementation support period to assist toward the effective implementation and completion of any agreed actions to improve and strengthen the Environmental and Social Management System.

Annex 7: Integrated Risk Assessment

ORAF: Burkina Faso Public Sector Modernization Program

PDO: Improved selected service standards in selected ministries. ⁷⁶				
1. PROGRAM RISKS				
2.1 Technical Risk		Rating:	Moderate	
Description: Poor coordination by the Permanent Secretariat of the Modernization Plan or weak technical implementation capacity in the pilot ministries could have an impact upon the pace of achieving results.		Risk Management: The overall oversight responsibility of the Program is with the National Public Administration Modernization Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister. The Program has allocated resources for the functioning of the oversight mechanism. In addition, the Program envisages building stakeholder capacity for implementation through the Program Action Plan and setting up a strong communication strategy to support the implementation of the Program across the various ministries. Moreover, the Results Area 3 activities include enhancing the understanding of counterparts on the PforR instrument possibly through south-south exchanges. The team will closely monitor the implementation of activities, particularly at entry, to ensure all stakeholders are committed to the Program.		
		Resp: Task Team	Stage: Implementation	Due Date : Not yet due
2.2 Fiduciary Risk		Rating:	Moderate	
Description: Insufficient up-front national budget allocations could affect the pace or extent to which the DLIs are achieved. Delays in procurement might delay activity completion.		Risk Management: Work on consolidated PFM reforms will continue. A dedicated special treasury account will be established to ensure the flow of Program funds. In addition, a resident financial and public procurement controller that is fully dedicated to the Program will be appointed to speed up processing of transactions and payments.		
		Resp: Task Team	Stage: Implementation	Due Date : Not yet due
2.3 Environmental and Social Risk		Rating:	Moderate	
Description: The Program could experience minor social risk due to resistance from labor unions (civil servants) with respect to the administration's modernization		Risk Management: The PSDMA was developed on the basis of an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders. Extensive consultations with social actors were also undertaken during Program preparation. Improved communication and the consolidation of positive motivation strategies in		

⁷⁶ The improvements are in labor, education and justice sectors as well as human resource management in civil service. The service standards selected are drawn from the sector strategy of each ministry. For the purposes of this program, service standards refer to services provided by government ministries both internally within the administration and externally to citizens.

scheme.	the three selected ministries will minimize the risk.			
	Resp: Task Team	Stage: Implementation	Due Date : Not yet due	Status: Not yet due
2.4 Disbursement linked indicator risks	Rating:	Moderate		
Description: Implementation difficulties in certain ministries could have an impact upon overall disbursements, which would in turn penalize the performing ministries.	Risk Management: Inclusive preparation of Program activities has ensured that there is commitment and ownership of the DLIs at both the central and deconcentrated levels (regional offices of the three ministries participated in preparations). DLIs are allocated equitably across ministries and across the implementation period of the Program. This will help to ensure that performing ministries are appropriately and regularly rewarded for achieving results. The inclusion of scalable DLIs provides additional encouragement to ministries to sustain or accelerate reform momentum.			
	Resp: Task Team	Stage: Implementation	Due Date : Not yet due	Status: Not yet due
2.5 Other Risks (Optional)	Rating:	Moderate		
Description: Monitoring and evaluation capacity is limited.	Risk Management: The Program Action Plan ensures extensive capacity development in monitoring and evaluation and will strengthen the results-orientation of the government's PSDMA reform program. Clearly defined verification protocols and the inclusion of external verification mechanisms will complement the capacity development support. Close supervision and guidance will be provided by the Bank team throughout implementation.			
	Resp: Task team	Stage: Implementation	Due Date : Not yet due	Status: Not yet due
3. OVERALL RISK RATING: The overall risk is MODERATE.				

