

International Workshop Report

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People's Republic of China:

TA 8869: International Workshop: PPP Financing and Risk Management

12 June 2015 Beijing

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Summary

This report summarizes the presentations of the PPP Financing and Risk Management workshop held in Beijing on 12 June 2015. The workshop was organized by China PPP Centre, Ministry of Finance, PRC and the Asian Development Bank.

More than 80 participants attended the workshop from central governments, the financial and consulting sectors, academia, and development partner institutions. The workshop focused on PPP financing, risk management for PPPs and implications for the PRC.



Risk Management of PPPs Principles and Practice



Michael Schur and Alex Sundakov, June 2015

AGENDA

Issues in PPP risk management

- · Reducing the cost of finance
- Reasons why a feasible project may still be too risky to be bankable
- Risk over the project cycle

Responses to these issues

- · Credit enhancement measures
- Matching risk to investor preferences
 - Infrastructure is a popular asset class for Pension Funds
 - Infrastructure assets and Pension Funds in Australia



The cost of finance can and should be reduced

- Projects may be viable but not bankable
 - Even though expected revenues cover costs it may be impossible to secure adequate finance due to concerns about the variability (risk) of costs or revenues, credit worthiness of counter parties and capability of public sector counterparties
- There's a benefit to thinking about how you can reduce risks to the private party => reduction in financing costs => reduction in funding required
- Two ways to do this:
 - Shift risk from the private to the public sector
 - Managing the risks allocated to the public sector



Reasons why a feasible project may still be too risky

Risk allocation problem

Source of risk related to user fees...

- Demand risk: difficult to predict future demand
- Regulatory risk: user fees are often regulated by government

Source of risk related to finance...


- Refinancing risk
- Inflation

Risk management problem

Source of risk related to government obligations...

- The non-delivery of government financial commitments, which is influenced by the:
 - method of dispute resolution with the government
 - need to make multi year fiscal commitments under annual budgets
 - fiscal viability of local government and contracting agencies (sub-sovereign risk)
- The non-delivery of the government's non-financial commitments required to make the project viable. For example: acquire land, close streets, etc





There are two responses to these issues

- Manage and minimise these risks through credit enhancement measures
- Match risk of project finance to risk appetite of different investors



Credit enhancement measures can help make a project viable and bankable

Market risk mitigation measures can transfer the risk associated with user fees from the concessionaire to the government, for example:

- Minimum revenue guarantees
- Variable concession terms to maintain guaranteed minimum income

As more risk is transferred to the government, possible non-performance of the government will require greater credit enhancement, for example:

- Liquidated damages for non-performance of non-financial obligations
- Performance guarantees
- Debt and equity guarantees

The government will then need to manage any resulting contingent liabilities



Allow flexibility for different investors over the project life cycle

PPPs offer investment opportunities for:


- project developers (short term, more risky finance)
- owners (long-term, less risky finance)

For example, **pension funds** are a dominant investor in long-term PPP finance



Infrastructure is a popular asset class with Pension Funds

- High barriers to entry and monopoly-like characteristics => infrastructure not as sensitive to the economic cycle as other assets
- Stable and growing demand for services + long-term protection of revenues => infrastructure investments are generally low risk
- Stable revenue => enables relatively high leverage
- Infrastructure assets are long-term
 match tenor of liabilities
- Infrastructure assets provide protection against inflation



Successes and failures of infrastructure assets and Pension Funds in Australia

Sydney Desalination Plant

- Sale by the State Government of NSW
- 25 year contract with Sydney Water
- Regulated price
- Winning bid AUD2.3 billion consortium of Pension Funds: Ontario
 Teachers Pension Plan, Alberta Asset Management Co, Hastings

Heavy Haul Rail, Western Australia

- An iron ore company which built its own heavy haul rail.
 - Carries approximately 180 million tonnes per year of iron ore 500 km
- Attempted to sell 49% stake in its rail subsidiary to Pension Funds
- No takers because nothing was done to fit the asset to Pension Fund requirements:
 - No long-term contractual arrangements with the mining subsidiary
 - Full exposure to commodity risk



Summing up...

Three key issues in risk management

- There is a feedback loop between finance and funding
- Some project risks can be re-allocated (those associated with users fees and finance) while others need to be managed (those associated with government obligations)
- Risk changes over the project cycle, and different risk-return profiles appeal to different investors

Two methods for dealing with these issues

- Manage and minimise these risks through credit enhancement measures
- Match risk of project finance to risk-appetite of different investors



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
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
Finance Incentives for PPPs The UK Experience Karineh Grigorian June 2015




Infrastructure Challenge: The Picture in UK and around the world

As a result of recent and current fiscal conditions, countries around the world are looking to private finance as a means to develop their infrastructure and as an engine of growth to escape recession

- Estimated worldwide infrastructure capital spend required US \$3.4 trillion p.a. (Standard and Poors - 2014)
- Transport, telecoms, energy, water infrastructure investment requirement 3.5% world GDP (OECD)
- UK £466 billion pipeline. 65% private sector 15% PPP







Infrastructure financing issues: UK today

- Lending to UK infra pre-crash £6 billion p.a.
- Lending to UK infrastructure post-crash £3 billion p.a.
- Retreat of Monoline Guarantors
- · Liquidity for safer PPPs
- Harder for higher risk projects
- New instititutional lenders pension funds, life insurance
- Limited project credit expertise at institutional investors

Pension Investment Platform

- The Government, the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and Pension Protection Fund (PPF) signed a MoU to create the Pension Investment Platform (PIP) in November 2011
- NAPF and PPF announced in October 2012 that ten major UK pension funds have signed up to the PIP as Founding Investors
- First fund launched 2014, target funding £2 billion, current capital £650million. Two thirds already invested in 41 projects. Second fund launched (solar).
- IUK will work with the PIP further to develop applications of UK Guarantees to address particular investment needs of PIP investors
- The Government has worked closely with NAPF and PPF to support the foundation of the PIP but it is fully independent of Government



Insurers' Infrastructure Investment Forum

- The Government agreed at AS11 to establish the IIIF to provide members of the Association of British Insurers (ABI) a dedicated line of communication with infrastructure policy and delivery teams
- The Forum aims to explore ways to maximise opportunities for insurance fund managers to invest in debt instruments that finance UK infrastructure
- Messages that have emerged from Forum members have informed the policy development of PF2 and UK Guarantees
- Several of these funds are either already involved or are establishing the capacity to lend to projects directly, in addition to participating in public bond issues
- IUK helps them to develop this capacity and contribute to the development of renewed capacity for long-term project finance debt





Infrastructure UK

New UK funding levers

- Capital contributions
- Guarantee scheme £40 billion (managed by IUK)
- PF2 Equity fund
- Green Investment Bank
- Aggregator model
- · Contracts for difference

Other countries

- Viability gap funding
- Debt underpin
- EIB and multilaterals
- Mezzanine funding



PF2 Equity Investments

- Public sector equity rationale
- Transparency
- · Investment in schools projects
- Aggregator funding



UK Guarantees Scheme. Why are we doing it?

- Enable infrastructure projects to access the capital markets
- Use the UK's sovereign credit rating
- Avoid delays to infrastructure projects caused by shortage of long-term financing
- Minimise impact on fiscal position
- While avoiding crowding out new private sector initiatives



What is the Guarantee Scheme?