Annex 8: Program Action Plan

Action Description	Due Date	Responsible Party	Completion Description	Link to DLI	Covenant
Results Area 1 : Improved Human Resource Capacity and Performance					
Diagnostic of SIGASPE functionality	Effectiveness	MFPTSS	Validated report by a national workshop with stakeholders	DLI 1.1	
Technical assistance for SIGASPE system for new modules, upgrading old modules, training of users	CY1	MFPTSS	Upgraded SIGASPE has been approved by Minister of MFPTSS.	DLIs 1 and 1.1	
Introduction of an electronic registration and marking system 'e-concours' for teacher entry examinations		MFPTSS, MENA		DLIs 1.2 and 3	
Review of HR business processes and tools	CY1	MFPTSS	Report validated and approved by Minister of MFPTSS	DLI 1	
DRH training course designed	CY2		Training modules validated and approved by Minister of MFPTSS		
Results Area 2 Strengthened Institutional Capacity for Policy Planning, Implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation					
Minimum standards for regional ministerial departments / jurisdictions identified	CY1	MFPTSS, MENA, MJPDHC,	Ministerial protocols signed and disseminated MOU signed		
Implementation of a risk-based labor inspection program established	CY1,2,3	MFPTSS	Programme validated and disseminated to regional directorates by MFPTSS	DLI 2	
Monitoring and evaluation system for teacher time on task reviewed	Effectiveness	MENA	Report validated and approved by MENA	DLI 3.1	
Training and sensitization program for monitoring teacher time on task designed and disseminated	CY1	MENA	Report including training attendance records is submitted	DLI 3.1	
Technical assistance to review on-line accessibility to laws and	CY1	MJPDHC	Report validated and approved by MJPDHC		

jurisprudence					
Review of administrative law court registers and identification of automated registry criteria	CY2	MJPDHC	Report validated and approved by MJPDHC	DLI 4.1	
Local court registers standardized	CY1	MJPDHC	Decree issued by MJPDHC	DLI 4	
Training modules for local court personnel designed and disseminated	CY1, CY2, CY, 3	MJPDHC	Report including training attendance records is submitted	DLI 4	
Results Area 3 - Strengthened Coordination Capacity for Public Sector Reforms					
Decree issued to include MJPDHC and MENA in the National Public Administration Modernization Steering Committee	Effectiveness	PM, SPMA	Decree issued by Prime Minister		
Strengthening of the capacity of the SPMA	Effectiveness	PM, SPMA	Decree issued by Prime Minister		
Establishment of a Program Implementation Committee chaired by the SPMA and DGESS's of the MFPTSS, MENA and MJPDHC	Effectiveness	PM, SPMA	Circular issued by MFPTSS		
Program Operational Manual developed and disseminated	Effectiveness	SPMA	Circular issued by MFPTSS		
Action plans for risk-based auditing established in each of the participating ministries and training of ministerial staff conducted	CY2	ASCE, MFPTSS, MJPDHC, MENA	Circular issued to participating ministries by the ASCE		
Annual verification of Program results conducted	CY1, 2, 3, 4	ASCE	Report issued by ASCE		
Annual audits are completed by September 30	CY1, 2, 3, 4	<i>Cour des Comptes</i>	Annual audit report of the Program		
Semi - annual reporting on implementation and monitoring of safeguards related impacts (screening	CY1, 2, 3, 4	SPMA in coordination with MFPTSS, MENA and	Report issued by SPMA		

sheets, compensation mechanisms and payments and other relevant documentation included in the ESSA) and semi report on procurement deadlines and indicators (Percentage of contracts approved in the validity deadlines, percentage of contracts executed in the contractual time, number of days of contract payment)		MJPDHC			
Annual plan and budget of the Program prepared and included in the annual Finance Law and a Dedicated Treasury Special Account – CAST – opened	Starting from the first year of the Program	Directorate of Budget SPMA	Verified by unaudited financial report of the first quarter		
An annual consolidated procurement plan is prepared accordingly to the budget allocated	CY1, 2, 3, 4	SPMA			
Resident financial and public procurement controller fully dedicated to the Program	Starting from the first year of the Program	MEF	Annual performance assessment and program reports		
Experienced general procurement specialist appointed	Effectiveness	SPMA	Appointment letter (note d'affectation)		
Effective internal audit function established for the program ASCE in collaboration with ministerial inspections of Public Service, Education and Justice will carry out ex-post reviews of the Program each semester and oversee the implementation of the three- year audit plans of the ministries involved	CY1, 2, 3, 4	ASCE Ministerial inspections of Public Service, Education and Justice	Internal audit reports		
Procurement thresholds increased	First year	MEF	MEF Decree		

F & C cases reported on a semi-annual basis by the ASCE	Periodic (every June and December)	ASCE / SPMA	Report		
PSMA Capacity building program designed	First year	SPMA			Training materials developed
Definition of procurement deadlines and measurement of the performance of actors in the procurement chain	First year	SPMA			Annual performance assessment reports
Installation of an information monitoring and evaluation information system	First year	SPMA			