- Possible types of guarantee:
 - · Debt guarantee
 - Counterparty obligation guarantee
 - Construction period support
- Commercial basis no state aid
- Up to £40 billion available under Infrastructure (Financial Assistance) Act 2012
- Scheme open until 31 December 2016 subject to policy of new government
- Must meet headline eligibility criteria: nationally significant; ready to begin construction within a year; financially credible; dependent on a guarantee to proceed; and good value for the taxpayer



Scheme progress to date

- Over 200 enquiries received to date and 39 projects with a capital value of £34 billion are pre-qualified for further consideration
- Sectors seen to date include rail, road, energy, waste management, housing and higher education projects
- Over 50 institutional investors, including life insurance and pension funds, funded infrastructure projects as a result of the scheme
- 7 guarantees issued (total £1.7 billion) including

UK Guarantees Scheme Speyside CHP Plant Ineos Grangemouth Ethane Import & Storage Facilities

• £74million capex • £48.2million guara • 14 year bond

- - €600 million
 €285 million guarantee • 5 year bond

Mersey Gateway



- £615 million funding requirement
 • £257million guarantee • 29 year bond
- Northern Line Extension
- Up to £1bn can be
- borrowed
 £750m Standby Refinancing Facility

SDC - UK Energy Efficiency Investment Fund



• £8.8m guarantee for payment obligations • 4 year term Counterparty payment risk

Drax Power

- £650-700m capex • £75m guarantee • 5 year loan note

Blending EU Funds and PPP 2014-2020

Philip J Kelly Lawyer and Economist International PPP Adviser Beijing June 12 2015

Outline of Presentation

- Note: The text of the presentation has been prepared in note form to assist understanding of the Chinese translation and is not in the more visually attractive powerpoint format
- What are EU Blended PPP Projects and what EU funds are used?
- 2. What problems were found and what is being done to resolve these?
- 3. What next?

What are EU Blended PPP Projects?

- Blended PPPs are a financing scheme involving private funds (debt / equity), and
- A contribution from EU funds (grants / financial instruments)
- There may be similarities between China at national level and provinces / municipalities etc. if grant / loan funds used to support projects and activities at sub-national level can be extended to PPP projects

.

Why Blended PPP projects?

EU funds can assist PPP delivery although primary channel is to assist Government and conventional public procurement of projects and activities

- ▶ Risk mitigation mechanisms
- Bridging market gaps
- ▶ Provision of additional liquidity
- Increasing financial viability

Which EU funds and How are they used?

- ▶ European Structural and Investment Funds ESIF (mainly: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), Cohesion Fund, European Social Fund (ESF)), Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)
- Funds have Different Purposes and Means including grant co-financing, financial instruments, funding of advisory services and studies

.

Purpose of EU Funds: Strengthen Economic Social and Territorial Cohesion

Article 174 / 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion, reduce disparities between the levels of development of regions and locations through the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, European Social Fund, European Regional Development Fund, European Investment Bank and other instruments.

EU Blended PPP Projects Before 2014

- Before 2013 blending was not prohibited but was not widely known and was used in a small number of projects
- Limited public sector capacity in PPP and with using EU funds in PPP was the most important barrier to wider use of blending
- Some EU member states and private sector participants mistakenly thought that blended projects were seen negatively by EU institutions
- Government usually finalises conventional public procurement before filing grant applications under EU Funds but this not possible for PPP project
- Difficulties integrating PPP process with EU grant administration process
- Timing for procurement and grant application have an impact on the funding gap calculation and it is difficult to get timing right
- Timing for disbursing the grant to the project different from standard PPP funding practices
- Private sector uncertainty as to how EU grant amount is determined for revenue generating projects (funding gap calculations) and how certain and stable is that amount:

Difficulty in calculation of the funding gap (based on projections)

Risk of recalculation where the gap is materially different from projections

- Funds usually made capital contributions so that PPP availability payments presented new challenges
- Cut-off date (no payments possible beyond the eligibility period)

Steps to Address Challenges

- 2013 New Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) for the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1303&from=EN includes support for PPPs
- CPR defines <u>PPPs</u> broadly <u>"means forms of cooperation between public bodies and the private sector, which aim to improve the delivery of investments in infrastructure projects or other types of operations, delivering public services through risk sharing, pooling of private sector expertise or additional sources of capital"</u>
- CPR defines <u>PPP operation "means an operation which is implemented or intended to be implemented under a public-private-partnership structure"</u>
- CPR adapts common provisions on the ESI Funds to suit PPP
- Article 62 explicitly provides for blending stating that ESI Funds may be used to support PPP operations
- Flat rates are a new way to calculate the grant amount removing the funding gap calculation issue
- Grant may be made to the project and private partner previously only made to public sector entity
- Escrow accounts allow disbursements to continue until 2023 to allow for multi-year delivery of facilities and payments

PPP Private Partner can be the Beneficiary

- ▶ Public body initiating the operation <u>OR</u> private partner selected or to be selected to implement the operation can receive payments from ESIF
- A conditional approval can be issued before selection of the private partner - the selected private partner assumes the obligations of a beneficiary
- A replacement of private party possible without loss of grant (PPP step-in rights etc.)



Eligible Expenditure

- Expenses incurred and paid by the private sector are considered incurred and paid by the public sector beneficiary
- Payments are to be made in accordance with the PPP agreement, including termination payment
- Minimum requirements to be included in the PPP agreements, including provisions relating to contract termination and to audit and accountability

What should Governments do in programming blended PPPs?

- ▶ PPP Project identification / scope
- ▶ Government or user-pay PPP (revenue generation)
- Initial assessment of the PPP option (affordability, risks, bankability, value for money, deficit and debt treatment)
- ► EU Funding Eligibility (11 thematic objectives, Operational Programme)
- Selection of funding instrument (grant, financial instrument)
- Careful selection of well prepared candidates for blended PPPs


What Next?


- ▶ EC prepares rules and other provisions for implementing each fund
- Member states build networks facilitating EU grant blending applications including for PPP projects
- Governments identify PPP procurement opportunities in sectors covered by Operational Programmes
- Private sector identifies and prepares for PPP opportunities and develop structures for participation with Government in obtaining funds


Making PPPs Work

Craig Sugden, Principal PPP Specialist East Asia Department 12 June 2015











The problem

PPPs bring additional challenges to project preparation

Governments often lack the expertise to prepare PPPs

 PPPs are more complex than conventional projects and require additional skills

Or may lack the funds needed to hire professional advisors

- PPPs are normally finalized by advisory teams comprising financial and commercial advisers, lawyers, technical advisors, economists etc
- Costs can be 3% to 5% of the project's capital cost

The international experience is that well equipped advisory teams improve project quality and pay for themselves

Making PPPs Work

See Appendix 4 of ADB. 2012. Public-Private Partnership Operational Plan 2012-2020. Manila (available in English and Chinese at https://www.adb.org/documents/public-private-partnership-operational-plan-2012-2020)

ADB

Project development fund

Good project preparation is at the heart of a sound PPP program A project development fund (PDF) helps governments prepare bankable PPP projects

The fund pays the up-front costs of project development, which are typically recovered from the winning bidder and re-used

Normally supported by a panel of advisors under retainer contracts, who are selected for projects on a competitive basis

Helps set market standards by implementing sound procedures and demonstrating good practices

Run by a PPP unit or part of a PPP fund

Making PPPs Work

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PDF examples

PDFs have been used or are used at the national and subnational level in many places


- India Infrastructure Project Development Fund
- Philippines Project Development and Monitoring Facility
- Government of Sindh, Pakistan Project Development Facility
- World Bank Global Infrastructure Facility
- ADB Asia Pacific Project Preparation Fund
- South Africa Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit
- Indonesia Private Sector Participation Development Facility
- Egypt Private Sector Participation Project Development Fund
- Bangladesh Private Sector Infrastructure Development Fund
- Sri Lanka Private Sector Infrastructure Development Facility


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
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
PDF examples				
Philippines Project Development and Monitoring Facility (PDMF)				
Objectives	Fund and facilitate pre-investment activities of potential PPP projects such as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and to develop a pipeline of viable projects for Implementing Agencies (IA) and Local Government Units (LGU).			
Governance	The PPP Center screens and evaluates the application based on a set of eligibility criteria, and makes a recommendation to the PDMF Board. If application is approved, IA signs Technical Assistance Agreement with PPP Center. Board is composed of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and PPP Center. PPP Center oversees the administration and management of the PDMF.			
Eligibility criteria	Criteria are unique to the project, sector, and IA/LGU. Applications must meet the PDMF application requirements, and the project should be consistent with government priority infrastructure programs.			
Nature of funding	The project development cost (plus a 10% administrative fee) is recovered from the successful bidder or directly from the IA/LGU. The IA/LGU repays 100% of the development cost and administrative fee when it fails to bid out the project, conclude the bidding process, or sign the contract with the winning bidder. IA/LGU refunds 50% of the development cost, plus administrative fee, when it fails to bid out the project after a failed series of re-biddings, conclude the bidding process, or sign the contract with the winning bidder.			
	pine Public-Private Partnership Centre 2012Project Development and Monitoring Facility at ADB gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ThePDMF.pdf			


Overview of a PDF for the PRC



















PPP Funds for Government Contributions

MOF: Government contributions MoF will actively explore the use of existing User pays special transfer payments to provide capital projects are support for demonstration projects to be Local finance departments at all levels may prioritized offer upfront cost subsidies, capital grants or But other forms of financial support to demonstration projects based on your own other PPP fiscal strength and specific needs of projects models are Local finance departments ...shall gradually shift also accepted away from "subsidizing construction" to "subsidizing operation" and explore the establishment of a dynamic subsidy mechanism. The subsidies and other expenditure items shall be included in the government budget.... ADB Making PPPs Work





What does a PPP fund do?

Plays a catalytic role in market development by leveraging resources and specialized skills

Takes on an intermediary role, providing a technical team that identifies and examines projects on behalf of potential investors

Builds relationships and market knowledge to develop a portfolio of projects against criteria identified by investors

Shares costs across investors, lowering the costs they would face if acting individually

Consolidates financing from investors otherwise deterred by high bid costs, long preparation processes, large required investments, and the 'patchy' deal flow of PPPs

Making PPPs Work

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PPP funds in other countries

The PRC does not yet have equivalent funds and guarantee schemes

Viability gap funds are used in Asia (e.g., in India and Pakistan) to provide an initial capital contribution by the government

State-owned infrastructure funds, such as the India Infrastructure Finance Limited and Indonesia Infrastructure Finance, can provide loans to private partners to PPPs to facilitate the participation of private finance


Government guarantee schemes, typically provided through financial intermediaries, are also being used in Asia, the UK, and Europe

The UK is trialing a systematic approach to providing equity

Making PPPs Work

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Fur	Fund Examples		
Go	vernment-supported f	unds	
	IIFCL—India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited	Provides long term, commercial loans, up to 20% of total capital costs, as part of a bank-led consortium. Also provides advisory services and a pilot guarantee scheme. Prioritizes PPPs. Partly financed by ADB loans (\$1.2b).	
	IIF —Indonesia Infrastructure Finance	Private non-bank financial institution under MOF with independent management. Provides loans, guarantees and advisory support. Part financed by loans from ADB and other IFIs and bonds.	
	Marguerite 2020 Fund	Provides equity and quasi-equity to PPPs and other infrastructure investments in Europe in climate change, energy security etc. A joint initiative of the EC, the EIB, and other public financial institutions.	
	JESSICA	A joint venture between the EC and EIB, JESSICA provides financing as loans, equity and guarantees to municipal PPPs in Europe. Can also offer quasi-equity to reduce the credit risk for senior lenders.	
	Infrastructure Development Corporation (Karnataka), Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Financial Services, etc	India has established many State-level entities to provide local government with the project development, structuring and financial skills to do PPP projects at the local level and to manage VG and other PPP funds	
Making PP	Ps Work	AD	



Marguerite 2020 Fund

€320m has been invested in 10 road, airport, wind, and waste to energy projects worth more than €4b A long term equity fund targeting greenfield transport & energy infrastructure in EU 27

The Fund operates on market principles with an independent advisory team responsible for project origination, appraisal, execution, monitoring and asset management

All investments and disinvestment decisions are made by an Investment Committee

Six core sponsors (eg, KFW) have one representative on a Management Board, which also includes independent members and staff

A Supervisory Board oversees the fund

Making PPPs Work

http://www.margueritefund.eu/

ADB

JESSICA

Funded in 2013 with €2 billion from the EU, it will grow to as much as €8b by 2020 The fund is a vehicle for investing EU grant funds in PPPs and other investment projects

Equity investments, loans and/or guarantees, are delivered to projects via Urban Development Funds or Holding Funds which invest in several funds

Areas of supports include urban infrastructure, heritage or cultural sites, university buildings, medical, facilities, and energy efficiency improvements

Returns from investments are reinvested in new urban development projects


Making PPPs Work


http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/instruments/jessica_en.cfm#1

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
PPP funds: Key issues What, who, What products does the market need? and how What projects will the fund support? - An equity fund is best suited to projects with enough user revenue to be commercially viable. Other projects will need different types of support (eg, a viability gap fund) What is the exit strategy? Who else will want to invest? Who will manage the fund? How will projects be identified? How will conflict of interest be managed? How long will a fund take to establish? How big should the fund be? How long should the fund operate for? ADB **Making PPPs Work**











PDF example	
Objectives	ct Development and Monitoring Facility (PDMF) Fund and facilitate pre-investment activities of potential PPP projects such as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, and to develop a pipeline of viable projects for Implementing Agencies (IA) and Local Government Units (LGU).
Governance	The PPP Center screens and evaluates the application based on a set of eligibility criteria, and makes a recommendation to the PDMF Board. If application is approved, IA signs Technical Assistance Agreement with PPP Center. Board is composed of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and PPP Center. PPP Center oversees the administration and management of the PDMF.
Eligibility criteria	Criteria are unique to the project, sector, and IA/LGU. Applications must meet the PDMF application requirements, and the project should be consistent with government priority infrastructure programs.
Nature of funding	The project development cost (plus a 10% administrative fee) is recovered from the successful bidder or directly from the IA/LGU. The IA/LGU repays 100% of the development cost and administrative fee when it fails to bid out the project, conclude the bidding process, or sign the contract with the winning bidder. IA/LGU refunds 50% of the development cost, plus administrative fee, when it fails to bid out the project after a failed series of re-biddings, conclude the bidding process, or sign the contract with the winning bidder.
	ppine Public-Private Partnership Centre 2012Project Development and Monitoring Facility at ADB













Tri-win of government, public and social capital



- 1. Stabilize growth and open up financing channels for infrastructure and public service sectors;
- 2. PPP mode will not aggravate government debts and will smooth fiscal expenditures;
- 3. It will effectively reduce government's risks because governments are free from overly involving in planning, construction, financing and operation;
- Adopt market-oriented method; introduce funds, technologies, experience and talents from social capital to reduce investment cost and enhance operation efficiency.