Annex 9: Implementation Support Plan

1. The Program will require considerable focused support from the World Bank team particularly during the early stages. The main challenge will be to strengthen the capacity of implementation agencies to plan for program activities and coordinate implementation with the different line ministries and their regional offices. It will be particularly important to support SPMA in the rolling out the Program, including the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation system. Implementation support will focus on implementation of the Program Action Plan

2. Key to effective implementation support will be sustained engagement on the ground. The first implementation mission will take place as soon as possible after effectiveness to provide direct feedback on the quality of Program plans and review progress made against the Program Action Plan. The first mission is therefore expected to include staff predominantly from the M&E and fiduciary teams.

3. From a fiduciary perspective, the implementation support will focus on reviewing the Program quarterly financial reports, annual financial statements and audit reports as well as the Program reports such as the results verification reports prior to disbursement. The task team will coordinate the results reporting for the DLIs with the disbursement of the IDA credit funds.

Table A.9.1: Main Focus of Implementation Support

Time	Focus	Skills Need	Resources
First 12 months	Support to implementing agencies to finalize Program plans and begin implementation, including ensuring adequate resource and M&E capacity	Technical skills in main Program areas and ability to work with clients	Team of 3-4 specialists
12-48 months	Quarterly discussions with implementation agencies to review progress and plans for next cycle	Technical skills in main Program areas and ability to work with clients	Team of 3-4 specialists
Other	Independent verification of results	Technical skills on M&E	Team of 3-4 specialists

Annex 10: Development Partner Support

1. Extensive and ongoing coordination has been established with other development partners working on public sector governance reforms, including the UNDP and the European Union (EU). In addition to close bi-lateral relations with active partners in public sector governance, the program team participate in the donor working groups on Public Sector Management, Justice and Human Rights and Education as platforms to coordinate with development partners. While there are few development partners supporting the implementation of the PDSMA, there are multiple donors engaged in the justice (EU, French, Danish and Japanese) and education (EU, UNICEF, UNDP, French) sectors. Close collaboration with these partners during project preparation will ensure that the various interventions are complementary and appropriately harmonised.

2. Details of the existing and planned engagement of development partners in supporting the implementation of the PSDMA, PSEF and PNJ are discussed below.

Primary Education

3. The proposed Program has been designed utilizing a sector wide approach that would complement the efforts of the government and development partners in the primary education sector. Consistent with this approach, the Program aims to address institutional weaknesses in the MENA not currently being addressed by the government, the Bank or other DP. Table A.10.1 below presents the operations of other development partners in the primary education sector. As presented in the table, other development partners are currently engaged in different aspects of primary education system.

Table A.10.1. Donor Partners' Support to the Primary/Basic Education Sector

Donors	Period	Type of Intervention	Total Budget (000 FCFA)
Pooled Fund Participating Donors: French Development Agency Canada Denmark Netherlands Switzerland UNICEF GPE	2013-2015	Development of access to formal basic education; improving the quality of formal basic education; development of non-formal education; control of the formal basic education and non-formal education; effective and efficient management of PDSEB.	101,600,000 (US\$203.2 million)
School Canteens Project MEBA / Cathwel	2011-2015	Addressing food insecurity by improving students' health and nutritional status, with a specific focus on rural food insecurity (serving a meal each day for students in the program, contributes to lower dropout rates; improve the rate of enrollment, attendance and success in school).	7,655,813 (US\$15.4 million)
Project Schools Annex and Centers Non-formal Basic Education (ES / CEBNF) and	1995-2015	Increasing: (i): the number of girls and boys receiving quality basic education and (ii) the	9,445,901 (US\$19 million)