- 1. Social capital's allocation need in assets with long-term stable return;
- 2. Gathering professional competence and experience of professional institutes and distribute risks rationally.



Human-oriented philosophy and the need to obtain better and more efficient public services.

Advisors for restructuring of state-owned assets





PPP risk aversion (I)

Policy risks

 Legal and policy risks will be assumed by the government

Risks in government's contract performance

- Demonstration of government' s risk tolerance and evaluation of VFM
- Incorporate government's payment into middle-long term financial budget

Normative risks

- Adopt standardized operation procedures and contract texts
- Government's public disclosure of terms and conditions of contracts, performance test report, mid-term evaluation report and major changes in project





PPP risk aversion (II)

Borrower's risks

 Adopt bid invitation and other methods for government' s procurement (prequalification and publicity); rating in accordance with financial strength and operating capability

Project construction risks

- Performance guarantee for construction
- Adopt single-period and other methods to control risks in project completion
- Transfer constructional risks through EPC

Project operation risks


- The government assumes the minimum demand risk and feasibility gap subsidy
- Set rational pricing and price adjustment mechanism
- "Take or Pay" , "Supply without delay" ,
- "uniqueness clause"
- Letter of guarantee for operation and maintenance
- Government's right of intervention




Evaluation of overall risk


Risks are relatively controllable

- ◆ Adhere to the principle of "A risk shall be assumed by the most appropriate party"
- Standard operational procedures and contract texts and relatively clear long-term contractual relationship
- Incorporating government subsidies into budge and the predicable cash flow is stable
- Government authorities supervise the entire life cycle of the project and evaluate its performance


















(III) Investment objects for sub-funds

- 1. Government debt replacement sub-funds
- 2. Land purchase and reserve sub-funds
- 3. PPP sub-funds
- 4. Competitive industry sub-

The focus should be placed on the replacement of existing debts involving relatively a large sum

Underline support for urban development and take the income from land sale as the source for repayment

For infrastructure projects with certain cash flow or benefits, satisfy capital financing follow the PPP mode


Strategic new industries, marketoriented investment strategies



Case 2 (early stage of project): PPP fund—BA fund

projects

- In order to improve urban infrastructure construction and enhance investment in people's livelihood, it is hoped to start marching forward into urban sewage treatment industry across the country.
- B city has granted the sewage treatment of downtown area and utilization service of recycling water to B Group in the form of concession with a term of 30 years.
 Meanwhile, B Group will perform relevant construction tasks.
- An affiliate to G signed agreement with B Group to jointly establish a BG
 Development Limited Liability Company through the fund which is controlled by G.
 Such company will be the operating entity as the project company undertakes
 businesses such as sewage treatment, recycling water production and sludge
 disposal from B Group as well as the entity to be listed in stock exchange in future.
- BG contributes 3 billion yuan as the posterior and jointly contribute capitals with social security fund, SPD Bank and other banks to establish BA Fund (limited partnership) so as to invest the water-related projects such as sewage treatment and recycling water utilization included in the "three-year plan" of B city and quality water projects which are not included and quality water projects of other cities.






Case 3 (construction period of project): Consortium loan

Client: Shanghai L Solid Waste Comprehensive Development Co., Ltd. Main Business: Investment of environment and municipal utility projects, design, construction, investment consultation and operation management and etc. of environment and municipal utility projects

Project background:

- 1. Inland river project of the comprehensive utilization base of old port;
- 2. Old port comprehensive landfill project, phase I;
- 3. Waste leachate emergency discharge project of the base of waste solid comprehensive utilization of old port;
- 4. Old port recycling energy utilization center project
- 5. Anti-pollution isolating greenbelt project at the north side

Financing plan: Consortium loan 2.3 billion yuan with a term of 15 years **Sources of repayment:** Special repayment fund calculated at the settlement price of 40 yuan/ton by the municipal waste management and old port waste solid company





Case 4: A case of debt financing tool (operation period)

Client: A Group Co., Ltd.

Main business: Sewage treatment

Project: Invest, operate and manage 63 domestic sewage treatment plants, which require growing operating cost.

PPP mode: Since 2012, A Group has been granted the franchise


for the sewage treatment for the downtown with varied

concession terms from 8 to 30 years (different terms for different projects)

Financing demand: 250 million yuan

Financing plan: SPD Bank serves as the lead underwriter of the 250 million yuan of short-term financing bill of A Group, proving


fund guarantee for daily operation of the company





















	TOP 10 D	EVELOPING C	OUNTRIES, 19	90-2014	
Country	Ranking	Total Value (US\$ Billion)	Number of Transactions	Global Share (%) By Value	PPI/Populatio Ratio (2013)
Brazil	1	363.7	707	22%	112
India	2	263.8	805	16%	6
China	3	150.8	1,200	9%	6
Turkey	4	81.3	170	5%	228
Argentina	5	81.1	210	5%	20
Mexico	6	74.9	224	5%	51
Russia	7	70.0	151	4%	3
Malaysia	8	63.6	96	4%	57
Philippines	9	54.7	116	3%	14
Chile	10	48.8	155	3%	385











TOP 10 PROJ	ECT FINAI	NCE LENDERS II	N CHINA, 2005-	2014
Company	Country	Total Value (US\$ Million)	Number of Transactions	Market Share (%) By Value
Agricultural Bank of China	China	4,152	14	33
Bank of Communications	China	1,753	9	14
Standard Chartered Bank	United Kingdom	643	15	5
Sinopec	China	536	1	4
China Merchants Bank	China	482	4	4
China Guangfa Bank	China	481	2	4
Zhonghai Trust & Investment Co	China	467	1	4
Zhuhai Rural Credit Union	China	403	1	3
China Everbright (Group)	China	333	1	3
China Minsheng Banking	China	333	1	3















Risk transfer lies at the heart of effective PPP design

- Each of the participants involved in PPPs faces risks → evaluation, allocation and management of these risks is crucial
- Risks should be borne by the party that controls them → Rationale:
 That party can bear the risks at the least cost
- · Problems at the risk allocation stage can delay project negotiations
- Project contracts are used as a means to mitigate these risks
- Residual risks, such as political force majeure and regulatory risks, are mitigated through guarantees and insurance
- Risks not mitigated are borne by the consumer → higher tariffs





Risk Allocation			
Risk	Description	Private	Public
Site	Availability and quality of the project site, such as the cost and timing of acquiring the site, needed permits or assuring rights of way for a road, the effect of geological or other site conditions, and the cost of meeting environmental standards	**	*
Design, Construction, Commissioning	Risk that construction takes longer or costs more than expected, or that the design or construction quality means the asset is not adequate to meet project requirements	×	*

Risk	Description	Private	Public
Financing	Raising of equity and debt to implement project	×	₩
Permits	Obtaining necessary permits and licenses to implement project		×
Operation and maintenance	Risks to successful operations and maintenance, including the risk of interruption in service or asset	×	
Demand	Risk that usage of the service is different than was expected, or that revenues are not collected as expected	*	×


Risk	Description	Private	Public
Change in legal framework	Risk that a change in general law or regulation adversely affects the project, such as changes in general corporate taxation, or in rules governing currency convertibility, or repatriation of profits		×
Regulatory or Political	risk of regulatory or political decisions or changes in the sector regulatory framework that adversely affect the project. For example, this could include failure to renew approvals appropriately, unjustifiably harsh regulatory decisions, or in the extreme, breach of contract or expropriation	**	*


Risk	Description	Private	Public
conomic	Risk that changes in interest rates, exchange rates or inflation adversely affect the project outcomes		×
orce Majeure	Uninsurable risk that external events beyond the control of the parties to the contract, such as natural disasters, war or civil disturbance, affect the project		•


Mitigation of Risk?


- · Project preparation and optimal risk allocation
- Public financing support:
 - loan or grant finance directly to the project company
 - government guarantee on a commercial loan
 - governments retain the financing function
















Risk Management of PPPs Principles and Practice



Michael Schur and Alex Sundakov, June 2015

AGENDA

Issues in PPP risk management

- · Reducing the cost of finance
- Reasons why a feasible project may still be too risky to be bankable
- Risk over the project cycle

Responses to these issues

- · Credit enhancement measures
- Matching risk to investor preferences
 - Infrastructure is a popular asset class for Pension Funds
 - Infrastructure assets and Pension Funds in Australia



The cost of finance can and should be reduced

- Projects may be viable but not bankable
 - Even though expected revenues cover costs it may be impossible to secure adequate finance due to concerns about the variability (risk) of costs or revenues, credit worthiness of counter parties and capability of public sector counterparties
- There's a benefit to thinking about how you can reduce risks to the private party => reduction in financing costs => reduction in funding required
- Two ways to do this:
 - Shift risk from the private to the public sector
 - Managing the risks allocated to the public sector



Reasons why a feasible project may still be too risky

Risk allocation problem

Source of risk related to user fees...

- Demand risk: difficult to predict future demand
- Regulatory risk: user fees are often regulated by government

Source of risk related to finance...


- Refinancing risk
- Inflation

Risk management problem

Source of risk related to government obligations...

- The non-delivery of government financial commitments, which is influenced by the:
 - method of dispute resolution with the government
 - need to make multi year fiscal commitments under annual budgets
 - fiscal viability of local government and contracting agencies (sub-sovereign risk)
- The non-delivery of the government's non-financial commitments required to make the project viable. For example: acquire land, close streets, etc





There are two responses to these issues

- Manage and minimise these risks through credit enhancement measures
- Match risk of project finance to risk appetite of different investors



Credit enhancement measures can help make a project viable and bankable

Market risk mitigation measures can transfer the risk associated with user fees from the concessionaire to the government, for example:

- Minimum revenue guarantees
- Variable concession terms to maintain guaranteed minimum income

As more risk is transferred to the government, possible non-performance of the government will require greater credit enhancement, for example:

- Liquidated damages for non-performance of non-financial obligations
- Performance guarantees
- Debt and equity guarantees

The government will then need to manage any resulting contingent liabilities



Allow flexibility for different investors over the project life cycle

PPPs offer investment opportunities for:


- project developers (short term, more risky finance)
- owners (long-term, less risky finance)

For example, **pension funds** are a dominant investor in long-term PPP finance



Infrastructure is a popular asset class with Pension Funds

- High barriers to entry and monopoly-like characteristics => infrastructure not as sensitive to the economic cycle as other assets
- Stable and growing demand for services + long-term protection of revenues => infrastructure investments are generally low risk
- Stable revenue => enables relatively high leverage
- Infrastructure assets are long-term
 match tenor of liabilities
- Infrastructure assets provide protection against inflation



Successes and failures of infrastructure assets and Pension Funds in Australia

Sydney Desalination Plant

- Sale by the State Government of NSW
- 25 year contract with Sydney Water
- Regulated price
- Winning bid AUD2.3 billion consortium of Pension Funds: Ontario
 Teachers Pension Plan, Alberta Asset Management Co, Hastings

Heavy Haul Rail, Western Australia

- An iron ore company which built its own heavy haul rail.
 - Carries approximately 180 million tonnes per year of iron ore 500 km
- Attempted to sell 49% stake in its rail subsidiary to Pension Funds
- No takers because nothing was done to fit the asset to Pension Fund requirements:
 - No long-term contractual arrangements with the mining subsidiary
 - Full exposure to commodity risk



Summing up...

Three key issues in risk management

- There is a feedback loop between finance and funding
- Some project risks can be re-allocated (those associated with users fees and finance) while others need to be managed (those associated with government obligations)
- Risk changes over the project cycle, and different risk-return profiles appeal to different investors

Two methods for dealing with these issues

- Manage and minimise these risks through credit enhancement measures
- Match risk of project finance to risk-appetite of different investors



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
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New York

Bogotá





Risk Transfer in PPPs

Karineh Grigorian
June 2015




Infrastructure UK

The Core Characteristics of PFI/PF2 are... 私人融资计划的核心特点是...

- Capital at risk 资本有风险
- Incentives to complete and deliver on time and at cost 激励按时按照预算完成和提供服务
- Fixed Price 固定价格
- Certainty of whole-life costs
 全程成本的确定性
- Certainty of whole-life investment 全程投资的确定性
- Output-based 以产出为基础
- Payment relates as closely as possible to delivery of the desired 'outcomes' rather than of inputs 尽可能在提供所需预期结果时付款,而不是根据投入

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




The private sector will price risk

So to achieve best Value for Money: Risk should be allocated to parties best able to manage it!

Beware of transferring too much





Typical Risk Allocation in PPPs for:

- Design
- Construction
- Operations
- Financial
- Demand



Risk Allocation on Design Aspects

	Public Authority	Private Contractor	Shared
Cost overrun caused by design		X	
Construction delay caused by design		X	
Operating inefficiencies caused by design		X	
Obtaining land ownership & warranting good title to land.	X		
Relocation of people	X		
Obtaining planning permission and other consents			X



Risk Allocation on Construction Aspects

	Public Authority	Private Contractor	Shared
Construction problems cause time overrun		X	
Contractor becomes insolvent		X	
Change to legislation in build phase		X	
Public sector delay or restrict site access	X		
Force Majeure causes delay			X
Force Majeure causes cost over run		X	
Facility never satisfies handover requirements / Private sector abandons construction		X	



Risk Allocation on Operations Aspects (Cont.)