Donors	Period	Type of Intervention	Total Budget (000 FCFA)
UNICEF		number of girls and boys with disabilities receiving quality basic education. Building the capacity of community structures to promote educational innovations.	
Public primary school classrooms Construction and equipment Project (Phase 5). Japan	2012-2014	Construction of primary school infrastructure, accommodation for teachers, classrooms and toilets in primary schools.	7,373,498 (US\$15 million)
Project to Support Continuing Education of Teachers in Science and Mathematics at Primary School Phase II (Burkina Faso SMASE-II) JICA	2012-2015	Improvement of students learning in mathematics and sciences in all public schools in Burkina Faso, including the training of teachers and academic supervisors.	1,831,463 (US\$3.5 million)
Development Project of Basic Education, Phase IV - IDB	2011-2015	Construction and equipping of an ENEP (<i>Ecole Normale des Enseignants du Primaire</i>) in Tenkodogo; construction and equipping of school complexes; acquisition of vehicles; acquisition of office equipment (computer, photocopiers and fixtures); training of coaches, teachers and executives of MENA in emerging themes; acquisition of school kits, sewing and grinding machines; awareness campaigns to lead to the promotion of girls' education.	6,290,000 (US\$12.6 million)
Project to support basic education and literacy by the PV-LFP-LED (A Lamp for Africa) lighting. Taiwan, China	2011-2014	Improving the quality of basic formal education and basic non-formal education in rural areas through the provision of lighting for classrooms through the acquisition of lighting kits.	2,967,798 (US\$6 million)
WFP Country Program 2011/2015	2011-2015	Improving enrollment, attendance and success of students, especially those in rural areas with high food insecurity rates by setting up local canteens in the Sahel region.	6,594,607 (US\$13.2 million)

Justice

4. While the World Bank has not extensively engaged in the justice sector to date, a recent background review of the justice sector in Burkina Faso, including a political economy analysis of reform implementation in the sector, has provided a strong rationale for strategic engagement. In addition to the sector's pivotal influence with respect to the country's stability and with respect to the population's confidence in the administration in general, the externalities of a performing justice sector in other areas of development are significant. Table A.10.2 below presents the operations of other development partners in the justice sector. As presented in the table, other development partners are currently engaged in different aspects of justice system, namely, the France in criminal justice, the Denmark in human rights.

Table A.10.2. Donor Partners' Support to the Justice Sector

Projects/Programs	Objectives/Components	Development Partner
<p>National Justice Policy Support Program</p> <p><i>Programme d'appui à la politique nationale de justice (PA-PNJ)</i></p>	<p>The objectives of the program are to support justice sector to have a credible justice, effective and accessible to all. It seeks the following outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcome 1: the structural framework of justice is improved • Outcome 2: the public service of justice is optimized • Result 3: Implementation of the instruments of the NPC are reinforced 	<p>Partner : European Union Amount : 10 100 000 EUR (6,6 billion FCFA) Duration : 84 months: Effectiveness date : October, 2014 Closure : 2022</p>
<p>Support for the Modernization of the Justice</p> <p><i>Appui à la modernisation de l'institution judiciaire (AMIJ)</i></p>	<p>AMIJ is part of the National Justice Policy; it is built around the following components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • improving access to justice • restoration of the criminal courts performance and support criminal treatment of terrorism and transnational threats • reform and modernization of the prison system to reduce overcrowding 	<p>Partner : French development Agency Amount : 485 000 EUR (317 million FCFA) Start date : 2013 Closure : 2016</p>
<p>Project "Establishment of Human Rights and Credibility of Justice with Denmark"</p> <p><i>Projet « Instauration des Droits humains et Crédibilité de la Justice avec le Danemark »</i></p>	<p>The objective of the project is to strengthen the protection of the rights and the freedoms in Burkina Faso and the credibility of justice.</p> <p>The expected outcomes of the justice component are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The legislative framework is enhanced inclusive and participatory manner according to the recommendations of the UPR on the rights of women and non-negotiable rights - Ethics is better respected in the administration of justice and the stakeholders of the judiciary. 	<p>Partner : DANIDA Amount : 39 028 815 DKK (3 439 268 000 FCFA) Duration : 5 years Start Date : January 2016 Closure : December 2020</p>
<p>Project to support the consolidation of the rule of law and access to justice for the poor in Burkina Faso led by UNDP</p> <p><i>Projet d'appui à la consolidation de l'Etat de droit et l'accès à la justice pour les pauvres au Burkina Faso piloté par le PNUD</i></p>	<p>The project aims to strengthen national capacity for good governance promotion based on the strengthening of the rule of law.</p> <p>Specific objective 1: strengthening access to legal and judicial information of populations to improve the psychological populations' access to justice.</p> <p>Specific Objective 2: effective implementation of legal assistance to improve financial access of the poor to justice.</p> <p>Specific Objective 3: strengthening human, technical, material and logistical poor to justice.</p>	<p>Partner : Japon Amount : 350 millions FCFA Start Date : 2013 Closure : 2015</p>