	Public Authority	Private Contractor	Shared
Public Sector reclaims building or ends contract early.	X		
Force Majeure causes cost overrun		Х	
Public sector changes performance standards	X		
Recurring persistent breaches		X	



Risk Allocation on Financial Aspects

	Public Authority	Private Contractor	Shared
Inflation rate changes	X		Х
Private sector costs are higher than budgeted		X	
Change in general tax		X	
Discrimination or project specific change in law	X		
Public sector changes performance standards	X		
Public body is not authorised to sign contract or exceeds powers. New government or newly elected officials seek to overturn contract.	X		
Private sector found guilty of corrupt practices		X	



Risk Allocation on Demand Aspects

	Public Authority	Private Contractor	Shared
Low user numbers			X
Change of tariff (other than as allowed for in indexation)	X		
Public sector build competing infrastructure nearby and demand goes down	X		







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New Challenges of Risk Management under China's Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Mode

Dr. Chen Chuan

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Engineering Management Professor with the Business School of Sichuan University/ Doctoral Advisor/ Head of Engineering Management Department

Advisor of the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility of the World Bank (2006-currently)


Managing Director of Roca Infrastructure Construction Business Information Consultation Co., Ltd.


Email: chenchuan@scu.edu.cn; Mobile: 18010636887


Risk is everywhere. Risk is a kind of ubiquitous phenomenon and unavoidable. All of us face risks--some people prefer to face risks than others.


Although some people worry about risks, while others are excited to seek risks. Risks are around us. However, we could neither always detect them nor effectively deal with them.

Edward and Bowen (2005)












Challenge 1: Establish new PPP risk management procedure based on partnership










The specialty of China's PPP

 China's government sector or representative bodies attract social capital in infrastructure and public utility construction. Different from the cooperation between "public sector" and "private sector" in western countries, China's model is not traditional stead, it adapts and localized PPP


The specialty of China's PPP

 The cooperation between government and business enterprises could adopt either the franchising model granted by the government to the company, or PFI model where government invests capital to the company through special investment platform.




 Challenge 2: How to reasonably allocate risks between state-owned enterprises and investors?





PPP mode does not change the public welfare nature of infrastructure

- PPP mode needs to both meet the "profitability" of private sector and consider its <u>public goods nature</u>.
- Both economic and social benefits need to be considered.
- In any cooperation models, the public sector investment projects need to strike a balance between maximizing social benefits and protecting investors, maximally meeting public demands and ensuring the operating enterprises to make certain profit.





 Challenge 3: How to deal with risks that threatening the public welfare nature of PPP projects with high probability and high impact?



PPP risk management case: Plant B of the 6th Chengdu Tap Water Plant

- The Plant B of the 6th Chengdu Tap Water Plant is the first pilot BOT project in China approved by the State Development Planning Commission.
- The project officially invited international bidding. 33 foreign companies or consortia bid for the project.
- The bid winner is the consortium consisting of General des eaux of France and Marubeni Corporation.
- On August 11, 1999, Chengdu Government officially signed the concession agreement with Chengdu General-Marubeni Water Supply Co., Ltd (project company).
- After the construction for two and a half years, the project was completed and put into operation on February 11, 2002.





			-		
	Risk type	Code	Risk	Government	Social capital
	Political risk	P1	Cancel, expropriation and seizure risk	٧	
		P2	Exclusiveness risk		٧
N! - I.		P3	Legal change risk		٧
Risk		P4	Development approval risk	٧	٧
allocation plan:		P5	Adverse government behaviors or negligence	٧	٧
.		P6	The provision of public infrastructure	٧	
		P7	Increasing tax rate	٧	٧
		P8	Political force majeure	٧	
		P9	The concession agreement termination due to government reasons	٧	
		P10	Payment failure by urban utility company	٧	
	Construction risk	C1	Land acquisition	٧	٧
		C2	Land compensation fee		٧
		C3	Cost overruns		٧
		C4	Increasing financing costs		٧
		C5	Project delay		٧
		C6	Quality risk		٧
		C7	Contractor mistakes		٧
		C8	Environmental damage during the construction period	٧	٧
		C9	Geology and historic relics protection	٧	
		C10	Franchisor mistake	٧	٧
		C11	Natural force majeure during the construction		٧
		C12	Non-natural force majeure	٧	


Water Plant	D'alabama	Code	Risk	c	Social capital
	Risk type			Government	
	Operational risk	01	Government mistake	٧	
isk allocation		02	Franchise company mistake		٧
lan		03	Agreement is terminated by the franchisor	٧	٧
continued):		04	Environmental damage during the operation period		٧
commucum,		05	Natural force majeure		٧
		06	Non-natural force majeure	٧	
		07	Labor risk	٧	٧
		08	Technology risk		٧
		09	Equipment maintenance risk		٧
	Market and income risk	M1	Insufficient income	√v \	
		M2	Fluctuation of water demand	٧	
		M3	Project handover failure	٧	
		M4	Water fee collection problems	٧	
		M5	Raw water supply	V	
	Financial risk	F1	Inflation risk		٧
		F2	Interest rate risk	$\overline{}$	٧
		F3	Foreign currency availability	٧	
		F4	Exchange rate risk during the construction period		٧
		F5	Exchange rate risk during the operation period	٧	٧
		F6	Currency exchange and remittance risk	٧	

PPP risk management case: Plant B of the 6th Chengdu Tap Water Plant

- After Plant B was constructed, water usage in Chengdu dropped significantly. The water usage was affected by industrial restructuring (the secondary industries transformed to the tertiary industries), and Asian financial crisis.
- To consume 400,000 tons water per day, Chengdu Municipal Waterworks Co., Ltd. had to shut down Plant II and Plant V, with daily production capacity of 230,000 cubic meters and 150,000 cubic meters respectively. 2/3 water fees charged by Chengdu Municipal Waterworks Co., Ltd. is paid for purchasing purified water for Plant B. So, the company lost RMB 150 million from profit in the first year after Plant B was put into operation.

• Challenge 4: Risks of PPP Project Risk Management





Risk Sharing in the Operational Guidebook for Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Mode

Xu Xiangdong

International Seminar on PPP FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT

June 12, 2015

Xu XiangdongProfile

Mr. Xu Xiangdong, a Chemical Engineering and Law major, has worked in large central SOEs, private enterprises, Top 500 multi-national corporations, and intermediary institutions. He has held the positions of senior legal investment president. advisor. director, vice government advisor. Mr. Xu is now a partner and Deputy Director of Beijing ICS Law Firm, as well as a senior advisor of Beijing Caizhinan Consulting Co., Ltd. Since getting involved in the operation and implementation of PPP projects in 2002, Mr. Xu has gained the overall experience in project development, business mode and architecture design, bidding/tendering. transaction contract drafting and negotiation, investment finance taxation, financing, and engineering and construction, operation & maintenance. has participated in many PPP projects inside and outside China, including the National Stadium, water park, electricity generation from waste incineration, water supply projects.

Xu Xiangdong Profile (Continued)

As an appointed expert, Mr. Xu has participated in the compilation of the NDRC's Infrastructure and Utilities Franchise Law, Measures for Management of Infrastructure and Utilities Franchise; the Ministry of Finance PPP Center's Guideline for PPP Project Contracts (Trial), Measures for Management of Government Procurement in PPP Projects, Interim Measures ofManagement Competitive and Consultative Procurement Mode in Government Procurement, and Guidebook for VFM Assessment of PPP Projects. Mr. Xu also holds the titles of an expert of China PPP Specialty Committee, an expert of China PPP Research Institute, the chief legal expert of Central University of Finance and Economics PPP LAB, the leader of MOHURD Zhongjian Zhengyan Experts Committee Legal Team, the PPP training expert of NDRC Training Center, and the post-project assessment expert of China International Engineering Consulting Corporation.

Table of Contents

- I. What is China PPP?
- II. Sharing of Major Risks in China PPP
- III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation

I. What is China PPP?

- 1. An old concept
- It has been nearly 30 years since the earliest China PPP project (the BOT project of Shenzhen Shajiao B power plant in 1988);
- It has been 20 years since the earliest China PPP policy (the *Notice* on Matters Concerning Management of Examination and Approval of Foreign-invested Franchise Projects promulgated on August 21, 1995);
- Public utilities PPP projects reached a climax upon the promulgation of *Measures for Management of Public Utilities* Franchise (MHURD Directive No. 126) by the former Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development on March 19, 2004.

I. What is China PPP? (continued)

2. It is rather a new concept (Guo Ban Fa [2015] No. 42)

- It is an important innovation for the public service supply mechanism;
- It helps accelerating the transformation of government functions, the separation of government administrative functions and enterprises' management, the separation of government and business functions, and driving the modernization of China's governance system and capability;
- · It helps breaking the restrictions on industry access, stimulating economic vitality and creativity;
- It helps improving the financial input and management modes, improving the effectiveness in
 using fiscal funds, smoothing the fluctuations of government expenditures between fiscal years,
 as well as preventing and solving government debts.

China PPP is rather a new concept

I. What is China PPP? (continued)

3. Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Mode

- Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (Adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 12, 2013): ...We will establish a transparent and standardized investment and financing mechanism for urban development, allow local governments to expand the channels of financing for urban development by issuing bonds and other means, allow private capital to participate in urban infrastructure investment and operation by franchise and other means, and study the possibility of setting up policy financial institutions for developing urban infrastructure and housing...
- The concept of China PPP was unified by the Guidelines for Making Innovations in the Investment and Financing Mechanism of Key Areas and for Encouraging Non-governmental Investments (Guo Fa [2014] No. 60) promulgated by the State Council on November 16, 2014.

China PPP is the Public-Private-Partnership Mode

II. Risk Sharing in China PPP

- 1. Reasonable sharing of risks is key to success of PPP projects
- The PPP project contract, the core document of PPP project, is called the "Royal Contract" or
 "Constitutional Contract". The nature of PPP project contract is to reasonably distribute risks
 between governmental and non-governmental investments, to define the rights and obligations of
 contract parties, so as to ensure the smooth implementation of PPP project and the realization of
 value for money;
- Reasonable sharing of risks is key to success of PPP projects. A successful PPP project should not be the
 one that all risks and responsibilities are borne by one party only;
- Reasonable sharing of risks is the most important content in the risk management of PPP projects.

II. Risk Sharing in China PPP (Continued)

- 2. Five principles of risk sharing
- The party bearing risks should have control over the risks;
- The party bearing risks should be able to reasonably transfer risks (e.g. by purchasing relevant insurances);
- · The party bearing risks should have larger economic benefits or motives in controlling the risks;
- · It is most effective for the said party to bear the risks;
- In the event that the risks take place eventually, the party bearing the risks should not transfer the costs and losses incurred to the other party to the contract.


II. Risk Sharing in China PPP (Continued)

3. Risk matrix

Risk factors	Government	Social capital	Sharing
Politics (expropriation, control, nationalization)	Δ		
Financing		Δ	
Design and construction		Δ	
Operation & maintenance		Δ	
Handover		Δ	
Market			Δ
Force Majeure			Δ
Controllable by governm	nent Δ		
Changes in law Uncontrollable by govern	nment		Δ
Systematic financial risks			Δ

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation

1. Guidebook for PPP operation - main basis for the



2. Project identification

- · Project initialization:
- ① Government initialization: The government should be responsible for whether it can successfully pass the assessment and screening, become a backlog project, and be included into the annual and medium-term development plan;
- 2 Non-governmental investment initialization: The non-government investment should be responsible for whether it can successfully pass the assessment and screening, become a backlog project, and be included into the annual and medium-term development plan;

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

2. Project identification

- VFM assessment: The qualitative assessment focuses on the comparison between PPP mode and the traditional government procurement mode: whether the former mode will increase supply, optimize risk distribution, improve operation efficiency, promote innovation and fair competition. The optimization of risk distribution is mainly scored according to risk analysis in the project materials. Clearly identifying, optimizing and distributing risks is a major driver to value for money.
- Whether it can pass the VFM assessment is a risk to be borne by the government;
- 2 However, the optimized risk distribution in the VFM analysis is the initial distribution between governmental and non-governmental investments, and to some extent decides whether the PPP project in question can be continued.

2. Project identification

· Demonstration of financial capacity:

- a) The expenditures of all PPP projects in a year that are part of budget should not exceed 10% of public budgetary expenditures. Provincial-level financial departments may determine the specific percentage in line with local situations, register the number with the Ministry of Finance, and make it public.
- 1 The risk of invisible government debts arising from the overuse of PPP mode and excessive expenditure percentage should be borne by the government:
- (2) As for non-governmental investments, nevertheless, it is possible to back-calculate the upper limit of budgetary expenditures of all PPP projects in a year, so as to control the risks of government payments or feasible gap subsidy.

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

2. Project identification

· Demonstration of financial capacity:

- b) For those PPP projects that have been "demonstrated" and approved by the people's government of the same level, financial departments at various levels should put them into the PPP project catalogue, and budget their expenditure responsibilities in medium-term financial plans.
- ① If a PPP project enters budget without the demonstration of financial capacity, the risk will to be borne by the government;
- In order to ensure that the actual payments can be made in the government expenditures, non-governmental investment must confirm the project has undergone the demonstration of financial capacity.

2. Project identification

· Demonstration of financial capacity:

- c) When signing the contract for a PPP project, the financial department (or PPP Center) should review the contract to ensure that the contract contents are consistent with the demonstration of financial capacity, so as to prevent material changes in government expenditures due to adjustments in contract contents. The financial department should strictly abide by the contract terms, make payments in a timely manner, earnestly protect the credibility of local government and guarantee the effective supply of public services.
- The risk of inconsistencies between contract contents and the demonstration of financial capacity should be borne by the government;
- Non-governmental investments must confirm that the financial department has participated in reviewing the project contract.

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

3. Project preparation

- Building of management architecture: Specific coordination mechanism and project implementer
- 1 The establishment, authorization and working of specific coordination mechanism and project implementer belong to the risks to be borne by the government;
- (2) Non-governmental investments may avoid, by building the management architecture, repetitive examination and approval as well as poor coordination among departments.

3. Project preparation

- Project implementation plan: Whether it can be approved, and changes in implementation are
 risks to be borne by the government. Meanwhile, the basic framework of risk distribution in the
 implementation plan is one of the important contents.
- ① Distribute project risks between governmental and non-governmental investments in accordance with the principles of risk distribution optimization, equal risk incomes and controllable risks, and by comprehensively considering the government's risk management capability, project return mechanism and market risk management capability;
- ② In principle, the risks of project design, construction, finance, operation and maintenance are to be borne by non-governmental investments; the law-, policy- and minimum demand-related risks are to be borne by the government; and the risks of force majeure will be borne by both governmental and non-governmental investments.

The basic framework of PPP risk sharing will be further confirmed through the procurement procedure

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

4. Project procurement

- The risks of procurement procedure's legality and success will be undertaken by the government:
- 1 In accordance with project needs, prequalification files should be prepared, prequalification announcement should be released, non-governmental investments and their collaborative financial institutions to participate in the prequalification of project;
- When at least 3 non-governmental investments have passed the prequalification, the preparation of procurement documents can be continued;
- 3 A special working group for confirming and negotiating procurement results should be set up to sign and confirm negotiation memos;
- Publicity for at least 5 working days. Announcement within 2 working days after signing the project contract

5. Project implementation

- · Financing risks will be undertaken by non-governmental investment:
- Project financing will be undertaken by non-governmental investment or project company;
- The financial department) and project implementer should do a good job in supervision and management, so as to prevent the transfer of enterprise debts to the government;
- 3 For those projects that have not completed financing according to project contract, the government take corresponding measures ranging from requesting for performance security to the termination of project contract.
- 4 Creditors may request, according to direct involvement agreement or clauses, nongovernmental investment or project company to improve management.

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

5. Project implementation

- Systematic financial risks or force majeure are to be shared by governmental and non-governmental investments:
- Government, non-governmental investment or project company may revise the contract's financing clauses in accordance with the agreement of project contract.
- Risks in establishing a project company will be borne by non-governmental investment:
- 1 Project implementer and financial department (PPP Center) should supervise the non-governmental investment to establish a project company with sufficient capital in accordance with the agreement of procurement documents and project contract.

5. Project implementation

· Government payment-related risks will be borne by the government:

- The government's payment obligations, along with medium- and long-term financial plan, will be incorporated into the budget of the same-level government and be fulfilled according to regulations related to budgetary management. A government payment account should be established to strictly control the government's financial risks. The government's payment obligations should be presented in the government's combined financial report.
- · Operation and maintenance risks will be borne by non-governmental investment:
- Payments should be made in full and in a timely manner against actual performance and according to the output as stipulated in the project contract;
- ② For performance not up to agreed standards, punishment clauses or remedy measures will be implemented.

III. "Shortcut" in the Risk Management of China PPP

5. Project implementation

- · Supervision-related risks will be borne by the government:
- Supervising the fulfillment of contract obligations, monitoring the performance indicators of project output, and preparing quarterly and annual reports;
- ② Medium-term assessments will be conducted every 3-5 years, so as to timely assess the risks of identified problems and take corresponding measures;
- 3 Relevant functional departments will fulfill their administrative and supervision responsibilities, attach importance to the quality of public products and services, pricing and charging mechanism, safety production, environmental protection and the rights and interests of workers;
- The general public and project stakeholders may apply to the government's functional departments for supervision and inspection.

Project handover

- · Handover risks will be borne by non-governmental investment:
- If performance test results are not up to standards, non-governmental investment or project company should conduct restorative repairs, make updates and/or resets, or resort to handover & maintenance warranty;
- 2 For those project assets, intellectual property rights, technical and legal files that are satisfactory to performance test requirements, non-governmental investment or project company should make legal transfer or management power handover to the project implementer or other government-designated institution. Non-governmental investment or project company should provide cooperation for the smooth transition of project operation.

III. Sharing of Major Risks in Guidebook for PPP Operation (Continued)

- 7. Risk sharing is present in the entire process of PPP project implementation
- Risk sharing is present in the entire process of PPP project implementation, instead of in some phases or at some points;
- The guidebook for PPP operation, providing a basic framework of risk sharing, is of very great guiding significance.

Thank you!

No. 1 WeChat Interaction and Exchange Platform for China PPP

Smart China - PPP Club -Humanity Section Smart China - PPP Club - Justice Section Smart China - PPP Club -Courtesy Section Smart China - PPP Club -Wisdom Section Smart China - PPP Club -Integrity Section



PPP FINANCING AND RISK MANAGEMENT

International Consultation Workshop 12 June 2015 Beijing

FINAL AGENDA

	Xindadu Hotel, Huaxinggong Room, Beijing				
	Opening Session				
8:30 - 8:45	Speech by Mr. Xiaoping Jiao, Deputy Director General, China PPP				
	Centre, Ministry of Finance, PRC				
	Speech by Mr. Hamid Sharif, Country Director, East Asia				
	Department, Asian Development Bank (ADB)				
	Session 1 PPPs Financing				
Moderator: Mr.	Xia Yingzhe, Director, China PPP Centre, Ministry of Finance, PRC				
	Mr. Michael Schur, Managing Director, Castalia and former				
8:45- 9:15	Secretary of the New South Wales Treasury, Australia				
0.43-3.13	Mr. Alex Sundakov, Executive Director, Castalia				
	Topic: Funding and financing of PPPs: Principles and Practice				
9:15- 9:45	Ms. Karineh Grigorian, Office of International, Infrastructure UK				
3.13-3.43	Topic: Finance Incentives for PPPs,The UK Experience				
9:45 -10:15	Mr. Philip Kelly, International Consultant				
9.43 -10.13	Topic: Blending EU Funds and PPP 2014-2020				
10:15-10:30	Question and Answer				
10:30-10:45	Tea/coffee break				
	Mr Craig Sugden, Principal PPP Specialist, East Asia Department,				
10:45-11:15	ADB				
	Topic: Making PPPs Work				
	Mr Zheng Dawei, Financing Expert, Shanghai Pudong Development				
11:15-11:45	Bank				
	Topic: Thoughts on China's PPP Financing Route				
11:45-12:00	Question and Answer				
12:00-14:00	Lunch				
	Session 2 Risk Management for PPPs				
	Moderator: Mr Philip Kelly, International Consultant				
	Ms. Towfiqua S. Hoque, Senior Infrastructure Finance Specialist,				
14:00-14:30	PPP Group, World Bank (Singapore)				
11100 11100	Mr Michael Schur, Managing Director, Castalia and former				
14:30-15:00					
14.30-13.00					
15:00-15:10					
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11:45-12:00 12:00-14:00 14:00-14:30 14:30-15:00 15:00-15:10 15:10-15:20 15:20-16:00	Question and Answer Lunch Session 2 Risk Management for PPPs Moderator: Mr Philip Kelly, International Consultant Ms. Towfiqua S. Hoque, Senior Infrastructure Finance Specialist,				

	Xindadu Hotel,Huaxinggong Room, Beijing
16:00-16:40	Mr Xiangdong Xu, Partner, Beijing Zilue Law Firm
Topic: Risk Sharing in the Operational Guidebook for	
	Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Model
16:40-17:00	Question and Answer
17:00-17:10	Open Conference End
	Internal Discussion: Implications for the PRC
Sui	mmary: Mr Ying Qian, Director, East Asia Department, ADB
17:10-17:30	Panellists:
17.10-17.50	ranemsis.
17.10-17.50	- The Consultant Team of ADB Technical Assistance for